Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book VI: Grace and Free Choice in Works of Piety
Chapter 7: That God cannot be loved without the help of grace
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book VI. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The third opinion remains, about the love of God; which, before it be proved, is briefly to be explained. For the acceptation of love can be manifold, and thereby the question also manifold.
First, the love of God could be taken either for an action of the will, or for a certain propensity toward God as the last end and the highest good; and about this latter we do not inquire in this place, but only about the former. For we judge it established that the nature of the will is propense toward good, and thereby toward God, toward whom we were made; for God made us toward himself, and therefore our heart is unquiet until we rest in him, as St. Augustine speaks, book 1 of the Confessions, chapter 1. Second, the love which is an act of the will can be taken either for the love of God as he is the author of nature, or for the love of the same as he is the giver of eternal felicity; and in this latter way all the Theologians concede that God cannot be loved without the grace of God and preceding faith; nor do we doubt of this matter. Third, the love of God — whether as author of natural goods, or also of supernatural — is either perfect or imperfect; and that in three ways. For one love is perfect because it is a love of God above all things, which, namely, sets God before all things; another imperfect, because it is indeed affected toward God, but does not yet prefer him to the other things. Again, one is perfect because it not only prefers God to all things, but is affected toward him with greater ardor and vehemence than toward any created thing — which is wont to be called love above all things both appreciatively and intensively; another is imperfect, because it esteems God indeed above all things, and would rather lose all other things than him, yet is not, as regards intensity, so vehemently affected toward God as toward created things. Finally, one is perfect because it not only loves God above all things by some single act of the will, while it thinks him to be the highest and infinite good, but also perseveres in the love even to the fulfilling of all the commandments — which is called love above all things as to affection and effect; another is imperfect, because it is indeed affected toward God above all things while it thinks him the highest good, and no occasion of temptation occurs, yet, an alluring object occurring, it easily fails and is extinguished.
We, then, understand that third opinion, noted in the very title of the chapter, thus: that we judge that God cannot be loved without his own help — neither as author of nature, nor as bestower of grace and glory; neither perfectly, nor imperfectly, in any way. And we do not doubt that this is the opinion of St. Augustine — nay, even of the Scriptures and Councils — whatever some have written less considerately in this part.
First, then, the divine Scripture everywhere testifies that love is the gift of God. Romans 5: The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us. 1 John 4: Charity is of God. Ephesians 6: Peace be to the brethren, and charity with faith, from God the Father. Galatians 5: The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, etc. They will say, perhaps, that these are understood only of the love of God as he is the author of supernatural goods. But Scripture nowhere so restricts the gift of love; rather it pronounces absolutely that the charity of God is of God, and is given us through the Spirit; and the author of all natural goods is truly and properly God: why then should the love of him not be of God, and a gift of the Holy Spirit? Moreover, he who loves God as the author of nature, and his neighbor for God’s sake, certainly fulfills the whole natural law — for love is the fulfilling of the law; but he who fulfills the whole natural law has in him, without doubt, that charity which the Scriptures commend to us. For blessed Paul, when he writes, Romans 13, He that loveth hath fulfilled the law, speaks of the law of nature, as is clear from those words, Thou shalt not kill, etc. And those conditions of true charity described in 1 Corinthians 13 — Charity is patient, is kind, etc. — without doubt befit that love by which God is loved above all things as the author of nature. Finally, he who loves God as the author of nature can certainly love his neighbor, and does in fact love him, as himself. But, says the Lord, John 14: He that hath my commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me. And below: He that loveth me will keep my word; and he that loveth me not keepeth not my words. And what his precepts are he explains in chapter 15: This is my commandment, that you love one another. And below: These things I command you, that you love one another. And so the true charity of God is in him who loves his neighbor — nay, even perfect charity; for, as John writes in the first epistle, chapter 2, He that keepeth his word, in him in very deed the charity of God is perfected; and chapter 4, If we love one another, the charity of God is perfected in us. We have it, then, that the Scriptures which teach that charity is the gift of God must be understood also of that love which is borne toward God as the author of nature.
They will say again that those Scriptures speak not of any love of God whatever, but only of that which is born from the infused habit; and that this alone is properly the gift of God, and cannot be had by the powers of nature. But Pelagius did not teach that the love which is born from an infused habit can be had by the powers of nature; and yet Augustine and the other Fathers adduced the Scriptures alleged by us against the Pelagians, who contended that God can be loved without the help of grace. Moreover, the divine Scripture not only preaches that love is the gift of God, but also commands that we love God; but certainly it does not command that we love from an infused habit — which to have is not in our power — but that we love God with the whole heart; even as also, when God commands that we live justly and soberly, he does not order that we do these things from a habit, but only that we do them; for laws are given about acts, not about habits. Therefore the love which according to the Scriptures is the gift of God is not only the infused habit, or the action springing from that habit, but any action whatever by which we love God. They will say, perhaps, last, that the Scriptures produced by us cannot be understood of the imperfect love, by which God is not loved above all things and with the whole heart, but only of the perfect. And that indeed is true — since the imperfect love, by which God is not set before all things, does not deserve the name of charity, nor fulfills the law, nor do those praises befit it which everywhere in the divine writings are attributed to charity; yet from the same places it is proved that that imperfect love is the gift of God, and cannot be had from the powers of nature alone. For of whatever thing the perfection is from God, from him also is the beginning; and as the beginning of faith was proved above to be from God, because faith is from God, so also the beginning of charity is to be attributed to God, because charity itself is from God. “Nor is its beginning from us,” says Augustine, book 2 to Boniface, chapter 9, “and its perfection from God; but if charity is from God, the whole of it is to us from God. For may God avert this madness: that in his gifts we should make ourselves first, him later; for his mercy shall go before me.”
Let the testimonies of Councils come in the second place. The Council of Milevis, canon 4: “Each is the gift of God: both to know what we ought to do, and to love that we may do it.” The Council of Orange, last canon: “It is absolutely the gift of God to love God.” And that we may understand that not only perfect charity is the gift of God, but also the imperfect and inchoate, it subjoins that faith and the love of God are first inspired in us, that we may faithfully seek baptism, and thereafter may be able to fulfill the things pleasing to God. Where you see that a certain imperfect love of God is not from nature, but is inspired by God; and that through it man is led to the grace of justification, and to the perfect charity through which all the commandments are kept. Which same thing the Council of Trent expressed more clearly; for in session 6, chapter 6, it says that man, moved and aroused by God, and with the same Lord helping, begins to love God; then in chapter 7 it adds that in justification itself infused charity is received. The Councils, then, define that not only perfect charity, but also the inchoate, is the gift of God.
Let the testimonies of St. Augustine come in the third place. In epistle 107 to Vitalis: “We lost, by the greatness of the first sin, the free choice for loving God.” Where Augustine simply denies that any action whatever of loving can be had by the powers of free choice alone. The same, in book 4 against Julian, chapter 3: “The love of God, by which one arrives at God, is only from God. Through this love of the creator each one uses creatures well; without this love of the creator, no one uses creatures well.” Here you see that the love of the creator — that is, of the author of nature — is only from God. The same, in the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 17: “And who had begun to give that charity, however small, but he who prepares the will?” And chapter 18: “Why was it said, Let us love one another, because love is of God — except that by the precept free choice was admonished to seek the gift of God? Which indeed would have been admonished wholly without fruit, unless it first received something of love, that it might seek to have added to itself that whereby it might fulfill what was commanded.” Behold, here it is most openly said that a certain imperfect love, by which one asks from God the gift of perfect charity whereby he may be able to fulfill the commandments, is the gift of God. And so, deservedly, in the same place the same Augustine says: “If the love of God and neighbor is not of God, but of men, the Pelagians have conquered; but if it is of God, we have conquered the Pelagians.” See also Prosper, in the book against the Collator, chapter 30 [al. 12], where he compares human nature destitute of all grace to icy stiffness, out of which nothing at all of heat can be struck, unless it begin to be melted by him who said: I am come to cast fire on the earth.
Let reasons come, last. The first reason: The love of God above all things, even if it regard God only as the author of nature, suffers with itself no disordered affection — nay, it includes the hatred of all things delightful contrary to the law of God; therefore, if this love can be obtained by the powers of nature, man will be able by the powers of nature to fulfill all the commandments, to live without all sin — nay, even to be justified from past sins without the grace of God. For it implies a contradiction that someone be in mortal sin and not be turned away from God and turned toward creatures; accordingly, either through that love of God above all things he will be justified from his sins, or else he will be at once turned away from God and turned toward God, turned away from the creature and turned toward the creature. But that man can by the powers of nature alone fulfill all the commandments, live without sin, and be justified from past offences, are manifest Pelagian errors. The second reason: The love of God above all things is the last and greatest disposition toward the grace of the remission of sins, so that that remission does not precede it by any space of time; for God loves those who love him — and he that loveth me, says the Lord, John 14, shall be loved of my Father; and to the sinful woman many sins were forgiven, because she loved much, Luke 7. Wherefore, if man could by his own powers always love God above all things, he could without any prevenient grace of God attain to the remission of sins — which is the very heresy of Pelagius, from Augustine, book 1 to Boniface, last chapter. But let us prove also, by two other reasons, that not only the love of God above all things cannot be had by the powers of nature, but neither the love not above all things — that is, the inchoate and imperfect. The third reason: No work of piety can be done by the powers of nature alone, nor can the contrary be affirmed without danger of heresy, as was demonstrated in the fourth chapter. But the love of God — even as of the author of nature, and imperfect and inchoate — is a work of piety, as St. Augustine teaches in epistle 29 [al. 167] to Jerome, who speaks thus: “Piety is the worship of God, which is exhibited chiefly by loving.” Therefore every love of God needs the help of grace, that it may be had by us. Nor can it be answered that that love alone is piety which is borne toward God as the author of beatitude. For even in pure natural endowments man would be bound to worship God, although then there were no promise of eternal felicity; nor is there any doubt that the worship of piety is owed to God because he is God — that is, the highest good, the first principle, and the last end of all things — which would certainly belong to him, even if he had willed to bestow supernatural beatitude on no one. The fourth reason: Every disposition toward justification arises from the gift of God and his prevenient grace, as was sufficiently proved in the fifth chapter. But any love whatever, however small and inchoate, is a disposition toward justification, since it is conversion, or at least the beginning of conversion; therefore without the gift of God and his prevenient grace it cannot be had. Nor indeed is it necessary that the love of God be borne toward God as the author of beatitude, that it may be called conversion. For as the turning away from God as the author of nature is a true turning away, so the turning toward the same, as the author of nature, is a true conversion.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT VII. i\ o u posse sine auxilio gratix diligi Deum . Tertia restat sententia de dilectione Dei, quae priusquam probetur, paucis explicanda est. Siquidem multiplex esse potest dilectio¬ nis acceptio, ac per hoc etiam multiplex quaestio. Primum, accipi posset dilectio Dei vel pro actione voluntatis, vel pro quadam propen¬ sione ad Deum, ut finem ultimum et sum¬ mum bonum, et de hac posteriore non quae¬ rimus hoc loco, sed tantum de priore. Nam pro comperto haberi existimamus, naturam voluntatis propensam esse ad bonum, ac per hoc ad Deum, ad quem facti sumus, fe¬ cit enim nos Deus ad se, et ideo inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescamus in ip¬ so, ut S. Augustinus loquitur lib. i. Confes sion. cap. 4. Secundo, dilectio, quae est actus volunta¬ tis accipi potest, vel pro dilectione Dei, ut is est a actor naturae, vel pro dilectione ejus¬ dem, ut est donator felicitatis aeternae. Et hoc modo posteriox^e concedunt omnes Theo¬ logi, non posse diligi Deum sine gratia Dei, et fide praecedente ; neque nos de hac re dubitamus. Tertio, dilectio Dei, sive ut auctor bo¬ norum naturalium, sive etiam supernatura- lium, alia est perfecta, alia imperfecta : id- que tribus modis. Alia enim est perfecta, quoniam est dilectio Dei super omnia, quae videlicet Deum rebus omnibus anteponit. Alia imperfecta, quoniam afficitur quidem erga Deum, sed nondum illum rebus caeteris praefert. Rursus alia est perfecta, quia non solum Deum rebus omnibus praefert, sed majore ar¬ dore ac vehementia in illum afficitur, quam in ullam rem creatam, quae dici solet dilectio super omnia, tam appretiative, quam inten- sive. Alia est imperfecta, quoniam aestimat quidem super omnia Deum, et mallet caete- ra omnia potius, quam illum perdere, ta- i 120 LIBER VI. men non ita vehementer, quod attinet ad intensionem, afficitur in Deum, ac in res creatas. Alia denique est perfecta, quoniam non modo Deum super omnia diligit, unico ali¬ quo actu voluntatis, dum eum cogitat sum¬ mum esse, atque infinitum bonum, sed etiam perseverat in dilectione usque ad im- pletionem omnium mandatorum, quae dici¬ tur dilectio super omnia, quoad affectum et effectum. Alia est imperfecta, quoniam affi¬ citur quidem in Deum super omnia, dum eum cogitat summum esse bonum, et nulla occurrit tentationis occasio, tamen occur¬ rente objecto aliquo alliciente, facile defi¬ cit et extinguitur. Nos igitur sententiam illam tertiam in ip¬ so titulo capitis annotatam, ita intelligimus, ut existimemus, non posse Deum sine ope ipsius diligi, neque ut auctorem naturae, neque ut largitorem gratiae et gloriae : ne¬ que perfecte, neque imperfecte ullo modo : atque hanc non dubitamus sententiam esse S. Augustini, imo etiam Scripturarum et Conciliorum, quicquid aliqui minus conside¬ rate in hac parte scripserint. Primum igitur, Scriptura divina passim testatur, dilectionem esse donum Dei. Rom. v : Charitas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris, per Spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis (d). I Joan. iv : Charitas ex Deo est. Ephes. vi : Pax fratribus; et charitas cum fide a Deo patre. Ad Calat, v : Fructus spiriffis est charitas, daudium, etc. (d). Dicent fortasse, haec intelligi solum de amore Dei, ut est auctor bonorum superna- turalium. At scriptura nusquam ita restrin¬ git dilectionis donum, sed absolute pronun- ciat, charitatem Dei ex Deo esse, et per spi¬ ritum nobis dari : auctor autem bonorum omnium naturalium vere, ac proprie Deus est ; cur igitur ejus dilectio non sit ex Deo, et Spiritus sancti donum ? Praeterea qui diligit Deum, ut auctorem naturae, et proximum propter Deum, certe implet totamlegem naturalem. Nam plenitu¬ do legis est dilectio. Qui vero totam legem naturalem implet, in eo sine dubio charitas illa est, quam Scripturae nobis commendant. Nam B. Paulus cum scribit ad Rom. cap. 13. Qui diligit , legem implevit (2), de lege na¬ turae loquitur, ut perspicuum est ex verbis illis : Non occides etc. Et illae conditiones ve¬ rae charitatis, quae describuntur, I Corinth. xm. Charitas patiens est, benigna, etc. Sine dubio dilectioni illi conveniunt, qua diligi¬ tur super omnia Deus, ut auctor naturae. Denique, qui diligit Deum, ut auctorem naturae, certe proximam diligere potest, et re ipsa diligit, sicut se ipsum. At, inquit Do¬ minus, Joannis cap. xiv : Qui habet manda¬ ta mea, et servat ea, ille est qui diligit me. Et infra : Qui diligit me, sermonem meum servabit, et qui non diligit me, sermones meos non servat. Quae sint autem sua praecepta explicat in cap. xv. Hoc est praeceptum meum, ut diligatis invicem. Et in infra : Haec mando vobis, ut diligatis invicem. Itaque vera cha¬ ritas Dei est iri eo, qui diligit proximum. Imo etiam perfecta charitas. Nam ut scribit Joan- nes in i. epist. cap. ii. Qui servat verbum ejus , in hoc vere charitas Dei perfecta est (d). Et cap. iv. Si diligamus ingicem, charitas Dei in nobis perfecta est (3). Habemus igitur Scri¬ pturas, quae docent charitatem esse donum Dei, intelligi debere de illa etiam dilectione, quae fertur in Deum, ut auctorem na¬ turae. Dicent rursus, eas Scripturas non loqui de quacumque dilectione Dei, sed de illa tan¬ tum, quae nascitur ex habitu infuso ; eam- que solam proprie esse donum Dei, et natu¬ rae viribus haberi non posse. At Pelagius non docebat dilectionem, quae nascitur ex habitu infuso, viribus naturae haberi posse, et tamen Augustinus, aliique Patres, Scri¬ pturas a nobis allegatas adducebant contra Pelagianos, qui contendebant, Deum diligi posse sine auxilio gratiae. Praetera Scriptura divina non solum prae¬ dicat, dilectionem esse donum Dei, sed etiam praecipit, ut diligamus Deum ; at certe non praecipit, ut diligamus ex habitu infuso, quem habere, non est in nostra potestate, sed ut diligamus Deum ex toto corde ; quem¬ admodum etiam cum praecipit Deus, ut ju¬ ste, sobrieque vivamus, non imperat, ut ista faciamus ex habitu, sed tantum ut faciamus. Leges enim de actibus dantur, non de habi¬ tibus. Igitur dilectio, quae secundum Scri¬ pturas est donum Dei, non est solum habitus infusus, aut actio ex habitu illo scaturiens, sed quaccumquc actio , qua diligimus Deum. (l) Rom. V, 5 ; 1 Joan. IV, 7 ; Eph. VI, 23; Gal. V, 22. - (2) Rom. XIII, 8. - (3) Joan. XIV, 21, 23 ; ibid. XV, -H, 12 ; 1 Joan. II, 4 ; ibid. IV, 17. ^ CAPUT VII. 1:!1 Dicent fortasse postremo, Scripturas a nobis productas, non posse intelligi de dile¬ ctione imperfecta, qua non diligitur Deus su¬ per omnia, et toto corde, sed solum de per¬ fecta. At id quidem verum est, quoniam di¬ lectio imperfecta, qua Deus non antefertur omnibus rebus, non meretur nomen charita- tis, neque implet legem, neque conveniunt illi encomia, quse passim tribuuntur in divi¬ nis litteris charitati : tamen ex eisdem locis convincitur imperfecta illa dilectio, donum esse Dei, et ex solis natura; viribus haberi non posse. Nam cujus rei perfectio est a Deo, ab illo etiam est inchoatio. Et sicut ini¬ tium fidei supra probatum est, esse a Deo, quia fides a Deo est, ita quoque initium charitatis tribuendum est Deo, quia charitas ipsa est a Deo. « Nec initium ejus (inquit Augustinus lib. ii. ad Bonifac. cap. 9.) ex nobis, et perfectio ejus ex Deo, sed si cha¬ ritas ex Deo est, tota nobis ex Deo est. Aver¬ tat eniir, Deus hanc amentiam, ut in ejus do¬ nis nos priores faciamus, posteriorem ip¬ sum, quoniam misericordia ejus pr.eveniet me. » Accedant secundo loco testimonia Conci¬ liorum, Concilium Milevitanum, canone i. « Utrumque donum Dei, et scire quid facere debeamus, et diligere ut faciamus. » Conci¬ lium Arausioanum can. ult, « Prorsus do¬ num Dei est diligere Deum. » Et ut intelli- gamus, non solum perfectam charitatem es¬ se Dei donum, sed etiam imperfectam et in¬ choatam, subjungit, fidem et amorem Dei nobis primum inspirari, ut baptismum fide¬ liter requiramus, et deinde quee Deo sunt placita implere possimus. Ubi vides amorem Dei quemdam imperfectum non esse ex natu¬ ra, sed a Deo inspirari, et per eum perduci hominem ad justificationis gratiam, et per¬ fectam charitatem, per quam omnia manda¬ ta servantur, quod idem expressit clarius Tridentinum Concilium. Nam sessione 6. cap. 6, dicit, hominem a Deo motum et ex¬ citatum, atque eodem Domino adjuvante in¬ cipere diligere Deum. Deinde cap. 7. ad¬ dit, in ipsa justificatione recipi charitatem infusam. Concilia igitur non solam charita¬ tem perfectam, sed etiam inchoatam Dei do¬ num esse definiunt. Accedant tertio S. Augustini testimonia, in epistola 107. ad Vitalem : « Liberum, in¬ quit, arbitrium ad diligendum Deum pri¬ mi peccati granditate perdidimus. » Ubi simpliciter actionem diligendi quamcum- Tom. VI. que, negat Augustinus solis liberi arbitrii viribus haberi posse. Idem in libro iv. in Julianum, cap. 3. « Amor, inquit, Dei, pro pervenitur ad Deum non est nisi a Deo. Per hunc amorem creatoris bene quisque utitur creaturis, sine hoc amore creatoris, nemo bene utitur creaturis. » Hic vides amorem creatoris, id est, auctoris naturae, non esse nisi a Deo. Idem in libro de gratia et libero arbitrio cap. 17. « Et quis istam, quamvis parvam dare coeperat charitatem, nisi qui praeparat voluntatem ? » Et cap. 18. « Cur, inquit, dictum est, diligamus invicem, quia dilectio ex Deo, nisi quia praecepto admoni¬ tum est liberum arbitrium, ut quaereret Dei donum ? quod quidem sine suo fructu pror¬ sus admoneretur, nisi prius acciperet aliquid dilectionis, ut addi sibi quaereret, unde quod jubebatur impleret. » En hic apertissime di¬ citur Dei donum imperfecta quaedam dilea ctio, qua quis a Deo petit donum perfectae charitatis, quo mandata valeat adimplere. Itaque merito in eodem loco idem Augusti¬ nus ait : « Si non ex Deo, sed ex hominibus est dilectio Dei et proximi, vicerunt Pela- giani ; si autem ex Deo, vicimus Pelagia - nos. » Vide etiam Prosperum in lib. contra Col¬ latorem, cap. 30, ubi comparat naturam hu¬ manam omni gratia destitutam glaciali ri¬ gori, ex quo nihil omnino caloris excuti po¬ test, nisi resolvi incipiat ab illo, qui dixit : Ignem veni mittere in terram. Accedant ultimo rationes. Prima ratio. Amor Dei super omnia, etiamsi Deum solum respiciat, ut auctorem naturae, non patitur secuin ullum affectum inordinatum , imo includit odium rerum omnium delectabilium contra legem Dei, ergo si potest hic amor naturae viribus obtineri, poterit homo natu¬ rae viribus implere omnia mandata, vivere sine omni peccato, imo et a praeteritis sine gratia Dei justificari. Nam implicat contra¬ dictionem, ut quis in peccato mortali sit, et non sit aversus a Deo, et conversus ad crea¬ turas. Proinde vel per amorem illum Dei super omnia 'justificabitur a peccatis, vel certe simul erit aversus a Deo, et conversus ad Deum, aversus a creatura et conversus ad creaturam. At posse hominem solis natu- ree viribus implere omnia mandata, vivere sine peccato, et a praeteritis delictis justifi¬ cari, manifesti sunt Pelagiani errores. Secunda ratio. Dilectio Dei super omnia est ultima et maxima dispositio ad gratiam 9 122 UBER VI. remissionis peccatorum, ita ut non praecedat eam remissionem ullo spatio temporis, nam Deus diligentes §e diligit. Et qui diligit me (inquit Dominus, Joan. cap. xiv.) diligetur a Patre meo (1). Et peccatrici remissa sunt peccata multa, quoniam dilexit multum, Lu¬ cae cap. vix. Quare si posset homo suis viri¬ bus semper diligere Deum super omnia, posset sine ulla Dei gratia praiveniente per¬ tingere ad remissionem peccatorum. Quae est ipsissima haeresis Pelagii ex Augustino in lib. i. ad Bonifacium cap. ult. Sed probe¬ mus etiam duabus aliis rationibus, non so¬ lum dilectionem Dei super omnia viribus naturae haberi non posse, sed neque dilectio¬ nem non super omnia, id est, inchoatam et imperfectam. Tertia ratio. Nullum opus pietatis fieri potest solis naturae viribus, neque contrarium affirmari sine haeresis periculo, demonstra¬ tum est in quarto capite. At dilectio Dei, quamvis ut auctoris naturae, et imperfecta atque inchoata opus est pietatis, ut S. Au¬ gustinus docet in epist. 29. ad Hieronymum, qui sic ait : « Pietas est cultus Dei, qui prae¬ cipue diligendo exhibetur. » Igitur omnis dilectio Dei eget auxilio gratiae, ut haberi possit a nobis. Neque responderi potest, di¬ lectionem illam solam esse pietatem, quae fertur in Deum, ut auctorem beatitudinis. Nam etiam in puris naturalibus- teneretur homo Deum colere, quamvis tunc nulla esset felicitatis aeternae promissio. Neque dubium est, quin pietatis cultus debeatur Deo, quia Deus est, id est, summum bonum, princi¬ pium primum, et tinis ultimus omnium re¬ rum, quod certe illi conveniret, etiamsi su- pernaturalem beatitudinem largiri nemini voluisset. Quarta ratio. Omnis dispositio ad justifi¬ cationem ex dono Dei, et gratia illius prae¬ veniente oritur, ut satis probatum est in quinto capite. At quaevis dilectio, quantum¬ vis parva, et inchoata, est dispositio ad ju¬ stificationem, cum sit conversio, vel certe conversionis initium ; igitur sine dono Dei, et gratia illius praeveniente haberi non po¬ test. Neque vero necesse est, ut dilectio Dei feratur in Deum ut auctorem beatitudinis, ut dici possit conversio. Nam quemadmodum aversio a Deo, ut auctore naturae, vera est aversio, ita conversio ad eumdem, ut au¬ ctorem naturae, est vera conversio.