Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 27: Testimonies are brought forward from the books of Augustine which he wrote before the rise of the Pelagian heresy
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Now at last the testimonies of St. Augustine are to be brought forward. And since Calvin, in book 3 against Pighius, answers in two words to all the places had in the books written by him before the rise of the Pelagian heresy — saying that in them either it is treated only of the free choice of the first man before sin, or free choice is not affirmed from his own opinion, but conceded, that something may thence be gathered against the adversaries — we shall first bring forward the testimonies written before the rise of the heresy of Pelagius, and briefly examine those responses of Calvin; then we shall bring forward the testimonies also from the books written after the Pelagian heresy arose. For from each rank a great enough supply is at hand; and would that the adversaries were willing to acquiesce in the judgment even of St. Augustine alone — for the whole matter would easily be composed.
The first testimony, then, is taken from the book On the Greatness of the Soul, chapter 36, where we read thus: “God, the highest and true, by an inevitable and incorrupt law by which he rules all that he has founded, subjects the body to the soul, the soul to himself, and so all things to himself; nor does he desert it in any act, whether with punishment or with reward. For this he judged most beautiful: that whatever is should be, in the way it is, and be so ordered by the grades of nature that no deformity from any part should offend him who considers the universe; and that every punishment of the soul, and every reward, should always confer something upon the proportion of just beauty and the disposition of all things. For free choice was given to the soul; and they who endeavor to overthrow it with trifling reasonings are so far blind that they do not understand that they say even those vain and sacrilegious things by their own will.” This place St. Augustine did not retract (for Calvin sends us back to the Retractations for the explication of places of this kind), nor did he explain it, but left it plainly untouched, as is clear from book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 8, where he reviews this book. Nor is it rightly said (as Calvin thinks) that this place ought to be reckoned retracted, or explained, because other like ones have been retracted or explained; for all the places which St. Augustine explains in the books of the Retractations concerning free choice are later; accordingly he ought to have begun from this our place, had he found in it anything to be noted. Nor does St. Augustine in this place speak of the free choice of Adam alone, as Calvin impudently affirms; for he says that those very men who now dispute against free choice are so blind that they do not understand that they do this through free choice; and moreover, when he says that in each of our acts we are not deserted by God, with punishment or with reward, because we are of free choice — of what free choice, I ask, does he speak? Is it not of ours — that is, of all men who now live? Finally, that Augustine does not argue from things conceded, but affirms from his own opinion, and that altogether seriously, those words attest by which he says that they are blind who endeavor to overthrow free choice with trifling reasonings. Would he not also place himself among the blind and the triflers, if he did not believe that free choice exists, but only conceded it to exist for the sake of arguing?
The second testimony is taken from the three books On Free Choice. For in book 1, chapter 12, he speaks thus: “You see now, then, I judge, that it is placed in our will whether we enjoy or lack so great and so true a good.” Likewise book 2, chapter 1: “So far as I seemed to myself to understand in the preceding book, we both have free choice of the will, and only by it do we sin.” Likewise book 3, chapter 1: “Nor can any fault be detected where nature and necessity dominate.” And chapter 18: “But if it is laborious to commit all to memory, hold this briefest thing. Whatever that cause of the will be: if it cannot be resisted, it is yielded to without sin; but if it can, let it not be yielded to, and there will be no sin. Or does it perhaps deceive the unwary? Then let him beware that he be not deceived. Or is the deceit so great that it cannot be guarded against at all? If it is so, there are no sins; for who sins in that which can in no way be guarded against? But sin is committed; therefore it can be guarded against.” There will be no need, I believe, to prove that in these places Augustine does not argue from things conceded, but confirms the liberty of choice from his own opinion; for the whole work was written chiefly to this end: that free choice be defended against the fables of the Manichaeans.
Let us come, then, to Calvin’s other response, and see whether Augustine discourses of free choice such as it now is, or only of that which was in the state of innocence. For that Augustine speaks only of the free choice of entire nature, Calvin proves from book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 9, where St. Augustine not only says this very thing, but also indicates that he was not silent about it in book 3 On Free Choice itself, chapter 18, where these words are had: “To approve false things for true, so that one errs unwilling, and, the pain of the carnal bond resisting and torturing, not to be able to refrain from lustful works, is not the nature of man as instituted, but the punishment of man as condemned. But when we speak of the free will of acting rightly, we speak, namely, of that in which man was made.” Thus he. But assuredly, if St. Augustine believed that Adam alone was free, and he only before sin, he ought not to explain his opinion in the books of the Retractations, but to commit to the fire the whole three books On Free Choice, and many others with them — unless he wished to be held most foolish. For almost every single line of these books teaches so luminously that man after the fall of Adam is of free choice, that there is no place for any explication. Certainly in book 2, chapter 1, he very often repeats that man is now of free choice, and that, were he not such, he would not sin, and would be unjustly punished: “That good,” says he, “by which justice itself is commended in condemning sins and honoring deeds rightly done — how would it exist, if man lacked free choice of the will?” And before, when he had said in the person of Evodius, “So far as I seemed to myself to understand in the preceding book, we both have free choice of the will, and by it alone do we sin,” he subjoins in his own person: “I too remember that this has already been made clear to us; but then I asked whether you know that God gave us this thing which it is manifest we have, and by which we sin,” etc. Do you hear Augustine say that it is clear that we have free choice (not only that Adam had it), and that by it we sin — not only that Adam sinned by it?
That we may understand, then, what it is that St. Augustine explains in the Retractations from the books On Free Choice, it must be known that the free choice of Adam before sin was more powerful than ours in two things. For we, though we are free in the act of the will, and can at our choice will and not will, choose and not choose, yet often are not free in the acts of the other powers, or in the execution of the will; and we are compelled to suffer the rebellion of the lower part, and to say with the Apostle, what I will not, that I do. But Adam before the fall was free not only in the act of the will, but also in the execution, since there was no rebellion in his body, and all his members served him at his nod. Then, we need the protection and special aid of God against temptations, and, that not being present, we necessarily yield and succumb — though absolutely we do not necessarily succumb, since the aid of the Lord for not sinning is denied to no one, as we demonstrated in book 2. But Adam did not need that aid, because the rebellion of the flesh, and concupiscence, whence temptations arise, was not in him. Both of these the Pelagians denied, and contended that our free choice yields in nothing to the free choice of Adam; and for this false opinion of theirs they objected to Augustine his own words, written in the books On Free Choice. For this cause, then, in book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 9, St. Augustine explains his opinion more clearly, and notes that in book 3 On Free Choice, chapter 18, he had not been silent about this diversity between our free choice and Adam’s before sin. Wherefore those words — “but when we speak of the free will of acting rightly, we speak, namely, of that in which man was made” — do not signify, as Calvin falsely believed, that all the places of these books are to be expounded of the free choice of Adam alone; but that all the places in which is asserted a liberty of choosing without the resistance of the lower part, and without any ignorance and difficulty, are to be understood of free choice such as it was before sin, not such as it now is after sin. And that this is so can be confirmed from the words of the same eighteenth chapter of the third book On Free Choice: “Nor is it to be wondered at that either through ignorance he has not free choice for electing what he should rightly do, or, carnal habit resisting, he sees what should rightly be done, and wills, and cannot fulfill it. For this is the most just punishment of sin: that each one lose that which he would not use well, when he could without any difficulty, if he would.” Note that, “wills, and cannot fulfill”; for it signifies what we said: that man wills freely, but does not freely fulfill, on account of the resistance of the lower part. In the same place: “To approve false things for true, so that one errs unwilling, and, the pain of the carnal bond resisting, not to be able to refrain from lustful works, is not the nature of man as instituted, but the punishment of man as condemned. But when we speak of the free will of acting rightly, we speak, namely, of that in which man was made.” You see here that the liberty of acting rightly, which is granted to man as instituted, is opposed to the necessity of erring, and of lusting against one’s will? Adam, then, could avoid erring unwilling, and refrain from all the motions of the flesh — which we can by no means do, even if we would. And this is the first diversity between us and Adam. The same Augustine, in the same book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 9, explains the other difference between our free choice and Adam’s: that we need an aid which he did not need: “Let not the new Pelagian heretics,” says he, “who so assert free choice of the will as to leave no place for grace, exalt themselves as though I had pleaded their cause, because in these books I said many things for free choice, which the purpose of that disputation demanded.” And below: “In these and words of mine of this kind, because the grace of God was not mentioned, which was not then in question, the Pelagians think, or can think, that we held their opinion. But they think this in vain.” The same Augustine also, in the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 67, demonstrates that in book 3 On Free Choice the mention of grace was not altogether passed over. For when the Pelagians had objected that saying from the same book 3 — “For who sins in that which cannot be guarded against?” — he answered that no one sins in that which he cannot avoid, but that sins can be avoided not because nature is still entire, as it was in Adam, but because the grace of God is at hand. And he adds that he had not been silent about this in book 3 On Free Choice: “From those very books,” says he, “I must recall what this man, if he perceived it and set it in his writings, would leave no controversy remaining between us on this matter.” And soon he recites many things, and among others that from chapter 19 of book 3: “Since he is everywhere present, who in many ways through his creature calls back him who is turned away, teaches him who believes, consoles him who hopes, exhorts him who loves, helps him who strives, hears him who prays — it is not counted to thee as fault that thou art unwillingly ignorant, but that thou neglectest to seek what thou knowest not; nor that thou dost not bind up thy wounded members, but that thou despisest him who would heal them.” From all these things we have it that St. Augustine, in the books On Free Choice, so confuted the Manichaeans — and thereby also the Calvinists — truly and solidly, that yet he in no part helped the cause of the Pelagians; though he did not commend grace so diligently and copiously — which then no one denied — as he afterwards did, when the occasion of defending it offered itself.
The third testimony is taken from the book On True Religion, chapter 14, where St. Augustine speaks thus: “So far is sin a voluntary evil, that it is in no way sin if it be not voluntary. And this indeed is so manifest that no fewness of the learned, no crowd of the unlearned, here dissents.” And below: “And since it is not doubtful that sin is committed, I see that neither is this to be doubted: that souls have free choice of the will. For God judged that his servants would be better if they served him freely — which could in no way come to pass if they served not by will, but by necessity.” It cannot be answered to this place that Augustine argues from things conceded, and does not seriously explain what he thinks. For what could he say more openly from his own opinion than that it is so manifest that souls have free choice of the will, that no fewness of the learned, no crowd of the unlearned, here dissents? Calvin, then, betaking himself to his other refuge, says that Augustine speaks of the sin of the first man, which truly was committed not by necessity, but by will. And this he proves from book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 13, where, explaining this place, Augustine speaks thus: “This definition can seem false; but if it be diligently examined, it will be found most true. For that sin is to be thought of which is only sin, not that which is also the punishment of sin.” Likewise he proves it from the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 65 [al. 66], where the objection of Pelagius is proposed, from those words of Jerome, book 2 against Jovinian: “God founded us with free choice; neither to virtues nor to vices are we drawn by necessity; otherwise, where there is necessity, there is neither crown nor damnation.” To which objection Augustine answers: “Who would not acknowledge it? Who would not receive it with his whole heart? Who would deny that human nature was so founded? But in doing rightly there is no bond of necessity for this reason, that there is the liberty of charity.” But nonetheless we constantly assert that the place of Augustine cited by us from the book On True Religion cannot be so expounded as to be taught to pertain to the sin of Adam alone. For that sin is altogether voluntary, and, if it be not voluntary, is not sin, Augustine proves from the common consent of the human race, when he says that no crowd of the unlearned here dissents; but certainly the crowd of the unlearned, and the common run of the human race, when it proclaims that that is not sin which is done not by will but by necessity, does not look back to the sin of Adam, but to its own experience, and the natural light implanted in all. Then, Augustine affirms that sinners ought not to be rebuked, if they sin not by will but by necessity; and that, if they be not rebuked, all religion is taken out of the way — where without doubt he speaks not of Adam, but of the sins which are done by men who live at this time. Finally, Augustine writes that souls without any doubt have free choice of the will, because it is not doubtful that many sins are committed — where, as he speaks without controversy of the sins which are now done, so also without controversy he must be understood of the free choice which now is. To the objection proposed from the Retractations, then, I answer that St. Augustine wished to signify that the definition of sin, in which the voluntary is set down, befits the first sin most perfectly and most fully; but that yet all the other sins also must be voluntary, and otherwise are not sins. And when Augustine says that that definition, unless it be diligently examined, can seem false, he says it on account of original sin, which has the least of the voluntary — not on account of actual sins, of which we are now speaking, which indeed are so manifestly voluntary that of them above all is understood that saying, that no fewness of the learned, no crowd of the unlearned, here dissents.
Augustine, then, distinguishes four kinds of sins. The first is that sin which is the punishment of no preceding sin; and such was the first sin of Adam, which, because it was most fully voluntary, was therefore also most fully and most perfectly sin. The second is that of those who consent to dominating cupidity — which indeed is in some manner a punishment of sin (for cupidity was born from sin), and is necessary upon a supposition, since he cannot but fall in whom cupidity reigns; yet absolutely it is not necessary, but voluntary, since man can, with the help of God, bring it about that cupidity reign not in him; and thereby it is also absolutely and simply sin. The third is that of infants, who contract original sin from their parents; and this is not voluntary except by the will of the first parent, and therefore is called not actual, but original; and it is in one manner another’s, in another manner one’s own, and is at once sin and the punishment of sin. And on account of this (as we have already said) St. Augustine admonishes that one must look back to the sin of the first man, if one would understand how every sin, even original, is voluntary. The fourth is that of those who sin from ignorance, when they do that which they know not to be sin; and this too is a punishment of sin, because the ignorance is from sin; and it is in some manner voluntary — but by the will of the deed, not by the will of the sin, since they will to do what they do, but if they knew it to be sin, they would not will to do it, nor would they do it. And therefore this is improperly voluntary, and accordingly also improperly sin. To the objection from the book On Nature and Grace the response is most easy. For in that place St. Augustine does not deny that sin is voluntary, but adds that grace is necessary for avoiding sins — which we do not deny; and would that the adversaries did not so assail free choice, as we most willingly and most gratefully defend grace.
The fourth testimony is taken from the book On the Two Souls, chapter 11 [al. 14], where these words are had: “Sin is the will to retain or to obtain what justice forbids, and from which it is free to abstain. Nor did I need to search obscure books to learn that no one is worthy of blame or punishment who either wills that which justice does not forbid him to will, or does not do that which he cannot do. Do not shepherds sing these things on the mountains, and poets in the theaters, and the unlearned in their circles, and the learned in their libraries, and masters in the schools, and prelates in the sacred places, and the human race in the globe of the earth?” And chapter 12: “That anyone should be held guilty of sin because he did not do what he could not do, is of the height of iniquity and insanity. Wherefore, whatever those souls do, if they do it by nature, not by will — that is, if they lack a motion of the mind free both for doing and for not doing; if, finally, no power of abstaining from their own work is granted them — we cannot hold them for their sin.” That to this place too it cannot be answered that Augustine argues from things conceded, and does not speak from his own mind, ought to be beyond controversy; for he would accuse himself of insanity, if he believed that he is held guilty of sin who has not free choice, so that he can do and not do. Calvin therefore answers, after his wonted manner, that Augustine speaks of the sin of the first man, which was committed with free will; and he proves it from book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 15, where St. Augustine, reviewing the place cited by us, speaks thus: “The definition of sin, in which we said that sin is the will to retain, etc., is true for this reason: that that was defined which is only sin, not that which is also the punishment of sin.” But Augustine does not say that that alone is true sin which is so sin as not also to be the punishment of sin; otherwise no true sin would be the punishment of sin, and St. Augustine would fight with himself. But if that which is the punishment of sin can also be true sin, certainly the definition of sin can also befit it. Augustine signifies, then, that that definition, in which is set down the liberty toward either, befits chiefly the sin of Adam, since that was done so freely that there was no necessity of sinning, neither conditional nor absolute. Whence also a little before, in the same chapter, the same Augustine added that particle “chiefly,” saying: “Sin, which is nowhere but in the will, is chiefly to be understood as that which a just condemnation has followed.” But the sins which are done with cupidity compelling (for of these St. Augustine speaks in this place) are indeed absolutely voluntary, and the definition set down above befits them absolutely; yet they have something of necessity admixed, since upon a supposition — that is, unless cupidity be repressed by the help of God — they cannot be avoided; and therefore the definition of sin does not befit them so perfectly as it befitted the sin of the first man. Finally, that Augustine in the Retractations does not mean to say that the definition set down by him in the book On the Two Souls befits only the sin of the first man, ought to be most certain. For he himself says that it is sung by shepherds on the mountains, by poets in the theaters, and by the unlearned in their circles, that no one sins if he does not do what he cannot do; but certainly shepherds, poets, and the unlearned, when they sing those things, do not think of Adam’s sin, but of their own sins, and those of men like themselves. Then, when in the same place Augustine adds that, if our soul has not free choice for doing and not doing, we cannot be held for its sin — does he not most openly speak of our sin, not of Adam’s?
The fifth testimony is taken from book 2 of the Acts with Felix the Manichaean, chapter 3, where these words are had: “That there is free choice, and that thence each one sins if he will, and sins not if he will not, I prove to thee not only from the divine Scriptures, which you do not understand, but also from the words of Manichaeus himself.” And below, chapter 4: “Hear, then, about free choice, first the Lord himself, where he mentions the two trees, of which thou thyself hast made mention; hear him saying: Either make the tree good, and its fruit good; or make the tree evil, and its fruit evil. When therefore he says, either do this or do that, he indicates power, not nature. For no one but God can make trees; but each one has it in his will either to choose the things that are good, and to be a good tree, or to choose the things that are evil, and to be an evil tree.” This place St. Augustine nowhere retracted. For in book 2 of the Retractations, chapter 8, reviewing these books, he only notes that he did not dispute about grace, because it was not necessary. And so he judged all those things true, and that the liberty of choice does not fight — as in very truth it does not fight — with the necessity of grace. Nor can it be said that he argues from things conceded and to the man; for he with whom he disputed did not concede, but denied, free choice; and therefore he himself undertook to prove it from the divine writings. Calvin therefore flees to his old precaution about the free choice of the first man. But this is now intolerable impudence — since Augustine says that there is free choice, and that each one (not, therefore, Adam alone) thence sins if he will, and sins not if he will not; and proves it from a testimony of the Gospel which was spoken by the Lord not to Adam, but to the Jews; and finally, since Augustine disputes against the Manichaeans not about Adam’s sin, but about ours — which they, denying free choice, were wont to excuse, and to refer to a certain prince of darkness.
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CAPUT XXVII. Ad feruntur testimonia ex libris Augustini , quos ille scripsit ante exortam hseresim Pe- lagianam. Nunc demum proferenda sunt testimonia sancti Augustini. Et quoniam Calvinus in lib. ut. adversus Pighium, duobus verbis re¬ spondet ad omnia loca, quae habentur in li¬ bris ab eo scriptis ante exortam haercsim Pelagianam, dicens, in eis vel agi tantum de libero arbitrio primi hominis ante pecca¬ tum, vel non affirmari ex propria sententia liberum arbitrium, sed concedi, ut inde ali¬ quid contra adversarios colligatur. Nos pri¬ mo, adferemus teslimon.ia [scripta ante exor¬ tam hseresim Pelagii, et breviter discutiemus istas Calvini responsiones. Deinde, adfere¬ mus etiam testimonia ex libris scriptis post exortam Pelagianam hseresim. Nam ex utro¬ que ordine satis magna copia suppetit, at¬ que utinam adversarii vel unius sancti Au¬ gustini judicio acquiescere vellent. Res enim tota facile componeretur. Primum igitur testimonium sumitur ex li¬ bro de quantitate animse, cap. 36. ubi sic legimus : « Deus summus et verus lege ine¬ vitabili et incorrupta, qua omne quod con¬ didit, regit, subjicit animse corpus, animam sibi, et sic omnia sibi, neque in ullo actu eamdem deserit, sive poena, sive prsemio. Id enim judicavit esse pulcherrimum, ut esset quidquid est, quo modo est, et ita naturae gradibus ordinaretur, ut considerantem uni¬ versitatem, nulla offenderet ex ulla parte deformitas, omnisque animae poena, et omne praemium conferret semper aliquid propor¬ tioni justae pulchritudinis; dispositionique rerum omnium. Datum est enim animae libe¬ rum arbitrium, quod qui nugatoriis ratioci¬ nationibus labefactare conantur, usque adeo eci sunt, ut ne ista ipsa quidem vana, at- CAPUT XXYIT. 95 que sacrilega propria voluntate se dicere in- telligant ». Hunc locum non retractavit (nam ad re¬ tractationes nos Calvinus remittit, pro ejus¬ modi locorum explicatione) sanctus Augu¬ stinus, neque explicuit, sed reliquit plane intactum, ut perspicuum est ex lib. i. retract. cap. 8. ubi hunc librum recognoscit. Neque recte dicitur (ut Calvinus existimat) hunc locum retractatum, vel explicatum censeri debere, cum alii similes retractati sunt, vel explicati. Nam omnia loca, qute sanctus Au¬ gustinus explicet in libris retractationum circa liberum arbitrium, posteriora sunt, proinde ab hoc nostro loco incipere debuis¬ set, si in eo annotandum aliquid reperis- set. Neque loquitur hoc loco sanctus Augusti¬ nus de libero arbitrio solius Adami, ut Cal¬ vinus impudenter affirmat , nam dicit eos ipsos, qui nunc disputant contra liberum arbitrium, tam caecos esse, ut non intelli- gant, se per liberum arbitrium hoc facere et praeterea cum dicit in singulis actibus non deseri nos a Deo poena, vel praemio, quia liberi arbitrii sumus, de quo quaeso libero arbitrio loquitur? nonne de nostro, hoc est, omnium hominum, qui nunc vivimus? Denique, non argumentari Augustinum ex concessis, sed affirmare ex sententia sua, idque omnino serio, testantur illa verba, quibus dicit, caecos esse, qui nugatoriis ratio¬ cinationibus liberum arbitrium labefactare conantur. An non etiam ipse se inter caecos, et nugaces constitueret, si liberum arbitrium esse non crederet, sed tantum argumen¬ tandi gratia illud esse concederet? Secundum testimonium sumitur ex libris tribus de libero arbitrio. Nam lib. i. cap. 12. sic ait : « Yides igitur jam existimo, in voluntate nostra esse constitutum, ut hoc vel fruamur, vel careamus tanto et tam vero bono. » Item lib. n. cap. 1 : « Quantum, in¬ quit, in superiore libro intelligere mihi visus sum, et habemus liberum voluntatis arbitri¬ um, et non nisi eo peccamus ». Item lib. m. cap. 1. « Neque ulla culpa, inquit, depre¬ hendi potest, ubi natura necessitasque . do¬ minatur ». Et cap. 18 : « Sed si laboriosum est, inquit, omnia mandare memoriae, hoc. brevissimum tene. Quaecumque ista causa est voluntatis, si non ei potest resisti, sine peccato ei ceditur. Si autem potest, non ei cedatur, et non peccabitur. An forte fallit incautum ? ergo caveat ne fallatur. An tanta fallacia est, ut caveri omnino non possit ? si ita est, nulla peccata sunt. Quis enim peccat in eo, quod nullo modo caveri potest ? pec¬ catur autem, ergo caveri potest. » Non erit opus, credo, ut probemus in his locis, Augu¬ stinum non argumentari ex concessis, sed ex propria sententia libertatem arbitrii con¬ firmare : nam totum opus ad hunc finem potissimum scriptum est, ut liberum arbi¬ trium contra Manichaeorum fabulas defenda¬ tur. Veniamus igitur ad alteram Calvini re¬ sponsionem, et videamus, utrum Augustinus disserat de libero arbitrio, quale nunc est, an solum de illo, quod fuit in statu innocen¬ tia!. Nam de solo libero arbitrio naturae in¬ tegrae Augustinum loqui, probat Calvinus ex lib. i. retractationum, cap. 9. ubi sanctus Augustinus hoc ipsum non solum dicit, sed etiam indicat, se id non tacuisse in ipso lib. m. de libero arbitrio, cap. 18. ubi habentur haec verba : « Approbare falsa pro veris, ut erret invitus, et resistente atque torquente dolore carnalis vinculi, non posse a libidino¬ sis operibus temperare, non est natura insti¬ tuti hominis, sed poena damnati. Cum au¬ tem de libera voluntate recte faciendi loqui¬ mur, de illa scilicet, in qua homo factus est, loquimur » . Haec ille. At profecto, si sanctus Augustinus crede¬ ret, solum Adamum fuisse liberum, eumque non nisi ante peccatum; non deberet expli¬ care sententiam suam in libris retractatio¬ num, sed totos libros tres de libero arbitrio, et cum eis alios multos igni tradere, nisi stultissimus haberi vellet. Nam singuli fere versus horum librorum tam luculenter do¬ cent, hominem post lapsum Adse esse liberi arbitrii, ut nulli explicationi sit locus. Certe in ii. lib. cap. 1 . SBepissime repetit, hominem nunc esse liberi arbitrii, et nisi talis esset non peccaturum, et injuste puniendum : « Il¬ lud, inquit, bonum, quo commendatur ipsa justitia in damnandis peccatis, recteque fa¬ ctis honorandis, quomodo esset, si homo ca¬ reret libero voluntatis arbitrio ? » Et antea cum dixisset in persona Evodii : « Quantum in superiori libro intelligere mihi visus sum, et habemus liberum voluntatis arbitrium, et eo solo peccamus ». Subjungit in persona sua: «Ego quoque memini, jam nobis id factum esse perspicuum, sed tunc interroga¬ vi, utrum hoc quod nos habere, et quo nos peccare, manifestum est, Deum nobis dedis¬ se scias, etc. ». Audisne Augustinum dicere, 9G LIBER V. perspicuum esse, nos habere liberum arbi¬ trium (non solum Adamum habuisse) et eo nos peccare, non solum Adamum eo pecca¬ visse ? Ut igitur intelligamus, quid sit quod san¬ ctus Augustinus in Retractationibus explicat, ex libris de libero arbitrio, sciendum est, li¬ berum arbitrium Adami ante peccatum, dua¬ bus in rebus potentius fuisse, quam no¬ strum ; nos enim etsi liberi simus in actu voluntatis, et possimus pro arbitrio velle, et non velle, eligere et non eligere ; tamen sae¬ pe non sumus liberi in actibus aliarum po- tentiaruni, sive in executione voluntatis : et pati cogimur rebellionem partis inferioris, et dicere cum Apostolo, quod nolo hoc facio. Adam vero ante lapsum liber erat, non so¬ lum in actu voluntatis, sed etiam in execu¬ tione, cum nulla esset in ejus corpore rebel¬ lio, et omnia membra illi servirent ad nu¬ tum. Deinde nos egemus protectione, et adju¬ torio Dei speciali contra tentationes, et eo non praesente, necessario cedimus et suc¬ cumbimus, quamvis absolute non necessario succumbamus, cum adjutorium Domini ad non peccandum nemini denegetur, ut in 2. lib. demonstravimus. Adam vero isto adjuto¬ rio non egebat quia rebellio carnis, eteoncu- pi scentia, unde tentationes oriuntur, in eo non erat. Utrumque Pelagiani negabant, et liberum nostrum arbitrium nulla in re libero arbitrio Adami concedere contende¬ bant, et ad hanc falsam sententiam suam, ipsius etiam Augustini verba in libris de libero arbitrio scriptis, eidem Augustino objiciebant. Hac igitur de causa in lib. i. retractationum, cap. 9. sanctus Augustinus clarius explicat sententiam suam, et mo¬ net in lib. iii. de libero arbitrio, cap. 18. non se tacuisse hanc diversitatem inter li¬ berum arbitrium nostrum, et Adami ante peccatum. Quare verba illa : « Cum autem de libera voluntate recte faciendi loquimur, de illa scibcet in qua homo factus est, loqui¬ mur ». Non significant, ut Calvinus falso credidit, omnia loca horum librorum expo¬ nenda esse, de solo libero arbitrio Adami ; sed omnia loca, in quibus asseritur libertas eligendi sine resistentia partis inferioris, et sine ulla ignorantia, et difficultate, intelli- genda esse de libero arbitrio quale fuit an¬ te peccatum, non quale nunc est post pec¬ catum; Id autem ita esse, confirmari potest ex ver¬ bis ejusdem capitis decimi octavi, libri tertii, de libero arbitrio : « Nec mirandum, inquit, quod vel ignorando non habet liberum arbi¬ trium, ad eligendum quid recte faciat vel resistente carnali consuetudine, videat quid recte faciendum sit, et velit, nec possit im¬ plere. Illa est enim peccati poena justissima, ut amittat unusquisque quo bene uti noluit, cum sine ulla posset difficultate, si vellet ». Nota illud, « velit, nec possit implere ». Sig¬ nificat enim, quod diximus, libere hominem velle, sed non libere implere, propter resi¬ stentiam partis inferioris. ibid. « Appro¬ bare falsa pro veris ut erret invitus, et resi¬ stente dolore carnalis vinculi, non posse a libidinosis operibus temperare, non est na¬ tura instituti hominis, sed poena damnati. Cum autem de libera voluntate recte facien¬ di loquimur, de illa scilicet, in qua homo factus est, loquimur » . Vides hic libertatem recte faciendi, quae homini instituto concedi¬ tur, opponi necessitati errandi, et concupi¬ scendi contra voluntatem ? Poterat igitur Adam non errare invitus, et temperare ab omnibus motibus carnis, quod nos minime possumus, etiamsi velimus. Atque haec est prima diversitas inter nos et Adamum. Idem Augustinus in eodem lib. i. retracta¬ tionum, cap. 9. explicat alteram differen¬ tiam inter liberum arbitrium nostrum, et Adami, quod nos egeamus adjutorio, quo il¬ le non egebat : « Novi, inquit, haeretici Pe¬ lagiani, qui liberum sic asserunt voluntatis arbitrium, ut gratiae non relinquant locum, non se extollant, quasi eorum egerim cau¬ sam, quia multa in his libris dixi pro libero arbitrio, quae illius disputationis causa po¬ scebat. » Et infra : « In his, atque hujusmo¬ di verbis meis, quia gratia Dei commemorata non est, de qua tunc non agebatur, putant Pelagiani, vel putare possunt, suam nos te¬ nuisse sententiam. Sed frustra hoc putant». Idem etiam Augustinus in libro de natura et gratia, cap. 67. demonstrat in iii. lib. de libero arbitrio, non fuisse omnino praeteri¬ tam gratiae mentionem. Nam cum Pelagiani objecissent illud ex eodem lib iii. « Quis enim peccat in eo quod caveri non potest »? Respondit, neminem peccare in eo quod vi¬ tare non potest, sed non ideo vitari posse peccata, quod adhuc sit integra natura ut erat in Adamo, sed quoniam Dei gratia prae¬ sto est. Et addit, id se non tacuissein m. lib. de libero arbitrio : « Ex ipsis, inquit, libris, oportet me commemorare, quod iste si sen- 4 CAPUT XX VII. 97 tiret, atque in suis litteris poneret, nulla in¬ ter nos de hac re controversia remaneret ». Et mox recitat multa, et inter alia illud ex cap. 19. lib. iii. n Cum ubique sit praesens, qui multis modis per creaturam suam aver¬ sum vocet, doceat credentem, consoletur sperantem, diligentem adhortetur, conantem adjuvet, exaudiat deprecantem, non tibi de¬ putatur ad culpam, quod invitus ignoras, sed quod negligis quaerere quod ignoras, neque illud quod vulnerata membra non col¬ ligis, sed quod volentem sanare contemnis». Ex his omnibus habenius S. Augustinum in libris de libero arbitrio, sic Manichaeos, et per hoc etiam Calvinistas, vere ac solide confutasse, ut tamen causam Pelagianorum nulla ex parte adjuverit; licet non ita dili¬ genter, et copiose gratiam commendaverit, quam tunc nemo negabat, sicut postea fecit, cum occasio illam defendendi se obtulit. Tertium testimonium sumitur ex libro de vera religione, cap. 14. ubi sic loquitur san¬ ctus Augustinus : « Usque adeo peccatum voluntarium est malum, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit voluntarium. Et hoc quidem manifestum est adeo, ut nulla hic doctorum paucitas, nulla indoctorum turba dissentiat ». Et infra : « Et quoniam peccari non dubium est, ne hoc quidem dubitandum video, habere animas liberum voluntatis ar¬ bitrium. Tales enim servos suos meliores es¬ se, Deus judicavit, si ei servirent liberaliter. Quod nullo modo fleri posset, si non volun¬ tate, sed necessitate servirent. « Non potest ad hunc locum responderi, Augustinum ar¬ gumentari ex concessis, et non serio expli¬ care quid sentiat. Quid enim potuit apertius ex sententia sua dicere, quam ita esse ma¬ nifestum, animas habere liberum voluntatis arbitrium; ut nulla hic doctorum paucitas, nulla indoctorum turba dissentiat ? Calvinus igitur ad alterum perfugium se conferens dicit, Augustinum loqui de pec¬ cato primi hominis, quod vere non necessi¬ tate, sed voluntate commissum est. Id au¬ tem probat ex lib. i. retractationum, cap. 13. ubi hunc locum explicans Augustinus ita loquitur : « Potest videri falsa hac definitio, sed si diligenter excutiatur, invenietur esse verissima. Peccatum quippe illud cogitan¬ dum est, quod tantummodo peccatum est, non quod est etiam poena peccati ». Item probat ex libro de natura et gratia, cap. 63. ubi proponitur objectio Pelagii, ex verbis illis Hieronymi lib. ii. in Jovinianum : « Li¬ beri arbitrii nos condidit Deus, nec ad vir¬ tutes, nec ad vitia necessitate trahimur, a- lioqui ubi necessitas, neque corona, neque damnatio est ». Ad quam objectionem re¬ spondet Augustinus : « Quis non agnoscat ? quis non toto corde suscipiat ? quis aliter condita humanam neget esse natura ? sed in recto faciendo ideo nullum est vinculum necessitatis, quia est libertas charitatis ? » At nihilopainus constanter asserbnus, non posse locum Augustini citatum a nobis ex lib. de vera religione ita exponi, ut ad solius Adee peccatumpertinere doceatur. Nam quod peccatum sit omnino voluntarium, et si non sit voluntarium, non sit peccatum, probat Augustinus ex communi consensu generis humani, dum dicit, nullam hic indoctorum turbam dissentire, at certe turba indoctorum, et vulgus generis humani, cum praedicat, non esse peccatum quod voluntate non fit, sed necessitate, non respicit ad peccatum Adami, sed ad experientiam suam, et natu¬ rale lumen omnibus insitum. Deinde affirmat Augustinus non debere corripi peccatores, si non voluntate, sed ne¬ cessitate peccant, si autem non corripiantur, omnem de medio tolli religionem. Ubi sine dubio non loquitur de Adamo, sed de*pecca- tis, quae fiunt ab hominibus, qui hoc tempo¬ re vivunt. Denique scribit Augustinus, ideo sine ulla dubitatione animas liberum habere volunta¬ tis arbitrium, quod dubium non sit, multa peccata fieri. Ubi sicut absque controversia, loquitur de peccatis, quae nunc fiunt, ita etiam sine controversia intelligi debet de li¬ bero arbitrio, quod nunc est. Ad objectionem igitur propositam ex Re¬ tractationibus, respondeo, sanctum Augu¬ stinum significare voluisse definitionem pec¬ cati, in qua ponitur voluntarium, perfectis¬ sime et plenissime convenire primo peccato, sed tamen etiam caetera omnia peccata de¬ bere esse voluntaria, etalioqui non esse pec¬ cata. Quod autem dicit Augustinus, defini¬ tionem illam, nisi diligenter discutiatur, vi¬ deri posse falsam, dicit propter peccatum originale, quod minimum habet de volun¬ tario, non propter peccata actualia, de qui¬ bus modo nos loquimur, quae quidem adeo sunt manifeste voluntaria, ut de illis potissi¬ mum intelligatur, quod nulla hic doctorum paucitas, nulla indoctorum turba dissen¬ tiat. Distinguit igitur Augustinus quatuor ge- 98 LIBER V. nera peccatorum. Primum est peccatum il¬ lud, quod nullius praecedentis est poena pec¬ cati, et tale fuit peccatum primum Adami, quod quia plenissime voluntarium fuit, ideo fuit etiam plenissime perfectissimeque pec¬ catum. Alterum eorum est, qui dominanti cupi¬ ditati consentiunt, quod quidem est aliquo modo poena peccati (nam cupiditas ex pec¬ cato nata est) et est necessarium ex hypo- thesi, quoniam non potest non cadere is, in quo regnat cupiditas, tamen absolute non est necessarium, sed voluntarium, quoniam potest homo cum Dei auxilio facere, ut cu¬ piditas in se non regnet, ac per hoc est etiam absolute, simpliciterque peccatum. Tertium est infantium, qui contrahunt ex parentibus originale peccatum, et hoc non est voluntarium, nisi primi parentis volunta¬ te, et ideo non dicitur actuale, sed originale, et est aliquo modo alienum, aliquo modo proprium, et simul est peccatum, et poena peccati. Et propter hoc (ut jam diximus) sanctus Augustinus monet, respiciendum es¬ se ad peccatum primi hominis, si quis in- telligere velit, quomodo omne peccatum, e- tiam originale, sit voluntarium. Quartum est eorum, qui ex ignorantia pec¬ cant, cum id faciunt, quod ignorant esse peccatum, atque hoc etiam est poena pecca¬ ti, quia ignorantia ex peccato est, et est ali¬ quo modo voluntarium, sed voluntate facti, non voluntate peccati, quoniam volunt face¬ re quod faciunt, sed si scirent esse pecca¬ tum, non vellent facere, nec facerent. Et idcirco hoc est improprie voluntarium, proin¬ de etiam improprie peccatum. Ad objectionem ex libro de natura et gra tia, facillima responsio est. Non enim eo lo¬ co sanctus Augustinus negat, peccatum esse voluntarium, sed addit, gratiam esse neces- sariam ad peccata vitanda, quod nos non ne¬ gamus; atque utinam adversarii sic li¬ berum arbitrium non oppugnarent quomodo nos gratiam libentissime, gratissimeque de¬ fendimus. Quartum testimonium sumitur ex lib. de duabus, animabus, cap. 14. ubi haec ha¬ bentur : « Peccatum est voluntas retinendi, vel consequendi quod justitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere. Nec hic libri obscuri mihi scrutandi erant, unde discerem, nemi¬ nem vituperatione, suppliciove dignum, qui aut id velit, quod justitia velle non prohibet, aut id non faciat, quod facere non potest. Nonne ista cantant in montibus pastores, et in theatris poeta*, et indocti in circulis, et docti in bibliothecis, et magistri in scholis, et antistites in sacris locis, et in orbe terra¬ rum genus humar^um ? » Et cap. 12. « Pec¬ cati reum teneri quemquam, quia non fecit, quod facere non potuit, summaj iniquitatis est, et insaniae. Quamobrem illae animae quid¬ quid faciunt, si natura, non voluntate faciunt, id est, si libero ad faciendum, et non facien¬ dum motu animi carent, si denique his ab¬ stinendi ab opere suo nulla potestas conce¬ ditur, peccato earum teneri non possu¬ mus. » Ad hunc etiam locum responderi non posse, argumentari Augustinum ex concessis, et non loqui ex propria mente, extra contro¬ versiam esse debet. Siquidem ipse se insaniae argueret, si crederet, reum peccati teneri eum, qui non habet liberum arbitrium, ut possit facere et non facere. Respondet igitur Calvinus more solito, loqui Augustinum de peccato primi hominis, quodlibera voluntate commissum fuit. Et probat ex lib. i. retra¬ ctationum, cap. 15. ubi recognoscens sanctus Augustinus locum a nobis citatum, sic ait : « Definitio peccati, qua diximus, peccatum est voluntas retinendi, etc. propterea vera est, quia id definitum est, quod tantummodo peccatum est, non quod est etiam poena pec¬ cati » . At non dicit Augustinus, solum illud esse verum peccatum, quod ita est peccatum, ut non sit etiam poena peccati, alioqui nullum verum peccatum esset poena peccati, et san¬ ctus Augustinus secum ipse pugnaret. Quod si id, quod est poena peccati, potest etiam veruin esse peccatum, certe potest illi etiam peccati definitio convenire. Significat igitur Augustinus, definitionem illam, in qua poni¬ tur libertas ad utrumlibet, praecipue conve¬ nire peccato Adami, quoniam illud ita libere factum est, ut nulla fuerit necessitas neque conditionalis, neque absoluta peccandi. Un¬ de etiam paulo ante in eodem capite, idem Augustinus apposuit illam particulam. Praecipue dicens : « Peccatum quod nus¬ quam est nisi in voluntate, illud Praicipue intelligendum est, quod justa damnatio con¬ secuta est » . Peccata vero, quse fiunt cogente cupiditate (de his enim loquitur hoc loco sanctus Au¬ gustinus) sunt quidem absolute voluntaria, et absolute illis convenit definitio supra po¬ sita, tamen habent aliquid necessitatis ad- CAPUT XXVIII. 99 mixtum, quoniam ex hypothesi, id est, nisi auxilio Dei reprimatur cupiditas, evitari non possunt, et ideo non tam perfecte illis conve¬ nit definitio peccati, ac peccato primi homi¬ nis conveniebat. Denique, non velle Augustinum in retra¬ ctationibus dicere, definitionem a sepositam, in libro de duabus animabus, soli peccato primi hominis convenire, certissimum esse debet. Nam ipse dicit, cantari a pastoribus in moribus, a poetis in theatris, et ab indoctis in circulis, neminem peccare si non facit, quod facere non potest. Certe autem pasto¬ res, poetae, indocti , cum illa cantant, non cogitant Adami peccatum, sed peccata sua, suique similium. Deinde cum ibidem Augu¬ stinus adnit, si anima nostra non habet libe¬ rum arbitrium ad faciendum, et non facien¬ dum, peccato ejus nos teneri non posse : nonne apertissime de nostro, non de Adami peccato, loquitur ? Quintum testimonium sumitur ex lib. 2. Actorum, cum Felice Manichaeo, cap. 3. ubi habentur haec verba : « Esse liberum arbitrium, et inde peccare quemque, si velit, non peccare, si nolit, non solum in divinis Scripturis, quas non intelligitis, sed 'etiam in verbis ipsius Manichaei tibi probo ». Et infra cap. 4. «Audi ergo de libero arbitrio, primo ipsum Dominum, ubi duas arbores commemorat, quarum mentionem ipse fecis¬ ti, audi dicentem, aut facite arborem bonam, et fructum ejus bonum, aut facite arborem malam, et fructum ejus malum. Cum ergo di¬ cit, aut hoc facite, aut illud facite ; potestatem indicat, non naturam. Nemo enim nisi Deus facere arbores potest. Sed habet unusquisque in voluntate, aut eligere quse bona sunt, et esse arbor bona ; aut eligere quse mala, et ©sse arbor mala » . Hunc locum sanctus Augustinus nusquam retractavit. Nam in lib. ii. retraetationum, cap. 8. recensens hos libros, tantum admo¬ net, se non disputasse de gratia, quia non erat necesse. Itaque vera esse illa omnia existimavit, nec pugnare libertatem arbitrii, ut revera non pugnat cum necessitate gra- tiae. Neque dici potest, illum argumentari ex concessis et ad hominem. Nam is (cum quo disputabat) non concedebat, sed negabat, liberum arbitrium, et ideo ex divinis litteris illud probandum ipse suscepit. Confugit igi¬ tur Calvinus ad suam veterem cautionem de libero arbitrio primi hominis. Sed hsec jam est intolerobilis impudentia, cum Augusti¬ nus dicat,- esse liberum arbitrium, et unum¬ quemque (non solum igitur Adamum) inde peccare si velit, non peccare, si nolit. Et id probet ex testimonio Evangelii, quod non ad Adamum, sed ad Judaeos a Domino dictum erat, et denique, cum Augustinus adversus Manichaeos disputet, non de Adami peccato sed de nostris, quae illi negantes liberum ar¬ bitrium excusare, et in principem quemdam tenebrarum referre solebant.