Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 26: The testimonies of the Latin Fathers for free choice in moral matters
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The first of the Latins is Tertullian. He, in book 2 against Marcion, speaks thus: “I find man instituted free, and of his own choice, and of his own power.” But lest Calvin say (as is his wont) that Tertullian speaks of the first institution, which afterwards was changed through sin, hear what follows: “This state of his even the law then set by God confirmed. For a law would not be set for him who had not the obedience owed to the law in his own power; nor again would the threat of death be ascribed to transgression, unless the contempt of the law also were counted to man in the liberty of his choice. So also in the later laws of the Creator you may find him setting before man good and evil, life and death.” And below, not far from the end: “God questions, as if uncertain, that even hence he may prove man to be of free choice, in the matter of confession or denial, that he might give him place for spontaneously confessing his fault, and by that title being relieved; as he inquires of Cain where his brother is, that he might have the power, from the same liberty of choice, of spontaneously denying his fault, and by that title being burdened.” And in the book On the Exhortation of Chastity, not far from the beginning: “And so, since we have learned from his precepts both — what he wills and what he wills not — we have now the will of choosing the one, as it is written: Behold, I have set before thee good and evil.” But Tertullian does not deserve a place among the witnesses of Catholic dogmas, since he erred in many and great matters — for that is the only thing Calvin can answer. But the response is easy. For if he alone said these things, we should give him no credit, as one who founded his own sect; but what he says with all the Greek and Latin Fathers avails not a little for the testimony of the faith which flourished in the Church in those ancient times. And that Tertullian did not err in this matter, and that the dogma of the liberty of choice was not proper to his sect, is certain from this: that neither Eusebius in the history, nor Augustine in the book On Heresies, nor any other author enumerates this opinion among the other errors of Tertullian.
Let the second be the blessed Martyr Cyprian. He, in book 1, epistle 3 to Cornelius: “The Lord did not chide those who withdrew, nor gravely threaten them, but rather, turned to his Apostles, said: Will you also go away? — keeping, namely, the law by which man, left to his own liberty and set in his own choice, desires for himself either death or salvation.” And in the book On the Unity of the Church: “These things indeed the Lord permits and suffers to be done, the choice of one’s own liberty remaining.” Where it is to be noted that these words cannot be twisted to liberty from coercion, which alone Calvin has left us. For even if God hindered all sins, liberty from coercion would still remain, as it remains in beasts, which cannot sin; but liberty from necessity, and the true power of choosing good and evil, would be plainly taken away, unless God permitted sins. And this is what Cyprian says: that God suffers sins to be done, the choice of one’s own liberty remaining.
Let the third be Minucius Felix. He, in the Octavius, past the middle of the book, thus addresses the gentiles: “In fine, the prison seethes with your number; no Christian is there, unless either accused for his religion, or a deserter of it. Nor let anyone catch at consolation from fate, or excuse himself thereby: though the event be of the lot of fortune, yet the mind is free; and therefore the act of a man, not his rank, is judged.” Nor indeed does he speak of liberty from coercion alone; for that is not repugnant to fate, to which nevertheless liberty from necessity is repugnant. For what is done by fate can be done of one’s own accord; but what is done by fate cannot not be done necessarily.
Let the fourth be Lactantius. He, in book 4 of the Divine Institutes, chapter 24: “He who gives precepts ought to cut off the ways of all excuses, that he may lay on men the necessity of obeying — not by any force, but by shame — and yet leave liberty, so that both a reward may be established for those who obey, because they could have not obeyed, had they willed; and a punishment for those who obey not, because they could have obeyed, had they willed. How then can the excuse be cut off, except that he who teaches do the things he teaches, and be as it were a forerunner, and stretch out his hand to him who is to follow?”
Let the fifth be Julius Firmicus. He, in the book on the errors of the profane religions, which he wrote to the sons of Constantine, speaks thus, chapter 29: “God has made thee free; it is in thy hand either to live or to perish; why dost thou hurl thyself down the steeps?”
Let the sixth be St. Hilary. He, in the commentary on the second Psalm, speaks thus: “To each one of us he has permitted the liberty and judgment of life, not fastening necessity toward either part.” And below, rendering the reason: “For what of honor and reward would the necessity of goodness deserve, when a certain force woven into us would not let us be evil?” This eminent Father Calvin gives us of his own accord; nor does he understand how great a damage he does his cause when he professes himself contrary to him whom not only Jerome and Augustine, but also the whole first Synod of Ephesus, and the Councils thereafter, wonderfully honored.
Let the seventh be Optatus of Milevis, who speaks thus at the beginning of the seventh book against Parmenian: “Whatever necessity sins cannot be accused with great force. The will has punishment, necessity pardon. The homicide can commit the crime, and can also not commit it; the adulterer can admit the adultery, and can also not admit it — and the other things of this kind, in which free choice is had.”
Let the eighth be St. Ambrose. He, in book 1 On Jacob, chapter 3: “There is no reason for us to ascribe our fault to anyone but our own will. No one is held to fault unless he have swerved by his own will. Christ chooses for himself a voluntary soldier; the devil buys at auction for himself a voluntary slave.” To this testimony Calvin answers that it is to be understood of the voluntary which is opposed to the coerced and unwilling, not of that which is opposed to the determined-to-one. But he is deceived. For, in the first place, the voluntary which is opposed only to the coerced does not suffice for sinning; otherwise the wolf too would sin, when of its own accord it seizes and kills another’s sheep. Then, those words — “unless he have swerved by his own will” — signify not merely to swerve of one’s own accord and freely, which can befit even a beast (which yet is not said to swerve by its own will, even when it errs willingly), but signify to sin from deliberate counsel and election. But what will Calvin answer to what the same Ambrose writes in book 2 On Cain, chapter 7 — “Thou hast nothing wherein to accuse necessity rather than thine own mind”; and to what the same author has in the exposition of the fortieth Psalm — “To man he gave the choice of electing what he should follow: before man are life and death; if thou offend, nature is not in fault, but the affection of the chooser”? For these testimonies are too clear to be able to be depraved by any false interpretation.
Let the ninth be blessed Philastrius, St. Ambrose’s contemporary. He, in the book On Heresies, in the chapter on the Pythoness: “They are ignorant that believing souls, falling away from the faith of Christ, make themselves thenceforth given over to impiety; because every man is of his own choice, to choose to do what he will, God permitting.”
Let the tenth be blessed Gaudentius of Brescia, Philastrius’s successor. He, in the third tractate on Exodus, says: “The liberty of the will, once granted, shall not be taken away — lest nothing could be judged concerning him who was not free in acting.” In which place this is to be observed: that the free choice given to the first man in creation (which, Calvin being witness, was true free choice, free even from necessity) is never taken away, Gaudentius being the author. Again, the same author, in the tractate on the Machabees: “God chose one tree out of all the woods of Paradise — not indeed an evil one, but one in which he might thoroughly try the obedience of his servants; so that the liberty of choice, obeying, might possess the reward of immortality, or, contemning, might receive the sentence of death threatened. Man ate because he willed; he kept not the commandment, because he willed not; he is punished with death, because he could have kept the commandment, and took no pains. If, therefore, the fruit of one small tree, rashly tasted by the First-formed against the commandment of God, procured death for the human race, the transgression of the divine commandment could also prepare destruction for the Machabees, then placed under the law — for whom now the keeping of his precept has procured honor and glory.” Gaudentius compares the Machabees with the First-formed, in that the latter were tempted about the eating of the tree of knowledge, the former about the eating of swine’s flesh, which at that time was no less prohibited to the Jews than of old the tree of knowledge to the First-formed. And in this he praises the Machabees: that they kept the precept, which from the liberty of choice they could have not kept; and contrariwise he accuses the First-formed: that they kept not the precept, which from the liberty of choice they without doubt could have kept. For otherwise the comparison is most inept, if it is not made with the liberty of choice remaining in the Machabees, as in the First-formed.
Let the eleventh be Prudentius, who in his verses has beautifully described free choice. For thus he sings in the Hamartigenia: “He is not good of his own accord, to whom there is not a ready power to will otherwise, and to turn the bent senses of his mind.” Likewise in the second book against Symmachus: “Let them say why the law was framed in twice six tables, or why the rubric threatens — which forbids to sin those guilty ones whom iron fates compel to the crime, and plunge into the inevitable; nay, who even drive them to will, insinuating the depraved wish, so that it is not permitted the wretches to refuse to commit the forbidden thing? Yield, if there is any shame, and blunt your sword. You hold harsh laws that smite with punishments a harmless troop that has deserved nothing, while fate does the sinning. No one is guilty, if the fates rule what is lived and done. Nay rather, whoever willingly dares what is not lawful is guilty — because to will either is his own; nor do the fates impose guilt; and he pays for the wickedness that pleased him, and for impious deeds, destroyed by punishments deservedly, not by chance.” Nor let some Calvinian answer that these things make nothing against those who do not defend fate. For Prudentius and the other ancients assail fate precisely because it takes away free choice; and if the Calvinists do not acknowledge fate, and yet deny free choice no less than they who asserted fate, certainly Prudentius and the other ancients write against them also, and by their writings vindicate the possession of free choice from all who in any way hinder it.
Let the twelfth be blessed Jerome. He, in the epistle to Damasus on the prodigal son, explaining that verse, And he divided unto them his substance, speaks thus: “More significantly it is read in the Greek, dieilen autois ton bion — that is, he gave them free choice, he gave the liberty of their own mind, that each one might live not by the command of God, but by his own compliance — that is, not from necessity, but from will; that virtue might have place; that we might differ from the other animals, while, after the example of God, it is permitted us to do what we will. Whence both upon sinners the judgment is equitable, and upon the holy and just a just reward is repaid.” The same author has like things in the epistle to Hedibia, question 10, and in book 2 against Jovinian. But since Calvin says that Jerome only in old age, aroused by the Pelagians, began to be wise, let us bring forward one place also from the dialogues against the Pelagians. Thus, then, he speaks in the third dialogue: “This is what I had said to thee at the beginning: that it is in our power to sin or not to sin, that free choice may be preserved.” Certainly nothing can be desired here; for the book is against the Pelagians, and the sentence clear.
Let the thirteenth be St. Paulinus, who in the second epistle to Severus speaks thus: “What thanks have we (if we shall have been faithful only in what is another’s), unless we serve from our own — that is, from the free choice of the will?” Paulinus calls earthly riches “another’s,” since, though they be ours, yet we can easily be hindered from doing with them what we will; he names “our own” the internal actions, since these are in our power, and of them, on account of the liberty of choice, we are truly lords. The same, in the same epistle: “The liberty of the will is not coerced, but persuaded.” By coercion in this place he understands necessity; for persuasion would be applied in vain, if man could not do otherwise. The same, in epistle 4 to the same Severus: “A thing of our own power is our affection; let us expend and pay this to the Lord.” The Lutherans teach that we are after a fashion free in external actions, but in internal ones, especially toward God, have not even a crumb of liberty; but our Paulinus teaches the contrary: that the internal affection, even toward God, is more in the power of free choice than external actions. And so St. Paulinus was a true Papist — who again, in epistle 8 to the same: “I knew the good, and did the evil, when it was equally free to me to do the good. What pardon of sin, then, will be at hand for wretched me?”
Let the fourteenth be blessed Innocent I, Roman Pontiff, who in the rescript to the Council of Carthage speaks thus: “In all the divine pages we read that only the help of God is to be joined to the free will, and that it can do nothing when destitute of the heavenly aids.” The same, in the rescript to the Council of Milevis: “We received free choice when we were born.” These testimonies of Innocent are to be considered most diligently. For they are without controversy his to whom they are attributed; and the author is ancient and grave, and more than once praised by St. Augustine and Jerome. They were written, moreover, against the Pelagians, and are commended by St. Augustine, in epistle 106 to Paulinus, so that there is no danger of their attributing too much to free choice. Finally, they cannot be twisted back to the free choice of the first man only, which he had in the state of innocence, since this author says that we all receive free choice in our very birth. Nor can they be expounded of a liberty toward evil only, which according to Calvin the impious have, because they sin willingly; for Innocent says that free choice needs the grace of God, but sinners do not need the grace of God that they may sin willingly. Nor can they be explained of a liberty toward good only, which according to Calvin the just have, who willingly act well; for that liberty does not begin when we are born, but when we are reborn; and Innocent speaks of the free choice which we received when we were born. Nor, at the last, can they be understood of liberty from coercion alone; for that needs not the grace of God, since it is common to us with the beasts, nor could it be lost or wounded by sin.
Let the fifteenth be blessed Celestine I, Roman Pontiff, who in the epistle to the Gauls, chapter 13, speaks thus: “By the help and gift of God free choice is not taken away, but freed — that from darksome it may become lucid, from depraved right, from languid sound, from imprudent provident.” Here almost all could be repeated which we said of the testimonies of St. Innocent — to omit that St. Celestine in the same epistle confirms the opinion of St. Innocent, and for the same alleges also blessed Zosimus, Innocent’s successor, and his own predecessor.
Let the sixteenth be St. Leo I, likewise Roman Pontiff, who was the chief author of the canons of the Council of Orange, as is said in the preface of that Council; and we read in canons 8 and 13 [al. 25] that free choice was weakened and attenuated through the fall of the first man, not extinguished; accordingly that it can choose evil and good — but evil of itself, good with the help of grace. Nor can this be diverted to liberty from coercion alone; since, as we said, that liberty needs not the help of grace, nor was it weakened or attenuated through sin, nor does it deserve the name of free choice.
Let the seventeenth be blessed Prosper, who in book 1 On the Vocation of the Gentiles, chapter 3, speaks thus: “Nor, because he is led by the Spirit of God, let him think that he has not free choice — which he did not lose even then, when by his will he gave himself to the devil; by whom the judgment of the will was depraved, not taken away.”
Let the eighteenth be St. Fulgentius, who in the book On the Incarnation and Grace of Christ, chapter 20, speaks thus: “By the grace of God the human choice is not taken away, but healed.” These testimonies also of Prosper and Fulgentius cannot be understood of liberty from coercion alone, for the same reasons.
Let the nineteenth be Severinus Boethius, by far the most learned man of his time, who in book 5 On the Consolation of Philosophy, at the end, speaks thus: “These things being so, there remains to mortals an inviolate liberty of choice; nor unjustly do the laws propose rewards and punishments to wills loosed from all necessity.” Nothing clearer could be said.
Let the twentieth be St. Gregory I, Roman Pontiff, who in book 33 of the Morals, chapter 23 [al. 40], speaks thus: “For this reason they by no means receive the eternal rewards of the heavenly fatherland: because now, while they could have earned them, they contemned them from free choice.” You have here the free choice by which man (helped by grace) can earn eternal life, and can also, if he will, not earn it, but despise and contemn it.
Let the twenty-first be Arnobius, who, treating Psalm 90, speaks thus: “The liberty of choice it is both dangerous to deny, and to strip bare is sin. For if thou deny it, thou hast loosed the reins to all; if thou strip it bare, thou hast deceived.” This author we have placed in this spot because he did not flourish after Bede, since he is cited by him in the explication of the Psalms; and yet he flourished after the Pelagian heresy arose, as can be understood from many places of his commentaries on the Psalms. And so he is not that Arnobius who wrote seven books against the gentiles, but another, more recent — grave, however, and learned, and at least more ancient than the venerable Bede.
Let the twenty-second be the venerable Bede himself, who in the commentary on chapter 4 of Genesis speaks thus: “The appetite thereof shall be under thee — that is, of sin — and thou shalt have dominion over it; as if he said openly: it is under thy power, whether thou act well or ill.”
Let the twenty-third be St. Leo IX, Roman Pontiff, who in the epistle to Peter of Antioch: “I believe and profess that the grace of God goes before and follows after man — yet so that I deny not free choice to the rational creature.”
Let the twenty-fourth be St. Anselm, who in the commentary on the second chapter of the latter epistle to Timothy speaks thus: “The Lord gave us free choice, that by the choice of our own will we may depart from iniquity, or remain in iniquity.”
Let the twenty-fifth be St. Bernard, who in sermon 81 on the Canticles: “The liberty of choice is plainly something divine, shining forth in the soul like a gem in gold. From it, namely, the soul has both the knowledge of judgment and the option of choosing, between life and death, and no less between light and darkness.” And below: “Whence also it is named free choice, because it is permitted to turn oneself in these things at the choice of the will. Hence man is able to merit; for everything he shall have done, good or evil, which indeed it was free not to do, is deservedly counted toward merit. And as he is deservedly praised, not only who could have done evil things and did them not, so he lacks not evil merit, both he who could have not done evil things and did them, and he who could have done good things and did them not. But where there is no liberty, neither is there merit. Wherefore the animals that lack reason merit nothing, because as they lack reason, so also they lack liberty.” An altogether splendid sentence, and worthy to have concluded, with a kind of peroration, the consent of so many most learned men.
Now indeed, if Calvin would stand by his promises, he must altogether yield — not to me, but to a Council plainly ecumenical and free, such as no other was ever celebrated. For here, if you ask the dignities of the sees, you have seven Roman bishops: Clement, Innocent, Zosimus, Celestine, Leo, Gregory, the other Leo; three of Alexandria: Athanasius, Theophilus, Cyril; of Antioch, Ignatius; of Jerusalem, Cyril; of Constantinople, Chrysostom. If the variety of Provinces: you have from Asia Justin, Origen, Eusebius, Theodoret, and others; from Africa, Tertullian, Cyprian, Lactantius, Fulgentius; from Europe, Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome, Paulinus, and the rest in the greatest number. If doctrine, eloquence, sanctity: you have the very lights of the whole Church, both Latin and Greek. There comes, last of all, this: that in the Councils of the Church, however numerous, only they could take part who lived in that age; but here we have gathered together all those eminent Pastors and Doctors who flourished in diverse ages, from the very time of the Apostles down to the year of the Lord one thousand one hundred; nor would it be difficult, if the adversaries required it, to add the rest, who, illustrious not only in doctrine but also in life and miracles, have taught the same opinion on the liberty of choice in these later centuries.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXVI. Testimonia Patrum Latinorum, pro libero arbitrio in moralibus. Primus ex Latinis Tertullianus est. Is in lib. ii. contra Marcionem ita loquitur : « Li¬ berum, et sui arbitrii, et sute potestatis inve¬ nio hominem institutum. » Sed ne Calvinus dicat (ut solet) Tertullianum loqui de prima institutione, quee postea per peccatum sit mutata, audi sequentia. « Hunc statum ejus confirmavit etiam ipsa lex tunc a Deo posita. Non enim poneretur lex ei, qui non habere j obsequium debitum legi in sua potestate. Nec rursus comminatio mortis transgressioni adseriberetur, si non et comtemptus legis in arbitrii libertatem homini deputaretur. Sic et in posteris legibus creatoris invenias pro¬ ponentis ante hominem bonum et malum, vitam et mortem. » Et infra non procul a fine : « Interrogat, inquit, Deus quasi incer¬ tus, ut et hinc liberi arbitrii probans homi¬ nem in causa aut confessionis, aut negatio¬ nis, ut daret ei locum spoute confitendi deli¬ ctum, et hoc nomine relevandi. Sicut de Cain sciscitatur, ubinam frater ejus, ut ille habe¬ ret potestatem, ex eadem arbitrii libertate sponte negandi delicti, et hoc nomine gra¬ vandi. » Et in libro de exhortatione Castita¬ tis non longe ab initio : «Itaque, inquit, cum utrumque ex praeceptis ejus didicerimus, quid velit et quid nolit, jam nobis est volun¬ tas eligendi alterum, sicut scriptum est, Ecce posui ante te bonum et malum ». At non meretur Tertullianus locum inter testes dogmatum Catholicorum, cum in mul¬ tis magnisque rebus erraverit. Id enim solum est, quod respondere potest Calvinus. Sed facilis responsio est. Nam si solus ha)c dice¬ ret, nullam ei fidem haberemus, ut qui pro¬ priam sectam instituerit, sed quod dicit cum omnibus Grsecis et Latinis Patribus, non pa¬ rum valet ad testimonium fidei, quae vigebat antiquis illis temporibus in Ecclesia. Non errasse autem in hac re Tertullianum, nec fuisse dogma de libertate arbitrii proprium sectae ipsius, certum est ex eo,. quod neque Eusebius in historia, neque Augustinus in libro de haeresibus, neque alius auctor hanc sententiam inter alios Tertulliani errores enumerat. Secundus sit B. Martyr Cyprianus. Is in lib. i. epist. 3. ad Cornelium : « Dominus, inquit, non increpuit recedentes, aut gravi¬ ter comminatus est, sed magis conversus ad Apostolos suos dixit : Numquid et vos vultis abire? servans scilicet legem, qua homo li¬ bertati suae relictus, et in arbitrio proprio constitutus sibimetipsi vel mortem appetit, vel salutem » . Et in libro de unitate Eccle¬ siae : <( Fieri vero, inquit, haec Dominus per¬ mittit et patitur, manente propriae libertatis arbitrio ». Ubi notandum est, non posse haec detorqueri ad libertatem a coactione, quam solam nobis Calvinus reliquit. Nam etiamsi Deus impediret omnia peccata, ad¬ huc maneret libertas a coactione, sicut ea manet in bestiis, qua) peccare non possunt, sed libertas a necessitate, et vera potestas eligendi bonum et malum, plane tolleretur, nisi Deus peccata permitteret. Atque hoc est, quod Cyprianus dicit, Deum pati, ut pec¬ cata fiant, manente propria) libertatis arbi¬ trio. Tertius sit Minutius Felix. Is in Octavio ultra medium libri, sic gentiles alloquitur : « Denique de vestro numero carcer exaestuat. Christianus ibi nullus, nisi aut reus suae reli¬ gionis, aut profugus. Nec de fato quisquam aut solatium captet, aut excuset, eventum sit sortis fortuna), mens tamen libera est, et ideo actus hominis, non dignitas judicatur ». Ne¬ que vero loquitur de libertate a sola coactio¬ ne. Nam ea non repugnat fato, cui tamen repugnat libertas a necessitate. Potest enim sponte fieri, id quod fato fit. Non potest au¬ tem quod fato fit, non necessario fieri. Quartus sit Lactantius. Is in lib. iv. divi¬ narum Institutionum, cap. 24. « Qui dat (in- CAPUT XXVI. 91 quit prtecepta, amputare debet omnium ex¬ cusationum vias, ut imponat hominibus pa¬ rendi necessitatem, non vi aliqua, sed pudo1 re, et tamen libertatem relinquat, ut et prae¬ mium sit constitutum parentibus, quia pote¬ rant non parere, si vellent, et non parentibus poena, quia poterant parere, si vellent. Quo modo ergo poterit amputari excusatio, nisi ut qui docet, faciat qua; docet, et sit quasi praevius, et manum porrigat secuturo » ? Quintus sit Julius Firmicus. Is in libro de erroribus profanarum religionum, quem ad filios Constantini scripsit, sic loquitur cap. 29 : <( Liberum te Deus fecit, in tua manu est, ut aut vivas, aut pereas ; quid te per abrupta praecipitas? » Sextus sit sanctus Hilarius. Is in commen¬ tario Psalmi secundi, sic ait : « Unicuique nostrum libertatem vitae, sensumque permi¬ sit, non necessitatem in alterutrum affigens. » Et infra rationem reddens : « Quid enim (in¬ quit) honoris et praemii bonitatis necessitas mereretur, cum malos non esse, vis quaedam nobis conserta non sineret » ? Hunc egre¬ gium Patrem ultro nobis dat Calvinus, neque intelligit quantum detrimenti causae suae fa¬ ciat, cum illi contrarium se profiteatur, quem non solum Hieronymus et Augustinus, sed etiam integra Synodus Ephesina prima, et aliaMeinceps Concilia miritice coluerunt. Septimus sit Optatus Milevitanus, qui sic loquitur initio libri septimi, adversus Par- menianum : « Quidquid necessitas peccat, non potest magnis viribus accusari. Voluntas habet poenam, necessitas veniam. Homicida scelus potest facere, potest et non facere, adulterium moechus potest admittere, potest et non admittere, et caetera hujusmodi, in quibus liberum habetur arbitrium. » Octavus sit sanctus Ambrosius. Is in lib. i. de Jacob, cap. 3 : « Non est (inquit) quod cuiquam nostram adscribamus culpam, nisi nostris voluntati. Nemo tenetur ad culpam nisi voluntate propria deflexerit. Volunta¬ rium sibi militem legit Christus, voluntarium sibi servum diabolus auctionatur » . Ad hoc testimonium Calvinus respondet, intelligen- dum esse de voluntario, quod opponitur co¬ acto, atque invito, non quod opponitur de¬ terminato ad unum. Sed fallitur, nam in pri¬ mis voluntarium, quod solum opponitur coacto, non sufficit ad peccandum, alioqui lupus etiam peccaret cum sponte alienas oves rapit et occidit. Deinde verba illa (nisi voluntate propria deflexerit) non signifi¬ cant solum sponte, libereque deflectere, quod etiam pecudi convenire potest, quae tamen non dicitur propria voluntate deflectere, etiam quando libenter errat, sed significant ex deliberato consilio, atque electione pec¬ care. Sed quid respondebit Calvinus ad id, quod idem Ambrosius scribit in lib. ii. de Cain, cap. 7 : <( Non habes in quo necessitatem magis, quam mentem tuam arguas » . Et ad illud, quod habet idem auctor in expositione Psalmi quadragesimi : « Homini dedit eli¬ gendi arbitrium, quod sequatur : ante homi¬ nem vita et mors, si deliqueris, non natura in culpa est, sed eligentis affectus » . Haec enim testimonia clariora sunt, quam ut ulla falsa interpretatione depravari queant. Nonus sit beatus Philastrius, sancti Am¬ brosii aequalis. Is in libro de haeresibus, ca¬ pite de Pythonissa : « Ignorant, inquit, quod credentes animae a fide Christi, deditas jam se impietati faciunt, quia arbitrii sui est om¬ nis homo, quod velit, ut eligat facere per¬ mittente Deo. » Decimus sit beatus Gaudentius Brixianus, Philastrii successor. Is in 3, tract. super Exodum, inquit, <c concessa semel voluntatis libertas non ayferetur, ne nihil de eo judi¬ care possit, qui liber non fuerit in agendo. » Quo loco illud est observandum, liberum ar¬ bitrium primo homini in creatione datum (quod teste Calvino verum fuit liberum arbi¬ trium, etiam a necessitate) numquam aufer¬ ri, auctore Gaudentio. Rursus idem auctor in tractatu de Macha- baeis : « Unam (inquit) Deus elegit arborem de omnibus lignis Paradisi, non utique ma¬ lam, sed in qua servorum suorum obedien- tiam pertentaret, ut libertas arbitrii, vel im¬ mortalitatis praemium possideret obediens, vel contemnens exciperet mortis interminatae sententiam. Manducavit homo quia voluit ; mandatum non custudivit, quia noluit ; morte muletatur, quia mandatum servare potuit, et non studuit. Igitur si unius arbu- §culi fructus, contra Dei mandatum temere a Protoplastis degustatus, mortem generi acquisivit humano, potuit etMachabaeis tunc sub lege positis interitum parare mandati di¬ vini transgressio, quibus nunc honorem et gloriam praecepti ejus custodia comparavit.» Comparat Gaudentius Machabeeos cum Pro¬ toplastis, quod isti tentati fuerunt de mandu¬ catione ligni scientiae, illi de manducatione carnis suillae, quae non minus eo tempore 92 LIBER V. Judaeis prohibita ' erat, quam olim arbor scientiae Protoplastis. Atque in eo Macha- baeos laudat, quod praeceptum servaverint, quod ex libertate arbitrii potuissent non ser¬ vare et contra Protoplastos accusat, quod praeceptum non custodierint, quod ex liber¬ tate arbitrii custodire sine dubio potuissent. Alioqui enim ineptissima comparatio est, si non fit manente arbitrii libertate in Macha- baeis, sicut in Protoplastis. Undecimus sit Prudentius, qui in versibus liberum arbitrium pulchre descripsit. Sic enim canit in Hamartigenia. Non fit sponte bonus, cui non est prompta potestas Velle aliud, flexosque animi convertere sensus. Item in libro secundo, adversus Symma¬ chum. Dicant cur condita sit lex Bis sex in tabulis, aut cur rubrica minatur, Quae prohibet peccare reos, quos ferrea fata Cogunt ad facinus, et inevitabile mergunt : Quin et velle adigunt pravum insinuantia votum. Ne liceat miseris vetitum committere nolle ? Cedite, si pudor est, gladiumque retundite vestrum. Aspera nil meritos poenis plectentia jura, Agminis innocui, fato peccante, tenetis. Nemo nocens, si iata regunt, quod vivitur, ac fit. lmmo nocens quiciimque volens, quod non licet, audet Alterutrum quia velle suum est, nec fata reatum Imponunt, placitumque nefas, et facta rependit Impia, suppliciis merito, non forte peremptus. Neque respondeat Calvinianus aliquis, h®c non facere contra se, qui fatum non defen¬ dunt. Nam Prudentius, et alii veteres ideo fatum oppugnant, quia tollit liberum arbi¬ trium : quod si Calvinist® fatum non agno¬ scunt, et tamen liberum arbitrium non minus negant, quam illi qui fatum asserebant ; cer¬ te Prudentius et alii veteres contra ipsos etiam scribunt, et liberi arbitrii possessio¬ nem ab omnibus, qui quoquo modo eam impediunt scriptis suis vindicant. Duodecimus sit beatus Hieronymus. Is in epistola ad Damasum, de fdio prodigo, ex¬ plicans illud, Et divisit eis substantiam , sic ait : « Significantius in Gr®co legitur StetXstv- auxo I; xov fltov, id est, dedit eis liberum ar¬ bitrium, dedit mentis propriae libertatem^ et ut viveret unusquisque, non ex imperio Dei, sed ex obsequio suo, id est, non ex ne¬ cessitate, sed ex voluntate, ut virtus habe¬ ret locum, ut a c® teris animantibus dista¬ remus, dum ad exemplum Dei permissum est nobis facere, quod velimus. Unde ct in peccatores eequum est judicium, et in san¬ ctos ac justos justum praemium retribuetur.» Similia habet idem auctor in epist. ad He- dibiam, quaest. 10. et in lib. ii. adversus Jo- vinianum. Sed quoniam Calvinus dicit, Hieronymun solum in senectute a Pelagianis excitatum, sapere ccepisse ; proferamus unum etiam locum ex dialogis adversus Pelagianos. Sic igitur loquitur in tertio dialogo : « Hoc est quod tibi in principio dixeram, in nostra esse potestate peccare, vel non peccare, ut libe¬ rum servetur arbitrium.» Certe nihil hic de¬ siderari potest. Nam et liber est contra Pe¬ lagianos, et sententia perspicua. Tertius decimus sit sanctus Paulinus, qui in epistola secunda ad Severum, sic ait : «Quse nobis est gratia ( si in alieno tantum fideles fuerimus ) nisi de prop rio serviamuSj id est, de libero voluntatis arbitrio ? » Yocat aliena Paulinus terrenas divitias, quoniam tametsi nostrae sint, tamen facile possumus impediri, ne faciamus ex eis, quod volumus : propria nominat actiones internas, quoniam ilice sunt in potestate nostra, et earum pro¬ pter arbitrii libertatem vere domini sumus. Idem in eadem epistola : « Libertas (inquit) voluntatis non cogitur, sed suadetur. » Per coactionem hoc loco necessitatem intelligit, frustra enim adhiberetur suasio, si homo non posset aliter facere. Idem in epist. 4. ad eumdem Severum : « Res potestatis no¬ sti’® est noster affectus, hunc Domino impen¬ damus et solvamus». Lutherani docent, nos utcumque liberos esse in actionibusexternis ; in internis autem, prsesertim erga Deum, ne micam quidem libertatis habere. Noster vero Paulinus contra docet, magis esse in potestate liberi arbitrii affectum internum etiam erga Deum, quam actiones externas. Itaque verus Papista fuit sanctus Paulinus. Qui rursusin epistol. 8. adeumdem : «Agno¬ vi bo num ( inquit ) et feci malum, cum seque mihi liberum esset bonum facere. Quse ergo misero mihi suppetet venia peccati ? » Quartus decimus sit beatus Innocentius I. Pontifex Romanus, qui in rescripto ad Con¬ cilium Milevitanum, sic loquitur : « In om¬ nibus divinis paginis voluntati liber®, non nisi adjutorium Dei, legimus esse necten¬ dum, eamque nihil posse coelestibus auxiliis destitutam » . Idem in rescripto ad Conci¬ lium Milevitanum : «Liberum (inquit) ar¬ bitrium cum nasceremur accepimus » . H®c Innocentii testimonia diligentissime consideranda sunt. Nam et sunt absque CAPUT XXVI. 93 controversia ejus, cui tribuuntur, et auctor est antiquus et gravis, et a sancto Augustino ac Hieronymo non semel laudatus. Scripta sunt praeterea contra Pelagianos, et a san¬ cto Augustino commendantur, in epist. 106. ad Paulinum, ut non sit periculum, ne ni¬ mium tribuant libero arbitrio. Denique non possunt retorqueri ad liberum arbitrium priijii homini^*tantum, quod habuit in statu innocentiae, cum hic auctor dicat, nos omnes liberum arbitrium in ipsa nativitate accipere. Neque exponi possunt de sola libertate ad malum, quam habent juxta Calvinum impii, quia libenter peccant ; nam Innocentius dicit, liberum arbitrium egere gratia Dei, non au¬ tem egent gratia Dei peccatores, ut libenter peccent. Neque possunt explicari de libertate tantum ad bonum, quam habent secundum Calvinum justi, qui libenter bene agunt. Nam ista libertas non incipit, cum nascimur, sed cum renascimur ; Innocentius autem loquitur de libero arbitrio, quod cum nasce¬ remur, accepimus. Nec possunt ad extre¬ mum intelligi de libertate a sola coactione. Illa enim non eget gratia Dei, cum sit nobis communis cum bestiis, neque peccatum amitti aut laedi potuerit. Quintus decimus sit beatus Coelestinus pri¬ mus, Pontifex Romanus, qui in epistola ad Gallos, cap. xm, sic loquitur : « Auxilio et munere Dei liberum arbitrium non tollitur, sed liberatur, ut de tenebroso lucidum, de pravo rectum, de languido sanum, de im- prudente sit providum. » Hic omnia ferme repeti possent, quae diximus de testimoniis saucti Innocentii, ut omittam, quod sanctus Coelestinus in eadem epistola, sancti Inno¬ centii sententiam confirmat, et in eamdem allegat etiam beatum Zozimum, Innocentii successorem, suum autem praedecessorem. Sextus decimus sit sanctus Leo primus, item Pontifex Romanus, qui canonum Con¬ cilii Arausicani primarius auctor fuit, ut in praefatione ejus Concilii dicitur ; legimus autem in canon. 8 et 13. liberum arbi¬ trium per lapsum primi hominis infirmatum, atque attenuatum, non extinctum fuisse : proinde posse malum et bonum eligere, sed malum per se, bonum cum auxilio gratiae. Neque potest hoc ad libertatem a sola coa¬ ctione derivari, quoniam, ut diximus, ea libertas non eget auxilio gratiae, neque per peccatum infirmata, vel attenuata fuit, neque liberi arbitrii nomen meretur. Septimus decimus sit beatus Prosper, qui in i. lib. de vocatione gentium, cap. 3. sit ait : « Nec quia spiritu Dei agitur, ideo se putet liberum arbitrium non habere, quod nec tunc perdidit, quando diabolo voluntate se dedit, a quo judicium voluntatis depra¬ vatum est, non ablatum » . Decimus octavus sit sanctus Fulgentius, qui in libro de Incarnatione et gratia Chri¬ sti, cap. 20, sit ait : « Gratia Dei humanum non aufertur, sed sanatur, arbitrium. » Hsec quoque Prosperi, atque Fulgentii testimoni intelligi possunt de sola libertate a coa¬ ctione, propter easdem rationes. Decimus nonus sit Severinus Boetius, 'vir sui temporis longe doctissimus, qui in lib. v. de Consolatione Philosophias, extremo sic ait : « Quas cum ita sint, manet intemerata mortalibus libex*tas arbiti’ii, nec inique leges solutis omni necessitate voluntatibus praemia, poenasque proponunt ». Nihil clarius dici potuit. . Vigesimus sit sanctus Gregorius primus, Romanus Pontifex, qui in lib. xxxm. Mora¬ lium, cap. 23, ita loquitur : « Idcirco ne¬ quaquam ccelestus patriae praemia aeterna percipiunt, quia nunc dum promereri po¬ terant, ex libero arbitrio contempserunt » . Habes hic liberum arbitrium, quo potest homo ( adjutus gratia ) promereri vitam aeternam, et eamdem si velit, non promereri, sed despicere atque contemnere. Vigesimus primus sit Arnobius qui tractans Psal. xc. sic ait : « Libertatem arbitrii et negare periculum est, et nudare peccatum. Si enim negaveris, omnibus fraena laxasti, si nudaveris, decepisti ». Hunc auctorem hoc loco posuimus, quoniam non floruit post Bedam, cum ab illo citetur in explicatione Psalmorum, et tamen floruit post haeresim Pelagianam exortam, ut ex multis locis com¬ mentariorum ejus in Psalmos intelligi potest. Itaque non est ille Arnobius, qui scripsit septem libros contra gentes, spd alius recen- tior, gravis tamen et doctus, et saltem vene¬ rabili Beda antiquior. Vigesimus secundus sit ipse venerabilis Beda, qui in comment. ad 4. cap. Genes, ita loquitur : « Sub te erit appetitus ejus, id est, peccati, et tu dominaberis illius, ac si aperte diceret, sub tua potestate est, si bene vel male egeris » . Vigesimus tertius sit S. Leo IX. Romanus Pontifex, qui in epistola ad Petrum Antio¬ chenum : « Gratiam, inquit, Dei praevenire, et subsequi hominem credo, et profiteor, it 94 LTBER Y. tamen, ut liberum arbitrium rationali crea¬ tura} non demegem. » Vigesimus quartus sit S. Anselmus, qui in comment. ad n. cap. epistola} posterioris ad Timotheum, sic ait : « Liberum arbitrium dedit nobis Dominus, ut arbitrio propriae voluntatis recedamus ab iniquitate, vel per¬ maneamus in iniquitate ». Vigesimus quintus sit S. Bernardus, qui in serm. lxxxi. in Cantica : « Arbitrii, inquit, libertas est plane divinum quiddam praeful¬ gens in anima, tamquam gemma in auro. Ex hac nempe inest illi inter vitam et mor¬ tem, sed et nihilominus inter lucem et tene¬ bras et cognitio judicii, et optio eligendi. » Et infra : « Unde et liberum nominatur ar¬ bitrium, quod liceat aversari in his pro ar¬ bitrio voluntatis. Inde homo ad promeren- tum potis : omne etenim quod fecerit bonum, malumve, quod quidem non facere liberum sit, merito ad meritum deputatur. Et ut merito laudatur non is tantum, qui potuit facere mala, et non fecit : ita malo non caret merito, tam is, qui potuit non facere mala, et fecit, quam qui potuit facere bona, et non fecit. Ubi autem non est libertas, nec meritum. Propterea quae sunt carentia ra¬ tione animalia nihil merentur, quia sicut ratione itaet libertate carent n . Praeclara om¬ nino sententia et digna, quae consensum tot hominum doctissimorum quadam quasi peroratione concluserit. Jam vero si Calvinus stare promissis velit, cedere prorsus illum oportebit, non mihi, sed Concilio plane cecumenieo ct libero, quale alterum numquam celebratum est. Hic enim, si quaeras dignitates sedium, habes Romanos episcopos septem, Clemen¬ tem, Innocentium, Zozimum, Ccelestinum, Leonem, Gregorium, alterum Leonem : Alexandrinos tres, Athanasium, Theopbylum, Cyrillum ; Antiochenum Ignatium ; Hiero¬ solymitanum Cyrillum : Constantinopolita- num Chrysostomum. Si Provinciarum va¬ rietatem, habes ex Asia Justinum, Origenem, Eusebium, Theodoretum, et alios. Ex Afri¬ ca Tertullianum, Cyprianum, Lactantium, Fulgentium. Ex Europa, Hilarium, Am¬ brosium, Hieronymum, Paulinum, et coete- ros maximo numero. Si doctrinam, elo¬ quentiam, sanctitatem, habes lumina ipsa totius Ecclesia}, tum Latinae, tum Graecae. Accedit postremo, quod in Conciliis Ecclesia}, quantumvis numerosis, soli illi iuteres-e potuerant, qai illa retate vivebant : hic autem nos illos omnes egregios Pasto* res et Doctores congregavimus, qui diversis aetatibus ab ipso tempore Apostolorum usque ad annum Domini millesimum et centesimum floruerunt, neque difficile esset, si adversarii id requirerent, addere caeteros, qui non so¬ lum doctrina, sed etiam vita, et miraculis illustres sententiam eamdem de arbitrii liber¬ tate his posterioribus sa}culis cfocuerunt. •