Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book VI: Grace and Free Choice in Works of Piety
Chapter 14: The objections from the testimonies of St. Augustine are dissolved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book VI. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
To the arguments from the divine writings the adversaries add not a few testimonies from the books of St. Augustine.
The first testimony, from book 2 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 18: “Men labor to find in our power some good of ours which is not to us from God; and how it can be found, I know not.” I answer: St. Augustine speaks against those who taught that man has of himself — that is, without any prevenient grace — the beginning of faith, or of the love of God; that is, some pious will; and he most rightly teaches that there is nothing at all of good in our will which is not to us from God. But this does nothing against free choice. For although free choice cannot of itself alone cooperate with God, yet it can from the gift of prevenient grace.
Second, they bring forward that from the book On the Grace of Christ, chapter 14 [al. 13]: “The choice is so helped that it not only knows what is to be done, but also does what it has known. And thereby, when God teaches not through the letter of the law, but through the grace of the Spirit, he so teaches that what each one has learned he not only sees by knowing, but also desires by willing, and completes by doing.” I answer: nothing is said in this place against our opinion, since we most willingly confess all these things, and from them prove free choice. For if the choice is helped, both in knowing and learning and in willing and doing, certainly it is present, and remains, and works; for that is not helped which is not, or works not.
The third testimony, from the book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 13: “This it profits us both to believe and to say — this is pious, this true — that the confession be humble and submissive, and the whole be given to God.” I answer: this too makes nothing to the matter. For we do not place in man the beginning of good will from free choice, and the perfection from God; nor do we divide the works with God, and take the first parts to ourselves and give the later to God, as did those whom in that book, and the preceding, St. Augustine reprehends; but we give the whole to God, and to ourselves nothing at all which is not from God.
The fourth testimony, from the book On Correction and Grace, chapter 12: “It has been provided that the human will should undeclinably and inseparably,” etc. And chapter 14: “No choice of men resists him who wills to save. For to will or not will is so in the power of him who wills or wills not, that it neither hinders the divine will nor overcomes its power.” And below: “It is not to be doubted that human wills cannot resist the will of God.” I answer: these places display efficacious grace, which is given to the elect, and has infallibility adjoined, not necessity. For whom God predestined, them he called; and whom he called, them he justified; and whom he justified, them he glorified, Romans 8. And as all who are predestined are infallibly called, so all who are called — according to purpose, namely, for of this calling Paul without doubt speaks — are justified; accordingly that calling is efficacious, and is never rejected, since otherwise predestination could be deceived. And in the same way, they who are justified according to purpose all infallibly persevere and are glorified, lest perchance election be rendered uncertain. Efficacious grace, then, has — as predestination also, of which predestination that grace is the effect — an infallible certainty; and this those testimonies of St. Augustine signify. Yet it has not necessity, except upon a supposition; and thereby does not hinder the liberty of choice. For, as we explained in book 1, chapter 12, that grace is called efficacious by which God so calls a man as he sees to be congruent to him, so that he reject not the calling. Wherefore efficacious grace no more induces necessity, or hinders liberty, than foreknowledge, of which we discoursed copiously in book 4. And hence it is that St. Augustine, for the most part, when he speaks of efficacious grace, does not say that it cannot be rejected, but that in fact it is not rejected. If, however, he sometimes says it cannot be rejected, it is to be understood upon the supposition, not absolutely — so that the sense is: it cannot come to pass that he follow not God calling, whom God has called in that manner in which he foresaw he would follow; yet absolutely he can not follow — but then God would not have foreseen him following, and would have called him in another manner, in which he would have foreseen him following. And since God foresees that they whom he calls according to purpose will follow freely, as it cannot come to pass, upon the supposition, that they follow not, so it cannot come to pass that they follow not freely. For in neither can the providence of God be deceived: neither in this, that it sees someone about to follow, nor in this, that it sees him about to follow freely.
The fifth testimony, from the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 17: “That we may will, he works without us; but when we will, and so will that we do, he cooperates with us.” Here the adversaries triumph, as though they had caught us in a manifest error, in that we say that we cooperate with God in the very first conversion, and toward the act of willing are not only aroused but also helped — whereas Augustine plainly says that, that we may will, God works without us, and accordingly in this we are not helped, but this is simply done by God in us. Nor are other places wanting which seem to make for the adversaries, as that in the Enchiridion, chapter 32: “The whole is to be given to God, who both prepares the good will of man to be helped, and helps it when prepared. For the good will of man goes before many gifts of God, but not all; and among those which it does not go before is itself.” I answer: this argument could have terrified us vehemently, had we forgotten how frequently above we have heard Augustine saying that we cannot be converted to God unless he arouse and help us; and that “that we will, he willed to be both his and ours — his by calling, ours by following”; and that in the work of believing, when we begin to will to believe, we work the works of Christ, and cooperate with God, etc. See the places noted in chapter 11 of this same book. But moreover, this whole argument was solved in book 1 of this treatise On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 14. And the sum of the solution is this: God works in us, without us, that we may will, in one certain kind of cause — the moral, namely — but not in every kind of cause. For God effects in us that we will, by internal inspiration and persuasion — in which way we do not work that we may will, for we do not persuade ourselves; for if we did that, we should already will. But although God, without any previous endeavor of ours, moves us to willing, yet he does not effect the very willing without us cooperating by consenting. And therefore Augustine does not say, “he makes the willing without us,” but, “that we may will, without us.” In the same way he prepares the good will to be helped, and helps it when prepared: because, in that kind of cause which makes that we will — without us making that we will — he prepares the will, we not preparing the same by a like arousing and persuasion; and therefore in this matter we are not helped, since it is done without us. But yet, in the other kind of cause, we prepare our will, God helping, when we consent to the divine calling: “Man,” says Augustine, book 2 to Boniface, chapter 8, “prepares his heart — yet not without the aid of God, who touches the heart.” Thus he. And what if we now show that this place, over which the adversaries seem so greatly to triumph, fights most gravely against them? For St. Augustine, after he had said, “That we may will, he works without us,” subjoined: “But when we will, and so will that we do, he cooperates with us.” I ask of the adversaries what “he cooperates with us” is. For if God cooperates with us, certainly we also work. But we are not said to work, and to cooperate with God, because we produce that act as natural instruments moved by another — since in that way we work even the very willing, Calvin and Chemnitz being witnesses; and yet these same men deny that we cooperate with God in the act of willing. They must confess, then, from the mind of Augustine, that we work the external works, and in them cooperate with God, not only by producing the act, but by producing it freely — so that we be truly said to cooperate with God, and to be helped by him. But it cannot be understood how the external action is free, if the election, or the internal will, was not free. For external actions have no liberty except in their cause; for they necessarily follow the election of the will and the command of reason. He does not freely give an alms, but he who freely willed to give; nor does he freely pray or fast, but he who freely chose to pray and fast. Wherefore, from this — that they are compelled to admit that we freely work the external works of piety — they are also compelled, will they nill they, to admit free choice in the very internal act of the will.
Another testimony Calvin brings forward from the book On Correction and Grace, chapter 11 [al. 12], where he says Augustine affirms that Adam had a grace through which he could not sin, and that we have a much greater, through which it comes to pass that we cannot sin. But we have already shown, in the preface, that this is not an argument, but a most impudent lie. For Augustine does not say that we cannot sin, but that in the future life the saints will have that liberty, that they cannot sin. See what we said in the preface.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XIV. Diluuntur objectiones ex testimoniis S. A ugustini. i Ad argumenta ex divinis litteris addunt adversarii non pauca testimonia ex libris sancti Augustini. Primum testimonium ex lib. ii. de peccat, merit. etremiss. cap 18: «Laborant, inquit, homines, invenire in nostra potestate, quid boni sit nostrum, quod nobis non sit ex Deo, et quomodo inveniri possit, ignoro. » Respondeo : loquitur S. Augustinus ad¬ versus eos, qui docebant, homidem habere ex Pe, id est, sine ulla praeveniente (gratia, initium fidei, aut dilectionis Dei, id est, piam aliquam voluntatem , et rectissime docet, nihil omnino boni esse in nostra vo¬ luntate, quod nobis non sit ex Deo. Sed nihil id facit contra liberum arbitrium. Tametsi enim non possit liberum arbitrium ex se solo cooperari Deo ; potest tamen ex dono gratiae praevenientis. Secundo, proferunt illud ex lib. de gratia Christi cap. 14 : « Arbitrium sic adjuvatur, ut non solum quid faciendum sit sciat, sed quod scierit , etiam faciat. Ac per hoc , quando Deus docet non per legis litteram, sed per Spiritus gratiam ita docet, ut quod quisque didicerit, non tantum cognoscendo videat, sed etiam volendo appetat, agendo- que perficiat. Respondeo : Nihil hoc loco dicitur contra sententiam nostram, siquidem omnia ista libentissime confitemur : et ex iis liberum arbitrium comprobamus. Si enim a adjuva¬ tur arbitrium, tum in 6ognoscendo et scien¬ dorum in volendo et agendo, certe adest, et manet, et operatur. Non enim adjuvatur quod non est, aut non operatur. Tertium testimonium ex lib. de bono per¬ severant. cap. 13. « Hoc nobis expedit et credere et dicere, hoc est pium, hoc verum, ut sit humilis, et submissa confessio, et detur totum Deo » . Respondeo : et hoc quoque nihil facit ad rem. Nos enim non ponimus in homine ini¬ tium bonae voluutatis ex libero arbitrio, et perfectionem ex Deo, neque partimur opera cum Deo, et priores partes accipimus nobis, posteriores damus Deo , ut faciebant illi, quos in eo libro, et praecedente, S. Augusti¬ nus reprehendit, sed damus totum Deo, no¬ bis autem nihil omnino, quod non sit ex Deo. Quartum testimonium ex lib. de corrept. et gratia cap. xn : « Provisum -est, inquit, ut voluntas humana indeclinabiliteretinsepa- rabiliter, etc. » Et cap. 14 : « Volenti salvum facere nullum hominum resistit arbitrium. Sic enim velle aut nolle, in volentis aut no¬ lentis est potestate , ut divinam voluntatem non impediat, nec superet potestatem ». Et infra : « Non est dubitandum, voluntati Dei, voluntates humanas resistere non posse ». Respondeo : haec loca manifestant gratiam efficacem, quse datur electis, et infallibili - tatem adjunctam habet, non necessitatem. Nam quos Deus praedestinavit, hos vocavit; et quos vocavit, hos justificavit; et quos ju¬ stificavit, hos magnifieavit, ad Rom. 8. et sicut qui sunt praedestinati omnes infallibi- liter vocantur ; ita qui sunt vocati, secun¬ dum propositum videlicet, nam de hac voca¬ tione loquitur sine dubio Paulus, omnes ju¬ stificantur, proinde vocatio illa efficax est, et numquam rejicitur, quoniam alioqui falli posset praedestinatio. Et eodem modo qui sunt justificati, secundum propositum, om¬ nes infallibiliter perseverant et glorificantur, ne forte incerta reddatur electio. Habet igitur gratia efficax, ut etiam prae¬ destinatio, cujus pi-aedestinationis gratia illa est effectus, infallibilem certitudinem : et hoc significant testimonia illa S. Augustini : non tamen habet necessitatem, nisi ex hypo- thesi, ac per hoc non impedit arbitrii liber¬ tatem. Nam ut explicuimus in lib. i. cap. 12. gratia efficax dicitur illa, qua Deus ita vocat hominem, ut videt congruere illi, ut voca¬ tionem non respuat. Quare non magis indu¬ cit necessitatem, aut impedit libertatem gra¬ tia efficax, quam praescientia; de qua co¬ piose disseruimus in lib iv. Atque hinc est, quod S. Augustinus ut plurimum, cum loquitur de gratia efficaci, non dicit, eam non posse respui, sed de facto non respui. Si quando tamen dicit, non posse respui, intelligcndum est de hypothesi, non absolute, ut sensus sit, non posse fieri, ut is Deum vocantem non sequatur, quem Deus vocavit eo modo, quo praevidit eum ser¬ turum : tamen absolute posse non sequi. Sed tunc Deus non eum praevidisset, secutmrum, et alio modo eum vocassct, quo secutnrum praevi disset. Et quoniam Deus praevidet eos, CAPUT XIV. quos vocat secundum propositum, libere se¬ cuturos, sicut non potest fieri, ex hypothesi ut non sequantur, ita non potest fieri ut non libere. In neutro enim falli potest providenti Dei,. neque in eo, quod videt aliquem secu¬ turum, neque in eo, quod videt libere se¬ cuturum. Quintum testimonium ex lib. de grat. et liber, arb. cap. 17 : « Ut velimus, inquit, sine nobis operatur : cum autem volumus, et sic volumus ut operemur, nobiscum coo¬ peratur». Hic triumphant adversarii, quasi deprehenderint nos in manifesto errore, quod dicamus, nos cooperari Deo in ipsa prima conversione, et ad actum volendi non solum excitari, sed etiam adjuvari, cum Augusti¬ nus perspicue dicat, ut velimus, Deum ope¬ rari sine nobis, et proinde in hoc nos non juvari, simpliciter hoc a Deo in nobis fieri. Nec desunt alia loca, quse pro adversariis facere videantur, ut illud in Enchir. cap. 32. « Totum Deo dandum est, qui hominis voluntatem bonam, et praeparat adjuvan¬ dam, et adjuvat praeparatam. Praecedit enim bona voluntas hominis multa Dei dona, sed non omnia, quae autem non praecedit ipsa, in eis est et ipsa » . Respondeo : hoc argumentum vehementer nos terrere potuisset, si obliti essemus, quam frequenter supra dicentemAugustinum audi¬ verimus, quod nos ad Deum converti, nisi ipso excitante et adjuvante, non possumus. Et velle suum, esse voluit et nostrum, suum vo¬ cando, nostrumsequendo. Et, in opere creden¬ di, cum incipimus velle credere, nos operari opera Christi, etcooperari Deo etc. Vide loca notata cap. 11 in hoc eodem lib. Sed praeter¬ ea totum hoc argumentum solutum est in i. lib. hujus tract. de grat. et lib. arb. cap. 1-4. Summa autem solutionis haec est, Deum operari in nobis, sine nobis, ut ve imus, uno quodam genere causae, nimirum moralis, non autem omni genere causae. Nam efficit in nobis Deus, ut velimus interna inspiratione et suasione, quo modo nos non operamur, ut velimus, non enim nos ipsi nobis persua¬ demus; si enim id faceremus, jam vellemus. Sed quamvis Deus sine nostro praevio conatu nos moveat ad volendum, non tamen efficit ipsum velle, sine nobis cooperantibus con¬ sentiende. Et ideo non ait Augustinus, velle facit sine nobis ; Sed, ut velimus, sine nobis. Eodem modo voluntatem bonam praeparat adjuvandam, et adjuvat praeparatam, quia illo genere causae, quae facit ut velimus, sine 135 nobis facientibus ut velimus, praeparat volun¬ tatem nobis non praeparantibus eamdem si¬ mili excitatione et suasione, et ideo in hac re non juvamur, cum sine nobis fiat. Sed tamen adio genere causae nos praeparamus voluntatem, adjuvante Deo, cum vocationi divinae consentimus : « Homo, inquit Augu¬ stinus lib. ii. ad Bonifac. cap. 8. praeparat cor, non tamen sine adjutorio Dei, qui tan¬ git cor ». Haec ille ». Quid si nunc ostendamus, hunc locum, de quo tantopere triumphare videntur adver¬ sarii, adversus ipsos pugnare gravissime? nam S. Augustinus posteaquam dixerat : « Ut velimus, sine uobis operatur, subjun¬ xit : Cum autem volumus, et sic volumus, ut operemur, nobiscum cooperatur. Quaero ab adversariis, quid sit nobiscum coopera¬ tur? » Nam si nobiscum Deus cooperatur, certe et nos operamur. Non autem dicimur operari, Deoque cooperari, quia produci¬ mus actum illum, ut instrumenta naturalia, ab alio mota, quoniam hoc modo operamur etiam ipsum velle, Calvino etKemnitio testi¬ bus, cum tamen ipsi idem negent, nos coo¬ perari Deo in actu volendi. Igitur fateri debent ex mente Augustini, nos operari opera externa, et in eis coope¬ rari Deo, non tantum producendo actum, sed etiam libere producendo, ut vere dica¬ mur cooperari Deo, et ab illo adjuvari. At non potest intelligi. quemadmodum sit li¬ bera actio externa, si non fuit libera electio, sive voluntas interna. Actiones enim externa! non habent libertatem, nisi in sua causa. Necessario enim sequuntur electionem vo¬ luntatis, et imperium rationis. Non dat li¬ bere eleemosynam, nisi qui libere voluit dare ; neque libere orat, aut jejunat, nisi qui libere elegit orare et jejunare. Quare ex eo, quod admittere coguntur, nos libere ope¬ rari opera pietatis externa coguntur etiam, velint nolint, admittere liberum arbitrium in ipso actu voluntatis interno. Aliud testimonium profert Calvinus ex lib. de corrept. et grat. cap. 11. ubi dicit, Augu- stin. affirmare, Adamum habuisse gratiam, per quam posset non peccare, nos habere multo majorem, per quam fit, ut non possi¬ mus peccare. Sed jaminpraefat. ostendimus, hoc non argumentum, sed impudentissimum esse mendacium. Non enim dicit Augustin. nos non posse peccare, sed in futura vita eam libertatem sanctos habituros, ut non possint peccare. Yidc qua! diximus in pradatione. 136 LIBER VI.