Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book VI: Grace and Free Choice in Works of Piety
Chapter 6: The arguments against the doctrine of the two preceding chapters are solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book VI. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
But there are not wanting certain arguments against the things said in this and the preceding chapter.
First can be objected that of Zacharias, chapter 1: Turn ye to me, and I will turn to you. And that of Proverbs 16: It is the part of man to prepare the soul, and of the Lord to govern the tongue. St. Augustine answers, book 2 to Boniface, chapter 8, and book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 5, that in these sentences free choice is commended, but prevenient grace is not excluded — even as in those, Convert us, O God our saviour, and, The will is prepared by the Lord, prevenient grace is commended, but the cooperation of free choice is not excluded. For if God alone did these things, it would be said to men in vain, “turn ye”; and if men alone sufficed for this, it would be said to God in vain, “convert us”; and if God prepared us without us, it would be false that man prepares the soul; and if without God we prepared our own hearts, it would be false that the will is prepared by the Lord.
Second can be objected two testimonies of the Fathers. For St. John Chrysostom, homily 42 on Genesis, teaches that Abraham received from God great gifts of grace, but had first disposed himself for them through good works; likewise, homily 17 on John, he writes that God does not go before our wills, but that when we shall have been prepared, then at last he is at hand, and helps through grace; and he has like things in homily 12 on the epistle to the Hebrews, and homily 42 to the people of Antioch, and book 1 On Compunction of Heart, at the end. St. Jerome, in book 3 against the Pelagians, twice repeats that it is ours to will, but God’s that we fulfill what we will. I answer: St. John Chrysostom does not indeed preach prevenient grace so openly, since at that time they had not yet arisen who denied it; but neither does he deny it, if his words be taken in a sound way. And so he sometimes attributes to God those things which he alone does, and to us those things which we do with God. And in this way he speaks of Abraham, to whom God alone granted those great gifts — that he should be the father of many nations, and that in his seed all nations should be blessed; but God did not grant these things until after Abraham had long exercised himself in the race-course of the virtues — which indeed was Abraham’s own work, and is by right and deservedly attributed to him, although he did those good works not without the help of God. In like manner are to be explained the things had in homily 17 on John, and in the former book On Compunction of Heart. But sometimes he says that we are not forestalled by God after the manner of one determining to one and bringing necessity, so that the liberty of choice is taken away — which Chrysostom often and willingly repeats, both on account of the Manichaeans, who denied free choice, and also for the shaking-off of the negligence and sloth of men, lest they should think themselves to be so forestalled by God that nothing were left them to do. And St. Jerome says that it is ours to will, but God’s to fulfill what we will — not that it is ours to will without the grace of God, but that we can will many things with the aid of grace which yet, with the same aid, we are not able to fulfill; and that it is God’s alone to bring it about that at some time we fulfill those things we will. For example: we will to live without all sin, and to feel no rebellious motion at all of the lower part; but we cannot fulfill these things, even though that aid be not wanting through which we could will them; but we are compelled to say with the Apostle: To will is present with me; but to accomplish, I find not, Romans 7. Yet God will at some time grant that we fulfill this which we will — when he shall have healed all our languors, and that redemption of our body which we await shall have come. And that St. Jerome did not mean to signify that it is ours to will without the grace of God is clear from the epistle to Ctesiphon, where the same Jerome speaks thus: “To will and to run is mine; but this very ‘mine,’ without the help of God, will not be mine. For the same Apostle says: It is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish.”
Third can be objected that common saying of the schools: to him who does what is in him, God does not deny grace. For hence it follows that if someone do what he can by the powers of nature alone, he by this very fact is disposed for grace, or at least for the special help through which he may then be prepared for grace. I answer: that common saying of the schools is rightly expounded by St. Thomas, in 1-2, question 109, article 6, to the 2nd, and question 112, article 3, to the 1st, and by St. Bonaventure, on 2 Sentences, distinction 28, article 2, question 1, who teach that grace is not denied to him who does what is in him at that time when man does what is in him by cooperating with the grace of God, by which he is moved. For to him who does what is in him from the powers of nature alone is owed not grace, but punishment — not indeed for what he does from the powers of nature alone, but because, for one or another good moral work which he will perhaps do, he will without doubt commit very many deadly sins. Truly, they who teach that man, by doing what is in him by the powers of nature alone, is prepared for grace, either opine that he can by his own powers desire and ask grace from God — and this is the Pelagian heresy, as was proved from the Council of Orange and the other testimonies cited above; or at least they think that man can by his own powers keep all the moral precepts, and lead an innocent life according to reason, and by this moral sanctity call forth God to the giving of special help, by which at last he may arrive at faith and grace — but this too is the Pelagian heresy, refuted enough and more than enough in the preceding book. To omit that no man of this kind can be pointed out from the histories; for that the Catos, Socrates, and others like them, who among the heathen were judged most holy, were covered with many vices, could easily be demonstrated.
Fourth could be objected the example of Cornelius the Centurion, who, because he gave alms, deserved to obtain from God that the Apostle Peter be sent to instruct him in the Christian faith. I answer: Cornelius, before he heard the Christian faith, was not altogether an unbeliever, but knew the one God and religiously worshipped him, as St. Luke writes in the Acts, chapter 10. Accordingly he prayed from faith, and gave alms with the help of God. But even if he had been an unbeliever, yet he would not have done those good works without the gift of God, as St. Augustine teaches, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 7.
The fifth objection: good moral works, which can be done by the powers of nature alone, are not sins; therefore he who does a good moral work does not set a new impediment to grace — which he would set, if he did not do that good work; therefore he is nearer to salvation than if he had not done that good work; therefore more disposed. I answer: the good moral works which are done by a sinner do not make the man more undisposed for grace, since they add no new impediment; yet they do not dispose him, since they have no order or relation to grace. Wherefore God sometimes helps greater sinners, sometimes lesser, more and sooner, with special help.
The sixth objection: man can by his own powers alone fear the punishments of gehenna, for it is natural to fear evil; he will therefore be able, from dread of future punishment, to grieve over sin — which grief is wont by the theologians to be called attrition; but grief of this kind is a disposition for grace, and, the Sacrament coming, justifies; therefore man can by his own powers alone prepare himself for grace. And it is confirmed: since without doubt man can, without any special grace of God, grieve over the offence of a friend, why then could he not also grieve over the offence of God — especially if he be a Christian, and know the supreme benefits of God toward men? I answer: the fear of gehenna, if it be ordered to the detesting and abandoning of sin, is without doubt a gift of God, nor can it be had by the powers of nature alone; for it is the beginning of wisdom, and is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit by Isaias, chapter 11. Much more is the grief and detestation of sin, with the desire of cleansing, a gift of God, since it pertains to salvation. And although one can, without the aid of grace, detest the offence of a friend, yet not of God, of whom the sinner himself is not a friend, but an enemy. Finally, the Christian man knows indeed from faith the supreme benefits of God toward men; yet he is not moved to consider them, and thence to conceive hatred toward his sins and love toward God, unless divine grace forestall him. For he is held by the sleep — or rather the death — of sin, from which nothing rouses him but the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord.
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CAPUT VI. Solvuntur argumenta contra doctrinam duorum praecedentium capitum. Sed non desunt argumenta quaedam ad¬ versus ea, quae dicta sunt in hoc, et praeced. cap. Primum objici potest illud Zachar. cap. i. Convertimini ad me, et ego convertar ad vos. Et illud Prov. xvi. Hominis est praeparare animam , et Domini gubernare linguam (1). Respondet, S. Augustinus lib. u. ad Boni- facium cap. 8. lib. de gratia et libero arbi¬ trio cap. 5. commendari inhissententis libe¬ rum arbitrium, sed non excludi gratiam prae¬ venientem : quemadmodum in illis : Con¬ verte nos Deus salutatis noster. Et : Praepara¬ tur voluntas a Domino. Commendatur gratia praeveniens, sed nonexcluditur liberi arbitrii cooperatio. Si enim solus Deus ista faceret, frustra diccrcturhominibus, convertimini, et si homines soli ad hoc sufficerent, frustra diceretur Deo, converte nos, etsi Deus sine nobis nos praepararet, falsum esset, homi¬ nem praeparare animam, et si absque Deo nos corda nostra praeparemus, falsum esset praeparari voluntatem a Domino. Secundo objici possunt duo testimonia Pa¬ trum. Nam S. Joannes Ghrysostomus hom. 42. in Genesim docet, Abrahamum accepisse a Deo magna dona gratiae, sed antea se ad illa per opera bona disposuisse. Item hom. 17. in Joan. scribit, Deum non praevenire nostras voluntates, sed ubi praeparati fue¬ rimus, tunc demum illum adesse, ac juvare per gratiam. Et similia habet in hom. 12. in epist. ad Hebraeos et homil. 42. ad populum (l)Zach. I, 3; Prov. XVI, 1. 118 LIBER VI. Antiochenum, et lib. i. de compunctione cordis, extremo. S. Hieronymus in lib. m. advers. Pelagianos, bis repetit, nostrum esse velle, Dei autem, ut impleamus quod volu¬ mus. • Respondeo : S. Joannes Chrysostomus non ita quidem aperte gratiam praevenien¬ tem praedicat, quoniam eo tempore nondum exorti fuerant, qui eam negarent ; s6d tamen neque eam negat, si verba ejus sano modo accipiantur. Itaque nonnumquam Deo tri¬ buit ea, quae solus ipse facit, nobis autem tribuit ea, quaenos cum Deo facimus. Et hoc modo loquitur de Abrahamo, cui Deus solus praestitit magna illa dona, ut esset pater multarum gentium, et ut in semine ejus be¬ nedicerentur omnes gentes : sed non haec praestitit Deus, nisi posteaquam Abraham se in virtutum stadio diu exercuit, quod qui¬ dem opus ipsius Abrahae fuit, et illi jure, meritoque tribuitur, licet non sine Dei ope, bona illa opera fecerit. Similiter explicanda sunt, quae habentur homil. 17. in Joannem, et in priore de compunctione cordis. Nonnumquam vero dicit, non praeveniri nos aDeoper modum determinantis ad unum, et necessitatem adferentis, ita ut tollatur libertas arbitrii. Id quod saepe ac libenter Chrysostomus repetit, tum propter Mani¬ chaeos, qui negabant liberum arbitrium, tum etiam ad negligentiam et desidiam ho¬ minum discutiendam, ne ita se putarent a Deo praeveniendos esse, ut nihil sibi, relin¬ queretur agendum. Sanctus autem Hieronymus dicit, nostrum esse velle, Dei vero implere quod volumus, non quod nostrum sit velle sine gratia Dei, sed quod nos possimus multa velle cum ad¬ jutorio gratiae, quae tamen cum eodem adju¬ torio non vallemus implere, sed Dei solius <, sit efficere, ut aliquando illa quae volumus impleamus. Ex. gr. volumus sine omni pec¬ cata vivere, et nullum omnino rebellem mo¬ tum partis inferioris sentire ; sed non pos¬ sumus haec implere, etiamsi adjutorium illud non desit, per quod velle ista potuimus ; sed cum Apostolo dicere cogimur : Velle adjacet mihi , perficere autem non invenio , Roman. vii (1). Tamen dabit aliquando Deus, ut hoc quod volumus impleamus, quando sanaverit omnes languores nostros, et ea, quam expe- ctamus, advenerit redemptio corporis nostri. Non voluisse autem S. Hieronymum sig¬ nificare, nostrum esse velle, sine gratia Dei, perspicuum est ex epist. ad Gtesiphon- tem, ubi sic loquitur idem Hieronymus : « Velle et currere meum est, sed ipsum meum sine Dei auxilio non erit meum. Di¬ cit enim idem Apostolus ; Deus est, qui ope¬ ratur in vobis velle et perficere » . Tertio objici potest illud commune scho¬ larum : facienti quod in se est, Deus non de¬ negat gratiam. Hinc enim sequitur, ut si quis faciat quod potest solis naturae viribus, is hoc ipso disponatur ad gratiam, aut certe ad auxilium speciale, per quod deinde prae¬ paretur ‘ad gratiam. Respondeo, dictum illud commune schola¬ rum, recte exponitur a S. Thoma in 1. 2. quaest. 109. art. 6. ad. 2. etquaest. 1,12. art. 3. ad 1. et a S. Bonaventura in 2. sentent. dist. 28. art. 2. quaest. 1. qui docent, tunc facien¬ ti quod in se est non denegari gratiam, cum homo facit quod in se est, cooperando gratiae Dei, a qua movetur. Nam ei, qui facit quod in se est ex solis naturae viribus, non debe¬ tur gratia, sed pcena, non quidem pro eo quod facit ex solis viribus naturae ; sed quo¬ niam pro uno aut altero bono opere morali, quod fortasse faciet, plurima peccata letha- lia sine dubitatione committet. Sane qui docent, hominem faciendo, quod in se est, solis naturae viribus ad gratiam praeparari, aut opinantur, cum suis viribus posse desiderare et petere a Deo gratiam, et haec est haeresis Pelagiana, ut ex Concilio Arausicano, aliisque testimoniis supra cita¬ tis probatum est ; aut certe existimant, pos¬ se hominem servare propriis viribus omnia praecepta moralia, et innocentem vitam age¬ re secundum rationem, et hac sanctitate morali provocare Deum ad auxilium speciale sibi donandum, quo tandem ad fidem, gra¬ tiamque perveniat ; sed haec quoque est haeresis Pelagiana in libro superiore satis superque refutata. Ut omittam, nullum ejus¬ modi hominem ex historiis posse monstrari. Catoncs enim, Socrates, aliique horum si¬ miles, qui inter ethnicos sanctissimi judica¬ ti sunt, multis vitiis coopertos fuisse, facile demonstrari posset. Quarto, posset objici exemplum Cornelii Centurionis, qui quoniam eleemosynas facie¬ bat, impetrare meruit a Deo, ut ad se insti¬ tuendum in fide Christiana Petrus Aposto¬ lus mitteretur. (1) Rom. VII, 18. CAPUT VII. 419 Respondeo : Cornelius antequam fidem Christianam audiret, non erat omnino infi¬ delis, sed unum Deum noverat, eumque re¬ ligiose colebat, ut in Actis cap. 10. S. Lu- cas scribit. Proinde ex fide orabat, et auxi¬ lio Dei eleemosynas faciebat. Sed etiamsi in¬ fidelis fuisset, tamen illa bona opera non si¬ ne dono Dei fecisset, ut S. Augustinus docet, in lib. de praedestinat. Sanctor. cap. 7. Quinta objectio : opera bona moralia, qua? possunt fieri solis naturae viribus, non sunt peccata, ergo qui facit bonum opus morale non ponit novum impedimentum gratiae, quod poneret, si bonum illud opus non faceret, ergo vicinior est saluti, quam si non fecisset bonum illud opus, ergo magis dispositus. Respondeo : bona opera moralia , quae fiunt a peccatore, ‘(non faciunt hominem magis indispositum ad gratiam, cum no¬ vum impedimentum non addant ; tamen non disponunt, cum nullum habeant ordinem, aut relationem ad gratiam. Quocirca Deus interdum majores peccatores, interdum mi¬ nores, auxilio speciali magis et citius ad¬ juvat. Sexta objectio : potest homo suis solis viri¬ bus timere poenas gehenna? ; naturale enim timere malum; poterit igitur metu poenae futurae dolere de peccato, qui dolor a theo¬ logis attritio dici solet : atqui ejusmodi do¬ lor est dispositio ad gratiam, et accedente Sacramento justificat : igitur potest homo suis solis viribus ad gratiam se praeparare. Et confirmatur, quoniam sine dubio potest homo sine ulla speciali gratia Dei do¬ lere de offensa amici, cur igitur non possit etiam dolere de offensa Dei, praesertim si Christianus sit, et noverit summa Dei erga homines beneficia ? Respondeo : timor gehennae si ordinatur ad peccatum detestandum et relinquendum, si¬ ne dubio donum est Dei, neque solis viribus, naturae haberi potest. Ipse enim est initium sapientiae, et inter dona Spiritus sancti nu¬ meratur ab Isaia cap. xi. Multo etiam ma¬ gis dolor, ac detestatio peccati cum deside¬ rio purgationis, donum Dei est cum ad salu¬ tem pertineat. Et quamvis possit quis sine auxilio gratiae detestari offensam amici, non tamen Dei, cujus ipse peccator non est ami¬ cus, sed iilimicus. Denique novit quidem homo Christianus ex fide summa Dei in ho¬ mines beneficia, non tamen movetur ad ea consideranda, et inde concipiendum odium in peccata, et amorem in Deum nisi gratia illuni divina praeveniat. Tenetur enim som¬ no, vel potius morte peccati, a' qua non eum excitat, nisi gratia Dei per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum.