Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book VI: Grace and Free Choice in Works of Piety
Chapter 8: The contrary arguments are solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book VI. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
But against this some object these reasons.
The first reason: The love of God above all things is natural to man; for the will is naturally inclined toward good, and more inclined toward a greater good, and most of all toward the greatest; accordingly it is inclined above all things toward the highest good, which is God. Why then could not man by his own powers love God above all things, at least as the author of nature, since that is most according to his nature? I answer: the love of God above all things is natural as regards the inclination of nature, which remains in man after the manner of first act, and is nothing other than the will itself, propense toward good; yet it cannot come forth into second act, on account of the corruption of nature, without the help of the grace of God. Nor is it necessary that, wherever there is a natural inclination, there be also powers sufficient of themselves to perfect that act toward which nature leans. For the human soul, separated from the body, naturally leans toward the body, and yet cannot by its own powers be coupled again with the body; and according to the opinion of many, the mind of man is naturally inclined toward seeing God, and yet cannot by its own powers see God.
The second reason: The love of God — whether of friendship or of concupiscence — arises from love of self. For (as the Philosopher teaches) the friendly dispositions which are toward another arise from the friendly dispositions which are toward oneself. And so man loves God with the love of concupiscence, because he understands that his own highest good is placed in the vision of him; he loves the same with the love of friendship, because he knows him to be as it were another self — or rather something more, since he himself is as it were a part, and God as it were the whole. But love of self is had without the help of grace; therefore also the love of God, which (as we said) takes its beginning from love of self. I answer: the love of God as the author of nature arises from love of self — not any whatever, but ordered; that is, that by which one loves oneself as a part, as a creature, as a thing fashioned by God. For disordered love of self, which in the sacred writings is called cupidity, begets not love but contempt of God, as St. Augustine teaches, book 14 On the City of God, last chapter; for disordered love of self makes itself, as it were, the whole, and the principle and end of all things. Further, ordered love of self does not exist from corrupt nature, but is inspired by God correcting and healing nature. And so St. John, in the first epistle, chapter 4: Let us love one another, for charity is of God — where he says that the love of neighbor, and thereby also the ordered love of self, from which the love of neighbor is born, is from God.
The third objection: Natural reason dictates that God is to be loved above all things; but the will can elicit an act conformed to the judgment of reason; for otherwise it would necessarily choose evil, or suspend the act, and thereby would either be necessarily evil, or at least not free. I answer: that God is to be loved above all things reason dictates by a certain universal judgment, from which the will often departs, according to that: “I see the better things, and approve them; I follow the worse.” But the particular judgment, which dictates here and now, “God is to be loved by me above all things,” cannot be had without the help of grace, since it depends on the inclination of the will, and pertains to salvation and piety. And that man cannot, without the aid of grace, will to love God above all things, though the universal judgment dictate that so it must be done, is not an argument that the will is necessarily evil, or not free, but that it is infirm, and more corrupted than reason is.
The fourth objection: Man can love his neighbor above all things, so that he even expose himself to death for him — which parents often do for their children; likewise an unbeliever can love God as known according to his own heresy or perfidy, so as even to die for him — which we sometimes see in heretics and Jews; finally, someone can love his fatherland more than himself — which we know from the histories many of the Romans did, who offered themselves to most certain death for their fatherland. Why then could not man, by the same reasoning, love the true God above all things, without the help of grace? I answer: it is easier to love oneself, or another creature, above all things, than God: both because sensible things are better known — whence John says, in the first epistle, chapter 4: He that loveth not his brother, whom he seeth, how can he love God, whom he seeth not? — and also because corrupt nature always inclines toward self and its own. Further, they who die for their heresies, or for their fatherland, seek themselves — that is, their own glory; of which above all the Romans among the heathen, and the heretics among unbelievers, were ever most greedy. See Augustine, in the book On Patience, chapters 16 and 17, where he solves a like argument, and among other things speaks thus: “They who say these things do not understand that each of the unjust is the harder for enduring any evils whatever, the greater in him is the cupidity of the world; and each of the just the stronger for bearing any evils whatever, the greater in him is the charity of God. But the cupidity of the world has its beginning from the choice of the will, its progress from the pleasantness of delight, its confirmation from the chain of custom; whereas the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us.” Add that if anyone should truly die for his fatherland, seeking chiefly not his own glory but the fatherland’s safety, he — though an unbeliever — would have to be believed to do this not without special help. For although to die for the fatherland is a moral work, yet it is arduous and difficult, and therefore can by no means be performed by a nature infirm, and prone to the loving of itself.
The fifth objection: A sinful man can, without the help of grace, will that God be God, and that he himself be not God, but man; therefore he can, without the help of grace, love God more than himself. I answer: the sinful man wills that God be God because he cannot prevent it from being so. For otherwise he wills rather that he be man, and such a man, than that God be God. But this is to prefer his own life to God, and to love himself more than God.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
. CAPUT VIII. Solvuntur argumenta contraria. At contra objiciunt quidam has rationes. Prima ratio. Dilectio Dei super omnia est homini naturalis, nam inclinatur voluntas naturaliter ad bonum, et magis inclinatur ad majus bonum, et maxime ad maximum, proinde inclinatur super omnia ad summum bonum, quod est Deus : cur ergo non possit homo suis viribus diligere Deum super om¬ nia, saltem ut auctorem naturae, cum id sit maxime secundum ejus naturam ? Respondeo : dilectio Dei super omnia na¬ turalis est, quod attinet ad inclinationem na¬ turae, quae manet in homine per modum ac¬ tus primi, neque est aliud, quam ipsa pro¬ pensa ad bonum : tamen non potest in actum secundum prodire propter naturae corrupti¬ onem, sine auxilio gratiae Dei. Neque neces¬ se est, ut ubicumque est inclinatio naturalis, sint etiam vires sufficientes per se ad actum illum perficiendum, ad quem natura propen¬ det. Nam humana anima, a corpore separata, naturaliter propendet ad corpus, nec tamen suis viribus potest iterum cum corpore copu¬ lari : et juxta multorum sententiam natura¬ liter inclinatur mens hominis ad Deum vi¬ dendum, nec tamen potest suis viribus Deum videre. Secunda ratio. Amor Dei sive amicitiae, sive concupiscentias, oritur ex amore sui. Nam (ut Philosophus.docet) amicabilia, qua; sunt ad alterum, oriuntur ex amicabilibus, qua; sunt ad se. Itaque diligit homo Deum, amore concupiscentia^, quia intelligitin ejus visione summum suum bonum positum esse : Diligit eumdem amore amicitiae, quia novit illum esse quasi alterum se, vel potius ali¬ quid amplius, cum ipse sit quasi pars, et Deus quasi totum . At amor sui habetur sine auxilio -gratia;, igitur et amor Dei, qui (ut diximus) initium ducit ex amore sui. Respondeo : amor Dei, ut auctoris natura;, oritur ex amore sui, non quocumque sed or¬ dinato, id est, quo quis amat se, ut partem, ut creaturam, ut figmentum Dei. Amor enim sui inordinatus, qui in sacris litteris cupidi¬ tas dicitur, non parit amorem, sed contem¬ ptum Dei, ut S. Augustinus docet in lib. 14. (1) Joan XIV, 21 . CAPUT IX. 123 de Civit. Dei cap. ult. facit enim amor sui inordinatus, se ipse quasi totum et princi¬ pium, ac finem omnium rerum. Porro amor sui ordinatus non ex natura corrupta existit, sed inspiratur a Deo corrigente, atque sa¬ nante naturam. Itaque S. Joannes in i. epist. cap. iv. Diligamus, inquit, invicem , quia charitas ex Deo est (1). Ubi dilectionem pro¬ ximi, ac per hoc etiam dilectionem sui ordi¬ natam, ex qua nascitur dilectio proximi, dicit esse a Deo. Tertia objectio. Naturalis ratio dictat, Deum esse super omnia diligendum. Potest autem voluntas elicere actum conformem judicio rationis ; nam alioqui necessario eligeret malum, vel actum suspenderet, ac per hoc vel esset necessario mala, vel certe non libera. Respondeo, Deum esse super omnia dili¬ gendum, ratio dictat universali quodam ju¬ dicio, a quo sajpc voluntas recedit, juxta illud : Video meliora , proboque, deteriora se¬ quor. At judicium particulare, quod hic et nunc dictat, Deum a me super omnia dili¬ gendum, non potest haberi sine auxilio gratiae, quoniam pendet ex inclinatione vo¬ luntatis, et ad salutem, et pietatem pertinet. Quod autem non possit homo, sine gratiae ad¬ jutorio, velle diligere Deum super omnia, licet universale judicium dictet, ita esse facien¬ dum, non est argumentum, voluntatem esse necessario malam, aut non liberam, sed in¬ firmam, magisque corruptam, quam sit ratio. Quarta objectio. Potest homo diligere proximum super omnia, ita ut etiam pro illo se morti objiciat, quod saepe faciunt paren¬ tes pro filiis; potest item infidelis diligere Deum secundum suam haeresim, aut perfi¬ diam cognitum, ita ut pro illo etiam moria¬ tur, quod interdum in haereticis et Judaeis cernimus : potest denique aliquis patriam suam diligere, plus quamrse, quod ex histo¬ riis novimus, multos fecisse Romanorum, qui se pro patria morti certissimae obtule¬ runt : cur igitur non possit homo eadem ra¬ tione diligere Deum verum super omnia, sine auxilio gratiae ? Respondeo : facilius est diligere ‘seipsum, aut aliam creaturam super omnia, quam Deum; tum, quia sensibilia melius cogno¬ scuntur; unde Joannes ait, in i. epist. cap. iv : Qui non diligit fratrem, quem videt , Deum, quem non videt , quomodo potest diligere (2) ? Tum etiam, quia natura corrupta semper in¬ clinat ad se, et sua. Porro, qui pro suis hee- resibus, aut pro patria moriuntur, se ipsos quaerunt, id est, gloriam propriam, quarum praecipue Romani inter ethnicos, et haeretici inter infideles avidissimi semper fuerunt. Vi¬ de Augustinum in lib. de patientia cap. 16 et 17. ubi simile argumentum solvit, et inter alia sic loquitur : « Qui haec dicunt, non in- telligunt quemque iniquorum, tanto esse ad quaecumque mala toleranda duriorem, quanto in eo major est cupiditas mundi ; et quemque justorum, tanto esse ad quaecumque mala perferenda fortiorem, quanto in eo est major charitas Dei. Sed cupiditas mundi initium habet ex arbitrio voluntatis, progressum ex jucunditate voluptatis, firmamentum ex vin¬ culo consuetudinis : Charitas autem Dei dif¬ fusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis. » Adde, quod si quis vere pro patria more¬ retur, non gloriam suam, sed patrias salutem potissimum quaerens, is, quamvis infidelis, non sine auxilio speciali id facere credendus esset. Tametsi enim mori pro patria sit opus morale, tamen est arduum, ac difficile, et ideo a natura infirma, et ad seipsain diligen¬ dam prona praestari nequaquam potest. Quinta objectio. Potest homo peccator, sine auxilio gratiae, velle Deum esse Deum, se autem non esse Deum, sed hominem ; igitur potest sine auxilio gratiae, Deum magis amare, quam se. Respondeo : vult homo peccator Deum esse Deuin, quia non potest prohibere, quo minus ita sit. Alioqui enim magis vult se hominem , et talem hominem esse , quam Deum, Deum esse. Atqui hoc est vitam suam Deo praeferre, seque ipdum magis amare, quam Deum.