Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Grace of the First Man
Chapter 5: That the rectitude which the first man received in creation was a supernatural gift
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia Primi Hominis. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The first, second, and third propositions, which were against the Pelagians, we have (as I think) sufficiently proved, according to our appointed brevity. Now the last, against the Lutherans, is to be asserted and confirmed. The fourth proposition, then, can be this: “That rectitude with which Adam was created, and without which after his fall all men are born, was a supernatural gift.” This is against the heretics of this time. But before it is proved, it must be explained.
It must be known, then, first, that man naturally consists of flesh and spirit, and therefore shares his nature partly with the beasts, partly with the angels; and indeed, by reason of the flesh and his communion with the beasts, he has a certain propensity toward the bodily and sensible good, to which he is borne through sense and appetite; by reason of the spirit and his communion with the angels, he has a propensity toward the spiritual and intelligible good, to which he is borne through intelligence and will. And from these diverse, or contrary, propensities there exists in one and the same man a certain battle, and from that battle a huge difficulty of acting well, while the one propensity hinders the other. It must be known, second, that divine providence, at the beginning of creation, to apply a remedy to this disease or languor of human nature, which arose from the condition of matter, added to man a certain notable gift — original righteousness, namely — by which, as by a certain golden bridle, the lower part was held easily subject to the higher part, and the higher part to God. And the flesh was so subjected to the spirit that it could not be moved against the spirit's will, nor become rebellious to it, unless the spirit itself became rebellious to God; yet it was in the power of the spirit to become rebellious to God, or not to become so.
It must be known, third, that a thing is called natural in many ways. First, everything is called natural that is had from birth — in which signification we are said to be by nature children of wrath, Ephesians 2; and in this way we confess that original righteousness can be called natural. But this signification does not pertain to the present question, because the natural so taken is not opposed to the supernatural, since both natural and supernatural gifts can be had from birth, as is known. Second, that can be called natural which is agreeable to nature, and which does not destroy it, but adorns and perfects it. In which notion St. Augustine, in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 27, teaches that the Apostle said: the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law, Romans 2. For since vice is against nature, and grace heals nature, when the law is fulfilled from grace it can not unfitly be said to be fulfilled naturally. But of the natural taken in this way there is no question, since such a natural is opposed not to the supernatural, but to what is against nature; and not only original righteousness, but any gift of grace whatever, and eternal life itself, would in this way have to be called natural. Third, that is called natural which, though it be a gratuitous gift, yet helps and perfects nature in natural works, and does not raise it to any supernatural works. And in this way original righteousness, if it be understood as distinct from the grace that makes pleasing, can be called a natural gift, as Andrew Vega speaks, book 2 on the Council of Trent, chapter 11. Fourth, that is called natural which either is a part of nature, or flows from the principles of nature. In which signification the body and the soul, the faculties too both of sensing and of understanding, and the operations which are exercised by those faculties, are said to be natural. And this is the signification of which we properly dispute in this place; and to the natural so considered the supernatural is very properly opposed. Now something can be called supernatural in two ways: per se, and per accidens. That is called supernatural per se which of its kind is not apt to flow from the principles of nature — such as was the ascent of Elijah in the fiery chariot into heaven, the strength of Samson, and other things of that kind. That is called supernatural per accidens which is sometimes obtained by divine miracle, though otherwise it is wont to flow from the principles of nature; such was the sense of sight which the Lord restored to the man born blind, the wisdom divinely bestowed on Solomon, and not a few other things which are read in the Scriptures.
Now then, the adversaries judge that that rectitude in which Adam was created was natural to him in this last way — namely, that it was as it were a certain health owed to nature, and apt to be born from nature itself well constituted, that is, not corrupted; and that now to men, who lost that rectitude in Adam, some natural good is wanting, such as would be wanting to a beast if it were born blind, or lame, or fevered. And if now that original righteousness were divinely restored to some man, they would say it was a supernatural gift per accidens, not per se, as we said of the eyes restored to the man born blind. But we hold that that rectitude, even of the lower part, was a supernatural gift, and that per se, not per accidens — so that it neither flowed, nor could flow, from the principles of nature. And because that gift was supernatural (as we are straightway going to prove), when it was removed, human nature, left to itself, began to experience that battle of the lower part with the higher which would have been natural — that is, would have followed from the condition of matter — had not God added to man the gift of righteousness. Wherefore the state of man after Adam's fall does not differ more from his state in pure naturals than a man stripped differs from a man naked; nor is human nature worse, if thou take away the original fault, nor does it labor more with ignorance and weakness, than it would be and would labor had it been created in pure naturals. Hence the corruption of nature flowed not from the lack of any natural gift, nor from the accession of any evil quality, but solely from the loss, on account of Adam's sin, of the supernatural gift. Which opinion is common to the scholastic Doctors, old and more recent. For what we teach we have not received from Dominic Soto alone; nor did St. Thomas, with the other more approved authors, write the contrary (as certain men, otherwise notably learned, judge); but, as I said, this opinion is the more common, as the testimonies which we subjoin will indicate.
First, then, St. Thomas, part 1, question 95, article 1, speaks thus of the rectitude with which Adam was created: “It is manifest that that subjection of the body to the soul, and of the lower powers to reason, was not natural; otherwise it would have remained after sin, since even in the demons the natural endowments remained after sin.” And below: “From which it is given to understand that, if, grace deserting, the obedience of the flesh to the soul was dissolved, then it was through the grace existing in the soul that the lower things were subjected to it.” From this place we openly learn that man, created in pure naturals, would have had that rebellion of the flesh against the spirit which now, after the gift of original righteousness lost, we all experience — seeing that the obedience of the flesh to the spirit was in the first man not natural, but supernatural and gratuitous. Hence the original righteousness divinely conferred on man did not merely preserve, but brought and made, the rectitude of the lower part. The same St. Thomas, 1-2, question 82, article 1, ad 3: “From original sin there follows a certain inclination to inordinate act, not directly, but indirectly — namely, through the removal of what hindered, that is, of original righteousness, which hindered the inordinate motions.” There would therefore have been inordinate motions in man, had not the supernatural gift come. The same author, 1-2, question 87 [al. 85], article 5 [al. 7], says that from original sin it came to pass that human nature was left to itself, destitute of the aid of original righteousness. The same author, in question 4 On Evil, article 1, speaks thus: “And it is to be considered that to the first man in his institution there had been divinely given a certain supernatural gift, namely original righteousness, through which reason was subjected to God, and the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul,” etc. The same author, book 4 against the Gentiles, chapter 52: “According to the doctrine of the faith we lay down that man was from the beginning so instituted that, so long as the reason of man was subject to God, the lower powers served him without hindrance, and the body could not be hindered from his subjection by any bodily impediment — God and his grace supplying what nature had less for perfecting this.” The same, on book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 31 [al. 32], question 1, article 1: “God had conferred on human nature at its beginning, above the condition of its principles, that there should be in reason a certain rectitude of original righteousness, which it could impress on the lower powers without any resistance. Because this had been conferred gratis, therefore it was justly withdrawn through the ingratitude of disobedience. Whence it came to pass that, the first man sinning, human nature, which was in him, was left to itself, to stand according to the condition of its own principles.” Human nature, therefore, by the opinion of St. Thomas, is now such as it would have been if it had never had that supernatural gift — this excepted, that what is now a punishment inflicted for sin would then have flowed from nature and the condition of matter. Nor is this repugnant to what the same St. Thomas teaches, 1-2, question 82, article 3, ad 1: that to lust is natural to man insofar as it is according to the order of reason, but is in man against nature insofar as it transcends the limits of reason. For by these words it is not signified that in man created in pure naturals there would have been no concupiscence transcending the limits of reason — for the contrary St. Thomas expressly taught, when he said that the inordinate motions followed from original sin as from a remover of the hindrance; but this is signified, that that concupiscence would have been, not as some natural good, but as a languor and vice of nature, following not from the intention of the Creator, but from the condition of matter — such a defect as it is in an iron sword to be subject to rust; for every defect can be said to be against nature. Much less is it repugnant to these things what St. Thomas writes in 1-2, question 85, articles 1 and 2: that through sin man is not only deprived of supernatural gifts, but the good of nature is also diminished. For in that place St. Thomas does not dispute of original sin in particular, but of sin in general; and he says the good of nature is diminished through sin because from the act of sinning there arises in him who sins an inclination to the same sin, and thereby the inclination to the opposite virtue is diminished — which inclination to virtue can be called a good of nature. From which general doctrine it follows that from actual sin arises an actual propensity to the same sin (as the same author teaches in express words in the same question, article 3); but from original sin, which consists not in act but in habit, no inclination to evil arises directly, but indirectly (as St. Thomas speaks), as from a remover of the hindrance. And these are the wounds of the several powers, of which the same St. Thomas speaks, 1-2, question 85, article 3: for since original righteousness hindered that languor which could have existed in human nature from the condition of matter, therefore, the gift of original righteousness removed, that languor showed itself; and what could have been the languor of nature became the wound of sin. Finally, that this is the judgment of St. Thomas, which we have said, can be evident from all his interpreters; for all with common consent teach that the rectitude of the first man was the effect of a certain supernatural gift, and that, that gift removed, nature remained such as it would be had it been created in pure naturals, as regards the inordinate motions of the lower part. See John Capreolus, on book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 30, question 1, article 1; Thomas Cajetan, 1-2, question 85, article 3, at the second doubt, and question 109, article 2; Francis of Ferrara, in the commentary on book 4 against the Gentiles, chapter 52; finally Conrad Koellin and Bartholomew Medina, 1-2, question 85, articles 3 and 6 — which last author adds that this is the common opinion of all the theologians.
And certainly John Scotus teaches it in express words, when he speaks thus on book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 29, sole question: “It can be said, then, that if original righteousness had that effect — namely, to make perfect tranquillity in the soul as to all the powers, so that the lower nature was not inclined against the judgment of the higher, or, if it was inclined so far as of itself, could yet be ordered and ruled without difficulty of the higher and without sadness of the lower — since a power made in pure naturals would not have had this, it is necessary to posit a supernatural gift, which is that perfect tranquillity in the soul.” Nor less openly does Durandus teach it, on book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 29 [al. 20], question 3, where, having said that original righteousness is properly the right order of the lower and higher powers, so that the lower were subject to the higher, he speaks thus, at number seven: “Original righteousness, though it was a bodily condition, was nevertheless purely a gift of God, and not a natural property; otherwise it would have remained after sin, as nature remained with its natural properties; hence original righteousness would not have been transfused from parent to offspring, but would have been infused into the offspring by God, as it was gratuitously conferred on the parents by God.” And at distinction 30, question 1, he admits with St. Thomas that death, and the other human defects into which we ran through Adam's sin, are from nature as from a per se cause, but from the fault as from a cause removing the hindrance — because, namely, through Adam's fault we lost the gift of original righteousness which hindered those defects. The same most openly teach Gabriel, on book 2, distinction 30, question 1; Marsilius, on book 2, questions 18 and 19; and others whom it would be long, and by no means necessary, to adduce here. Further, with the old scholastics the more recent Doctors agree; and, to bring forward a few out of many: John Driedo, book 1 On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 3, part 4, at the end: “From the consideration of these things one can easily understand that that tempering, or consonance, of all the powers under the empire of reason was not man's according to his nature constituted of rational soul and flesh, but according to a peculiar grace of God, giving to the first man, as the Wise Man says, the power of containing all things — through which not only the lower powers of the soul and the whole body were held under the empire of the rational soul, but through which also the bodily defects, as death, diseases, and corruptions of the humors, could be restrained. But through sin, this power — which was original righteousness — being lost, human nature, now left to itself, is moved in diverse ways according to the diversity of natural complexions.” Ruard Tapper, in the defense of the second article, sets down some propositions on original sin, of which I shall here write down two, the second and third. The second proposition is this: “With firm and infallible faith it is to be believed that the rebellion of the powers, and the inordinate motions, ignorance, weaknesses, death, and all the miseries which men suffer, are punishments of sin, and not natural conditions of man as created.” The third proposition is this: “All these evils could have been natural conditions and properties of man — as if God had created men without grace and original righteousness, which alone hindered these evils from being in man; without which the principles of nature would have followed, as even now they follow nature destitute of it, just as very many of them are in the other animals.” Thus far he. Andrew Vega, book 2 on the Council of Trent, chapter 11: “The very law of the members — the rebellion, namely, of the flesh against the spirit — is from the condition of our nature, and not from some evil quality transfused into us from our parents, as the Scholastics commonly teach against Gregory of Rimini; and they would have been, just as in us, in all created in pure naturals. Yet they have in us the character of punishment, which they would not have in those created in pure naturals, because God had reformed these natural defects through original righteousness, which we lost through sin.” See the same opinion in Dominic Soto, book 1 On Nature and Grace, chapter 13 [al. 3]; Albert Pighius, first controversy; and others. Finally, I know not how any Catholic at this time can doubt whether the integrity of the first man was natural or supernatural, since, as we noted above, two Supreme Pontiffs, Pius V and Gregory XIII, condemned that article: “The integrity of the first condition was not an unowed exaltation of human nature, but its natural condition.”
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
quam primus homo in creatione accepit. Propositionem primam, secundam, et ter¬ tiam, qua; erat adversus Pelagianos, satis (ut opinor) pro instituta brevitate, probavi¬ mus. Nunc postrema, contra Lutheranos as¬ serenda et confirmanda est. Quarta igitur propositio haec esse potest : « Rectitudo illa, cum qua Adam creatus fuit, et sine qua post ejus lapsum homines omnes nascuntur, donum supernaturale fuit. » Haec est adversus haereticos hujus temporis. Sed antequam probetur, explicanda est. Sciendum igitur est primo, hominem na¬ turaliter constare ex carne, et spiritu, et ideo partim cum bestiis , partim cum Angelis communicare naturam, et quidem ratione carnis, et communionis cum bestiis, habere propensionem quamdam ad bonum corporale, et sensibile, in quod fertur per sensum, et appetitum : ratione spiritus et communionis . cum Angelis, habere propensionem ad bo¬ num spirituale, et intelligibile, in quod fer¬ tur per intelligentiam et voluntatem. Ex his autem diversis, vel contrariis propensioni¬ bus existere in uno eodemque homine pug¬ nam quamdam, et ex ea pugna ingentem bene agendi difficultatem, dum una propen¬ sio alteram impedit. Sciendum secundo, divinam providentiam initio creationis ut remedium adhiberet huic morbo, seu languori natura; humanae, qui ex conditione materiae oriebatur, addidisse homini donum quoddam insigne, justitiam videlicet originalem, qua veluti aureo quo¬ dam fraeno pars inferior parti superiori, et pars superior Deo facile subjecta continere¬ tur. Sic autem subjectam fuisse carnem spi¬ ritui, ut non posset ipso invito moveri, ne¬ que eis rebellis fieri, nisi ipse fieret rebellis Deo; in potestate tamen spiritus fuisse, re¬ bellem Deo fieri, et non fieri. Sciendum tertio, multis modis dici aliquid naturale. Primum enim naturale dicitur id omne, quod habetur a nativitate, qua sig¬ nificatione dicimur natura filii irae, Ephes. n. Et hoc modo justitiam originalem fatemur dici posse naturalem. Sed haec significatio ad quaestionem praesentem non pertinet, pro- pterea quod naturale hoc modo acceptum non opponitur supernaturali, cum tam naturalia, quam supernaturalia. dona possint haberi a nativitate, ut notum est. Secundo, naturale dici potest id, quod est naturae consentaneum, quodque eam non destruit, sed ornat, ac perficit. Qua notione S. Augustinus libro de Spiritu, et littera, cap. 27. dictum esse docet ab Apostolo : Gentes qua: legem non habent , naturaliter quae legis sunt, faciunt. Roman. ii. (1). Quia enim vitium est contra naturam, gratia vero sanat naturam, cum ex gratia lex impletur, naturaliter im¬ pleri non inepte dici potest. Caeterum de na¬ turali hoc modo accepto, nulla quaestio est, cum ejusmodi naturale non supernaturali, sed ei quod est contra naturam opponatur, et non solum justitia originalis, sed etiam gratiae donum quodeumque, et ipsa etiam vita aeterna hoc modo dicenda sit naturalis. Tertio dicitur naturale, quod tametsi do¬ num sit gratuitum, tamen naturam juvat, ac perficit in operibus naturalibus, neque eam elevat ad opera ulla supernaturalia. Et hoc modo justitia originalis, si distincta esse in- telligatur a gratia gratum faciente, donum naturale dici potest, ut loquitur Andreas Yega lib. ii in Concil. Trident, cap. 11. Quarto naturale vocatur, quod autjest pars naturae, aut fluitaprincipiis natutae. Qua sig¬ nificatione corpus et animus, facultates quo¬ que tum sentiendi, tum intelligendi, et ope¬ rationes, qua; ab eisdem facultatibus exer¬ centur, naturalia esse dicuntur. Atque haec est significatio, de qua hoc loco proprie dis¬ putamus, et naturali, hoc modo considerato, valde proprie opponitur supernaturale. Potest autem duobus modis dici aliquid supernaturale, per se, et per accidens. Per se dicitur supernaturale, quod ex genere suo non est aptum fluere ex principiis natura;, qualis fuit ascensio Eliae igneo curru in coe¬ lum, robur Samasonis, et alia id genus. Per accidens supernaturale vocatur, quod inter¬ dum obtinetur divino miraculo, licet alioqui ex naturae principiis fluere soleat. Talis fuit sensus videndi, quem Dominus caeco nato restituit, sapientia divinitus Salomoni tributa, (t) Rom. II, 14. CAPUT V. 179 et alia non pauca, quae in Scripturis leguntur Jam igitur adversarii censent, rectitudi¬ nem illam, in qua creatus est Adam, fuisse illi naturalem hoc ultimo modo, nimirum quod fuerit velut quaedam sanitas debita naturae, aptaque nasci ex ipsa natura bene constituta, id est, non corrupta : et nunc hominibus, qui eam rectitudinem amiserunt in Adamo, deesse bonum aliquod naturale, quale deesset pecudi si caeca, vel claudicans, vel febricitans nasceretur. Etsi nunc alicui homini originalis illa justitia divinitus redderetur, dicerent eam esse donum supernaturale per accidens, non per se, ut diximus de oculis redditis caeco nato. Nos vero existimamus rectitudinem illam etiam partis inferioris, fuisse donum super¬ naturale, et quidem per se, non per accidens, ita ut neque ex naturae principiis fluxerit, neque potuerit fluere. Et quia donum illud supernaturale erat, jut statiin probaturi su¬ mus, eo remoto, natura humana sibi relicta, pugnam illam experiri coepit patris inferioris cum superiore, quae naturalis futura erat, id est ex conditione materiae secutura, nisi Deus justitiae donum homini addidisset. Quare non magis differt status hominis post lapsum Adae a statu ejusdem in puris natu¬ ralibus, :'quam differat spoliatus a nudo, ne¬ que deterior est humana natura, si culpam originalem detrahas, neque magisignorantia, et infirmatate laborat, quam esset et laboraret in puris naturalibus condita. Proinde corru¬ ptio naturae, non ex alicujus doni naturalis carentia, neque ex alicujus malae qualitatis accessu, sed ex sola doni supernaturalis ob Adae peccatum amissione profluxit. Quae sen¬ tentia communis est Doctorum Scholastico¬ rum veterum, et recentiorum. Neque enim, quod nos docemus, ex uno Dominico a Soto accepimus, neque contrarium scripsit S. Tho- mas cum caeteris probatioribus auctoribus, (ut quidam viri alioqui insigniter eruditi cen¬ sent) sed, ut dixi, est haec sententia commu¬ nior, ut testimonia, quae subjungimus, indi¬ cabunt. Primum igitur S.Thomas 1. par. quaest. 95. artic. 1. sic loquitur de rectitudine, cum qua conditus fuit Adam : « Manifestum, inquit, est, quod illa subjectio corporis ad animam, et inferiorum virium ad rationem, non erat naturalis ; alioqui post peccatum mansisset, cum etiam in daemonibus data naturalia post peccatum permanserint. » Et infra : «Ex quo datur intelligi, si deserente gratia soluta est obedientia carnis ad animam, quod per gra¬ tiam in anima existentem inferiora ei subde¬ bantur. )> Ex hoc loco aperte discimus ho¬ minem in puris naturalibus conditum, habi¬ turum fuisse rebellionem illam carnis ad Spi¬ ritum, quam nunc post amissum justi tise ori¬ ginalis donum omnes experimur. Quando¬ quidem obedientia carnis ad Spiritum non fuit in primo homine naturalis, sed super¬ naturalis, et gratuita. Proinde justitia ori¬ ginalis divinitus homini collata non conser¬ vavit solum, sed attulit, et fecit rectitudinem partis inferioris. Idem S. Thomas 1. 2. quaest. [82. art. 1. ad 3. « Ex peccato, inquit, originali sequitur aliqua inclinatio in actum inordinatum non directe, sed indirecte, scilicet per remotio¬ nem prohibentis, id est, originalis justitiae, quae prohibebat inordinatos motus. » Fuis¬ sent igitur in homine inordinati motus nisi donum supernaturale accessisset. Idem auctor I. 2. quaest. 87, art. 7. dicit, ex pec¬ cato originali factum esse, ut natura humana sibi ipsi relinqueretur destituta auxilio justi¬ tiae originalis. Idem auctor in quaest. 4. de malo, art. 1, sic loquitur : «Est autem consi¬ derandum, quod primo homini in sua insti¬ tutione datum fuerat divinitus quoddam su¬ pernaturale donum, scilicet originalis justitia perquam ratio subdebatur Deo, et inferiores vires rationi, et corpus animae, etc. » Idem auctor lib. iv contra Gentes, cap. 52 : « Se¬ cundum doctrinam (inquit) fidei ponimus ho¬ minem a principio taliter esse institutum quod quamdiu ratio hominis Deo esset sub¬ jecta et inferiores vires ei sine impedimento deservirent, et corpus ab ejus subjectione impediri non posset per aliquod impedimen¬ tum corporale, et Deo, et sua gratia sup¬ plente quod ad hoc perficiendum natura mi¬ nus habebat. » Idem in 2. Sententiar. dist. 31. quaest 1, art. 1. «Deus, inquit, humanae naturae in sui principio supra conditionem suorum principiorum contulerat, ut esset in ratione rectitudo quaedam originalis justitiae, quam sine aliqua resistentia imprimere pos¬ set inferioribus viribus. Quia hoc gratis col¬ latum fuerat, ideo juste per ingratitudinem inobedientiae subtractum est. Unde factum est, ut primo homine peccante, natura hu¬ mana, quae in ipso erat, sibi ipsi relinque¬ retur, ut consisteret secundum conditionem suorum principiorum. « Natura igitur hu¬ mana talis nunc est ex sententia S. Thomae, qualis fuisset si donum illud supernaturale 1 80 LIBE 11 I. numquam habuisset, eo excepto, quod nunc est poena ex peccato inflicta, quod tunc ex natura, et conditione materne profluxisset. Neque his repugnat, quod idem S. Thomas docet 1. 2. quaest. 82. art. 3. ad primum, con¬ cupiscere, esse homini naturale, in quantum est secundum ordinem rationis; inesse autem homini contra naturam in quantum trans¬ cendit limites rationis. Neque enim his ver¬ bis significatur non fuisse futuram in homine condito in puris naturalibus concupiscentiam transcendentem limites rationis : contrarium enim expresse docuit S. Thomas, cum ait inordinatos motus consecutos esse ex peccato originali, tamquam ex removente prohi¬ bens. Id igitur significatur, istam concupi¬ scentiam non 'fuisse futuram ut bonum ali¬ quid naturale, sed ut languorum, et vitium naturae, non ex intentione conditoris, sed ex conditione materiae consequens, quale vi¬ tium est in gladio ferreo, subjectum esse ru- bigini. Omne enim vitium, contra naturam dici potest. Multo minus his repugnat quod scribit S. Thomas in I. 2. quaest 83. art. 1. et 2. per peccatum non solum privari hominem donis super naturalibus, sed etiam diminui bonum naturae. Nam in eo loco non disputat S. Tho¬ mas de peccato originis in specie, sed de pec¬ cato in universum, ac dicit, bonum naturae diminui per peccatum, quia ex actu peccandi oritur in eo, qui peccat, inclinatio ad idem peccatum, et per hoc diminuitur inclinatio ad virtutem oppositam, quae inclinatio ad virtu¬ tem bonorum naturae dici potest. Ex qua generali doctrina sequitur, ut ex peccato actuali oriatur propensio actualis ad idem peccatum : (ut idem auctor disertis ver¬ bis docet in eadem qu. 83. art. 3.) ex pec¬ cato autem originali, quod non in actu, sed in habitu consistit, non oriatur directe ulla inclinatio ad malum, sed indirecte (ut S. Thomas loquitur) tamquam ex removente prohibens. Atque haic sunt vulnera singula¬ rum potentiarum, de quibus loquitur idem S. Thom. 1. 2. quaest. 83. art. 3. quia enim justitia originalis languorem illum impedie¬ bat, qui in natura humana existere potuisset ex conditione materiae. Ideo remoto originalis justitiae dono, languor ille se prodidit ; et fa¬ ctum est vulnus peccati, quod languor natu¬ rae esse potuisset. Denique eam esse sententiam S. Thomae, quam nos diximus, perspicuum esse potest cx omnibus ejus interpretibus. Omnes enim communi consensu docent, rectitudinem primi hominis effectum fuisse doni cujusdam supernaturalis, et eo dono rempto mansisse naturam, qualis esset, si in puris naturalibus condita fuisset, quod attinet ad motus inor¬ dinatos partis inferioris ; Vide Joan. Capreo¬ lum in 2. Sentent, dist 30. quaest. 1. artic. 1. Thomam cajetamnn 1. 2. quaest. 83. art. 3. ad 2 dubium, et quaest. 101). art. 2. Fran- ciscum Ferarien. in commentar, l.lib. contra gentes, c. 32. Denique Conradum Koellim, et Bartliolomaeum Medinam i. 2. quaest. 83. art. 3. et] 6 ; qui auctor postremus addit hame esse communem, sententiam omnium Theologorum. Et certe JoannCs ScotusTlisertis verbis eam docet, cum sic loquiturin 2. Sententiar. dist. 29. quaest. unica: « Potest dici ergo, quod si originalis justitia habuit illum effectum facere scilicet perfectam tranquillitatem in anima quantum ad omnes potentias, ita quod natura inferior non inclinaretur contra judi¬ cium superioris, aut si inclinaretur quantum est ex se, posset tamen ordinari, et regulari sine difficultate superioris, et sine tristitia in¬ ferioris: cum hoc non habucritpotentiafacta in puris naturalibus, neccssc est ipsum po¬ nere donum supernaturale, quod sit illa tranquillitas perfecta in anima.» Nec minusaperte doceteam Durandus in 2. Sententiar. dist. 20. quaest. 3. ubi cum dixis¬ set, justitiam originalem proprie esse rectum ordinem virium inferiorum, et superiorum ita ut inferiores superioribus subjectui essent infranumero septimo sic loquitur : «Justitia originalis quamvis esset conditio corporalis, errat tamen mere donum Dei: et non proprie¬ tas naturalis, alioquin manissct post pecca¬ tum, sicut natura mansit cum suis naturalibus proprietatibus ; ergo justitia originalis non fuisset transfusa a parente in prolem, sed fuisset proli a Deo infusa, sicut parentibus fuit a Deo gratis collata. » Et dist. 30qua)st. 1. admittit cum S. Thema, mortem, et cre¬ te ros defectus humanos, in quos per Adte peccatum incurrimus, esse a natura, ut a causa per se, a culpa vero sicut a causa re¬ movente prohibens, quia videlicet per cul¬ pam Ad ai amisimus donum justitiae origina lis quai defectus illos prohibebat. Idem apper- tissime docent Gabriel in 2. dist. 30. quaist. 1. Marsilius in 2. qua;st. 18 et 19. et alii quos longum esset, et minime necessarium huc adducere. Porro veteribus scholasticis consentiunt CAPUT VI. 18 i recentiorcs Doctorcs: ac ut paucos dc multis proferam, Joannes Dricdo lib. i. dc gratia, et libero arbitrio, cap. 3. par. 4. in fine : « Ex horum, inquit, consideratione facile potest quis intelligere temperaturam illam, seu consonantiam omnium virium sub im¬ perio rationis, non fuisse hominis secundum naturam ejus constitutam ex anima rationali ct carne, sed secundum peculiarem gratiam Dei dantis primo homini, ut inquit Sapiens virtutem continendi omnia, per quam non solum inferiores animae vires, et totum corpus continebatur sub rationalis animae imperio, per quam et corporales defectus, ut mors, morbi, et humorum corruptiones po¬ terant cohiberi. Per peccatum autem amissa virtute hac, qua; erat originalis justitia, jam natura humana sibi relicta secundum diver¬ sitatem naturalium complexionum diversi¬ mode movetur. » Ruardus Tapper in defensione articuli se¬ cundi, ponit aliquod propositiones de pec¬ cato originali. Quarum duas hic adseribam, secundam ct tertiam. Secunda propositio haec est : c» Fide firma et infallibili, creden¬ dum est, quod virium rebellio, ct motiones inordinata;, ignorantia, infirmitates, mors, et universa; miseriae, quas patiuntur homines sunt prona peccati, et non naturales hominis conditi conditiones. » Tertia propositio est hroc : <i Universa hroc mala potuissent esse naturales hominis conditiones et proprie¬ tates, ut si homines crcasset sine gratia, et jnstitia originali, qua; sola impediebat ne hroc mala essent in homincf sine qua secuta fuissent principia natuixe, sicut et nunc se¬ quuntur naturam ab ea destitutam, quemad¬ modum carum plurima; sunt in caderis ani¬ malibus. » Hroc ille. Andreas Vegalib.n. in Concilium Tridcnt cap. 11 : « Ipsa, inquit, lex membrorum, carnis scillicct rebellio ad Spiritum, ex con¬ ditione est naturae nostra;, ct non ex aliqua mala qualitate transfusa in nos a parentibus nostris, ut communiter docent Scholastici contra Gregorium Ariminensem, et, perinde atque in nobis, fuissent in omnibus creatis puris naturalibus, llabcnt tamen hroc in no¬ bis rationem prona;, quam non haberent in creatis in puris naturalibus, quia Deus bos defectus naturales reformarurat per justitiam originalem, quam perdidimus per peccatum.» Vide camdem sententiam Dominicum a Soto lib. i. de natura et gratia, cap. 13. Albertum Pigium controversia prima;, et alios. Denique nescio, quomodo possitullus hoc tempore Catholicus dubitare, fuerit ne primi hominis integritas naturalis, an supernaturalis cum, ut supra notavimus, duo summi Pon¬ tifices, Pius V. ctGregorius XIII. articulum illum damnaverint : « Integritas primas con¬ ditionis non fuit indebita natura; humana; exaltatio, sed naturalis ejus conditio. » CAPUT VI. Probatur veritas quartx propositionis.