Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book VI: Grace and Free Choice in Works of Piety
Chapter 15: A compendium of the disputation on the cooperation of grace and free choice, comprised in some few sentences
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book VI. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
At the end of the whole disputation, I have judged it worth while to comprehend, by way of compendium, in some few sentences, what I hold concerning the cooperation of grace and free choice — the authority being adjoined at the same time, not only of a Council, or of some ancient father, but also of John Driedo and Ruard Tapper, who in this our age have most diligently treated this whole matter through — that the reader may have where he can read more, if he will.
We shall conclude with these our sentences seven times, as it were, of the man being reborn through the Spirit. The first can be called that in which he lacks all grace of God, and lies in the darkness, or death, of sin. The second, when he is aroused by God through the internal calling. The third, when, acquiescing in the calling, he chooses penance. The fourth, when he begins to do the works of penance: to pray, to fast, to weep, to give alms. The fifth, when upon him, disposed through the action of penance, the grace of justification is poured in. The sixth, when, justified, he resolves to do the works of justice. The seventh, when, doing those very works, he runs through the way of the commandments with great alacrity.
The first sentence: “Man, before all grace, has free choice, not only for natural and moral works, but also for works of piety, and supernatural ones.” St. Augustine teaches this in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 33, where he says that free choice is a natural and middle power, which can be inclined toward faith and toward unbelief. See Driedo, in the book On the Concord of Free Choice and Predestination, chapter 3, and Tapper in the explication of article 7. The same is also proved by reason. For free choice can neither be given nor taken away through grace, nor through sin; it remains, therefore, before grace, and after sin. That it is not given through grace is certain, because we can use free choice well and ill, and only through it do we sin, when we sin, as St. Augustine teaches, book 2 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 18; but no one can use the gifts of grace ill, nor does anyone sin through grace. Nor is it less certain that free choice is not given through sin, since no one can use sin well; but free choice (as was said) we use both well and ill. That it is not taken away through grace is beyond controversy, since grace perfects, not destroys, nature. That it is not taken away even through sin appears from this: that sin could wound the natural goods, yet not extinguish them, as was proved above by many arguments.
The second sentence: “Man has, before all grace, a remote and imperfect power for doing the works of piety.” The same Augustine teaches this, book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 5: “To be able to have faith and charity belongs to the nature of men.” The same, book On the Grace of Christ, chapter 50 [al. 47], cites Ambrose in these words: “The venerable Ambrose testifies that the natural possibility has been vitiated by sin, unnerved and infirm.” See Driedo in the place noted. Finally, it cannot be understood how the human will concurs actively toward the works of piety, if it have not of itself an active power, at least remote.
The third: “Man has not, before all grace, a proximate and perfect power for the works of piety; and therefore he can do nothing at all in this kind of himself.” St. Augustine, book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 22: “It is in the power of man to change his will for the better; but that power is nothing, unless it be given by God, of whom it is written: He gave them power to be made the sons of God.” And hence is solved that dilemma of Chemnitz: Either man has of himself some powers, however slender, or none at all. If he has some, then he can do something without God, against that of John 15: Without me you can do nothing. If none, then free choice is extinguished, nor can it cooperate with grace. But this dilemma, from the things said in this and the preceding sentence, remains plainly solved. For it has a remote power, and imperfect strength; and therefore it can do nothing by itself; but if that power be perfected, and strength be added, it will be able to perform much. You will say: How is the choice free toward either before grace, if it cannot do the good? I answer: it is free, but its liberty is as it were bound and hindered; and it is loosed and set free when the proximate power of working is conferred upon it through the prevenient grace of God. Something like this we experience in the power of seeing: for, the sensible species being absent, man has the power and liberty of seeing — for that species is not the cause of the liberty, or of the power of seeing; yet the power is remote, and the liberty bound, until, the species being received, the power is perfected and can come forth into act.
The fourth: “Internal arousing grace must necessarily precede the conversion of man — whether from unbelief to faith, or from sin to justice — nor does helping grace suffice.” This is against certain men who think that the external arousing through the preaching or reading of the Gospel suffices, with the help of God concurring, for eliciting the act of conversion. But our sentence is proved from that place of the Gospel, John 6: No man can come to me, except my Father draw him. For the drawing is not helping grace, but arousing, because it forestalls the unwilling man, to make him willing; for helping grace does not go before, but accompanies; nor is he said to be drawn who is helped, but who is impelled. Nor can external preaching be understood by this drawing; for the Lord had already preached to those to whom he said, “No man can come to me,” etc.; but since many of them were not being converted, therefore he adjoined, “No man can,” etc., and added: Every one that hath heard of my Father, and hath learned, cometh to me. Speaking of this drawing, Augustine, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 8: “Very far removed from the senses of the flesh is this school, in which the Father is heard, and teaches, that one may come to the Son. There too is the Son, because he is his Word, through whom he so teaches; and he does this not with the ear of the flesh, but of the heart.” This drawing, then, is not external preaching, which is not removed from the senses of the flesh — nay, it beats chiefly upon the ear of the flesh. The same is proved from canon 7 of the Council of Orange, where it is said that he is deceived by a heretical spirit who says that man can consent to the preaching of the gospel without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit; and from canon 14 of the same Council: “No wretched man is freed from misery, however small, unless the divine mercy forestall him.” And we have already said that helping grace properly does not go before, but accompanies; for only then are we helped, when in very fact we produce the act of conversion. But this very thing the Council of Trent taught most clearly — which those men do not despise, but endeavor to explain, against whom we now discourse. The Council, then, session 6, chapter 5, speaking generally of the conversion both of the believer and the unbeliever, says that the beginning of justification is taken from the calling, or arousing, of God; and declares that this arousing is done by God touching the heart of man through the illumination of the Holy Spirit — where it speaks openly of the internal arousing. Then chapter 6, of unbelievers, says: “They are disposed, while, aroused by divine grace and helped,” etc. And chapter 14, of the faithful fallen: “They who by sin have fallen from the received grace of justification will be able to be justified again, when, God arousing them, they shall have taken care, through the Sacrament of penance, by the merit of Christ, to recover the lost grace.” And canon 3: “If anyone shall say that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and his aid man can believe, hope, love, or repent as is fitting, so that the grace of justification may be conferred on him, let him be anathema.” Nor do I think anyone will be so bold as to endeavor to twist this place into the sense that by the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit external preaching is to be understood. Much less is the interpretation of those to be approved who say that the Council speaks of the ordinary and common mode of calling, not of every calling; for the Council does not say that no one believes or repents, but that no one can believe or repent, without prevenient inspiration. The same can be proved from the Fathers. For certainly the words of Augustine are most clear, in book 2 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 18: “That we turn to God, we cannot, unless he arouse and help us.” And lest the arousing be dragged to external preaching, let the place cited a little before be repeated, from On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 8; and let the whole book On the Grace of Christ be consulted, but especially chapter 7 [al. 10] and following. And St. Gregory confirms that not only the preaching of men, but even the external voice of God itself, does not suffice without internal inspiration, in book 11 of the Morals, chapter 5 [al. 9]: “Cain could be admonished by the divine voice, and could not be changed; because, the fault of his malice demanding it, God had already left his heart within, to whom he was making words without, for a testimony.” And St. Fulgentius, in the book On the Incarnation and Grace of Christ, in the last words: “In vain does the divine discourse sound in the outward ears, unless God, by a spiritual gift, open the hearing of the inner man.” St. Prosper, in the book against the Collator, chapter 28 [al. 13], reprehends Cassian for saying that there are in the soul seeds of the virtues, but to be aroused through external preaching. For he sets down these words of Cassian: “These seeds will not be able to come to the increase of perfection, unless they shall have been aroused by the divine succor.” And he adds: “So that, forsooth, the succor of God is exhortation and teaching; while the mind, which is opulent with the seeds of the virtues, uses the faculty it possesses,” etc. Finally St. Bernard — to omit others — in the book On Grace and Free Choice: “The endeavors of free choice are both fruitless, if they be not helped, and nothing, if they be not aroused.” Let reason also come, last: for helping grace is required for the exercise of the act, arousing grace for its specification. For the latter is the principle of acting, and as it were the seed of the future fruit, as St. Prosper calls it in book 2 On the Vocation of the Gentiles, chapter 26. And as water, that it may be able to heat, demands not only the divine concurrence, by which it may be helped, but also that there first be impressed in it the form of heat, which is the principle of acting; and as the earth, that it may be able to germinate, needs not only the cooperation of God, but also the conception of the seed — so also the human mind, that it may bring forth an act of piety, needs not only the help of the cooperation of God, but also the seed of the Holy Spirit, which consists in arousing and prevenient grace — that is, in the illumination of the heart and the inspiration of good desire.
But some object: first, if prevenient arousing is always required, how are some converted in a moment? Second, if prevenient arousing is always required, conversion will therefore not be in the power of man; for that arousing is not in man’s power. Third, the faithful, though sinners, have faith; therefore through it they can pray, and thereby do not need arousing grace. Fourth, we ourselves can add the testimony of St. Augustine from the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 34, where he speaks thus: “By the persuasions of things seen God acts, that we may will and believe — whether from without, through the Evangelical exhortations, or from within, where no one has in his power what shall come into his mind.” I answer, to the first: conversion is always done in a moment, if conversion be taken for the act of the will by which we consent to the calling of God; but if it be taken for that whole work by which we hear him calling and perceive the calling, and at last acquiesce in it, it cannot be done in a moment, but in a very brief time, which may not unusually be called a moment. For we commonly say those men are suddenly converted who, as soon as they have heard some word of a preacher, or read some sentence, resolve to change their life — so that neither days nor hours, but a far briefer time, lies between the voice of the preacher and the conversion of the sinner. To the second I answer: conversion is always in the power of free choice, since one can always be converted when he shall have willed. For that is said to be in one’s power (as Augustine defines, book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 31, and book 5 On the City of God, chapter 10) which is present when we will, and when we will not, is not present. In which sense Augustine admits, in the same place, that faith is in the power of free choice, because man believes if he will, and if he will not, believes not. But the very willing to believe, or to be converted, man cannot have, unless through prevenient grace he shall have received the ability. Nor is it in the power of man that God call and arouse him; otherwise the Apostle would not say, 2 Timothy 2: If peradventure God may give them repentance,... and they may recover themselves from the snares of the devil. Nor would the Church pray so anxiously for unbelievers and other sinners, if they could by their own powers, without divine inspiration, be converted. And this is what we said above: that man has, toward the acts of piety, before all grace, free choice and a remote power, but not a proximate one. To the third I answer: in the sinful man there is indeed faith, but dead — which can work nothing in order to salvation, unless it be aroused through divine inspiration and calling. To the fourth I answer: it pertains to arousing grace to propose some object congruent to the mind, through which the man can be persuaded; and moreover to arouse the mind to consider it, and to move the will and incline it to accept it. As regards, then, the representation of the object, it is not necessary that this always be done inwardly; but it is enough if it be done from without, through the Evangelical exhortation; and this is what St. Augustine says in that place — where he does not deny that it is required that God inwardly arouse to attend to the preaching, and to embrace it. Although that too is a grace of God: that such an exhortation be offered from without as is congruent to the mind, as the same Augustine teaches in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 14. See Driedo, in the book On the Captivity and Redemption of the Human Race, treatise 5, chapter 2, part 2; Tapper, in the explication of article 7, before the middle.
The fifth sentence: “Arousing grace is given to man without any preceding merits, and without any preparation.” This was sufficiently proved above, in chapters 4 and 5, and is most manifest: for since this is absolutely the first grace, it can by no means fall under merit, lest grace be not grace; and since this same is the first disposition toward justice, no other disposition can by any means precede it.
The sixth: “Arousing grace is not given to man without an action of his own, although it be given without the cooperation of free choice.” This too was proved above, in chapter 9 [al. 6], and is no less certain than the preceding. For arousing grace embraces two things: the beginning of good thought, and the beginning of good desire. Now to think and to desire are acts of the mind and of the will; wherefore it cannot come to pass that anyone be aroused to thinking and desiring without his own act. Yet because they are certain sudden motions, and forestall all deliberation of reason, therefore they are not acts of free choice — such as are also, often, the unclean desires and sordid thoughts which the devil sometimes sends into us even against our will. And as of the evil motions which we suffer unwilling, since they are not free, the Apostle truly says, It is no more I that do it, but the sin that dwelleth in me, Romans 7 — so of these good motions, by the same reasoning, because they are not free, we can say: it is no more I that work them, but the grace of God which forestalls me. Of these Augustine writes, in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 34: “By the persuasions of things seen God acts, that we may will — whether from without, through the Evangelical exhortations, or from within, where no one has in his power what shall come into his mind.”
The seventh: “For assenting to arousing grace, or to the divine internal calling, helping grace is necessarily required.” This is known from the testimonies cited above: of the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 5 — they are disposed toward justification while, aroused and helped, they are freely moved toward God; and of St. Augustine, in the Enchiridion, chapter 32 — “he both prepares the will of man to be helped, and helps it when prepared”; and book 2 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 18 — “that we turn to God, we cannot, unless he arouse and help us”; and of St. Bernard, book On Grace and Free Choice — “the endeavors of free choice are both fruitless, if they be not helped, and nothing, if they be not aroused.” And it is here briefly to be noted that some distinguish four motions which can exist in man when he is aroused by God with internal inspiration. For either he who is called rejects him who calls; or he neither rejects nor receives, but lets God knock at the door of his heart, and yet is in no way affected toward him who knocks; or he neither rejects nor receives, but yet rejoices in that calling, and begins to be affected toward him who calls; or, finally, he simply embraces him who calls, and lets himself be drawn whithersoever he shall will. And indeed about the first and the last motion of the heart there can be no discord. For it is certain that man can, without the help of grace, reject him who calls — for God does not help us to sin; nor is it less certain that man cannot, without the grace of God, embrace him who calls. And of these two motions St. Augustine speaks when he says, in the book On the Grace of Christ, chapter 14: “This choice can be alone, if he comes not; but it cannot be, except helped, if he comes.” About the second and third some are in doubt; but there is scarcely any just cause of doubting. For the second pertains to the first, and the third to the last. The second (I say) pertains to the first, since to hear him who calls, and not follow — what else is it than to contemn and reject him? Certainly he who hears a poor man crying out, and is not moved to mercy, nor gives him anything, can be said to repel him, though he drive him away neither with word nor with hand; and he who for a long time hears one persuading, and is not persuaded — is he not said to resist the persuader? Wherefore St. Augustine, in the place noted, does not say, “this choice can be alone, if it repel God,” but says, “it can be alone, if he comes not.” And so not only to repel the calling by some contrary act, but also not to admit it, and not to come, is to reject. But the third motion pertains to the last, nor can it be had without the aid of grace; since to rejoice over the calling of God is the beginning of good will, and of a pious affection toward God; and though it be not absolutely to come, yet it is to be inclined toward coming, and as it were the beginning of the journey.
The eighth sentence: “Neither arousing grace nor helping grace imposes on man any necessity, so that he cannot freely consent, or dissent, to God calling.” For in the first place, arousing grace, if it be only sufficient and not efficacious, can be rejected, and in fact is rejected, as experience teaches. But if it be efficacious, it is never rejected, nor can be rejected upon the supposition; yet absolutely it can be rejected, as we showed in the preceding chapter; and the reason is that grace, however efficacious, is nothing else than persuasion, which does not determine the will, but inclines it after the manner of one proposing an object. But it is never rejected for this reason: that God so persuades as he sees to be apt for the man, that he acquiesce in the persuader. Helping grace, however, consists in three things: first, in the direction of the man; second, in the protection of the same against the various assaults of our enemy the devil; third, in the intrinsic cooperation, for eliciting the act together with the will itself. And indeed direction and protection impose no necessity, since they do not touch the very act of free election, but only remove impediments. And that intrinsic cooperation concurs in no other manner than the general help. For as for doing natural works the general help is necessary, so for supernatural works the special help; and as the former is never wanting to those who have the natural forms through which they can work, so neither is the latter ever wanting to those who have the supernatural form — that is, the habits of the infused virtues, or at least arousing grace; and finally, as the general help so concurs with all things in natural actions that it yet does not hinder liberty and contingency, as we showed in the fourth book of this disputation, so the special helping aid so concurs toward all supernatural actions that it does not hinder the liberty of man — since these helps concur in altogether the same manner, as Ruard Tapper rightly teaches in the explication of article 7. Nor can this be denied by Catholics, saving the authority of the Council of Trent, which in express words, in session 6, chapter 5, and canon 4, teaches that man, aroused and helped, is freely moved toward God, since he can both receive and reject the calling of God. But certain distorted explications of this canon must be refuted. For some say that man is freely moved toward God when he is aroused and helped by his grace, because he is moved of his own accord, and with the full and perfect judgment of reason, though he be moved necessarily. But the Council not only says that man is freely moved, but also adjoins the reason: because he can refuse to receive the grace, and resist the calling — which certainly he could not, if he were moved necessarily. Then, do not the blessed, who see God, of their own accord be carried by love toward God, and with the full and perfect judgment of reason — and yet, by the common opinion of the Theologians, are not freely moved, because they cannot not be moved? Finally, Calvin himself, who beyond the other heretics of this time assails free choice, will not deny that man is freely moved toward God, if this be to be freely moved: to be moved of one’s own accord and with the full judgment of reason. For thus he speaks in book 2 against Pighius: “If liberty be opposed to coercion, I both constantly assert that the choice is free, and hold for a heretic whoever thinks otherwise.” Why then did the Council labor against the heretics of this time in framing its canons, if Calvin thinks with us — or rather we with him? Again they say that man can dissent, if he will, but yet cannot will it, if he have the grace of God; and that this very thing was the opinion of the Council. But the Council not only says that man can dissent if he will, but also says absolutely that man can cast away the arousing grace of God, as is clear from chapter 5 of the sixth session. Then, not to be able to will to dissent fights altogether with free choice, if it be posited (as the adversaries posit) that he cannot will to dissent because grace determines the will actively and intrinsically to the contrary. We indeed have often said above that man can believe, or love God, if he will, yet cannot will without the aid of grace. But this was rightly said, because free choice toward good is infirm, and therefore needs aid; but, the aid being given, we said that man can will and not will, and in that way is truly and properly free. But if, the grace of God being present, man cannot will to dissent, and, it being absent, cannot will to consent, there is no liberty of choice, nor any departure from the opinion of the heretics. Again they say that man can, according to the decree of the Council, consent and dissent, because it can come to pass that he have grace, and it can also come to pass that he have not grace. But this makes not man free, but God, who at his choice bestows grace or bestows it not. Otherwise even a beast of burden could be called free, because it can run and not run, if it please the rider to apply the spurs or not apply them, and to slacken the reins or not slacken them. But they answer that the beast can never be called free, because it is naturally determined to one; while man is determined to good not naturally, but by the benefit of grace. But we are not now asking whence liberty is taken away — from nature, or from grace — but whether it is taken away; and whether that is true which Scripture says, He that could have transgressed, and hath not transgressed; and could do evil, and hath not done it; and what the Council says: that man freely receives the grace of internal inspiration, since he can also reject it. For whatever be the case with God and the blessed, who cannot sin, the Catholic Church, in mortal men, according to the divine Scriptures and the common consent of the Fathers, defends that liberty through which they can, by acting well, merit reward, because they could have not acted well; and, by acting ill, merit punishments, because they could have not acted ill — as in the fourth and fifth books we showed abundantly enough. They say, last, that the Council speaks of arousing grace, not of helping, when it says that grace can be rejected by man, and that man can dissent if he will; but that they themselves assert not arousing but helping grace to be so efficacious that it determines the will, and cannot be rejected. But these men are deceived, first, in that they think efficacious grace to be helping grace — whereas, according to the Scriptures and St. Augustine, efficacious grace is the calling itself, or the arousing according to purpose, as we proved copiously in book 1, chapter 12. This one place will suffice, from the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 5 [al. 17]: “That Paul should be converted by so great and most efficacious a calling was the grace of God alone.” Where you see that efficacious grace is the calling itself. And what that calling was, the same Augustine explains in book 1 to Simplicianus, at the end: “Laid low by one voice from above — Paul, namely — such a vision assuredly meeting him, whereby that mind and will, its savagery broken, might be twisted back and set right unto faith.” The efficacious grace, then, in the conversion of blessed Paul was the voice from heaven, with such an internal inspiration and persuasion as was congruent, that Paul should not spurn it. See the place cited, where this truth is clearly demonstrated. Nor do these men slip only in this, that they place efficacious grace in the helping, not in the arousing; but also in this, that they say arousing grace can be spurned, not helping. For since the helping is given for this — that the arousing be not spurned, but consented to — how can arousing grace be spurned, if the helping cannot be spurned? Add that, if we would speak properly, to be received or rejected cannot befit helping grace, because helping grace is not something which is offered to man, but is the very production of the act, which is not except when the act is produced; and when the act is produced, it cannot come to pass that it be not produced; and in this sense helping grace cannot be rejected — as neither can our own cooperation, which are altogether simultaneous. And therefore the Council did not say that helping grace can be rejected, but only the arousing. But although helping grace, properly speaking, cannot be rejected, yet the question still remains whether that working of God determine our will prior in nature, or not. For if it does not determine it — as we proved in book 4, almost at the end — it is in our power that that grace be posited or not posited, and so in a certain sense it can be rejected; in the way the general help is in a certain manner in our power, and in a certain sense can be rejected, because if we will to work, it is posited; if we will not, it is not posited. But if that grace determine our will prior in nature, then indeed in no sense can it be rejected — but the liberty of choice is taken away, as in the place cited we believe we have sufficiently proved.
The ninth sentence: “It can come to pass that, the same internal motion being applied to two men, the one is converted and the other is not converted; and the one advances more, the other less.” This is Ruard Tapper’s, in the place cited, and is gathered from the things said before. For the divine motion leaves man plainly free, so that he can be converted and not converted, and advance more and less. And it is confirmed from the parable of the sower, Matthew 13, where the Lord refers the cause of the diversity — why the same seed in one place brought forth much, in another little, in another nothing at all — to the varied disposition of the ground. Finally there comes also the common confession of the pious, who accuse their own negligence, and frankly profess that they do not advance as much as they could, if they cooperated with the divine grace with greater zeal. You will say: if the matter stands so, he who is converted, or who advances more, will be able to glory against the other, who from the same calling and help would not be converted, or was less zealous to advance; but that is against that of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 4: Who distinguisheth thee? What hast thou that thou hast not received? I answer: he who is not converted, or advances less, will deservedly be able to accuse his own negligence, that he would not cooperate with the divine grace; but he who is converted, or advances more, has nothing wherein to glory except in the Lord — since by the gift of God he had not only the being able to be converted and advance, like the other, but also the willing to be converted, and the advancing with great fervor. For although the motion was the same in each, as regards the substance of the motion, yet to the one it was congruous, to the other it was not. And since it is a singular grace of God that he deign so to move a man as he sees to be congruent and apt for him, that he may be persuaded and consent — therefore we did not say that it can come to pass that the one be converted and the other not converted, if the same grace be given to each; for that we judge to be false; but if the same motion be applied to each. For, as we said, the same motion can be congruous to the one, not congruous to the other; and thereby be given to the one that he may be able, to the other that he may be able and will.
The tenth sentence: “The conversion of man to God, as also any other pious work whatever, insofar as it is a work, is from free choice alone — yet not with the general help excluded; insofar as it is pious, from grace alone; insofar as it is a pious work, from free choice and grace together.” This is the same Ruard’s, in the same place. And it is proved: since the efficient cause of a human action, as it is an action, is the very will of man; as it is free, is the liberty of choice; as it is pious, is the divine seed, and the help befitting such a seed. Accordingly grace only makes the human action to be such — that is, pious and supernatural — to which assuredly nature by its own powers would never reach.
The eleventh: “For the works which follow the act of conversion, both internal and external — that is, for the works of penance, by which we are prepared for the grace of justification — some new grace does not seem to be necessarily required, but only the continual direction and protection, and the conservation of the divine seed already conceived and formed.” It is Ruard’s, in the same place. And it is proved: since, an efficacious will being posited, there is no doubt that the other works will necessarily follow. For he who efficaciously wills to change his life, to pray, to fast, to give alms, to withhold himself from delights and pleasures, carries out all these things without difficulty. “It is certain” (says Augustine in the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 16) “that we keep the commandments, if we will; but because the will is prepared by the Lord, it must be asked of him that we will so much as suffices, that willing we may do.” And below: “It is certain that it is we who do, when we do; but he makes us do, affording most efficacious strength to the will.” And in book 8 of the Confessions, chapter 9 [al. 8], he says that the whole cause why he could not renounce the pleasures of the flesh was this: that he did not fully will. Moreover, as in the works of the mind we can, from known principles, gather conclusions by discoursing, so also in the works of the will, from the love of the end — whether naturally aroused or conceived from divine inspiration — we can without doubt, without new inspiration, proceed to the inquiry and election of the means. For grace does not take away or hinder, but helps and perfects, the natural efficacy of the free will. He therefore who, acquiescing in God mercifully forestalling and calling, has most firmly resolved to change his life, will be able, without the inspiration of a new grace, to seek out and take up the means useful to this — provided, as we said, the aid of the divine direction and protection be not wanting. Nor is this sentence repugnant to that Ecclesiastical definition which St. Augustine reports in epistle 106: that grace is given for single acts. For by that definition is signified that there can be no pious act which is not the gift of God, and does not arise from grace, but from the powers of nature alone — which we most willingly confess. For the good works which follow conversion are all gifts of God, and arise from grace: both because they are commanded by the good will, which God prepared and made in us through prevenient grace; and also because without the special direction and protection of God they are not done.
The twelfth sentence: “The habit of justifying grace is poured in by God alone, yet not without our previous disposition.” This is most certain, since the habit of grace is a divine quality, which is not drawn out of the natural potency, but is produced by a certain quasi-creation; and God alone can create things. And so St. Augustine, on Psalm 118, discourse 26, treating that verse, I have done judgment and justice, distinguishes the actual justice which they do who are just, from the virtue of justice by which they are just; and speaking of this latter: “Who,” says he, “makes justice in man, but he who justifies the impious?” From which it follows (as Ruard in the place cited wisely admonished) that, when prevenient grace is compared to a seed, that grace is made like not to the seeds of herbs, which contain in virtue the form of the thing to be produced, but to the human seed, which does not contain in virtue the human form — that is, the rational soul, which is created by God alone — but only the dispositions for receiving that form. Being born again, says blessed Peter in the first epistle, chapter 1, not of corruptible seed, but incorruptible, by the word of God. And so, as in human generation the matter is disposed and formed by the power of the seed, that it may become apt for receiving the soul by divine creation and infusion — so also by the power of arousing and helping grace the soul of the sinner is disposed, that the grace of justification may be poured into it by the divine gift. Further, of justifying grace we shall discourse, God being propitious, in the following disputation.
The thirteenth sentence: “The just man can, when he will, exercise justice both internal and external — that is, do good works and keep the divine precepts — nor does he ordinarily need new arousing grace, but only helping.” This sentence is gathered from the preceding. For if a man not yet justified can, from the seed of good inspiration, produce the fruit of conversion and of the works of penance, how much more will he be able, from the seed of the grace that makes pleasing, to produce the fruit of justice and of good works? It is had, moreover, set down in express words in the last canon of the Council of Orange. But we said “ordinarily,” since it is not to be denied that in certain arduous works new and special helps of grace are demanded. And that in every good and pious work helping grace — that is, directing and protecting — is required, and that justifying grace does not suffice, the Scriptures, Councils, and Fathers everywhere teach. For that of John 15, Without me you can do nothing, was said to the Apostles, who without doubt were just, as St. Augustine notes in the book On Correction and Grace, chapter 1 [al. 12]; and that saying — Unless the Lord keep the city, he watcheth in vain that keepeth it, Psalm 126 — Hilary, in the commentary on this Psalm, and Ambrose, book 2 on Luke, understand of the soul of the just man, which without the divine protection cannot resist temptation. The Council of Orange, canon 19: “Human nature cannot, without grace, keep the salvation which it has received.” Which same thing Celestine teaches, in the epistle to the Gauls, chapter 6, and St. Augustine, in the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 6, and On Correction and Grace, chapter 12, and elsewhere.
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CAPUT XV. Compendium disputationis de cooperatione (jratise et liberi arbitrii , aliquot sententiis comprehensum. Ad extremum totius disputationis opera? pretium esse duxi, si per modum compendii sententiis aliquot comprehenderem, quid de cooperatione gratia? et liberi .arbitrii sen¬ tiam, adjuncta simul auctoritate, non solum Concilii, aut veteris alicujus patris, sed etiam Joannis Dricdonis, et Ruardi Tapperi, qui hac nostra a?tate totam hanc materiam dili¬ gentissime pertractarunt, ut habeat lector, ubi plura legere possit, si velit. Septem quasi tempora hominis per Spi¬ ritum 'reiiascentis, his nostris sententiis con¬ cludemus. Primum dici potest, cum omni gratia Dei caret, et in tenebris peccati, vel morte jacet. Secundum cum a Deo, per in¬ ternam vocationem excitatur. Tertium, cum vocationi acquiescens, eligit poenitentiam. Quartum, cum incipit opera poenitentiae ta¬ cere, orare, jejunare, flere, eleemosynas dare. Quintum, cum illi per actionem poeni¬ tentia? disposito, gratia justificationis infun¬ ditur. Sextum, cum justificatus, opera justi¬ tia facere statuit. Septimum, cum ipsa opera faciens viam mandatorum magna alacritate percurrit. Prima sententia : « Homo ante omnem gratiam liberum habet arbitrium, non solum ad opera naturalia, et moralia, sed etiam ad opera pietatis, et supernaturalia ». Docet hoc S. Augustinus in lib. de spir. et litter. cap. 33-. ubi dicit, liberum arbitrium esse vim naturalem et mediam, qua? ad fidem, et infidelitatem inclinari potest. Vide Driedo- nem in lib. de concordia liberi arbitrii, et pra?destinationis cap. 3. et Tapperum in explicatione art. 7 . Idem etiam probatur ratione. Nam libe¬ rum arbitrium non potest dari, nec tolli per gratiam, neque per peccatum. Manet igitur ante gratiam, et post peccatum. Non dari per gratiam, certum est, quia libero arbitrio .possumus bene et male uti, et non nisi per ipsum peccamus, quando peccamus," ut S. Augustinus docet lib. ii. de peccator, iner. et remiss. cap. 18. ut gratia? donis nemo potest male uti. Neque per gratiam ullus' peccat. Nec minus certum est, non dari li¬ berum arbitrium per peccatum, quoniam nemo potest bene uti peccato, libero autem arbitrio (ut dictum est) bene et male utimur. Non tolli per gratiam, extra controversiam est, quoniam gratia perficit, non destruit naturam. Non tolli etiam per peccatum, in¬ de constat, quod peccatum la?dero potuit na¬ turalia bona, non tamen extinguere, ut su¬ pra multis argumentis probatum est. Secunda sententia. « Habet homo ante omnem gratiam, potentiam remotam, et im¬ perfectam ad opera pietatis facienda ». Do¬ cet hoc idem Augustinus libro de pra?dest. Sanctorum cap. 5. « Posse habere fidem, et charitatem naturae est hominum». Idem lib. de gratia Christi cap. 50. citat Ambrosium his verbis : « Naturalem possibilitatem, pec¬ cato esse vitiatam, enervem, infirmamque testatur venerandus Ambrosius » . Vide Drie- donem loco notato. Denique intclligi non pc- test, quomodo ad opera pietatis active volun¬ tas humana concurrat, si nou habeat ex se potentiam activam, saltem remotam. Tertia, « Non habet homo ante omnem gratiam potentiam proximam et perfectam ad opera pietatis, et ideo nihil omnino in hoc genere ex se facere potest ». S. August. lib. i. Ilctract. cap. 22 : « In potestate, inquit, hominis est, mutare in melius voluntatem, sed ea potestas nulla est, nisi detur a Deo; de quo scriptum est : Dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri ». Atque hinc solvitur illud dilemma Kcmnitii. Aut habet homo ex se aliquas vires, quamvis exiles, aut nullas om¬ nino. Si habet aliquas, ergo potest aliquid sine Deo, contra illud Joan. xv : Sine me ni¬ hil potestis facere (1). Si nullas, igitur ex- tinctum est liberum arbitrium, neque gra¬ tia? cooperari potest. Sed hoc dilemna ex dictis in hac, et superiore sententia, plane solutum manet. Habet enim potentiam re¬ motam, et vires imperfectas, et ideo nihil per se potest, sed si perficiatur ea potentia, et vires addantur, poterit multa pra?stare. Dices : Quomodo liberum est arbitrium ad utrumlibet ante gratiam, si bonum facere non potest? Respondeo, liberum est, sed ejus libertas est quasi ligata et impedita; solvitur autem et expeditur, cum potentia proxima ad operandum per Dei gratiam pra?venientem ei confertur. Simile aliquid CAPUT XV. 137 experimur in potentia videndi : nam absente specie sensibili , habet homo potentiam et libertatem videndi ; non enim ea species causa est libertatis, aut potentiae videndi ; tamen potentia remota est, et libertas ligata, donec accepta specie potentia perficiatur, et in actum prodire possit. Quarta. « Gratia excitans interna neces¬ sario praecedere debet hominis conversio¬ nem, sive ab infidelitate ad fidem'; sive a peccato ad justitiam , neque sufficit gratia adjuvans ». Haec est contra quosdam, qui existimant, sufficere externam excitationem per Evangelii praedicationem, vel lectionem, cum auxilio Dei concurrente ad eliciendum actum conversionis. Sed probatur nostra sententia ex loco illo Evangelii, Joan. vi. Nemo potest venite ad me , nisi Pater meus traxerit eum. Tractus enim non est gratia adjuvans, sed excitans, quia praevenit nolentem, ut faciat volentem; gratia enim adjuvans non praevenit, sed co¬ mitatur, neque dicitur trahi, qui juvatur, sed qui impellitur. Neque per hunc tractum po¬ test intelligi praedicatio externa. Dominus enim jam praedicaverat istis, quibus dicebat : Nemo potest ad me venire etc. sed quoniam multi ex iis non convertebantur, ideo ad¬ junxit : Nemo potest , etc. et addidit : Omnis , qui audivit a Patre meo et didicit, venit ad me. De hoc tractu loquens Augustinus in lib. de praedestin. Sanet, cap. 8: «Valde, inquit remota est a sensibus carnis haec schola, in qua Pater auditur, et docet, ut veniatur ad filigm. Ibi est et filius, quia ipse est verbum ejus, per quod sic docet, nec agit hoc cum carnis aure, sed cordis » . Non igitur hic tractus est praedicatio externa, quae non est remota a sensibus carnis. Immo carnis au rem potissimum pulsat. Idem probatur ex can. 7. Concilii Arausi¬ cam, ubi dicitur, haeretico spiritu falli eum, qui dicit, posse hominem evangelizanti prae¬ dicationi consentire, absque illuminatione et inspiratione Spiritus sancti. Et ex illo canon. 44. Concilii ejusdem : « Nullus miser de quantulacumque miseria liberatur, nisi eum misericordia divina praeveniat ». Jam autem .diximus, gratiam adjuvantem proprie non praevenire, sed comitari. Tunc enim solum juvamur, cum re ipsa conversionis actum producimus, Sed hoc ipsum clarissime docuit Conci¬ lium Tridentinum, quod illi non spernunt sed explicare conantur, contra quos in prae- Tom. VI. senti disserimus. Igitur Concilium sess. G. cap. 5. generatim loquens de conversione tam fidelis, quam infidelis, dicit exordium justificationis sumi a Dei vocatione, seu exci¬ tatione, et declarat hanc excitationem fieri, tangente Deo cor hominis per Spiritus san¬ cti illuminationem, ubi aperte loquitur de excitatione interna. Deinde cap. 6. de infide¬ libus dicit : « Disponuntur, dum excitati di¬ vina gratia, et adjuti, etc. » Et cap. 44, de fidelibus lapsis : « Qui vero, inquit, accepta justificationis gratia per peccatum excide¬ runt, rursus justificari poterunt, cum exci¬ tante Deo, per poenitentia; Sacramentum, merito Christi, amissam gratiam, recuperare procuraverint ». Et can. 3. « Si quis dixerit, sine praiveniente Spiritus sancti inspiratione, atque ejus adjutorio, hominem credere, sperare, diligere, poenitere posse, sicut opor¬ tet, ut ei justificationis gratia conferatur, anathema sit » . Nec puto ullum fore tam audacem, ut hunc locum in eam sententiam detorquere conetur,ut per praevenientem Spiritus sancti inspirationem intelligendam esse velit exter¬ nam praedicationem. Multo etiam minus pro¬ banda est illorum interpretatio, qui dicunt. Concilium loqui de modo ordinario, et com¬ muni vocationis, non de omni vocatione. Nam Concilium non dicit, neminem credere aut poenitere, sed neminem posse credere aut poenitere, sine praeveniente inspiratione. Idem probari potest ex Patribus. Nam certe Augustini verba clarissima sunt in ii. lib. de peccat, mer. et remiss. cap. 48 : « Quod nos ad Deum convertimus, nisi ipso excitante et adjuvante non possumus » . Et ne trahatur excitatio ad praedicationem ex¬ ternam, repetatur locus paulo ante citatus, de praedestinatione Sanctor, cap. 8. et cop- sulaturtotus liber de gratia Christi, sed prae¬ sertim cap. 7. et seq. S. vero Gregorius, non solum praedicatio¬ nem hominum, sed ipsam Dei vocem exter¬ nam non sufficere sine interna inspiratione confirmat in lib. xi. Moral. cap. 5. « Cain, inquit, divina voce admoneri potuit, et mu¬ tari non potuit, quia exigente culpa malitiae, jam intus Deus cor reliquerat, cui foris ad testimonium verba faciebat ». Et S. Fulgentius in lib. de Incarnat. et grat. Christi, in ultimis verbis : « Frustra? inquit, sermo divinus exterioribus auribus sonat, nisi Deus spirituali munere, auditum hominis interioris aperiat », 40 m LIBER Vi. S. Prosper in lib. contra Collatorem, cap. 28. reprehendit Cassianum, quod diceret, incsse animae semina virtutum, sed excitanda per externam praedicationem. Ponit enim haec verba Cassiani : « Ad perfectionis in¬ crementum semina haec pervenire non pote¬ runt, nisi opitulatione divinas fuerint exci¬ tata». Et addit : « Ut scilicet opitulatio Dei sit cohortatio, atque doctrina ; mens autem quae virtutum est opulenta seminibus, utatur facultate, possidet etc. » Denique S. Bernardus, ut alios omittam, in libro de grat. et liber, arbit. : « Conatus, inquit, liberi arbitrii et cassi sunt, si non adjuventur, et nulli, sinon excitentur». Accedat postremo etiam ratio, nam gratia adjuvans, requiritur ad exercitium actus, gratia excitans ad specificationem. Illa enim est ratio agendi, et quasi semen fructus futuri, ut eam appellat sanctus Prosper in ii. lib. de vocatione gentium, cap. 26. et sicut aqua, ut possit calefacere, non solum exigit concursum divinum, quo adju¬ vetur, sed etiam ut prius in ipsa imprimatur forma caloris, quae sit ratio agendi ; et terra, ut possit germinare, non solum eget coope¬ ratione Dei, sed etiam conceptione seminis : sic et humana mens, ut pariat actum pieta¬ tis, non auxilio tantum eget cooperationis Dei, sed etiam semine Spiritus sancti, quod in gratia excitante, ac praeveniente, id est, in illuminatione cordis et boni desiderii inspi¬ ratione consistit. At objiciunt aliqui : primo si semper re¬ quiritur excitatio praeveniens, quomodo aliqui convertuntur in momento? Secundo, si semper requiritur excitatio praeveniens, non igitur in potestate hominis erit conver¬ sio. Non enim excitatio illa est in hominis potestate. Tertio, fideles, quamvis peccato¬ res, fidem habent, igitur per eam orare pos¬ sunt, ac per hoc non egent gratia excitante. Quarto, possumus nos addere testimonium S. Augustini ex lib. de spiritu et littera cap. di. ubi sic loquitur : « Visorum suasionibus agit Deus, ut velimus et credamus, sive ex¬ trinsecus , per Evangelicas exhortationes, sive intrinsecus, ubi nemp habet in potestate, quid ei veniat in mentem » . Respondeo ad primum, conversionem fieri semper in momento, si conversio accipiatur pro actu voluntatis, quo vocationi Dei con- sentinus : sed si accipiatur pro toto illo ope¬ re, quo vocantem audimus et vocationem percipimus, ac demum illi acquiescimus, non posse fieri in momento, sed in tempore brevissimo, quod non inusitate momentum dici poterit. Illos enim repente converti vul¬ go dicere solemus, qui statim ut audierin? vocem aliquam concionatoris, aut senten¬ tiam aliquam legerint, vitam mutare con¬ stituunt, ita ut neque dies, neque horae, sed tempus longe brevius inter vocem concio¬ natoris, et conversionem peccatoris intersit. Ad secandum respondeo, Conversionem semper esse in potestate liberi arbitrii, quo¬ niam potest semper converti, quando volue¬ rit. Id enim dicitur esse in potestate ( ut Augustinus definit lib. de spiritu et littera cap. 31. et lib. v. de Civit. V ei cap. 10) quod adest, quando volumus, et quando nolumus non adest. Quo sensu admittit Augustinus ibidem, fidem esse in potestate libexd arbi¬ trii, quia credit homo, si vult, et si non vult, non credit. Ceetermn ipsum velle credere, aut converti, non potest homo habere, nisi per gratiam praevenientem acceperit, ut pos¬ sit. Neque est in potestate hominis, ut Deus illum vocet atque excitet; alioqui non dice¬ ret Apostolus II ad Timoth. ii. Ne quando det eis Deus poenitentiam , et convertantur a diaboli laque is (1). Neque tam anxie oraret Ec¬ clesia pro infidelibus, aliisque peccatoribus, si possent ipsi suis viribus, absque divina inspiratione converti. Atque hoc est, quod supra diximus, habere hominem ad actus pietatis, ante omnem gratiam, liberum ar¬ bitrium et potentiam remotam, sed nqn proximam. Ad tertium respondeo, in homine pecca* tore fidem quidem esse, sed mortuam. Quae nihil operari potest in ordine ad salutem, nisi per divinam inspirationem et vocationem excitetur. Ad quartum respondeo, ad gratiam exci¬ tantem pertinere, ut proponat objectum ali¬ quod congruum menti, per quod homo per¬ suaderi possit ; et praeterea ut excitet men¬ tem ad illud considerandum, et ut moveat .voluntatem, eamque inclinet ad illud acce¬ ptandum. Quod igitur attinet ad repraesen¬ tationem objecti, non est necessarium, ut id semper fiat interius, sed satis est, si fiat ex¬ trinsecus per Evangelicam exhortationem, et hoc est quod dicit eo loco S. Augustinus, ubi non negat requiri, ut Deus intrinsecus (Q1I Tiiu. 11,25. CAPUT XV. 139 excitet aci intendendum praedicationi, et ad eam amplectendam. Quamvis illa etiam sit gratia Dei, quod talis exhortatio extrinsecus offeratur, quae menti sit congrua, ut idem Augustinus docet in lib. de bono persever. cap. 14. Vide Driedonem in libro de captiv. etredempt. generis humani, tract. 5. cap. 2 par. 2. Tapperum in explicat, art. 7. ante medium, id est, ante ilia verba capitalia : tractantur circa hanc materiam etc. pag. 313. in alia editione 320. Quinta sententia : « Gratia excitans datur homini sine ullis meritis praecedentibus, ac sine ulla praeparatione » . Haec satis probata est supra cap. 4. et 3. et manifestissima est, nam cum haec absolute prima gratia sit, non potest ulla ratione cadere sub meritum, ne gratia non sit gratia, et cum haec eadem sit prima dispositio ad justitiam, non potest eam ulla ratione praecedere alia dispositio. Sexta : « Gratia excitans non datur homini sine actione ipsius, quamvis sine cooperatione liberi arbitrii detur » . Haec etiam probata est supra in cap. 9. et non minus est certa, quam superior. Nam gratia excitans, duo quaedam complectitur, initium bonae cogita¬ tionis, et initium boni desiderii. Cogitare autem, et desiderare sunt actus mentis et voluntatis. Quare fieri non potest, ut quis sine suo actu ad cogitandum et desideran¬ dum excitetur. Quia tamen sunt repentini quidam motus, et omnem deliberationem rationis praeveniunt, ideo non sunt actus liberi arbitrii ; qualia sunt etiam saepe im¬ munda desideria, et sordidae cogitationes, quas diabolus interdum nobis etiam invitis immittit. Et sicut de malis motibus, quos inviti patimur, quoniam liberi non sunt, vere dicit Apostolus : Jam non ego operor illud , sed quod habitat in me peccatum , ad Roman. vir (1). Ita de istis motibus bonis eadem ratione, quia liberi non sunt, dicere possumus. Jam non ego operor illos, sed quae praevenit me gratia Dei. De iis Augu¬ stinus in lib. de spir. et lit. cap. 34. scribit : « Visorum suasionibus agit Deus ut velimus, sive extrinsecus per Evangelicas exhorta¬ tiones, sive intrinsecus, ubi nemo habet in potestate, quod ei veniat in mentem ». Septima. « Ad assentiendum gratiae exci¬ tanti, seu divinae internae vocationi, requi¬ ritur necessario gratia adjuvans ». Haec nota est ex testimoniis supra citatis. Concilii Tri- dentini sess. 6. cap. 3. Disponuntur ad justi¬ ficationem, dum excitati, et adjuti, libere moventur in Deum. Et S. Augustini in Enchi¬ ridio cap. 32. « Hominis voluntatem, et praeparat adjuvandam, et adjuvat praepara¬ tam». Et lib. ii. de peccator, meritis et remiss. cap. 18. « Quod nos ad Deum con¬ vertimus, nisi ipso excitante, et adjuvante non possumus » . Et S. Bernardi libro de grat. et liber, arbit. « Conatus liberi arbitrii, et cassi sunt, si non adjuventur, et nulli, si non excitentur». Est autem hoc loco breviter annotandum, a- nonnullis distingui quatuor motus, qui possunt in homine existere, cum a Deo ' interna inspiratione excitatur. Vel enim qui vocatur, rejicit vocantem ; vel neque rejicit, neque recipit, sed sinit Deum pulsare ad ostium cordis, et tamen nullo modo afficitur ad pulsantem ; Vel neque rejicit, neque recipit, sed gaudet tamen ea voeatione, et incipit affici ad vocantem ; vel denique simpliciter vocantem amplectitur, et se trahi sinit quocumque ille voluerit. Et quidem de primo et postremo cordis motu, nulla potest esse discordia. Certum est enim, posse hominem sine auxilio gra- tiee rejicere vocantem : non enim Deus nos ad peccandum adjuvat : nec minus est cer¬ tum, non posse hominem sine Dei gratia, vocantem amplecti. Ac de his duobus mo¬ tibus loquitur S. Augustinus, cum ait in lib. de gratia Christi cap 14. « Hoc arbitrium potest esse solum, si non venit; non autem potest esse , nisi adjutum, si venit ». De secundo et fertio aliqui ambigunt, sed vix est ulla justa causa ambigendi. Nam se¬ cundus pertinet ad primum, et tertius ad postremum. Secundus (inquam) ad primum pertinet, quoniam audire vocantem, et non sequi, quid est aliud nisi eum comtemnere ac reji¬ cere ? certe qui pauperem clamantem audit, et non movetur ad misericordiam, neque aliquid ei donat, repellere illum dici potest, quamvis neque verbo, neque manu illum abigat. Et qui longo tempore audit suaden¬ tem, et non persuadetur, nonne dicitur suadentj resistere ? Quare S. Augustinus, loco notato, non ait : Hoc arbitrium potest esse solum, si Deum repellit, sed ait : « Po¬ test esse solum, si non venit». Itaque non solum repellere vocationem contrario aliquo (1) Rom. VII, 17. 140 LIBER VI. actu, sed etiam non eam admittere, et non venire, rejicere est. Tertius autem motus ad postremum per¬ tinet, nec sine adjutorio gratiae haberi potest, quoniam gaudere de vocatione Dei, initium est bonae voluntatis, piique affectus erga Deum; et licet non sit absolute venire, tamen est inclinari ad veniendum, et quasi itineris inchoatio. Octava sententia. « Neque gratia excitans, neque adjuvans, ullam imponit homini necessitatem, quominus possit libere con¬ sentire, aut dissentire Deo vocanti». Nam in primis gratia excitans, si solum sit suf¬ ficiens, non autem efficax, rejici potest, et re ipsa rejicitur, ut experientia docet. Si vero sit efficax, non rejicitur unquam neque potest rejici ex hypothesi, sed absolute rejici potest, ut ostendimus eapite superiore ; et ratio est, quoniam gratia, quantumvis efficax, nihil est aliud, nisi suasio, quae non determinat voluntatem, sed inclinat per mo¬ dum proponentis objectum. Sed ideo num- quam rejicitur, quia Deus sic suadet , ut vi- dciaptum esse homini, ut suasori acquiescat. Gratia vero adjuvans tribus in rebus consistit. Primo, in directione hominis. Se¬ cundo, in protectione ejusdem, contra va¬ rias hostis nostri diaboli impugnationes. Tertio in cooperatione intrinseca, ad eli¬ ciendum actum cum ipsa voluntate. Et quidem directio et protectio nullam impo¬ nunt necessitatem, cum non attingant ipsum actum liberae electionis, sed tantum remo¬ veant impedimenta. Cooperatio autem illa intrinseca non alio modo concurrit, quam auxilium generale. Sicut enim ad opera naturalia facienda necessarium est auxilium generale, sic ad opera supernaturalia auxi¬ lium speciale : et sicut illud numquam deest iis, qui habent formas naturales, per quas operari queant, ita neque hoc deest unquam iis, qui habent formam supernaturalem, id est, habitus infusarum virtutum, vel certe gratiam excitantem : et sicut denique auxi¬ lium generale ita concurrit cum omnibus rebus in actionibus naturalibus, ut tamen non impediat libertatem et contingenliam, ut ostendimus in quarto libro hujus disputa¬ tionis, ita speciale auxilium adjuvans ita concurrit ad omnes actiones supernaturales, ut non impediat hominis libertatem ; quo¬ niam eodem prorsus modo auxilia ista con¬ currunt, ut recte docet lluardus Tapperus in explicat, art. 7. Neque hoc negari potest a Catholicis, salva Concilii Trid. auctoritate, quod disertis ver¬ bis in 0. sess. cap. 5 et can. 4. docet, homi¬ nem excitatum et adjutum, libere moveri in Deum, quoniam vocationem Dei et recipere ct rejicere potest. Sed refutandae sunt distor¬ tae quaedam hujus canonis explicationes. Dicunt enim aliqui hominem libere moveri in Deum, cum ab ejus gratia excitatur, et adjuvatur, quoniam sponte, et cum pleno, atque perfecto judicio rationis movetur, tametsi necessario moveatur. At Concilium non solum dicit, hominem libere moveri, sed etiam adjungit rationem : quia potest gratiam non recipere, et voca¬ tioni resistere, quod certe non posset, si ne¬ cessario moveretur. Deinde, nonne beati, qui Deum vident, sponte feruntur per amo¬ rem in Deum, ct cum pleno, atque perfecto judicio rationis, et tamen ex communi sen¬ tentia Theologorum non libere moventur, quia non possunt non moveri ? Denique Calvinus ipse, qui praeter caeteros hujus temporis haereticos, liberum oppugnat ar¬ bitrium, non negabit, hominem libere mo¬ veri in Deum, si hoc sit libere moveri, spon¬ te ct cum pleno judicio rationis moveri. Sic enim loquitur in lib. ii. adversus Pighium ; « Si coactioni opponitur libertas, liberum esse arbitrium, et constanter assevero, et pro haeretico habeo, quisquis secus sentiat». Quid igitur Concilium contra haereticos hu¬ jus temporis laboravit in canonibus conden¬ dis, si Calvinus nobiscum sentit, aut nos potius cum illo sentimus ? Dicunt rursus, hominem posse dissentire, si velit, sed tamen non posse id velle, si gra¬ tiam Dei habeat ; et hanc ipsam sententiam fuisse Concilii. At concilium non splum dicit, posse ho¬ minem dissentire, si velit, sed etiam dicit absolute, posse hominem gratiam Dei exci¬ tantem abjicere, ut patet ex cap. o. sessio¬ nis sextae. Deinde, non posse velle dissentire, pugnat omnino cum libero arbitrio, si po¬ natur (ut adversarii ponunt) ideo non posse velle dissentire , quia gratia determinat voluntatem active, et intrinsece ad contra¬ rium. Nos quidem supra saepe diximus, posse hominem credere aut diligere Deum, si velit, non tamen posse velle sine adjutorio gratiae. Sed hoc recte dicebatur, quia liberum arbi¬ trium ad bonum pst infirmum, ct ideo indi¬ get adjutorio ; sed adjutorio praestito, dice¬ bamus, posse hominem velle et non velle, CAPUT XV. 141 et eo modo vere ac proprie esse liberum. At si gratia Dei praesente, non potest homo velle dissentire, ea vero absente, non potest velle consentire, nulla est arbitrii libertas, neque ab haereticorum opinione receditur. Dicunt iterum , posse hominem , juxta Concilii decretum, consentire et dissentire, quia potest fieri, ut habeat gratiam, et potest etiam fieri ut non habeat gratiam. At hoc non facit hominem liberum, sed Deum, qui pro arbitrio gratiam tribuit, vel non tribuit. Alioqui dici posset liberum etiam jumentum, quia potest currere et non currere, si placeat sessori calcaria adhibere, vel non adhibere, et habenas laxare, vel non laxare. Sed re¬ spondent, jumentum numquam posse dici liberum, quia naturaliter determinatur ad unum; homo vero non naturaliter, sed be¬ neficio gratiae determinatur ad bonum. At nos non quaerimus nunc, unde tollatur libertas, ex natura, an ex gratia, sed, an tollatur, et an sit verum, quod Scriptura dicit, Qui potuit transgredi, et non est trans¬ gressus, facere malum, et nonfecit ; et quod Concilium dicit hominem libere recipere gratiam internae inspirationis, quoniam eam rejicere etiam potest. Quidquid enim sit de Deo et beatis, qui peccare non possunt, Ecclesia Catholica in hominibus mortalibus, secundum Scripturas divinas, et communem Patrum consensum, eam libertatem defendit, per quam possint bene agendo mereri prae¬ mium, quia poterant non bene agere ; et male agendo mereri poenas, quia poterant non male agere, ut in 4. et 5. lib. satis a- bunde monstravimus. Dicunt postremo, Concilium loqui de gra¬ tia excitante, non de adjuvante, cum dicit, posse ab homine gratiam rejici et posse ho¬ minem dissentire, si velit : se autem non gratiam excitantem, sed adjuvantem asserere ita efficacem, ut voluntatem determinet, et rejici non possit. At isti falluntur primum in eo, quod gra¬ tiam efficacem putant esse gratiam adjuvan tem, cum secundum Scripturas, et sanctum Augustinum, gratia efficax sit ipsa vocatio, sive excitatio secundum propositum, ut co¬ piose "probavimus in lib. i. cap. 12. Unus hic locus sufficiet ex lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio, cap 5. <* Ut Paulus, inquit, tam magna et efficacissima vocatione converte¬ retur, gratia Dei erat sola » . Ubi vides, gra¬ tiam efficacem esse ipsam vocationem. Quae autem fuerit illa yocatio, explicat idem Au¬ gustinus in lib. i. ad simplicianum, extremo: (i Una , inquit, desuper voce prostratus, Paulus videlicet, occurrente utique tali viso, quo mens illa et voluntas, refracta saevitia retorqueretur et corrigeretur ad fidem » . Gratia igitur efficax in conversione beati Pauli fuit vox de coelo, cum interna tali in¬ spiratione et suasione, qualis congruebat, ut Paulus eam non sperneret. Yide locum ci¬ tatum, ubi perspicue haec veritas demon¬ stratur. Neque solum in eo labuntur isti,quodgra- tiam efficacem in adjuvante, non in excitante constituunt ; sed etiam in eo, quod dicunt, excitantem gratiam respui posse, non adju¬ vantem. Nam, cum ad hoc detur adjuvans, ut excitans non respuatur, sed ei consentia¬ tur : quomodo potest respui gratia excitans, si respui non potest adjuvans? Adde quod si proprie loqui velimus, recipiet rejici, non potest convenire gratiae adjuvanti, quia gratia adjuvans non est aliquid, quod homini offeratur, sed est ipsa productio actus, quse non est, nisi quando actus producitur , quando autem actus producitur, non po¬ test fieri, ut non producatur, et in hoc sen¬ su non potest rejici gratia adjuvans, sicut nec ipsa cooperatio nostra, quse sunt omnino si¬ mul. Et ideo Concilium non dixit, posse rejici gratiam adjuvantem, sed solum excitantem. Sed quamvis gratia adjuvans, proprie lo¬ quendo, non possit rejici, tamen adhuc re¬ manet quaestio, an operatio illa Dei, deter¬ minet prius natura voluntatem nostram, nec ne. Nam si non determinat, ut nos probavi¬ mus in iv. lib. fere extremo, in nostra pote¬ state est, ut ea gratia ponatur vel non pona¬ tur, et sic in quodam sensu potest rejici ; quomodo auxilium generale in nostra quo¬ dammodo potestate est, et in quodam sensu potest rejici, quia si volumus operari, poni¬ tur; si nolumus, non ponitur. At si gratia illa determinat prius natura voluntatem no¬ stram, tunc quidem in nullo sensu potest rejici, sed tollitur libertas arbitrii, ut loco citato satis probasse nos credimus. Nona sententia : « Fieri potest, ut eadem motione interna duobus adhibita, unus convertatur, et alius non convertatur, et unus magis, alius minus proficiat » . Haec est Ruardi Tapperi loco citato , et colli¬ gitur ex iis, quae ante dicta sunt. Nam motio divina relinquit hominem plane libe¬ rum, ut possit converti et non converti, et magis minusque proficere. Et confirmatur 142 LIBER VI. ex parabola seminantis, Matth. xm. ubi Do¬ minus causam diversitatis, cur idem semen alicubi multum, alicubi parum, alicubi nihil omnino protulerit, refert in variam terree dispositionem. Denique accedit etiam com¬ munis piorum confessio, qui negligentiam suam accusant, et ingenue profitentur, se non tantum proficere, quantum possent, si gratiae divinae majori studio cooperarentur. Dices, si res ita se habet, poterit, qui con¬ vertitur, aut qui magis proficit, gloriari ad¬ versus alterum, 'qui ex eadem vocatione et auxilio converti noluit, aut minus proficere studuit. At id est contra illud Apostoli I. ad Corinth. iv. Quis te discernit ? quid habes , quod non accepisti (i) ? Respondeo : qui non convertitur, aut mi¬ nus proficit , merito poterit negligentiam suam accusare, quod gratiae divinae coope¬ rari noluerit : qui vero convertitur, aut ma¬ gis proficit, non habet unde glorietur, nisi in Domino, quoniam dono Dei habuit, non solum posse converti, et proficere, ut alius, sed etiam velle converti, et magno fervore proficere. Tametsi enim eadem fuit motio in utroque, quod attinet ad substantiam motio¬ nis, tamen uni fuit congrua, alteri non fuit. Et quoniam gratia Dei singularis est, ut di¬ gnetur ita movere hominem, sicut videt con¬ gruum atque aptum esse illi, ut persuadea¬ tur, atque consentiat, ideo non diximus , posse fleri, ut unus convertatur, alius non convertatur, si eadem utrique gratia done¬ tur ; id enim falsum esse censemus. Sed si eadem utrique motio adhibeatur. Potest e- nim, ut diximus, eadem motio uni esse con¬ grua, alteri non congrua, ac per hoc uni dari ut possit, alteri ut possit et velit. Decima sententia. « Conversio hominis ad Deum, ut etiam quodlibet aliud opus pium, quatenus opus a libero arbitrio est tantum, non tamen secluso auxilio generali ; quate¬ nus pium, a sola gratia est : quatenus opus pium a libero arbitrio et gratia simul ». Haec est ejusdem Ruardi ibidem. Et probatur, quoniam causa efficiens actionis humanae, ut est actio, est ipsa voluntas hominis ; ut est libera, est libertas arbitrii ; ut est pia, est di¬ vinum semen, et auxilium tali semini conve¬ niens. Proinde gratia solum facit, ut actio humana sit talis, id est, pia et supernatura- lis, ad quod sane viribus suis numquam ipsa natura pertingeret. Undecima. « Ad opera, quae sequuntur actum conversionis tam interna, quam ex¬ terna, id est, ad opera poenitentiae, quibus ad justificationis gratiam praeparamur, non videtur requiri necessario nova aliqua gra¬ tia, sed solum continua directio, et prote¬ ctio, et conservatio divini seminis jam con¬ cepti et formati». Est Ruardi ibidem, et pro¬ batur, quoniam posita vokmtate efficaci, non est dubium, quin caetera opera necessa¬ rio consequentur. Nam qui vult efficaciter vitam mutare, orare, jejunare, eleemosynas dare, continere se a deliciis et voluptatibus, ista omnia non difficulter exequitur. « Cer¬ tum est (inquit Augustinus in libro de gra¬ tia et libero arbitrio cap. 16.) nos mandata servare, si volumus, sed quia praeparatur voluntas a Domino, ab illo petendum est, ut tantum velimus, quantum sufficit, ut volen¬ do faciamus ». Et infra : « Certum est nos facere, cum facimus , sed ille facit ut facia¬ mus, praebens vires efficacissimas volunta¬ ti ». Et in lib. vili. Confess. cap. 9. totam causam, cur non posset abdicare a se carnis voluptates, eam fuisse dicit, quia non plene volebat. Adhaec, sicut in operibus mentis, ex prin¬ cipiis cognitis, possumus discurrendo con¬ clusiones colligere. Sic etiam in operibus voluntatis ex amore finis , sive naturaliter excitato, sive ex divina inspiratione conce¬ pto, possumus sine dubio, absque nova in¬ spiratione progredi ad inquisitionem , et electionem mediorum. Gratia siquidem non tollit aut impedit, sed juvat ac perficit natu¬ ralem efficaciam liberae voluntatis. Qui ergo Deo misericorditer praevenienti et vocanti acquiescens, firmissime statuit mutare vitam, poterit sine novae gratise inspiratione inqui¬ rere et accipere media ad hoc utilia, modo, ut diximus, non desit divinae directionis ac protectionis auxilium. Neque repugnat -haec sententia definitioni illi Ecclesiasticae, quam refert S. Augustinus in epist. 106. quod gratia ad singulos actus detur. Significatur enim ea definitione’, nul¬ lum esse posse pium actum, qui non sit do¬ num Dei, et non oriatur ex gratia, sed ex solis naturae viribus. Id quod nos libentissi¬ me confitemur. Nam opera bona, quae con¬ versionem sequuntur, omnia dona Dei sunt, et ex gratia oriuntur, tum quia imperantur a bona voluntate, quam Deus in nobis per (1)1 Corin. IV, 7. CAPUT XV. gratiam praevenientem praeparavit et fecit ; tum etiam quia sine speciali Dei directione et protectione non fiunt. Duodecima sententia : « Habitus gratiae justificantis a solo Deo infunditur, non ta¬ men sine praevia dispositione nostra ». Haec certissima est, quoniam habit is gratiae di¬ vina qualitas est, quae non educitur de po¬ tentia naturali, sed per quamdam quasi crea¬ tionem producitur. Solus autem Deus res creare potest. Itaque S. Augustinus in Psal. cxviii. concion. 26. tractans illud : « Feci judicium et justitiam », distinguit justitiam actualem, quam faciunt qui justi sunt a ju¬ stitiae virtute, qua justi sunt, ac de ista po¬ steriore loquens : « Quis, inquit, facit in homine justitiam , nisi qui justificat im¬ pium ? » Ex quo sequitur (ut Ruardus loco citato sapienter admonuit), cum gratia praeveniens semini comparatur, non fieri similem gra¬ tiam illam seminibus herbarum, quae virtute continent formam rei producendae ; sed se¬ mini humano , quod non continet virtute formam humanam, id est, animam rationa¬ lem, quae a solo Deo creatur, sed dispositio¬ nes tantum ad eam formam recipiendam. Renati, inquit B. Petr. in epistol. 1. cap. x, non ex semine corruptibili, sed incorruptibili per verbum Dei (1). Itaque sicut in humana generatione, ex vi seminis disponitur, forma- turque materia, ut fiat apta ad animam ex divina creatione, atque infusione recipien¬ dam : sic etiam ex vi gratiae excitantis et adjuvantis, disponitur anima peccatoris, ut ei gratia justificationis divino munere infun¬ datur. Porro de gratia justificante in sequenti disputatione, Deo propitio disseremus. Tertia decima sententia : « Homo justus 143 potest, quando vult, justitiam tam inter¬ nam, quam externam, exercere, id est, bona opera facere, ac praecepta divina servare, neque indiget ordinarie nova gratia excitan¬ te, sed solum adjuvante». Colligitur haec sententia ex superioribus. Nam si potest ho¬ mo, nondum justificatus, ex semine bonae inspirationis producere fructum conversio¬ nis, et operum poenitentiae, quanto magis ex semine gratiae, gratum facientis, producere poterit fructum justitiae, et operum bono¬ rum? Habetur id praeterea disertis verbis positum in canone postremo Concilii Arau¬ sicam. Diximus autem « ordinarie » , quoniam non est negandum, in arduis quibusdam operi¬ bus exigi nova et specialia auxilia gratiae. Requiri autem in omni opere bono et pio, gratiam adjuvantem, id est, dirigentem ac protegentem, nec sufficere gratiam justifi¬ cantem, docent Scripturae, Concilia et Patres passim. Illud enim Joan. xv. Sine me nihil potestis facere (2), dictum est Apostolis, qui sine dubio justi erant, ut notat S. Augusti¬ nus in lib. de corrept. et grat. cap. 1. Et il¬ lud : Nisi Dominus custodierit civitatem, fru¬ stra vigilat qui custodit eam (3), Psalm. cxxvi, intelligunt Hilarius in comment. hujus Psalmi, et Ambrosius lib. ii. in Luc. de a- nima justi, quae sine, divina protectione non potest tentationi resistere. Concilium Arau- sicanum can. 19. « Non potest, inquit, na¬ tura humana, sine gratia salutem custodire, quam accepit » . Quod idem docet Coelesti- nus in epist. ad Gallos, cap. 6. et S. Augu¬ stinus in lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio, cap. 6. et de corrept. et grat. cap. 12. et alibi. (1) I Pet. I, 23. — (2) Joan. XV, 5. — (3) Psal. CXXYI, 1. FINIS PRIMA CONTROVERSIA PRINCIPALIS, DECIM/E QUARTA CONTROVERSIA GENERALIS DE REPARATIONE GRATIiE CONTROVERSIA SECUNDA PRINCIPALIS DE JUSTIFICATIONE IMPII