Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book VI: Grace and Free Choice in Works of Piety
Chapter 12: The liberty of choice in works of piety is proved by reasons
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book VI. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
It remains that we prove the same truth by reasons. But since the same reasons which were brought forward in the preceding book, for the confirming of free choice in moral action, have place here also, it will be enough to touch them briefly.
First, then, if man were not of free choice in the works of piety, it would follow that they do not sin who will not believe in Christ, or will not be converted from their sins, or will not do good works for God’s sake. Then it would follow that they are not to be praised, nor worthy of any reward, who will to believe, hope, love, be converted, and to suffer for God’s sake anything arduous and bitter. Third, precepts, counsels, exhortations, admonitions, reprehensions, examples, and other things of that kind would have no place in matters of this sort. Fourth, all diligence and industry in increasing and cultivating faith and piety would be taken out of the way. That all these things are vehemently absurd, not even the adversaries themselves can deny. And that they follow is most certain, both from the things disputed in the preceding book, and also because for no other cause do the brute animals not sin, nor deserve praise or reward, nor are precepts or counsels given them, nor, finally, does diligence or industry befit them, except that they lack free choice. By like reasoning there is no other cause why men, in those actions which pertain to the last end — such as to will good and flee evil in general — can neither sin nor merit well, nor need precepts or counsels, nor are bound to apply any diligence or industry, except that the liberty of choice is not concerned with the end, as was demonstrated in the third book. Finally, why do men commonly not sin because they do not prophesy, or do not speak with tongues, or do not work miracles? Why does no one deserve a reward because he prophesies, or speaks with tongues, or works miracles? Why does no one, by precepts, counsels, exhortations, incite men everywhere to prophesying, to speaking with tongues, to working miracles? Why does no one place his diligence and industry in excelling in these actions — except that these things are not in the power of free choice, though they be exercised by men, as instruments of God, through reason and will, through tongue and hands?
Since, then, the adversaries will have it that we work no less from necessity in those things which pertain to conversion, faith, and piety, than we are determined from necessity to the pursuing of good and the fleeing of evil in general; and make us no more free in those things which pertain to conversion, faith, and piety, than toward the gifts of prophecy, of tongues, and of miracles — let them explain, if they can, why they consent that sins and good merits, precepts and counsels, diligence and industry, have place in conversion, faith, and piety.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XII. Probetur rationibus libertas arbitrii in operibus pietatis. Superest, ut eamdem veritatem rationibus eomprobemus. Sed quoniam e sedem ratio¬ nes, quae allatae sunt in lib. superiore, ad confirmandum liberum arbitrium in actione morali, hic etiam locum habent, satis erit eas breviter attingere. Primum igitur, si non esset homo liberi arbitrii in operibus pietatis, sequeretur, non peccare eos, qui nolunt credere in Christum, aut nolunt converti a peccatis, aut nolunt propter Deum bona opera facere. Deinde sequeretur, non esse laudandos, nec ullo praemio dignos eos, qui volunt credere, spe¬ rare, diligere, converti, propter Deum quid¬ vis arduum et acerbum pati. Tertio, nullum haberent locum in ejusmodi rebus praecepta, consilia, cohortationes, admonitiones, repre¬ hensiones, exempla, aliaque id genus. Quar¬ to, tolleretur e medio omnis diligentia, atque industria in fide et pietate augenda et exco¬ lenda. Haec omnia esse vehementer absurda, ne ipsi quidem adversarii negare possunt. Sequi autem certissimum est, tum ex iis, quae libro superiore disputata sunt, tum etiam quia non alia de causa bruta animantia non peccant, nec laude aut praemio digna sunt, nec prae¬ cepta vel consilia illis dantur, nec denique diligentia vel industria eis convenit , nisi quia libero carent arbitrio. Pari ratione nulla alia causa est, cur homines iniis actio¬ nibus, quae ad finem ultimum pertinent, qua¬ les sunt velle bonum, et fugere malum, in genere, neque peccare, neque bene mereri possint, neque praeceptis, aut consiliis egeant, nec diligentiam aut industriam ullam adhi¬ bere teneantur, nisi quoniam libertas arbi¬ trii non est circa finem, ut tertio libro de¬ monstratum est. Denique, cur homines vulgo non peccant, quia non prophetant, aut linguis non loquun¬ tur, aut miracula non faciunt? cur nemo praemium meretur, quia prophetat, aut lin¬ guis loquitur, aut miracula facit? cur nemo praeceptis, consiliis, hortationibus incitat pas- sim homines ad prophetandum, ad loquen¬ dum linguis, ad miracula facienda? Cur ne¬ mo diligentiam, industriamve suam in eo po¬ nit, ut in his actionibus excellat? nisi quoniam non sunt haec, in potestate liberi arbitrii, quamvis ab hominibus, ut instrumentis Dei, per rationem et voluntatem, per linguam et manus exerceantur? Cum igitur adversarii velint, hon minus nos ex necessitate operari in iis, quae ad con¬ versionem, fidem et pietatem pertinent, quam ex necessitate determinati sumus ad bonum sectandum, et malum fugiendum, et non magis nos liberos faciant in iis, quae per¬ tinent ad conversionem, fidem et pietatem, quam ad dona prophetiae, linguarum, et mi¬ raculorum, expediant, si possunt, cur peccata et bona merata, praecepta et consilia, diligen¬ tiam et industriam in conversione, fide, pie¬ tate, locum habere consentiant.