Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 25: The testimonies of the Greek Fathers are brought forward for free choice in moral matters
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The first of the Greek Fathers who presents himself is St. Ignatius. He, in the epistle to the Magnesians, speaks thus: “Seeing that actions themselves have their rewards, and life is proposed for obedience, but death for disobedience, and each one who has chosen either this or that is to depart into the place of that which he has chosen — let us flee death, and choose life.” And below: “If anyone is zealous for piety, he is a man of God; if he acts impiously, he is of the devil — made such not by nature, but by the choice of his own mind.” Nothing can be answered here. For St. Ignatius both speaks of moral good and evil, and affirms that men choose what they will — which is the proper act of free choice; and he teaches that he who acts impiously becomes evil through the choice of his mind. But perhaps the epistles which are carried about under Ignatius’s name are not his — for this the Lutherans are wont to object. But Eusebius receives them, book 3 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 36; St. Jerome also enumerates many, and among the rest this one to the Magnesians, and attributes it to Ignatius in the book On Ecclesiastical Writers; finally, these epistles are cited everywhere under the name of St. Ignatius by Athanasius, Theodoret, and other Fathers, nor does any solid reason occur why they should seem to be rejected.
Let the second be St. Dionysius the Areopagite. He, in the book On the Divine Names, chapter 4, part 4, near the end, after he had taught that evil is not a substance, but a certain defect, subjoins thus: “But someone will say that infirmity deserves not punishment, but pardon. If, then, it had not been permitted to resist, the objection would perhaps be right. But if the powers are supplied from the good itself — which, as the sacred oracles teach, bestows on all simply the things befitting them — there is no pardoning it, if anyone through sloth shall have wandered from the very habit of his proper goods, proceeding from God.” The same, in the book On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 2, part 3, attributes to man that name autexousion, which Calvin confesses to be proper to free choice. Nor can answer be made to this place — unless perhaps that these books are not the Areopagite Dionysius’s. But certainly it cannot be denied that the author of this book was a great man, and flourished a thousand years ago, since he is cited by St. Gregory, homily 34 on the Gospels, under the name of an ancient and venerable Father. Now if he was ancient to Gregory, since Gregory himself flourished about a thousand years ago, to us assuredly he must be most ancient. But of this author we have discoursed elsewhere.
Let the third be blessed Clement of Rome, whom we number among the Greeks because the book which is ascribed to his name was written in Greek. He, then, in book 3 of the Recognitions, brings in the Apostle Peter discoursing with Simon Magus for free choice thus: “Say how God judges each one according to truth for his acts, if he had it not in his power to do anything. If this be held, all things are shaken to pieces. In vain will be the zeal of following better things; nay, the judges too in vain preside over the laws and punish those who act ill; for they had it not in their power not to sin.” To this place the ready response is that the book is spurious — for otherwise the confession of free choice is so open that nothing can be feigned against it. But we confess that the book has been corrupted and depraved by heretics, yet that it is either Clement of Rome’s, or another’s equally learned and ancient. For Eusebius, book 3 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 38, writes that these books both are Clement’s and have been depraved by heretics; the same write Epiphanius, heresy 30, and Rufinus in the Apology for Origen; St. Jerome also mentions these books in book 2 against Rufinus. But if these books are corrupt, and are on that account counted among the apocrypha, to what end are they cited by us? Because it manifestly appears that they are not corrupt in those places where the liberty of choice is defended. For before the age of Rufinus, who turned these books into Latin, there were no heretics who attributed too much to free choice — which the Pelagians did afterwards; but there had been many heretics who denied free choice, as Simon Magus, Manichaeus, and others. And so, if in these books free choice were denied, we could suspect that that doctrine had been inserted by the Manichaeans, or other heretics of that kind; but the confession of free choice we cannot ascribe to any heretic of that time. Then, the ancient Fathers who say these books were corrupted by heretics are not silent as to the articles in which they are corrupt; for they write that they are corrupt in the articles on the divinity of the Son, and other like ones; but a corruption in the article on the liberty of choice none of the ancients ever noted. Add, last, that the things said in these books about free choice are repeated everywhere by the other Fathers; so that all the books of all the Fathers must be depraved, if these books of the Recognitions are to be reckoned depraved in this article.
Let the fourth be St. Justin Martyr. He speaks thus in the Apology to the Emperor Antoninus, page 31 in my copy: “Unless the human race can by free choice both flee base things and follow fair and good ones, it is outside the cause and fault of the things that are done in whatever way. But we teach that it is by free choice and free will that it both acts rightly and sins.” And below: “Nor would he be worthy of recompense or praise, if he did not of himself choose the good.” And in the Apology to the Senate: “There would be nothing in them worthy of praise, unless they had the faculty of turning themselves to either part.” Here indeed Calvin neither feigns, nor can feign, anything that has the appearance of a response; for the author is certain, and the words most clear. Only obstinacy resists these and the like.
Let the fifth be Athenagoras, Justin’s contemporary. He, in the Apology to the same Emperor Antoninus: “God had established in them also (the Angels, namely) a will of free choice toward either part, just as it is to be seen in men, having a free power of choosing both depravity and virtue.” What clearer? What truer?
Let the sixth be the blessed Martyr Irenaeus. He, in book 4, chapter 71, speaks thus: “That saying — How often would I have gathered thy children together, and thou wouldest not — manifested the ancient law of the liberty of man, because God made him free from the beginning.” And that Calvin may understand that Irenaeus meant to signify not only that man was created free, but also that he is now free, let the title of this chapter be read, which the same Irenaeus himself prefixed. For thus it stands: “A showing that man is free, and of his own power, to this end, that he may be able to choose good things, or the contrary.” Then let the end of the same chapter be read, where these words are had: “They who work good shall receive glory and honor, because they worked good when they could have not worked it; but they who work it not shall receive the just judgment of God, because they did not work good when they could have worked it.” And chapter 72: “If, then, it were not in us to do these things or not do them, what cause had the Apostle — and much before him the Lord himself — to give counsel to do some things, and to abstain from others?” And still Calvin resists, and strives to prove that Irenaeus does not say what he says — since in the same book he wrote that free choice pertains to the image of God; and that the image was in the first man, but extinguished through sin, is gathered from the Apostle, who says the image of God is re-formed in us. But the argument is too frigid against a most manifest truth. For that the image of God was extinguished after sin, neither Irenaeus nor Paul ever wrote; the image is re-formed in us because it had been obscured, though (as we said) not extinguished. But of this matter we have said much elsewhere.
Let the seventh be Clement of Alexandria. He, in book 1 of the Stromata, page 65, speaks thus: “Since free election and appetition first begin sins, punishments are justly inflicted.” And below: “These things being so, both to be freed from ignorance, and from evil and pleasurable election, and above all not to assent to those deceitful phantasies and appearances, is placed in our power.” See another place in book 4 On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 9.
Let the eighth be Origen. He, in the commentary on chapter 13 of Matthew, expounding the parable of the net of fishes, after he had said that by the good and bad fishes the heretics understand two natures, the one good, the other evil, subjoins thus: “Against this understanding all the Scriptures fight, declaring that there is free choice, while they both accuse those who offend and approve those who act rightly.” The same Origen teaches like things, book 3 On First Principles, chapter 1; in the preface on the epistle to the Romans; homily 12 on the book of Numbers; and elsewhere. But Calvin does not receive the testimony of Origen, because he says he slipped in many things. But that he did not err in this matter we most easily demonstrate. For the errors of Origen were most diligently noted by Epiphanius, Theophilus, Jerome, Augustine, Theodoret, Nicephorus, and others; and none of them placed among the errors of Origen that man is endowed with free choice. Again, Calvin contends that the testimonies of Origen do his cause no harm, because Origen disputes against Marcion, who so took away free choice that he said human nature was evil from its very creation. But it matters little against whom Origen discourses, provided he preach free choice in keeping the precepts of morals. Then, Origen, to show that nature is not evil from creation, proves that man is of free choice, and changes of himself from good to evil — which could not be done, if he were naturally evil. And so Origen proves two things: first, that man is free; second, that he is not evil by nature; and of these two he deduces the one from the other. Marcion denied both; Calvin only the one. Accordingly we grant to Calvin that he is not a Marcionite, but a Semi-Marcionite, and that Origen confutes Calvin not wholly, but in part. Nor will Calvin be able to say that Origen speaks of liberty from coercion, not from necessity; for liberty from mere coercion the Marcionites by no means denied.
Let the ninth be Eusebius of Caesarea. He, in book 6 On the Evangelical Preparation, chapter 5 [al. 6], speaks thus: “So through the law he showed the right way; but through the free power he brought it about that the rewards of virtue should be in the very doing, without any force — though it could also do the contrary evils. And so, if by its own motion it has despised the natural law, the fountain of vices was made of its own accord — not from elsewhere, nor by any necessity, but by free will and judgment.” And at the end of the chapter: “A blind man, assuredly, would judge rightly of these things: that they are done not by necessity, but by free choice.” And so, by the testimony of Eusebius, the Calvinists are blind — or rather worse than the blind, since they do not see what the blind could see. But perhaps someone will object that Eusebius discourses against those who posited a fatal necessity, such as the Calvinists do not posit. But the Calvinists, in the first place, posit even a necessity like the fatal; then, it matters little what moved Eusebius to defend free choice, provided he defended it truly and learnedly; finally, did not Eusebius exclude absolutely all necessity, when he said, “nor by any necessity, but by free will and judgment was it made”?
Let the tenth be the great Athanasius. He, in the oration against the Idols, not far from the beginning, speaks thus: “The soul is free, and of its own choice. For as it can incline itself to good things, so it can also turn away from good things.” And below: “Which, when it beholds its own free right and choice, perceives that it can use the bodily members toward either part — both toward the things that are, and toward the things that are not. And the things that are, I call good; the things that are not, evil.” To this testimony nothing at all can be answered; for the author is certain, grave, learned, ancient, holy, and he teaches free choice without any windings.
Let the eleventh be the great Basil, who, in the explication of Psalm 61, treating that verse, The sons of men are liars in the balances: “It will not be lawful for thee,” says he, “to say in the day of judgment, I knew not the good. Thine own balances shall be brought forth to thee, having a sufficient discernment of good and evil. For we examine the weights of bodies by the movements of the scale; but the things to be chosen in life we discern by the free judgment of the soul. And he named it a balance for this reason, that it can take an equal movement toward either part.” The same, in the oration on free choice: “For the free choice that is placed in man is placed in choosing and not choosing,” etc. Likewise, in the oration on the cause of evil: “Why,” says he, “have we not this in our very structure, that even willing, it should not be given us to sin? Because thou too dost count thy servants well-disposed, not when thou hast them bound, but when thou seest them voluntarily fulfill the things of their duty. And so also to God that is not pleasing which is coerced, but what is rightly done from virtue. And virtue comes from will, not from necessity; and the will depends on the things that are in us; and in us is free choice.” Calvin snatched at that little word “coercion,” and thence gathers that St. Basil speaks not of liberty from necessity, but from coercion alone. But without doubt he did not gather rightly. For St. Basil explained in the same place what he understood by coercion, when by the adversative particle he opposed to it that which is done from virtue; and said that what is done from virtue is that which is done from will, not from necessity; and declared that what is done from will is that which is in us, and which depends on the liberty of our choice. And so by coercion he understood the necessity determining to one. Which he manifests still more clearly in the same oration, when he says: “For, loosed from all necessity, and having received from the creator a life voluntary and placed in its own power, it was thereby created to the image of God.” Add also that in the two former places cited by us no mention is made of coercion, but of necessity alone, and in express words liberty is asserted in the election of good and evil, having an equal movement toward either part.
Let the twelfth be St. Gregory of Nyssa, the great Basil’s brother. He, in book 7 of the Philosophy, chapter 2: “To covet and not covet, to lie and not lie, and whatever things are such — in which consist the works of virtue and of vice — these are in our free choice.” I know not what Calvin could devise here; for Gregory has left no place for cavils. See also what we cited in the preceding book.
Let the thirteenth be St. Gregory Nazianzen, who in the verses on the suffering Christ: “For God will not bring necessity that thou be good; but in thy election and judgment that is placed.” See another place cited by us in the preceding book, from the Apologetic.
Let the fourteenth be Cyril of Jerusalem, who in Catechesis 4: “Know that the soul is of its own right, or free of will.” Likewise below: “The soul has free choice; and the Devil can indeed incite, but compel against the will he altogether cannot. He suggests to thee thoughts of fornication: if thou wilt, thou approvest; if thou wilt not, thou rejectest. For if thou didst fornicate from necessity, for what cause had God prepared gehenna?” Nothing could be said more openly.
Let the fifteenth be St. Epiphanius, who in the heresy of the Pharisees, which is the sixteenth in order: “By this — that anyone can sin, and sins not; and by this — that he could not sin, and yet sins; the one paying punishment by vengeance for his sins, the other carrying off praise for his good deeds — the difference of the two is established.” And below: “And so it is manifest, evident, and undoubted that free choice has been granted to each one by God, who by his own mouth said ‘if you will’ and ‘if you will not,’ so that it lies with man to do well or to work wickedly.” You see how this holy Father cries out as manifest, evident, and undoubted what Calvin has striven with so many books to obscure?
Let the sixteenth be Theophilus of Alexandria. For he, in the third Paschal epistle, speaks thus: “Nor is it doubted that we have a free faculty toward either part, of doing or not doing good things; and that, depraved things being crushed, right things are born; and then the chorus of the virtues sings together in harmony, when there shall be in the soul a solitude of vices.” What will the adversaries object here? The author is illustrious — one who deserved to have St. Jerome for his translator — and the sentence so clear that it can by no means be obscured.
Let the seventeenth be St. John Chrysostom, who in homily 23 [al. 19] on Genesis: “Is it not manifest that each one by his own will chooses either malice or virtue? For unless it were so, and depravity were implanted in our nature, neither ought the former to be punished, nor the latter to receive the recompenses of the virtues. But because, after the grace of God, the whole is left in our will, therefore both punishments are set before sinners, and recompenses before those who work well.” This Father Calvin willingly concedes to us, because he seemed to him excessive in preaching the powers of free choice. But he openly betrays his unskillfulness, when out of so great a number of Fathers he rejects Chrysostom alone, as introducing something new. For had he read the rest, he would never have so judged. For what does Chrysostom say which before him Ignatius, Clement, Justin, Athenagoras, Irenaeus, Basil, Cyril, Epiphanius, and after him very many, have not said? Then, if Chrysostom so gravely exceeded in preaching free choice, why did none of the ancients reprehend him? Why does St. Augustine, the most excellent preacher of the grace of Christ, in the books against Julian not only not reprehend this very Chrysostom, but even vehemently praise him?
Let the eighteenth be blessed Macarius the Egyptian, who in homily 15 [al. 13] speaks thus: “But that the election and liberty of choice which God gave to man at the first may once and altogether resound and remain, therefore affairs are administered by his dispensation, and the dissolution of bodies comes to pass, so that it may lie in the will of man to be turned to good or to evil.”
Let the nineteenth be Mark the Hermit, who in the book on baptism, past the middle, speaks thus: “Since Scripture knows that these and like things are placed in our power — whether we do them or not — therefore it chides not Satan, nor the sin of Adam, but us.” And below, comparing us with Adam: “We have our first conception from the dispensation, even as he; and just like him we can, at our choice, obey or not obey.” The sense of these words is that we are tempted by the permission of God, as by the same permission Adam, being tempted, fell; and that as he, on account of the liberty of choice, could acquiesce in the tempter or resist, so we too, on account of the same liberty of choice, can admit the temptation or repel it. Which, had Calvin read, he would perhaps have judged otherwise of Chrysostom.
Let the twentieth be St. Cyril of Alexandria, who in book 2 on John, chapter 44 [al. 54], speaks thus: “He shows by these words the free choice of man, who can proceed to either part according to the judgment of his own mind. For so we justly find praise, if we act well, and the contrary, if we commit evil.” See the other places we cited in the preceding book.
Let the twenty-first be Theodoret, who, treating Psalm 67, and explaining that verse, Thou shalt set aside a free rain, etc., speaks thus: “He calls the watering of doctrine a rain; and he called it voluntary, on account of free choice. For no one is watered from necessity; but he who acquiesces in the doctrine attains grace.”
Let the twenty-second be Palladius, in the epistle to Lausus, which he prefixed to his history of the life of the Saints; for in it, speaking of alms: “Nor shouldst thou, on any pretext of pleasing men, have bound by an oath thy free will of choosing,” etc.
Let the twenty-third be blessed John Damascene. For he, in book 2 On the Faith, chapter 26: “In us are those things of which we have received the free power both to do and not to do.” And below, explaining what those things are: “Those things,” says he, “upon which follow praise or censure, and in which transgression, and law, have place.”
Let the twenty-fourth be Theophylact, who in the commentary on chapter 13 [al. 14] of Luke speaks thus: “And so he who gave all these things equally permitted men to enter freely. For he compels no one unwilling. For if he had willed us to be compelled, he would not have made us rational, and of free choice.” Nor indeed does this author understand by compulsion that force which drives the unwilling, but the necessity determining to one, as is clear from the reason he renders, when he says, “he would not have made us rational, and of free choice.” For the beasts too, though they are not rational, are not compelled unwilling toward their objects, but run to them of their own accord; and the name of free choice, which this author uses, cannot properly befit liberty from coercion alone, as we demonstrated in the third book.
Let the twenty-fifth be Euthymius, who in the commentary on the same chapter 15 of Luke thus expounds the parable of the prodigal son: “He asked for the part of the substance which fell to him — that is, free choice, which was owed him from nature; as if he should say: I would not have the necessity of serving press me, for choice is free to me.” And below: “The father, therefore, candidly imparts it; for the Lord wills that we serve him voluntarily.” And it is here briefly to be noted that, according to the opinion of these Fathers, free choice is compared to the substance which the prodigal son dissipated, since sinners dissipate free choice while they use it ill — not that they altogether lose it, but that they exercise it uselessly; in the way someone is said to lose his life who does not spend it in good works. For similitudes do not hold in all points. Finally, the Fathers gather from the parable only this: that God permits those who will to sin, and does not compel them from necessity to act well.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXV. Testimonia Grxcorum Patrum ad feruntur pro libero arbitrio in moralibus. Primus ex Gra)cis Patribus occurrit S. Ignatius. Is in epist. ad Magnesianos ita lo¬ quitur : « Quandoquidem, inquit, actiones ipsa) sua habent praemia, et obedientiae pro¬ ponitur vita, mors autem inobedientiae, et singuli, qui aut hoc, aut illud elegerunt, in ejus quod elegerunt, locum abituri sunt, fu¬ giamus mortem, et eligamus vitam ». Et in¬ fra : « Si quis pietati studet, Dei homo est, si impie agit, diaboli est, non id factus per naturam, sed per animi arbitrium ». Nihil hic responderi potest. Nam et loquitur S. Ignatius de bono et malo morali, et affirmat, homines eligere id, quod volunt, qui est pro¬ prius actus liberi arbitrii ; et eum. qui impie agit, per animi arbitrium fieri malum, docet. At fortasse non sunt Ignatii epistola), qua) sub illius nomine circumferuntur, id enim Luthcrani objicere solent: Sed recipit easEu- sebius lib. ni. Historia) Ecclesiast. cap 36. Sanctus etiam H ieronymus multas enumerat} et inter ca)teras, istam ad Magnesianos, et Ignatio tribuit in libro de scriptoribus Eccle¬ siastici. Denique passim citantur epistolae is¬ ta) nomine S. Ignatii ab Athanasio, Theodo- reto, aliisque Patribus, neque ulla occurrit solida ratio, cur rejicienda) videantur. Secundus sit S. Dionysius Areopagita. Is ih libro de divinis nominibus, cap. 4. parf. 4. prope finem, posteaquam docuerat, malum non esse substantiam, sed defectum quem¬ dam, ita subjungit : « Dixerit vero quispiam infirmitatem supplicium non mereri, sed ve¬ niam. Si igitur non licuisset obsistere, recte forsan esset objectum. Sin autem ex ipso bc- no vires suppeditantur, quod, ut sacra eloquia docent, omnibus simpliciter convenientia tri¬ buit, non est ignoscendum, si quis per igna¬ viam ab ipso bonorum propriorum habitu di¬ vinitus procedente aberraverit » . Idem lib. de Ecclesiastica hierarchia cap. 2, part. 3, tribuit homini nomen illud auT£?ov(nov, quod fatetur Calvinus proprium esse liberi arbitrii. Neque ad hunc locum responderi potest, nisi forte libros istos, non esse Dionysii Areo¬ pagita). Sed certe negari non potest, aucto¬ rem hujus libri fuisse virum magnum, et ante mille annos floruisse, cum citetur a S. Grc- 86 LIBER V. gorio homil. 34. in Evangelia, nomine anti¬ qui, et venerandi Patris. Nane si Gregorio antiquus tuit, cum ipse Gregorius ante annos circiter mille floruerit, nobis profecto anti¬ quissimus esse debebit. Sed de hoc auctore alias disseruimus. Tertius sit B. Clemens Romanus, 'quem in¬ ter Graecos numeramus, quod Graece scri¬ ptus sit liber, qui nomini ejus adseribitur. Is igitur in lib. m. Recognition. inducit Apo¬ stolum Petrum cum Simone Mago, pro libero arbitrio, sic disserentem : « Dic quomodo Deus judicat secundum veritatem unum¬ quemque pro actibus suis, si agere aliquid in potestate non habuit? Hoc si teneatur, convulsa sunt omnia. Frustra erit studium sectandi meliora. Sed et judices frustra le¬ gibus praesunt et puniunt eos, qui male agunt. Non enim in sua potestate habuerunt, ut non peccarent » . Ad hunc locum prompta responsio est , librum esse supposititium. Nam alioqui li¬ beri arbitrii tam est aperta confessio, ut ni¬ hil contra fingi possit. At nos fatemur, librum esse corruptum, ac depravatum ab haereticis, sed tamen vel esse Clementis Romani, vel alterius aeque docti, atque antiqui. Siquidem Eusebius lib. m. Histor. Ecclesiast. cap. 38. scribit, bos libros et esse Clementis, et ab haereticis depravatos. Idem scribunt Epipha- nius haeres. 30. Et Ruffinus in Apologia pro Origene. Meminit etiam horum librorum S. Hieronymus, in lib. ii. adversus Ruffi- num. At si corrupti sunt hi libri, ac propterea inter apocryphos recensentur, quorsum ci¬ tantur a nobis ? quoniam manifeste constat, non esse corruptos iis in locis, ubi defen¬ ditur libertas arbitrii. Nam ante Rufflni aeta¬ tem, qui hos libros latinos fecit, nulli fue¬ runt haeretici, qui libero arbitrio nimis mul¬ tum tribuerent, quod postea fecerunt, Pela- giani ; multi autem haeretici fuerant qui ne¬ gaverant liberum arbitrium, ut Simon Ma¬ gus, Manichaeus et alii. Itaque si in his libris negaretur liberum arbitrium, suspicari pos¬ semus, insertam fuisse eam doctrinam a Manichaeis, vel aliis ejusmodi haereticis; at liberi arbitrii confessionem non possumus ulli haeretico illius temporis adseribere. Deinde, veteres Patres, qui dicunt, hos libros corruptos esse ab haereticis, non tacent in quibus articulis corrupti sint. Scribunt enim in articulis de divinitate filii, aliisque similibus esse corruptos. Corruptelam autem in articulo de libertate arbitrii, nullus vete¬ rum unquam notavit. Adde postremo, quod quae dicuntur in his libris de libero arbitrio, eadem repetuntur passim ab tiliis Patribus, ut necesse sit, om¬ nes omnium Patrum libros esse depravatos, si libri isti recognitionum in hoc articulo de¬ pravati censendi sunt. Quartus sit S. Justinus Martyr. Is ita lo¬ quitur in Apologia ad Imperatorem Antoni¬ num pag. 31. in meo codice : « Nisi libero arbitrio genus humanum, et res turpes fu¬ gere potest, et pulchras, ac bonas sequi, ex¬ tra causam, culpamque est eorum, qua; quoquo modo aguntur. Sed ipsum libero ar¬ bitrio liberaque voluntate et recte facere, et peccare docemus ». Et infra : « Neque ille renumeratione, aut laude dignus esset, si per se ipsum bonum non eligeret». Et in Apologia ad Senatum : « Nihil, inquit, esset in illis laude dignum, nisi facultatem habe¬ rent, qua se in utramque partem converte¬ rent » . Hic vero Calvinus neque fingit, neque fingere potest aliquid, quod speciem habeat responsionis . Auctor enim certus est , et verba clarissima. Sola pertinacia his, atque similibus resistit. Quintus sit Athenagoras Justini aequalis. Is in Apologia ad eumdem Imperatorem An¬ toninum : « Liberi arbitrii, inquit, in ipsis quoque (Angelis videlicet) in utramque par¬ tem, voluntatem constituerat Deus, sicut et in hominibus liberam et pravitatis, et vir¬ tutis deligendae potestatem habentibus cer¬ nere est ». Quid clarius? quid verius? Sextus sit B. Martyr Irenaeus. Is in lib. iv. cap. 71. ita loquitur : « Illud quod ait, Quo¬ ties volui congregare filios tuos, et noluisti, veterem legem libertatis hominis manife¬ stavit, quia liberum eum fecit Deus ab ini¬ tio » . Ac ut intelligat Calvinus, Irenseum non solum significare voluisse, creatum homi¬ nem liberum, sed etiam nunc esse liberum, legatur titulus hujus capitis, quem ipse idem Irenaeus praefixit. Sic enim habet : « Osten¬ sio, quod homo liber sit, et suae potestatis, ad hoc ut possit eligere bona, vel contraria ». Legatur deinde finis ejusdem capitis, ubi haec habentur : « Qui operantur bonum, gloriam et honorem percipient, quoniam operati sunt bonum, cum possent non ope¬ rari illud. Hi autem qui illud non operantur, judicium justum recipient Dei, quoniam non sunt operati bonum cum possent operari illud ». Et cap. 72 : « Si igitur, inquit, non CAPUT XXV. 87 in nobis esset facere haec, aut non facere, quam causam habebat Apostolus, et multo prius ipse Dominus consilium dare, quae qui¬ dem facere, a quibus vero abstinere?» Et adhuc resistit Calvinus, ac probare ni¬ titur, Irenseum non dicere id, quod dicit, quoniam in eodem libro scripsit, liberum arbitrium ad imaginem Dei pertinere : ima¬ ginem autem fuisse in primo homine, sed per peccatum extinctam, colligi ex Apostolo, qui reformari dicit in nobis imaginem Dei. At nimis fridigum est argumentum contra manifestissimam veritatem. Nam imaginem Dei extinctam esse post peccatum, neque Irenaeus, neque Paulus un¬ quam scripsit. Reformatur vero in nobis imago, quoniam obscurata fuerat, licet (ut diximus) non extincta. Sed de hac re alibi multa diximus. Septimus sit Clemens Alexandrinus. Is in i.,lib. Stromat. pag. 65. sic ait : « Quoniam libera electio et appetitio, peccata primum inchoat, jure infliguntnr supplicia ». Et in¬ fra : « Quae cum ita sint, et liberari ab igno¬ ratione, et a mala, et delectabili electione, et ante omnia non assentiri fallacibus illis phantasiis et visis, situm est in nostra potes¬ tate ». Vide alium locum, in 4. lib. de Gratia et libero arbitrio cap. 9. Octavus sit Origenes. Is in comment. ad cap. 13. Matth. exponens parabolam sagenae piscium, posteaquam dixerat, ab haereticis accipi per bonos et malos pisces, duas natu¬ ras, alteram bonam, alteram malam, ita subjungit : « Huic intellectui repugnant om¬ nes Scripturae, declarantes esse liberum ar¬ bitrium , dum et accusant eos , qui delin¬ quunt et probant cos, qui recte faciunt ». Idem Origenes similia docet, lib 3. de prin¬ cipiis cap. I. praefat. in epist. ad Roman. hom. 12. in librum Numeri, et alibi. Sed Calvinus Origenis testimonium non recipit, quod dicat eum in multis lapsum esse. At nos eum in hac re non erravisse, facillime demonstramus. Nam Origenes er¬ rores diligentissime notaverunt Epiphanius, Theophilus, Hieronymus, Augustinus, Theo- doretus, Nicephorus et alii, neque ullus eo¬ rum inter errores Origenis posuit, hominem praeditum esse libero arbitrio. Rursus Calvinus Origenis testimonia causae suae nihil nocere contendit, quod Origenes disputet adversus Marcionem, qui liberum arbitrium ita tollebat, ut naturam humanam ab ipsa creatione malam esse diceret. At pa¬ ram interest, contra quos Origenes disserat, modo liberum arbitrium in praeceptis mo¬ rum servandis praedicet. Deinde Origenes, ut ostendat, naturam non esse malam a creatione, probat, homi¬ nem esse liberi arbitrii, et mutari per se de bono in malum, quod fleri non posset, si esset naturaliter malus. Itaque duo probat Origenes. Primo, hominem esse liberum. Se¬ cundo, non esse natura malum, ex quibus duobus unum deducit ab altero. Marcion negabat utrumque, Calvinus alterum tan¬ tum ; proinde damus Calvino , ut non sit Marcionista, sed Semimarcionista, et Ori¬ genes Calvinum non ex' toto, sed ex parte confutet. Neque dicere poterit Calvinus, Ori- genem loqui de libertate a coactione, non a necessitate, nam libertatem a sola coactione Marcionistae minime denegabant. Nonus sit Eusebius Caesariensis. Is in lib. vi. de praeparat. Evangel. cap. 5. ita loqui¬ tur. « Sic per legem rectam viam ostendit, per liberam vero potestatem effecit, ut in ipsa essent virtutis praemia, sine vi aliqua agere, cum possit etiam contraria mala. Ita si proprio motu naturalem despexeritlegem, fons vitiorum sponte, non aliunde, neque ulla necessitate, sed libera voluntate, atque judicio facta est ». Et in extremo capite ; « Caecus profecto de his recte judicaret, non necessitate, sed libero haec fieri arbitrio » . Itaque testimonio Eusebii caeci sunt Calvi¬ nistae, vel potius caecis deteriores. Cum id non videant, quod caeci videre possent. Sed forsan objiciat aliquis, Eusebium con¬ tra eos disserere, qui ponebant fatalem ne¬ cessitatem, qualem Calvinistae non ponunt. At Calvinistae in primis ponunt, etiam ne¬ cessitatem similem fatali; deinde, parum refert quid moverit Eusebium, ut liberum arbitrium defenderet, modo illud vere doc- teque defenderit. Denique, nonne Eusebius omnem prorsus necessitatem exclusit, cum ait : a Neque ulla necessitate, sed libera vo¬ luntate atque judicio facta est » ? Decimus sit Magnus Athanasius. Is in ora¬ tione contra Idola, non procul ab initio, sic ait : << Anima libera est, et sui arbitrii. Po¬ test enim ut ad bona se inclinare, ita bona quoque aversari » . Et infra : « Quae cum liberum sui jus, arbitriumque intuetur, sen¬ tit se in utramque partem corporeis mem¬ bris uti posse, tum ad ea quae sunt, tum ad ea quae non sunt. Ea vero quae sunt, bona appello, ea quae non sunt, mala ». Ad hoc 88 LIBER V. testimonium nihil omnino responderi potest. Auctor enim est certus, gravis, doctus, an¬ tiquus, sanctus, et sine ullis ambagibus libe¬ rum arbitrium docet. Undecimus sit Magnus Basilius, qui in ex¬ plicat. Psal. lxi. tractans illud : « Mendaces filii hominum in stateris », « Non licebit (in¬ quit) tibi dicere in die judicii, non noveram bonum. Proferentur tibi propriae tuse statera, sufficientem boni et mali discretionem ha¬ bentes. Nam corporis pondera librae momen¬ tis examinamus, quae vero in vita eligenda sunt , libero animae judicio discernimus . Quod etiam stateram nominavit, propterea quod aequale momentum ad utramque par¬ tem capere potest». Idem in oratione de libero arbitrio : « Nam, inquit, quod in ho¬ mine situm est liberum arbitrium, in eligen¬ do et non eligendo situm est ete ». Item, in oratione de causa mali. « Cur, inquit, in structura non habemus, ut neque volentibus nobis peccare detur ? quia etiam tu famulos, non cum vinctos habes, benevolos putas, sed cum voluntarie ea, quae officii ipsorum sunt, explere videris. Itaque etiam Deo non gra¬ tum est, quod coactum est, sed quod ex vir¬ tute recte geritur. Virtus autem ex voluntate, non ex necessitate fit. Voluntas vero ex his, quae in nobis sunt, dependet. In nobis autem est liberum arbitrium. ;> Arripuit Calvinus voculam illam « coactio¬ nem » et inde colligit, non loqui S. Basilium de libertate a necessitate, sed a sola coac¬ tione. At sine dubio non recte collegit. Nam explicavit in eodem loco sanctus Basilius, quid per coactionem intellexerit, cum illi per adversativam particulam opposuerit id, quod geritur ex virtute. Et quod geritur ex virtute, esse dixerit id, quod ex voluntate, non ex necessitate fit. Et quod fit ex volun¬ tate, declaraverit esse id, quod in nobis est, quodque ex arbitrii nostri libertate de¬ pendet. Itaque per coactionem, necessitatem intel¬ lexit determinantem ad unum. Quod etiam clarius manifestat in eadem oratione, cum dicit : « Soluta enim ab omni necessitate, et voluntariam, ac in sua potestate sitam vitam a conditore adepta, per hoc ad imaginem Dei creata est » . Adde etiam, quod in duo¬ bus prioribus locis a nobis citatis, nulla fit coactionis mentio, sed solius necessitatis, et disertis verbis asseritur libertas in electione boni et mali , par momentum habens in utramque partem. Duodecimus sit S. Orcgorius Nyssenus, Magni Basilii frater. Is in lib. vn. de Philo¬ sophia, cap. 2. « Concupiscere (inquit) et non concupiscere, mentiri, et non mentiri, et queeeumque talia, in quibus consistunt vir¬ tutis, et vitii opera, hscc sunt in nostro libero arbitrio ». Nescio quid hic Calvinus commi¬ nisci possit. Nullum enim cavillis locum Gre- gorius reliquit. Vide etiam qua; citavimus libro superiore. Tertius decimus sit sanctus Gregorius Na- zianzenus, qui in carminibus de Christo pa¬ tiente : « Neque enim (inquit) Deus neces¬ sitatem adducet, ut sis bonus, sed in ele¬ ctione, et sententia tua id situm est ». Vide alium locum a nobis citatum libro superiore, ex Apologetico. Quartusdecimus sit Cyrillus Hierosolymi¬ tanus, qui Catechesi 4. e Cognosce (inquit) animam esse sui juris, seu voluntatis libera » . Item infra : « Liberum arbitrium habet ani¬ ma, etpotest quidem Diabolus incitare, coge¬ re autem prater voluntatem omnino non po¬ test. Subjicit tibi scortationis cogitationes, si vis, probas, si nolis, improbas. Si enim ex ne¬ cessitate scortareris, cujus gratia gehennam Deus parasset»? Nihil apertius dici potuit. Quintus decimus sit S. Epiphanius, qui in Iraresi Phariseorum, quae est ordine deci¬ ma sexta. « Per id (inquit) quod peccare quisquam possit, 'et non peccet, et per id, quod possit non peccare, peccet tamen, hoc propter peccata poenam per vindictam pen¬ dente, illo propter bene facta laudem repor¬ tante, utriusquo constituta est differentia». Et infra : « Itaque (inquit) manifestum, evi¬ dens et indubium est, unicuique liberum arbitrium concessum a Deo, qui perseipsum dixerit, si volueritis, et si nolueritis, ut penes hominem sit bene facere , vel prave ope¬ rari». Vides, ut sanctus his Pater manife¬ stum, evidens et indubiumessc clamet, quod Calvinus tot libris obscurare conatus est? Sextus decimus sit Thcophilus Alexandri¬ nus. Is enim in epist. 3. Paschali, sic loqui¬ tur : « Nec ambigitur quin in utramque par¬ tem faciendi, vel non faciendi bona, habea¬ mus liberam facultatem, et oppressis pravis recta nascantur, tuneque virtutum inter se concinit chorus, cum vitiorum in animo fue¬ rit solitudo ». Quid hic objicient adversarii? Auctor insignis est, quippe qui S. Hierony¬ mum meruit habere interpretem, et sententia tam perspicua, ut nulla ratione obscurari queat. CAPUT XXV. 89 Septimus decimus S. Joannes Chrysosto- mus sit, qui homil. 23. in Genesim : « Nonne, inquit, manifestum est, sua quemvis volun¬ tate, vel malitiam, vel virtutem eligere? Nam nisi ita esset, et natura nostra pravitas in¬ sita esset, neque illos puniri, neque istos vir¬ tutum retributiones accipere oportebat. Ve¬ rum quia in nostra voluntate totum post gratiam Dei relictum est, ideo et peccantibus supplicia proposita sunt, et bene operanti¬ bus retributiones ». Hunc patrem nobis Cal¬ vinus libenter concedit, quod ei nimius visus sit in liberi arbitrii viribus pradicandis. At imperitiam suam aperte prodit, cum e tanto numero patrum unum Chrysostomum, quasi novi aliquid introducentem rejicit. Nam si legisset ceteros, numquam ita judicasset. Quid enim Chrysostomus dicit, quod non ante illum Ignatius, Clemens, Justinus, Athe¬ nagoras, Irenseus, Basilius , Cyrillus, Epi- phanius , et post eum plurimi dixerint? Deinde, si tam graviter Chrysostomus in li¬ bero arbitrio pradicando excessit, cur nulli veterum illum reprehenderunt? cur S. Au¬ gustinus gratia; Christi excellentissimus pra- dicator, hunc ipsum Chrysostomum in libris adversus Julianum, non modo non repre¬ hendit, sed vehementer etiam laudat? Decimus octavus sit beatus Macharius Aegy¬ ptius, qui homil. 13. sic ait : « Ca;terum ut semel, ct omnino resonet, et permaneat de¬ lectus, et arbitrii libertas, quam primitus homini dedit Deus, eapropter dispensatione sua res administrantur, et corporum solutio fit, ut in voluntate hominis situm sit, ad bo¬ num vel malum converti » . Decimus nonus sit Marcus Eremita, qui in libro de baptismo, ultra medium, ita loqui¬ tur : « Ha;c ct similia cum sciat Scriptura in nostra potestate positum esse, ut haec aga¬ mus nec ne, propterea non Satanam, neque peccatum Adae, sed nos increpat » . Et infra comparans nos cum Adamo : « Primam, in¬ quit, conceptionem habemus ex dispensatio¬ ne, quemadmodum et ille, et perinde ac ille pro arbitrio possumus obtemperare, vel non obtemperare » . Sententia horum verborum est, nos tentari ex permissione Dei, sicut ea¬ dem permissione tentatus ruit Adam, et sicut ille propter arbitrii libertatem potuit tenta- tori acquiescere,’ vel resistere, sic etiam nos propter eamdem arbitrii libertatem posse tentationem admittere, vel repellere, qua; si Calvinus legisset, forsitan de Chrysostomo aliter judicasset. Tom. VI. Vigesimus sit sanctus Cyrillus Alexandri- nus, qui in lib. ii. in Joannem, cap. 44. sic ait : « Liberum, inquit, arbitrium hominis his verbis ostendit, qui ad alterutrum secun¬ dum animi sui judicium potest proficisci. Sic enim juste laudem, si bene agimus, ct con¬ traria, si mala committimus, invenimus. » Vide alia loca, qua; citavimus in libro supe¬ riore. Vigesimus primus sit Tbeodoretus, qui Psalm. xlvii. tractans, et explicans illud : « Pluviam voluntariam segregabis, ctc. » , sic ait: «Pluviam, doctrinae irrigationem vocat, voluntariam autem appellavit, ob liberum arbitrium. Non enim ex necessitate irrigatur aliquis, sed doctrina; acquiescens consequitur gratiam » . Vigesimus secundus sit Palladius, in epi¬ stola ad Lausum, quam prafixit historiae sua; de Sanctorum vita, in ea siquidem loquens de eleemosynis : « Neque, inquit, ullo pra- textu, quo placeres hominibus, jurejurando obligasses tuam liberam eligendi voluntatem, ete i) . Vigesimus tertius sit beatus Joannes Da¬ mascenus. Is enim in lib. ii. de fide, cap. 26 : « In nobis, inquit, sunt ea, quorum li¬ beram adepti potestatem sumus et facere, et non facere. » Et infra explicans qua; illa sint : « Ea, inquit, qurn sequitur laus aut vituperatio, et in quibus pravaricatio cadit et lex » . Vigesimus quartus sit Theopbylactus, qui in commentario ad cap. 13. Luca;, sic ait : « Itaque ille qui dedit omnia ha;c ex a;quo, permisit libere ingredi. Nullum enim cogit non volentem. Nam si voluisset nos cogi, non fecisset rationales, et liberi arbitrii». Neque vero hic auctor intelligit per coactio¬ nem vim illam, qua; adigit invitos, sed ne¬ cessitatem determinantem ad unum, ut per¬ spicuum est ex ratione, quam reddit, cum dicit : « Non fecisset rationales, et liberi ar¬ bitrii. » Nam bestia; quoque, tametsi ratio¬ nales non sunt, non coguntur invita; ad sua objecta, sed sponte accurrunt. Et nomen li¬ beri arbitrii, quod iste auctor usurpat, non potest proprie convenire libertati a sola coa¬ ctione, ut in tertio libro demonstravimus. Vigesimus quintus sit Euthymius, qui in comment. ad idem cap. xv. Luca;, ita edis¬ serit' parabolam filii prodigi : «Substantia;, inquit, partem, qua; sibi obveniebat, petivit, hoc est, liberum arbitrium, quod ei ex natu¬ ra debebatur. Ac si diceret, nolo urgeat me 7 90 LIBER V. serviendi necessitas, liberum est enim mihi arbitrium. » Et infra : « Pater ergo candide impertit, vult enim Dominus, ut sibi volun¬ tarie serviamus » . Est autem hoc loco breviter annotandum, ex sententia horum Patrum, liberum arbi- trium comparari substantia;, quam filius pro¬ digus dissipavit, quoniam peccatores dissi¬ pant liberum arbitrium, dum illo male utun¬ tur, non quod illud omnino amittant, sed quod inutiliter exerceant. Quomodo dicitur aliquis perdere vitam suam, quam non in bonis operibus insumit. Non enim similitudi- dines in omnibus valent. Denique id solum ex parabola colligunt Patres, Deum permit¬ tere, ut qui volunt, peccent, neque eos ad bene agendum ex necessitate compellere.