Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book VI: Grace and Free Choice in Works of Piety
Chapter 11: The liberty of choice in works of piety is proved from the tradition of the Fathers
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book VI. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Let there now come, for the proving of the same matter, the tradition of the ancient Church. And indeed John Calvin, in book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 3, § 11 [al. 10], confesses that our opinion began to be handed down and believed in the Church many ages ago: “And God moves the will,” says he, “not in the manner which for many ages has been handed down and believed — that it should be of our election to obey the motion of God, or to withstand it,&rdquoo; etc. And those “many ages” he understands as, at the least, a space of more than a thousand and one hundred years; for he straightway subjoins: “That saying, then, so often repeated by Chrysostom, must be repudiated: Whom he draws, he draws willing,” etc. But Chrysostom flourished a thousand and one hundred years ago. And so, even by the adversary’s witness, our opinion was not introduced by the Scholastic Theologians, but was celebrated in the ancient and true Church of Christ — which one argument ought to have satisfied prudent men. Nay, what of this: that not only from a thousand and one hundred years, but from a thousand and four hundred — and indeed from the beginning of the Church — this same opinion began to be taught and received? For St. Ignatius, in the epistle to the Magnesians — which place we cited in the preceding book — acknowledges free choice not only in moral matters, but also in pious and holy works, when he says: “If anyone is zealous for piety, he is a man of God; if he act impiously, he is of the devil — made such not by nature, but by the choice of his own mind.”
And more clearly St. Irenaeus, book 4, chapter 72, speaks thus: “Not only in works, but also in faith, the Lord preserved to man a choice free and of his own power, saying: According to thy faith, be it done unto thee — showing that the faith is the man’s own, since he has his own judgment. And therefore he who believes him has eternal life; and he who believes not the Son, the wrath of God abideth on him.” Likewise St. Cyprian, book 3 to Quirinus, prefixed this argument to chapter 52: that the liberty of believing and not believing is placed in the choice. The same, book 1, epistle 3, citing that of John 6, Will you also go away? — “The Lord keeps the law by which man, left to his own liberty and set in his own choice, desires for himself either death or salvation.” St. Hilary, book 1 [al. 8] On the Trinity: “To be sons of God — he willed it to be not a necessity, but a power.” St. Jerome, in the commentary on chapter 5 of Matthew: “Therefore he is a son not by nature, but by his own choice.” St. Ambrose speaks of the works of piety, when he says, book 2 on Luke, chapter 12 [al. 5]: “You see that everywhere the power of the Lord cooperates with human endeavors.” St. John Chrysostom, homily 19 on Genesis, discoursing of justification: “He imposes no necessity, but, the congruent remedies being applied, permits the whole to lie in the judgment of the sick man.” St. Celestine, Pope, in the epistle to the Gauls, chapter 12: “Nor does he suffer those gifts to be idle in us which he gave to be exercised, not neglected — that we too may be cooperators of the grace of God.”
St. Augustine teaches this truth in every one of the tomes of his works. In the first tome, book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 22: “Unless a man change his will, he cannot work the good. That this is placed in our power the Lord teaches in another place, where he says: Either make the tree good and its fruit good, or make the tree evil and its fruit evil — which is not against the grace of God which we preach. For it is indeed in the power of man to change his will; but that power is nothing, unless it be given by God, of whom it is said: He gave them power to be made the sons of God. For since that is in our power which, when we will, we do, nothing is so much in our power as our will itself — but the will is prepared by the Lord. In that way, therefore, he gives the power.” And so, according to the opinion of blessed Augustine, the will, prepared through prevenient grace, has it in its power to stand or to fall, to follow God calling, or at its choice to withstand him. But this is the very thing which Calvin contends is false. In the second tome, in epistle 89, question 2: “Free choice is not taken away because it is helped; but it is helped precisely because it is not taken away.” And in epistle 106: “Accordingly, in those who are saved through the election of grace, God the helper works both to will and to work.” Observe in this place that God is called helper even while he works in us the willing; for hence it follows that in the very act of willing — that is, in the first conversion itself — we are free. For (as we cited a little before from the same Augustine) “free choice is not taken away because it is helped, but is helped because it is not taken away.” Again in the same epistle 106: “Grace deserves to be increased, that, increased, it may deserve also to be perfected — the will accompanying, not leading; following as handmaid, not going before.” But a staff on which a man leans is not called his companion, nor the beast on which he rides, but another man, who freely walks with him, or follows him going before. This place Calvin, since he could not corrupt it, preferred to reprehend rather than receive, as is to be seen in book 2 [al. 3] of the Institutes, chapter 3, § 7 [al. 12]. In the third tome, in the book On the Spirit and the Letter to Marcellinus, chapter 34: “To consent to the calling, or not to consent, belongs to one’s own will.” It irks me to refute in this place the Chemnitian trifles: “Augustine,” says he, “says that to consent and to dissent is ‘properly’ — adverbially — of the will, as we say that to understand is proper to the mind, to will of the will. That sentence was afterwards so depraved: that to consent in spiritual things is of one’s own will, that is, from one’s own powers.” But who of us expounds “of one’s own will” as “from one’s own powers”? We say not this; but we teach that to consent pertains to the will after it has been forestalled by the Lord, and has thus received the power of consenting. Then, who gave Chemnitz the faculty of changing nouns into adverbs? For in all the copies is read “propriae” (of one’s own), not “proprie” (properly). Finally, whether you read the one or the other, who does not see that in this place there is attributed to the will itself the power of choosing between contraries — that is, free choice properly so called — if the words which precede a little before be read? For Augustine opposes the consent of our will to the divine calling, and says that the calling is not in our power, but that the consent is of our will — where the very antithesis compels us to understand that the consent is in the power of our will: “Let him attend,” says he, “and see that this will (of believing, namely) is to be attributed to the divine gift, not only because it is from the free choice which was con-created with us naturally” (note, Chemnitz: the will of believing is from free choice), “but also because God acts by the persuasions of things seen, that we may will and believe: whether outwardly, through the Evangelical exhortations, where even the commandments of the law do something, if they admonish man of his infirmity to this end, that he flee by believing to the justifying grace; or inwardly, where no one has in his power what shall come into his mind — but to consent, or to dissent, is of one’s own will.” What does that adversative particle “but” do, Chemnitz? Does it not indicate that no one has in his power what shall come into his mind, while through prevenient grace the will is prepared by the Lord — yet that after that preparation he has plainly in his power to consent or to dissent? But, say they, Augustine retracted this place in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 3, where he confesses that in his books is contained the error of those who teach that to consent to the Evangelical preaching is our own. But in that book he speaks of those who teach that to consent to the Evangelical preaching is our own from the powers of nature alone, without any prevenient grace — which error is contained in the books of Augustine written (as he himself there testifies) before his Episcopate; but this book On the Spirit and the Letter was written by Augustine when already a Bishop, and after the Pelagian heresy arose. But too much of this place.
In the fourth tome, likewise, book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2: “That we will, he willed to be both his and ours — his by calling, ours by following. What could be said more openly?” In the fifth tome, likewise, book 5 On the City of God, chapter 10: “If that is to be called our necessity which is not in our power, it is manifest that our wills, by which we live rightly or wrongly, are not under such necessity. For we do many things which, if we did not will, we should assuredly not do — to which first of all pertains the willing itself: for if we will, it is; if we will not, it is not.” In the sixth tome, book 2 of the Acts against Felix the Manichaean, chapter 4: “When therefore he (the Lord) says, either do this or do that, he indicates power, not nature. For no one but God can make trees; but each one has it in his will either to choose the things that are good, and be a good tree, or to choose the things that are evil, and be an evil tree.” In the seventh tome, book 2 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 5: “God helps those who are converted, deserts those who are turned away; but also, that we may be converted, he himself helps.” Note: even in the conversion itself we are helped, and thereby even then have free choice — against Chemnitz, who acknowledges no helping grace except in the works which are done after justification. And below: “Not for this reason is this matter to be carried on with prayers alone, so that the efficacy of our will for living well should not be brought in besides. For God is called Helper; and no one can be helped except him who of his own accord attempts something.” And chapter 18 [al. 5]: “That we turn to God, we cannot, unless he arouse and help us.” Likewise the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 32 [al. 31], speaking of justification: “Where indeed we too work; but we cooperate with him working, because his mercy goes before us.” Likewise the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 3: “Each is ours (namely, to will to believe and to love), on account of the choice of the will; and each was given through the spirit of faith and charity.” And chapter 5: “Not that to believe, or not believe, is not in the choice of the will; but in the elect the will is prepared by the Lord.” Here certainly we see how far they wander from the truth who hold that in this book was retracted what had been written in the book On the Spirit and the Letter — that to consent and to dissent is of one’s own will. Is it not more open to say that to believe and not believe is in the choice of the will, than that to consent and not consent is of one’s own will? Likewise in the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 15 [al. 31]: “But lest it be thought that men do nothing there through free choice, therefore it is said in the Psalm: Harden not your hearts; and through Ezechiel: Cast away from you all your impieties.” You see that in the very first conversion free choice has its place? Likewise in the book On the Grace of Christ, chapter 14: “Who does not see that each one comes, or does not come, by the choice of his will? But this choice can be alone, if he does not come; it cannot be except helped, if he comes.” And here you have helping grace at the beginning of faith. Book 2 against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians, chapter 8: “Man prepares his heart — yet not without the aid of God, who touches the heart.” And below: “Although, unless he help — without whom we can do nothing — we cannot open our mouth, yet we open it by his aid and by our own work. For what is to prepare the heart and open the mouth, but to prepare the will?” What more manifest Calvin and Chemnitz could desire, I altogether do not see. In the eighth tome, in the tractate on the title of Psalm 121, near the end: “It was not in thy power that thou shouldst not be born of Adam; it is in thy power to believe in Christ.” In the ninth tome, tractate 72 on John: “To him that believeth in him who justifieth the impious, his faith is counted for justice. In this work we do the works of Christ, because even the very believing in Christ is the work of Christ. He works this in us — yet not without us.” And below: “With Christ working in him, man cooperates unto his own eternal salvation and justification.” We cooperate with God, then, not only, as the adversaries will have it, after justification, but also in justification itself and the beginning of faith. Finally, in the tenth tome, sermon 13 on the words of the Apostle, past the middle: “You see that not even the conversion itself is without the aid of God.” And below: “The whole is from God — yet not as though we were asleep, not as though we should not strive, not as though we should not will. Without thy will, the justice of God will not be in thee. He who made thee without thee does not justify thee without thee.”
St. Prosper, Augustine’s most ardent follower and keenest defender, in book 2 On the Vocation of the Gentiles, chapter 12: “To many who now use the judgment of reason it is free to depart, precisely that not to have departed may be a reward; and that what cannot be done except with the spirit of God cooperating may be counted to the merits of those by whose will it could have not been done.” Man can, then, not cooperate with God working in him, if he will; and therefore he does well, and merits, by cooperating, because he could have not cooperated. The same, in the same book, chapter 26: “The grace of God indeed holds the chief preeminence in all justifications — persuading by exhortations, admonishing by examples, terrifying by dangers, inciting by miracles; by giving understanding, by inspiring counsel, and by illuminating the heart itself and imbuing it with the affections of faith; but the will of man also is subjoined to it and conjoined with it, which has been aroused to this end by the aforesaid supports: that it may cooperate with the divine work in itself, and may begin to exercise toward merit what it conceived, by the heavenly seed, toward zeal — having from its own mutability, if it fail; from the succor of grace, if it advance. Which succor, through innumerable modes, whether hidden or manifest, is applied to all; and that it is refused by many is of their own wickedness; but that it is received by many is both of divine grace and of the human will.” See also chapter 28, in the whole of which he proves that they who through the grace of God believe in Christ can refuse to believe, and that they who persevere can withdraw from God; and at last he concludes thus: “Therefore, as they who have believed are helped that they may remain in the faith, so also they who have not yet believed are helped that they may believe; and as the former have it in their own power to go out, so also the latter have it in their own power not to come.”
Consonant with these testimonies of the holy Fathers is what the Council of Orange, in the last canon, declares: that free choice was so inclined and attenuated through the fall of the first man, that no one can believe in God, or love God, unless grace and the divine mercy forestall him. Where you see that free choice, in the action of believing and loving, was indeed attenuated, yet not extinguished; and thereby can work the works of piety, if it be helped by grace. The same decree the Council of Valence renews and repeats, chapter 6 — which Council was celebrated in Gaul in the time of Lothair. The fourth Council of Toledo likewise, chapter 35 [al. 55], expressed the same opinion in these words: “As man, obeying the serpent by the proper will of his choice, perished; so, the grace of God calling him, each one is saved by believing, through the proper conversion of his own mind.” Where the comparison is to be noted: of the liberty in the first man toward sinning, with the liberty of his sons toward conversion and faith, the grace of God forestalling. For the comparison demands this: that, as that was a true free choice by which the first man, after the diabolic persuasion, sinned, so that be a true free choice by which his posterity, after the divine calling, are converted and believe. Like things, finally, in our times the Synod of Trent has sanctioned, session 6, chapter 5, and canon 4.
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CAPUT XI. Probatur Ubertas arbitrii in operibus ' pietatis ex traditione Patrum Accedat nunc adrem eamdem comproban¬ dam traditio veteris Ecclesiae. Et quidem Joannes Calvinus in lib. Instit. cap. iii. §. 11. fatetur, nostram sententiam a multis jam saeculis in Ecclesia tradi, credique coepisse* «Ac voluntatem, inquit, movet Deus, non qualiter multis saeculis traditum, et creditum est, ut nostrae sit electionis, motioni Dei obtemperare, aut refragari etc. » Ista autem multa saecula intelligit, ut minimum spatium annorum supra mille et centum. Namstatim subjungit: « Illud ergo a Chrysostomo toties repetitum repudiari necesse est, Quem trahit, volentem trahit etc. » Chrysostomus autem ante annos mille et centum floruit. Itaque, vel adversario teste, sententia nostra non est a Scholasticis Theologis introducta, sed in veteri, et vera Christi Ecclesia celebrata, quod unum argumentum prudentibus homi¬ nibus satisfacere debuisset. Quid, quod non solum ab annis mille et centum, sed etiam mille et quadringentis atque adeo ab initio Ecclesiae eadem haec (1) Psal. XXVI, 9 ; Psal. LXIX, 2; Rom. VIII, 26. - (2) I Corin. XV, 10. - (3) Sap. IX, 10. - (4) Prov. 1, 24: Matth. XXIII, 37 ; Joan. VI, 68: Act. VII, 51 ; Ap. III, 20. 128 LIBEM VI. i sententia doceri, ac recipi coepit? Nam S. Ignatius in epist. ad Magnesianos, quem lo¬ cum libro superiore citavimus, non solum in moralibus, sed etiam in piis et sanctis ope¬ ribus liberum arbitrium agnoscit, cum ait : « Si quis pietati studet, Dei homo est, si im* pie agat, diaboli est, non id factus per natu¬ ram, sed per animi arbitrium. » Et clarius S. Irenaeus lib. iv. cap. 72. sic loquitur : « Non tantum in operibus, sed e- tiamin fide liberum, et suae potestatis arbi¬ trium homini servavit Dominus, dicens, se¬ cundum fidem tuam fiat tibi. Propriam fidem hominis ostendens, quoniam suam habet sententiam. Et propterea is, qui credit ei, habet vitam aeternam, et qui non credit filio, ira Dei manet super eum ». Itera S. Cyprianus lib. iii. ad Quirinum, hoc argumentum praefixit capiti 52. creden¬ di, et non credendi libertatemin arbitrio po¬ sitam. Idem lib. vi. epist. 3. citans illud Joan. vi. Vultis et vos abire ? « Servat, in¬ quit, Domidus legem, qua homo libertati suae relictus, et arbitrio proprio constitutus, si- bimet ipse mortem appetit, vel salutem. » S. Hilarius lib. i. de Trinitate : « Esse, in¬ quit, filios Dei, non necessitatem esse voluit, sed potestatem. » S. Hieronymus in comment. ad cap. v. Matth. : « Ergo, inquit, non est natura filius, sed arbitrio suo » . S. Ambrosius de operibus pietatis loquitur, cum ait lib. ii. in Luc. cap. 42 : «Vides, quia ubique Domini virtus studiis cooperatur hu¬ manis ? » S. Joan. Chrysostomus hom. 19. in Genes, de justificatione, disserens : « Necessitatem, inquit, non imponit, sed congruis remediis appositis totum in aegroti sententia jacere permittit. » S. Ccelestinus Papa in epist. ad Gall. cap. 12 : «Nec otiosa, inquit, in nobis esse pati¬ tur, quae exercenda, non negligenda dona¬ vit, ut et nos cooperatores simus gratia; Dei. n S. Augustinus in singulis tomis operum suorum hanc veritatem elocet. Tomo primo, lib. i. Retract. cap. 22 : « Nisi quisquam vo¬ luntatem mutaverit, bonum operari non po¬ test. Quod in nostra potestate esse positum, alio loco Dominus docet, ubi ait, aut facite arborem bonam, et fructum ejus bonum, aut facite arborem malam, et fructum ejus malum, quod non est contra gratiam Dei, quam praedicamus. In potestate quippe ho¬ minis est, mutare voluntatem. Sed ea po¬ testas nulla est, nisi detur a Deo, de quo di¬ ctum est : Dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fie¬ ri. Cum enim hoc sit in potestate, quod cum volumus, facimus, nihil tam in potestate, quam nostra voluntas est, sed preeparatur voluntas a Domino. Eo modo ergo dat pote¬ statem. » Itaque ex sententia B. Augustini, voluntas praeparata per gratiam praevenien¬ tem, in potestate sua habet stare, vel cade¬ re, Deum sequi vocantem, vel eidem pro ar¬ bitrio refragari. Atqui hoc ipsum est, quod Calvinus falsum esse contendit. Tomo secundo, in epist. 89. qua;st. 2 : « Liberum arbitrium non ideo tollitur, quia juvatur, sed ideo juvatur quia non tollitur.» Et in epist. 106 : « Proinde in iis, qui per electionem 'gratia; salvi fiunt, adjutor Deus operatur, et velle, et operari. » Observa hoc loco, Deum dici adjutorem, etiam dum ope¬ ratur in nobis velle. Hinc enim sequitur, ut in ipso etiam actu volendi, id est, in ipsa conversione prima liberi simus. Nam (ut pau¬ lo ante ex eodem Augustino citavimus) « Li¬ berum arbitrium non tollitur, quia juvatur, sed ideo juvatur, quia non tollitur. » Rursus in eadem epist. 106 : « Gratia meretur auge¬ ri, ut aucta mereatur et perfici, comitante non ducente; pedissequa, non praevia volun¬ tate. » At non dicitur comes homini baculus, quo innititur, aut jumentum, quo vehitur, sed alter homo, qui libere cum illo ambulat, aut eum sequitur praeeuntem. Hunc locum, cum non posset Calvinus corrumpere, ma¬ luit reprehendere, quam recipere, ut videre est in lib. iv. Institut. cap. 3. §. 7. Tomo tertio, in lib. de spiritu et littera ad Marcellinum cap. 34. « Consentire vocationi, aut non consentire, propriae voluntatis est. » Piget refellere hoc loco nugas Kemnitianas : « Augustinus, inquit, dicit, consentire et dissentire proprie, adverbialiter, esse volun¬ tatis, sicut dicimus, intelligere proprium esse mentis, velle voluntatis. Illa sententia pofctea ita depravata est. Consentire in spiritualibus propria; esse voluntatis, hoc est, ex propriis viribus. » At quis nostrum -exponit, propina; voluntatis, id est, ex propriis viribus ? non hoc dicimus, sed, consentire, ad voluntatem pertinere docemus, posteaquam praeventa est a Domino, et sic accepit consentiendi potestatem. Deinde quis dedit Kemnitio fa¬ cultatem commutandi noipina in adverbia? nam in omnibus codicibus^ legitur, propria; non « proprie. » I CAPUT XI. 129 Denique sive propria;, sive proprie, legas, quis non videt, tribui hoc loco ipsi volunta¬ ti potestatem eligendi inter contraria, id est, liberum arbitrium proprie dictum, si legan¬ tur, quae paulo ante praecedunt ? Nam op¬ ponit Augustinus consensum voluntatis no¬ strae vocationi divinae, ac dicit, vocationem non esse in nostra potestate, sed consensio¬ nem esse nostrae voluntatis; ubi ipsa anti- thesis cogit, ut intelligamus consensum esse in potestate nostrae voluntatis : « Attendat, inquit, pt videat, non ideo tantum istam vo¬ luntatem (credendi videlicet) divino muneri tribuendam, quia ex libero arbitrio est (nota, Kemniti, voluntatem credendi ex libero ar¬ bitrio esse} quod nobis naturaliter concrea¬ tum est ; verum etiam quod visorum suasio¬ nibus agit Deus, ut velimus, et ut credamus : sive extrinsecus per Evangelicas exhortatio¬ nes, ubi et mandata legis aliquid agunt, si ad hoc admonent hominem infirmitatis sua;, ut ad gratiam justificantem credendo confu¬ giat; sive intrinsecus, ubi nemo habet in po¬ testate quid ei veniat in mentem : sed con¬ sentire, vel dissentire, proprie voluntatis est. » Quid facit, Kemniti, illa particula ad¬ versativa, « Sed », nonne indicat, neminem habere in potestate, quid ei veniat in men¬ tem, dum per gratiam praevenientem prae¬ paratur voluntas a Domino ; tamen post eam praeparationem habere plane in potestate, ut consentiat, vel dissentiat ? At, inquiunt, retractavit hunc locum Au¬ gustinus in lib. de praedest. Sanctor, cap. 3. ubi fatetur, in suis libris contineri errorem illorum, qui docent, praedicationi Evangeli- cae nostrum esse proprium consentire. At in eo lib. loquitur de iis, qui docent, praedica¬ tioni Evangelicae nostrum esse proprium con¬ sentire ex solis viribus naturae, sine ulla praeveniente gratia; quem errorem continent Augustini libri scripti ut (ipse ibidem testa¬ tur) ante suum Episcopatum, hic autem li¬ ber de spiritu et littera, scriptus fuit ab Au¬ gustino jam Episcopo, et post haeresim Pe- lagianam exortam. Sed nimis multa de hoc loco. Tomo quarto, item lib. i. ad Simplic. quaest. 2. « Ut velimus, inquit, et suum esse voluit, et nostrum, suum vocando, nostrum sequendo. Quid apertius dici potuit ? » Tomo quinto, item lib. v. deCiv. Dei, cap. 10. « Si necessitas nostra, illa dicenda est, quae non est in nostra potestate, manifestum est, voluntates nostras, quibus recte, vel perperam vivitur sub tali necessitate non es¬ se. Multa enim facimus, quae si nollemus, non utique faceremus, quo primitus pertinet ipsum velle. Nam si voludaus, est; si nolu¬ mus, non est. » Tomo sexto, lib. n. Actor, contra Felicem Manichaeum cap. 4. « Cum ergo dicit (Do¬ minus) aut hoc facite, aut illud, potestatem indicat, non naturam. Nemo enim, nisi Deus, facere arbores potest. Sed habet unusquis¬ que in voluntate, aut eligere quae bona sunt, et esse arbor bona, aut eligere quae mala sunt, et esse arbor mala. » Tomo septimo, lib. 2. de peccator, mer. et rcmiss. cap. 5. « Conversos, inquit, Deus adjuvat, aversos deserit, sed etiam ut con¬ vertamur, ipse adjuvat. » Nota, in ipsa e- tiam conversione nos adjuvari, ac per hoc etiam tunc habere liberum arbitrium, contra Kemnitium, qui gratiam adjuvantem non agnoscit, nisi in operibus, quse fiunt post justificationem. » Et infra : « Non ideo, in¬ quit, de hac re, solis votis agendum est, ut non subinferatur ad bene vivendum nostra; efficacia voluntatis. Adjutor enim Deus dici¬ tur, nec adjuvari potest, nisi qui sponte ali¬ quid conatur. » Et cap. 18 : « Quod ad De¬ um nos convertimus, nisi ipso excitante, atque adjuvanto, non possumus. » Item lib. de natura et gratia cap. 32. lo- quens de justificatione : « Ubi quidem, in¬ quit, operamur et nos, sed illo operante cooperamur, quia misericordia ejus prreve- nit nos. » Item lib. de pra;destinat. Sanctor, cap. 3 : (i Utrumque, inquit, nostrum est (velle scili¬ cet credere et amare) propter arbitrium vo¬ luntatis, et utrumque datum est perspiritum fidei et charitatis. » Et cap. 5. « Non quia credere, vel non credere, non est in arbitrio voluntatis, sed in electis pra;paratur volun¬ tas a Domino. » Hic certe videmus, quam longe aberrent a vero, qui sentiunt, in hoc libro retractatum esse, quod scriptum fuerat in libro de spiritu et littera, consentire et dissentire propriee voluntatis esse. An non apertius est credere, et non credere esse in arbitrio voluntatis, quam consentire, et non consentire esse proprise voluntatis ? Item in lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio cap. 15. « Ne autem putetur, nihil ibi facere ho¬ mines per liberum arbitrium, ideo in Psalmo dicitur : Nolite obdurare corda vestra. Et per Ezechielem : Projicite a vobis omnes impietates vestras. » Yides in ipsa prima 130 LIBER VI. conversione locum suum habere liberum ar¬ bitrium ? Item in lib. de gratia Christi cap. 14 : « Quis non videat,’ venire quemquam, aut non venire, arbitrio voluntatis ? Sed hoc ar¬ bitrium potest esse solum, si non venit; non autem potest esse, nisi adjutum, si venit. » Et hic habes gratiam adjuvantem ad initium fidei. Libro ii. contra duas epistolas Pelagiano- rum cap. 8. « Homo praeparat cor. non ta¬ men sine adjutorio Dei, qui tangit cor. » Et infra : « Quamvis nisi adjuvante illo, sine quo nihil possumus facere, os non possimus aperire, tamen nos aperimus illius adjutorio, et opere nostro. Nam quid est praeparare cor, et os aperire, nisi voluntatem praepara¬ re ? » Quid manifestius Calvinus, Kemnitius- que desiderent, omnino non video. Tomo octavo, tractatu in titulum Psal. exxi. prope finem : « Non erat, inquit, in potestate tua, ut non nascereris ex Adam ; est in potestate tua, ut credas in Christum.» Tomo nomo, tract. 72 in Joan. « Creden¬ ti in eum, qui justificat impium, deputatur ejus fides ad justitiam. In hoc opere facimus opera Christi, quia et ipsum credere in Chri¬ stum est opus Christi. Hoc operatur in nobis, non tamen sine nobis. » Et infra : « Ope¬ ranti in se Christo, cooperatur homo salu¬ tem aeternam, ac justificationem suam». Cooperamur igitur Deo non solum, ut ad¬ versarii volunt, post justificationem, sed et¬ iam in ipsa justificatione et initio fidei. Denique tomo decimo, serm. 13. de verbis Apostoli, post medium : « Videtis, inquit, quia nec ipsa conversio est sine adjutorio Dei. » Et infra : « Totum ex Deo, non tamen quasi dormientes, non quasi ut non cone- mur, non quasi ut non velimus. Sine volun¬ tate tua non erit in te justitia Dei ; qui fecit te sine te, non te justificat sine te. » S. Prosper, sectator Augustini ardentissi- mus, ac defensor acerrimus, in n. lib. de vocatione gentium, cap. 12: «Multis, inquit, qui jam judicio rationis utuntur, ideo libe¬ rum est discedere, ut non discessisse sit prte- mium, et ut quod non potest, nisi cooperan- te spiritu Dei fleri, eorum meritis deputetur, quorum id potuit voluntate non fieri. » Po¬ test igitur non cooperari Deo in se operanti homo, si velit, et ideo bene facit, et mere¬ tur cooperando, quia poterat non coopera¬ ri. Idem in eodem lib. cap. 26. « Gratia qui¬ dem Dei in omnibus justificationibus princi¬ paliter praeeminet suadendo exhortationi¬ bus, monendo exemplis, terrendo periculis, incitando miraculis, dando intellectum, in¬ spirando consilium, corque ipsum illuminan¬ do, et fidei affectionibus imbuendo : sed et¬ iam voluntas hominis subjungitur ei, atque conjungitur, quai ad hoc praedictis est exci¬ tata praesidiis, ut divino in se cooperetur o- peri, et incipiat exercere ad meritum, quod superno semine concepit ad studium, de sua habens mutabilitate, si deficit, de gratiae opi¬ tulatione, si proficit. Quae opitulatio per in¬ numeros modos, sive occultos, sive manife¬ stos omnibus adhibetur, et quod a multis refutatur, ipsorum est nequitiae : Quod au¬ tem a multis suscipitur, et gratiae est divinae, et voluntatis humanae ». Vide etiam caput 28. in quo toto probat, posse eos, qui per gratiam Dei in Christum credunt, non credere, et eos, qui perseve¬ rant, a Deo recedere, et tandem ita conclu¬ dit : « Igitur sicut qui crediderunt, juvantur ut in fide maneant, sic et qui nondum cre¬ diderunt, juvantur, ut credant. Et sicut illi in sua habent potestate, ut exeant, ita et isti in sua habent potestate, ne veniant. » His testimoniis sanctorum Patrum, conso¬ num est, quod Concilium Arausicanum ca¬ non. ult. declarat liberum arbitrium ita in¬ clinatum et attenuatum esse per lapsum pri¬ mi hominis, ut nemo credere in Deum, aut diligere Deum possit, nisi gratia eum, et mi¬ sericordia divina praeveniat. Ubi vides libe¬ rum arbitrium in actione credendi, et dili¬ gendi attenuatum quidem esse, non tamen extinctum; ac per hoc operari posse opera pietatis, si adjuvetur a gratia. Idem decretum renovat ac repetit Conci¬ lium Valentinum cap. 6. quod Concilium in Gallia, tempore Lotharii celebratum est. Concilium item Toletanum IV. cap. 35. sen¬ tentiam eamdem his verbis expressit : « Si¬ cut homo propria arbitrii voluntate serpenti obediens periit : sic vocante se gratia Dei, propria mentis conversione* quisque creden¬ do salvatur ». Ubi notanda est comparatio libertatis in primo homine ad peccandum, cum libertate filiorum ejus ad conversionem et fidem, gratia Dei pra;veniente. Id enim comparatio postulat, ut sicut verum fuit li- herum arbitrium, quo primus homo post diabolicam suasionem peccavit, ita verum sit liberum arbitrium quo posteri ejus, post vocationem divinam, convertuntur et cre- CAPUT XIII. 131 dunt. Similia denique nostris temporibus sanxit Synodus Tridentina sess. 7. cap. 5. et can. 4. i