Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Grace of the First Man
Chapter 4: That the first man in the state of innocence did not need a special help by which he might be stirred to each single act
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia Primi Hominis. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
That it may be better understood of what kind the grace of the first man in the state of innocence was, let the third proposition be: “The first man, adorned with original righteousness and the habit of the grace that makes pleasing, did not need a special help by which he might be stirred to work well, or to avoid sins.” This proposition is explained thus.
Four gifts of God can be considered in man. The first is the habit of grace perfecting nature, so that the lower part remains subject to the higher, and the higher to God. The second is the preservation of that habit; for it is common to all created things that they cannot continue unless God perpetually preserve them. The third is the cooperation of God with man — through general help in natural works, and special in supernatural; for second causes cannot work unless the first cause cooperate with them. The fourth is a certain motion of God through stirring help, which makes man use the former gifts. For the three former gifts do not give a man that he work, but only that he can work, if he will; but the fourth gift makes a man will and work. Which St. Augustine explains, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 12, and book 14 On the City of God, chapter 27, by the similitude of food: for as he who supplies a man with food, and leaves it in his choice to eat if he will, gives him not that he live, but that he can live if he will, while he who not only supplies someone with food but even puts it into his mouth gives not only the power to live, but living itself — so also God, through the infused habit of grace, and the preservation of that habit, and through this, that he is prompt to cooperate, gives a man the power to work well if he will, yet does not give the willing; but by that special motion and stirring, making him use the habit of grace, he gives both to will and to work.
Now then, the first man had the three former gifts; the fourth he did not need, nor did he have it. We, after his fall, need all, and obtain all from the kindness of God through the merits of Christ. The reason of this difference is that the first gift in Adam not only subjected the mind to God, but also the flesh to the spirit, as we said above; hence Adam was neither hindered nor slowed from good work, nor incited to sin, by carnal concupiscence. But in us that first gift subjects the mind to God, but not the flesh to the spirit; and therefore, on account of the carnal enticements which assiduously either incite to sin or slow us from good and make us slothful and drowsy, we need a help that stirs, directs, and protects.
All these things can be confirmed from the doctrine of St. Augustine. And first, that there was given to Adam a gift of grace which subjected the flesh to the spirit, and the spirit to God, we proved above by many testimonies; and notable is that testimony of book 4 against Julian, last chapter: “The grace of God was great there, where the earthly and animal body had no bestial lust.” Next, that Adam needed that second gift, in which we said the preservation of the first good is contained, is evident from book 8 On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 12, where we read thus: “Nor was man made such a thing that, he who made him deserting him, he could do anything well as of himself,” etc. And he sets a similitude: “As the air, in the presence of light, has not been made lucid, but becomes so — for if it had been made so, it would not become so, but would remain lucid even in the absence of light — so man, God being present to him, is enlightened, but in his absence is straightway darkened; from whom one departs not by intervals of places, but by the aversion of the will.” And that Adam had need of the third gift — that is, of the divine cooperation, or aiding help, besides habitual grace — St. Augustine indicates in these words, in the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 26: “As the eye of the body, even when most fully sound, cannot see unless it be aided by the brightness of light, so man, even when most perfectly justified, cannot live rightly unless he be divinely aided by the eternal light of righteousness.” Nor is it to be inquired too subtly in this place how light cooperates with the eye for seeing; for St. Augustine placed the similitude in this alone, that as the eye most perfectly sound cannot see unless it be helped from without, so also the man most fully justified cannot live well unless the cooperation of the omnipotent Good be present to him from without. Nor ought that to move us, that a little before Augustine drew a similitude from light to prove the preservation, and now seeks a similitude from the same light to prove the cooperation. For the properties of the same things are various, and therefore from the same things various similitudes are drawn, as the matter under discussion, the place, time, and occasion demand. But we have other places besides for confirming the same thing. In epistle 106: “Human nature, if it remained in that integrity in which it was created, would in no way preserve itself, its Creator not helping.” And in the Enchiridion, chapter 106: “And though sin was seated in free choice alone, yet free choice did not suffice for retaining righteousness, unless divine aid were furnished through participation of the immutable good.” And in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 11: “Then, therefore, God had given man a good will — for in it he had made him, he who had made him upright; he had given the aid without which he could not remain in it even if he would…” etc. Finally, book 14 On the City of God, chapter 27: “Why should not God permit the first man to be tempted by him, seeing he was so constituted that, if he trusted in the help of God, the good man would conquer the evil angel; but if by proudly pleasing himself he deserted God his creator and helper, he would be conquered?”
That Adam did not need the fourth gift — that is, the help stirring and persuading within — and on that account lacked it, can easily be understood, first from those words of St. Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 11: “He had no need of that aid which these implore when they say, I see another law in my members,” etc. Then from what the same St. Augustine says in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 7 [al. On Rebuke and Grace], where he asks whether a man can not sin — that is, persevere in good, resist every temptation, keep all the commandments, etc. — and answers: “This is not in the powers of free choice such as they now are; it had been in man before he fell.” And in book 3 of the Hypognosticon, near the beginning: “We answer that no one can of himself — that is, through free choice — fulfill what he wills; we say rightly that only the first-formed man could, since the will of his free choice was sound in him before the fault.” And below, speaking of the soundness of free choice: “This is that first grace, by which the first man could have stood, if he had willed to keep the commandments.” In these places St. Augustine does not signify that it was in the powers of free choice before Adam's fall to persevere in good without any grace of God — for that is repugnant to the very many testimonies adduced a little before; nor does he signify that after Adam's fall it is not in the powers of free choice, the grace of God being joined, to persevere in good. But he signifies that in the state of innocence it was in the powers of free choice to persevere in good, because that very grace also, without which he could not have persevered, was in the power of free choice. For habitual grace was already present to him, and he could use it when he willed; the preservation of grace also was not wanting, nor would it have been wanting, unless he himself had willed of his own accord to depart from God; the divine cooperation was most prompt, assisting him in first act (so to speak), though not in second act save when it pleased Adam himself to work something. But after Adam's fall it is said not to be in the powers of our free choice to persevere in good, because, besides habitual grace, preservation, and cooperation in first act, we need, on account of the corruption of nature, an internal calling and persuasion which is not in our power. For although to consent to the calling is in our power, yet the being called itself — and above all the being so called as God sees to be apt and congruous for us, that we resist not the calling — is without doubt not in our power. But of these things we shall say more in their place. Here it is enough to have learned, from the doctrine of St. Augustine, that Adam needed no grace besides that which was always present to him, and which was in a manner in his power. Wherefore, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 12, and book 14 On the City of God, chapter 27, he compares the grace and all the helps granted to the first man with food, which we use if we will, and use not if we will not; and in the same places he often repeats that the first man had grace by which he could persevere if he willed, but that the willing was left in his free choice. Nor do the scholastic theologians dissent from this judgment, as may be seen in the Master, book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 24, section 1; St. Bonaventure on the same distinction, question 2; Gregory of Rimini, distinction 29, question 1, article 1, conclusion 3; and St. Thomas, 1-2, question 109, article 9 [al. 8].
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
centia; auxilio speciali, quo excitaretur ad bene operandum, vel ad vitanda peccata. Ut melius intelligatur qualis fuerit gratia primi hominis in statu innocentiae, sit pro¬ positio tertia. « Primus homo, justitia origi¬ nali, et habitu gratia; gratum facientis orna¬ tus, non eguit auxilio speciali, quo excitare¬ tur ad bene operandum, vel ad vitanda pec¬ cata. » Uacc propositio sic explicatur. Quatuor dona Dei possunt in homine con¬ siderari. Primum est habitus gratia; naturam perficiens, ut pars inferior superiori, et su¬ perior Deo subjecta maneat. Secundum con¬ servatio ejus habitus , est enim commune omnibus rebus creatis, ut permanerenon pos¬ sint, nisi Deo eas poi'pctuo conservante. Tertium cooperatio Dei cum homine per au¬ xilium generale in operibus naturalibus, et speciale in supernaturalibus. Neque enim possunt secunda; causa; operari, nisi coope- rante cum eis prima causa. Quartum est motio quaedam Dei per auxilium excitans, qua; facit hominem uti prioribus donis. Prio¬ ra enim tria dona, non praestant homini, ut operetur, sed tantum ut possit operari, si velit : quartum autem donum facit hominem velle, et operari. Id quod explicat S. Augu¬ stinus in libro de correptione et gratia, cap. 12. et libro xiy. de civitate Dei, cap. 27. per similitudinem alimentorum. Sicut enim qui praebet homini cibos, et relinquit in ejus arbitrio, ut comedat, si velit, non praestat ei, ut- vivat, sed ut possit vivere, si velit ; qui vero non solum alicui cibos praebet, sed etiam ipsos in os ejus infundit, is non tan¬ tum praestat posse vivere, sed etiam vivere : sic et Deus per habitum gratiae infusum, et ejus habitus conservationem , et per hoc quod promptus est ad cooperandum, dat homini posse bene operari si velit, non ta¬ men dat velle ; at speciali illa motione et ex¬ citatione uti faciens habitu gratiae, dat velle, et operari. Jam igitur primus homo habuit tria priora dona, quarto non eguit, neque illud habuit. Nos post lapsum ejus indigemus omnibus, et omnia de Dei benignitate per Christi merita obtinemus. Ratio hujus discriminis est, quia primum donum in Adamo non solum men¬ tem subjiciebat Deo, sed etiam carnem spi¬ ritui, ut supra diximus, proinde non impe¬ diebatur, nec retardabatur Adam a bono opere, neque ad peccandum incitabatur per carnalem concupiscentiam : in nobis autem primum illud donum mentem subjicit Deo, sed non carnem spiritui, ideo propter carna¬ les illecebras, quae assidue vel incitant ad peccandum, vel a bono retardant, desides- que ac dormitantes efficiunt egemus auxilio excitante, dirigente, ac protegente. Ilaec omnia ex doctrina S. Augustini con¬ firmari possunt. Ac primum datum fuisse Adamo donum gratia;, quod carnem spiritui, et spiritum Deo subjiceret ex multis testi¬ moniis supra probavimus, et insigne est te¬ stimonium illud lib. iv. in Julian. cap. ult. : « Gratia Dei magna ibi erat, ubi terrenum, et animale corpus bestialem libidinem non habebat. » Deinde indiguisse Adamum secundo illo dono, quo conservationem primi boni dixi¬ mus contineri, perspicuum est ex lib. vm. de Genes, ad litteram, cap. 12. ubi sic legi¬ mus : « Neque tale aliquid est homo factus, ut deserente eo, qui fecit, possit aliquid age¬ re bene tanquam ex seipso etc. » Et ponit similitudinem : « Sicut, inquit, aer praesente lumine non factus est lucidus, sed fit, quia si factus esset, non fieret, sed etiam absente lumine lucidus maneret. Sic homo Deo sibi praesente illuminatur, absenteautem continuo tenebratur, a quo non locorum intervallis, sed voluntatis aversione disceditur. » Tertio autem dono, id est, cooperatione divina, sive' auxilio adjuvante, praeter gra¬ tiam habitualem, opus habuisse Adamum, indicat sanctus Augustinus illis verbis in lib. de natura, et gratia, cap. 26. ; « Sicut ocu¬ lus corporis etiam plenissime sanus, nisi candore lucis adjutus non potest cernere , sic homo etiam perfectissime justificatus, ni¬ si aeterna luce justitiae divinitus adjuvetur, recte non potest vivere. » Neque subtilius CAPUT IV. 177 inquirendum est hoc loco, quomodo lux coo- peretur oculo ad videndum. Si quidem S. Augustinus in co solo similitudinem consti¬ tuit, quod sicut oculus perfectissime sanus non potest cernere, nisi extrinsecus adjuve¬ tur. Sic etiam homo plenissime justificatus, non .potest bene vivere, nisi extrinsecus illi adsit cooperatio omnipotentis boni. Neque illud movere nos debet quod paulo ante a luce similitudinem duxerit Augustinus ad probandam conservationem, nunc ab eadem luce similitudinem petat ad probandam coo¬ perationem. Nam varice sunt rerum earum- dem proprietates, et ideo ab iisdem rebus varice similitudines trahuntur, prout mate¬ ria, de qua disseritur, locus, tempus, occa¬ sio postulant. Sed habemus alia loca praeter¬ ea ad rem eamdem comprobandam. In epist. 106 : « Natura humana, si in illa inte¬ gritate, in qua condita est, permaneret, nul¬ lo modo seipsam creatore suo non adjuvante servaret. » Et in Enchiridio cap. I0G : « Et si peccatum in solo libero arbitrio erat con¬ stitutum, non tamen justitiae retinendae suf¬ ficiebat liberum arbitrium, nisi participatio¬ ne immutabilis boni divinum adjutorium praeberetur. » Et in lib. de correptione et gratia, cap. 11 : «Tunc ergo dederat homini Deus bonam voluntatem, in illa quippe eum fecerat, qui fecerat rectum dederat adjuto¬ rium, sine quo in ea non posset permanere, si vellet etc. » Denique in lib. xiv. de civit. Dei, cap. 27 : « Cur non permitteret Deus, ut ab illo primus homo tentaretur; quando¬ quidem sic erat institutus, ut si de adjutorio Dei fideret, bonus homo malum Angelum vinceret. Si autem creatorem, atque adju¬ torem Deum superbe sibi placendo desere¬ ret, vinceretur ? » Quarto dono, id est, auxilio excitante, et suadente interius, non eguisse, atque ob id eo caruisse Adamum, facile potest intelligi primum ex illis verbis S. Augustini de cor¬ reptione et gratia, cap. 11 : « Ille non opus habebat eo adjutorio, quod implorant isti cum dicunt, Video aliam legem in membris meis etc. » Deinde ex eo quod idem S. Au- gustin. dicit in lib. de bono perseverantiae, cap. 7. ubi quaerit, an possit homo non pec¬ care, id est, perseverare in bono, resistere omni tentationi , servare omnia mandata ctc., et respondet : « Non est hoc in viribus liberi arbitrii, quales nunc sunt : fuerat in homine antequam caderet. » Et in lib. m. llipognost. circa principium : « Responde¬ mus, inquit, neminem posse per se sibi, id est, per liberum arbitrium implere quod ve¬ lit, recte dicimus, nisi protoplastum solum potuisse, cum voluntas liberi arbitrii fuisset sana ei ante culpam. » Et infra loquens de sanitate liberi arbitrii : « Ipsa, inquit, est prima gratia, qua primus homo stare potuis¬ set, si mandata servare voluisset. » In his locis S. Augustinus non significat fuisse in viribus liberi arbitrii ante lapsum Adoe, perseverare in bono sine ulla Dei gra¬ tia, id enim repugnat plurimis testimoniis paulo ante adductis : neque significat post lapsum Ada; non esse in viribus liberi arbi¬ trii, adjuncta gratia Dei, perseverare in bo¬ no. Sed significat, fuisse in statu innocentia; in viribus liberi arbitrii perseverare in bono, quia ipsa etiam gratia, sine qua perseverare non potuisset, erat in potestate liberi arbi¬ trii. Nam gratia habitualis jam illi aderat, eaque uti poterat cum volebat ; conservatio quoque gratia; non deerat, nec defutura erat, nisi ipse sponte a Deo recedere voluis¬ set. Cooperatio divina promptissima erat, sed in actu primo (ut sic loquar) illi assistens, non in actu secundo, nisi cum ipsi Adamo operari aliquid libuisset. Dicitur autem post lapsum Adte in viribus liberi nostri arbitrii non esse perseverare in bono, quia praeter gratiam habitualem, con¬ servationem, et cooperationem in actu pri¬ mo, egenus ob natura; corruptionem voca¬ tione, et suasione interna, qua; non est in nostra potestate, quamvis enim consentire vocationi sit in nostra potestate, tamen ip¬ sum vocari, et praesertim sic vocari, ut Deus videt, nobis aptum, congruumquo esse, ut vocationi non resistamus, sine dubio non est in nostra potestate. Sed de his plura suo lo¬ co dicemus. Illud hic satis est didicisse ex doctrina sancti Augustini, non eguisse Ada¬ mum ulla gratia piveter eam, qua; illi semper aderat, quasque quodam modo in ejus erat potestate. Quocirca in lib. de correptione et gratia, cap. 12. et lib. xiv. de civitate Dei, cap. 27. comparat gratiam, et omnia auxi¬ lia concessa primo homini, cum alimentis, quibus utimur, si volumus, non utimur, si non volumus. Et in iisdem locis sa;pius repe¬ tit, habuisse primum hominem, gratiam, qua posset perseverare, si vellet ; ut autem vellet, relictum fuisse in ejus libero arbitrio. Neque ab hac sententia dissentiunt theologi scholastici, ut videre est apud Magistrum in lib. ii. Seutent. dist. 24. §. 4. S. Ronaventu- 178 LIBER I. ram in eadem dist. quaest. 2. Gregorium Ari¬ minensem dist. 29. 'quaest. 1. art. 1. con- clus. 3. et S. Thomam. in 1. 2. qua;st 109. art. 9. CAPUT V. Super natur ale donum fuisse rectitudinem,