Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book I: On Justifying Faith
Chapter 5: The heretics' error on the notion of justifying faith is refuted from chapter 11 to the Hebrews
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book I. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
It is proved, then, first from the divine writings that justifying faith is not confidence in mercy, but only a firm and certain assent to all the things that God proposes to be believed.
The first testimony can be taken from the definition of faith which is had in Hebrews 11: Faith, says the Apostle, is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not. Which definition is briefly to be explained, that the force of the argument taken from it may the more appear. “Substance” in the Greek is hypostasis — that is, base and foundation. “Of things to be hoped for” in the Greek is elpizomenon, which is ambiguous, and can be rendered either “of men hoping” or “of things hoped, or to be hoped, for.” St. Augustine, almost wherever he cites this place, reads “of those hoping,” as in epistle 112 [al. 120] to Paulinus, book 2 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 31, tractate 79 on John, homily 32 of the book of 50 homilies, and elsewhere. And according to this reading the sense will be that faith is the substance of those who hope — that is, as it were the life and soul which sustains the just man, who, despising earthly things, hopes and awaits the eternal; in which sense it is also said that the just man lives by faith, in this same epistle, chapter 10. But the Greeks all — as St. Basil in the explication of Psalm 115, and Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Oecumenius on this place — take it passively; whom our ancient interpreter followed, who rendered it “of things to be hoped for.” But the sense is altogether the same. For that faith is the substance of things to be hoped for is nothing else than that the things which are hoped, since they are future, have no subsistence or foundation except in the intellect through faith. And so faith is as it were the life and soul of the things hoped for, since, apprehending them and representing them to the mind, it makes them in a certain manner be present and live, though in themselves they are only future. And it is the same thing for faith to be the substance of those hoping and the substance of the thing hoped; for faith can be called the substance of those hoping precisely because it is the substance of the thing hoped — that is, he who hopes sustains himself by faith, since the subsistence of the thing hoped is nothing but faith. And that which follows — the evidence of things that appear not — in Greek is elenchos ou blepomenon, that is, the demonstration, or conviction (as St. Augustine reads), of the things that are not seen. Which words some so expound that they will have it a repetition of the preceding sentence — the sense being that faith makes in a certain manner to stand forth the things which are not, but are hoped as future, and makes the same things be as it were discerned and beheld, though in themselves they appear not. But it is not so. For the same Apostle, explaining a little after the object of faith, does not restrict it to future things which are hoped, but extends it to all things which God has deigned to reveal — whether future or past, whether to be hoped or to be feared. For he says that by faith we believe that the worlds were framed by the Word of God, which is past; and that by faith holy Noe, through fear of the flood, framed the ark; and the flood was indeed future, but to be feared, not hoped. Those words, then, the evidence of things that appear not, are not referred to the things hoped, but explain another power of faith: which is to convince the intellect, and lead it to assent to things which it does not grasp, nor understand.
And so the definition of faith delivered by the Apostle contains two properties of faith: one, that it makes to subsist in the mind the things which are hoped as future; the other, that it makes the intellect assent to things which it does not understand. From which we understand that Christian faith (for this the Apostle defines) is distinguished from all other habits of the intellect. For that clause, the substance of things to be hoped for, distinguishes Christian faith from political and human faith: both because human faith can be deceitful, and therefore does not deserve the name of substance — that is, of a firm and solid foundation and base; and because by the name of things to be hoped for are understood the divine and heavenly goods, to which human faith does not reach. That word “evidence,” or conviction, distinguishes Christian faith from opinion, suspicion, and doubt; for these do not convince, nor compel the intellect to assent. Finally, those two words, that appear not, distinguish the same faith from science and understanding, which do not suffer obscurity, but require light and evidence. See on this place what we write below, chapter 19 [al. 11], in the solution of the first argument of the Lutherans.
Let us now show that the opinion of the adversaries on the notion of justifying faith is false. For that the Apostle in this place defines justifying faith cannot be denied. For when at the end of the preceding chapter he had said, The just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please my soul. But we are not the children of withdrawing unto perdition, but of faith to the saving of the soul — he straightway subjoins, with no word interposed, Now faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, etc. Where you see that that faith is defined by which the just man lives, and by which we please God, and whose children we are unto the acquisition of the soul, and from which he who withdraws himself rushes into perdition. Then, in the rest of the chapter the Apostle more than once repeats that this is the faith without which it is impossible to please God, and through which all the Saints pleased God. Justifying faith, then, is defined.
Now, that this faith is not confidence, but something pertaining to the intellect, that word “substance” proves, first. For faith is called the substance of a future thing (as we showed) because it makes present the things that are otherwise future; but to represent belongs not to the will, where confidence is, but to the intellect; for it, apprehending the thing through the species impressed on it, makes the thing be before it is. Second, the same is proved by that word “evidence”; for elenchos — that is, demonstration and conviction — pertains to the intellect, as also the Latin word “argumentum” itself; for to be convinced by arguments belongs to that to which it belongs to assent and to judge. Third, there comes what follows: “By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God” — where the act of faith is described through the word of understanding, which can in no way be accommodated to confidence. Fourth, the same is confirmed by that: “By faith Noe, fearing, framed the ark,&rdquoo; etc. — where the act of faith cannot be confidence, because confidence does not beget fear, but expels it; accordingly the act of faith in Noe was to believe that the flood would certainly come; for from that act of believing the fear arose, and was the cause why the ark was built. Fifth, finally, the same is proved by those words: “Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him.” Where without doubt by the word “believe” is explained the act of justifying faith; nor can that “believe” by any means be twisted to confidence. For we do not trust that God is; we certainly judge, and assent.
And that justifying faith is not properly knowledge, but assent even to a thing unknown, that clause proves: the evidence of things that appear not. For hence we understand that the office of faith is not to bring it about that obscure things become clear, but that they be believed, even though they appear not. For the Apostle wonderfully conjoined “evidence” with “of things that appear not,” to signify that faith does what arguments do, but in another way. For arguments, and above all demonstrations, make the intellect altogether assent; but they do this by convincing the intellect through the evidence of the thing, while they lay open the causes themselves and the properties. But faith indeed makes the intellect altogether assent, yet not through the evidence of the thing, and the knowledge of the cause and the properties, but by yielding to the authority of the speaker. And so in faith the thing remains obscure, as it was before, but is believed on account of the authority of the speaker; faith, therefore, properly speaking, is not knowledge, but assent. And when the Apostle says, “By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God,” he does not signify that the creation of the worlds is plainly known by faith; but by the word of understanding he wished to express the apprehension and assent of the intellect; for every act of the intellect can be signified by the word “to understand.”
That justifying faith has not for its object special mercy, but all things that God has revealed, is proved first from those words, “of things to be hoped for.” For special mercy is not some thing to be hoped, but a gift present or past, as the adversaries themselves teach, who say it pertains to faith that each one believe that his sins have been remitted to him, and that through Christ he is pleasing to God, and is reckoned as just. Second, the same is proved from those words, “By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God,” and from those, “He that cometh to God must believe that he is,” etc. Finally, from that whole chapter, where very many things are attributed to faith, and no mention is made of special mercy.
Finally, that historical faith — if indeed it is right to call by this name the assent we give to the narration of things past, not on account of the authority of men, but of God himself, because he revealed them — the faith of miracles, and that of the promises, is one and the same, and thereby that justifying faith is not the faith of the promises alone, is clearly proved from this same place. For to the same faith which he defined, and which we have shown to be justifying, the Apostle attributes that through it we understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God — which pertains to history; likewise that through it the saints conquered kingdoms, stopped the mouths of lions, quenched the violence of fire, etc. — which pertain to miracles; finally, that through the same they obtained the promises — which regards the promises. To this place Chemnitz endeavors to answer, and says two things. First, he confesses that there are many objects of faith — namely, all the things contained in the Word of God — but says the question is what that is upon which justifying faith properly ought to gaze; and that this is nothing else than special mercy. Second, he adds that the Apostle in this place treats of the various exercises of faith, which befit those who have been justified by faith. But these things do nothing toward the discharge of the argument. For in the first place, although there are many material objects of faith, there are not on that account many faiths; for the faith is one, on account of the one and same formal reason by which all things are believed. Otherwise, since in the symbol of faith twelve articles are numbered, there would also be twelve faiths — which in the Church of God is hitherto unheard of. Then, the Apostle in this place not only explains the various objects, or exercises, of faith, but at the beginning defines faith itself; why then, in that definition — which (as we showed) is of justifying faith — does he not mention that special mercy, if it is the proper object of justifying faith? Moreover, if the things narrated in that chapter are exercises, or objects, of faith — I ask, of what faith? Certainly of the justifying; for the exercises and objects of that faith are explained which at the beginning was defined; therefore justifying faith not only regards, or apprehends, special mercy, but also believes the creation of the world, and works miracles; accordingly justifying faith itself is also historical faith, and the faith of miracles. Nay, what of this: that the same Apostle, in this same place, in express words delivers that faith justifies insofar as through it we believe things which beget fear — and thereby insofar as it is not confidence in mercy? “By faith,” says he, “Noe, having received an answer concerning those things which as yet were not seen, fearing, framed the ark for the saving of his house; by the which he condemned the world, and was instituted heir of the justice which is by faith.” Do you see, in this place, that holy Noe obtained the justice of faith, and thereby was justified by faith, because he believed God saying that a general flood would come, and, fearing from that faith, built the ark? For he condemned the world of unbelief, and was himself instituted heir of the justice of faith, precisely because the world would not believe the flood was coming, and he believed. What can be answered here? Where in this place is mention of special mercy? Like is what we read a little below: “The saints by faith conquered kingdoms, wrought justice, obtained promises,” etc. — where to faith is attributed both the working of justice and the showing of miracles. But of this place enough has been said.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT V. Refellitur ex cap. 11. ad Hebr. haereticorum error de notione f dei justificantis. \ Probatur igitur primum ex divinis litteris, fidem justificantem non esse fiduciam mise¬ ricordia}, sed solum assensum firmum, ac certum ad ea omnia, qua) Deus credenda proponit. Primum testimonium sumi potest ex defi¬ nitione fidei, qua) habetur ad Hebr. xi. Fides , inquit, Apostolus, est sperandarum substantia rerum , argumentum non apparentium (2). Qua) definitio breviter explicanda est, ut vis argumenti, quod ex ea sumitur magis appa¬ reat. Substantia gimce est Marcum;, id est, basis, ac fundamentum. Sperandarum re¬ rum, greeee est IXiuCogEvov. quod ambiguum est, et verti potest, tum sperantium homi¬ num, tum rerum speratarum, sive speran¬ darum. S. Augustinus, fere ubicumque hunc locum citat, legit sperantium, ut in epist. 112. ad Paulinum, lib. n. de peccatorum meritis et remissione, cap. 31. tract. 79. in Joannem, homil. 32, lib. 50 homiliarum, et alibi. Et juxta hanc lectionem sensus erit, fi¬ dem esse substantium sperantium, id est quasi vitam et animam, qua) sustentat homi¬ nem justum, qui despiciens terrena, sperat, atque expectat feterna. Quo sensus dictum etiam est, justum ex fide vivere, in hac ipsa epistol. cap. 10. Grarni vero omnes, ut S. Basilius in explicatione Psal. 113. et Chryso¬ stomus, Theodoretus, Theophilactus OEcu- menius, in hunc locum passive accipiunt, quos secutus est antiquus noster interpres, qui reddidit rerum sperandarum. Sed sententia est omnino eadem, nihrl enim aliud est fidem esse substantiam re¬ rum sperandarum, nisi qua) sperantur, quo¬ niam futura sunt, non habere ullam subsi¬ stentiam, vel fundamentum, nisi in intellectu per fidem. Itaque fides est quasi vita, et ani¬ ma rerum, qute sperantur, quoniam eas ap¬ prehendens, ac menti repimsentans, facit eas quodam modo esse prasentes, ac vive¬ re, quamvis in se re vera non sint, nisi fu- (1) Rom. 111, 5; l Tim. 5, 12; Rom. XIV, 23; Eph. IV, 5. — (2) Heb. XI, 1 . CAPUT Y. ioo turse. Idem autem est, fidem esse substan¬ tiam sperantium, et substantiam rei spera¬ tae; ideo enim dici potest fides substantia sperantium, quoniam est substantia rei spe¬ rata} ; id est, ideo fide se ipse sustentat, qui sperat, quoniam subsistentia rei sperata} non est nisi fides. Illud autem quod sequitur, argumentum non apparentium, grace est, ouSXs-o- yivwv, hoc est, demonstratio, sive convictio (ut S. Augustinus legit) eorum, qua} non conspiciuntur. Qua} verba sic exponunt ali¬ qui, ut velint esse repetitionem sententiae superioris, ut sensus sit, fides facit quodam¬ modo extare ea, qua} non sunt, sed speran¬ tur futura, et facit quasi cerni, et spectari res easdem, cum in se minime appareant. Sed non ita est, nam idem Apostolus expli¬ cans paulo post objectum fidei, non restrin¬ git illud ad res futuras, quae sperantur, sed extendit ad omnia, quae Deus revelare di¬ gnatus est, sive sint f&tura, sive praeterita, sive speranda, sive timenda. Nam dicit, fide nos credere, aptata esse saecula Verbo Dei, quod praeteritum est; et fide sanctum Noe ob metum diluvii aptasse arcam; diluvium autem futurum quidem erat, sed metuendum, non sperandum. Verba igitur illa, argu¬ mentum non apparentium , non referuntur ad res speratas, sed explicant aliam fidei virtutem, quae est convincere intellectum, atque cum adducere, ut assentiatur iis, qua} non capit, neque intelligit. Itaque definitio fidei, ab Apostolo tradita, duas continet fidei proprietates. Unam, quod faciat in animo subsistere ea, quae speran¬ tur futura. Alteram, quod intellectum fa¬ ciat iis assentiri, quae non intelligit. Ex quo intelligimus, fidem Christianam (hanc eninf definit Apostolus) distingui ab om¬ nibus aliis habitibus intellectus. Nam ea particula, Substantia rerum sperandarum, distinguit fidem Christianam, a fide politica et humana ; tum quia fides humana potest esse fallax, et ideo non meretur nomen sub¬ stantiae, id est, fundamenti, ac basis firmae, ac solida} ; tum quia nomine rerum speran¬ darum intelliguntur bona divina, ac coele¬ stia, ad quae fides humana non pervea nit. Ea vox, « argumentum », sive convictio, distinguit fidem Christianam ab opinione, suspicione et' dubitatione. Ista enim non convincunt, neque cogunt intellectum ad as¬ sensum. Denique duae illae voces, « non apparen¬ tium », distinguunt eamdem fidem ascientia et intellectu, quae non patiuntur obscurita¬ tem, sed lumen, et evidentiam requirunt. Vide de hoc loco quae scribimus infra, cap. 11. in solutione primi argumenti Luthera- norum. Ostendamus nunc falsam esse adversario¬ rum sententiam, de notione fidei justifican¬ tis. Nam quod Apostolus hoc loco definiat fi¬ dem justificantem, negari non potest ; cum enim in cap. superiore extremo dixisset : Justus ex fide vivit; quod si subtraxerit se, non placebit animx mcie. Nos autem non sumus subtractionis filii in perditionem , sed fdei in acquisitionem, animx : continuo subjungit, nullo interposito verbo, est autem fides spe¬ randarum substantia rerum , etc. Ubi vides definiri eam fidem, ex qua justus vivit, et ex qua placemus Deo, et cujus filii sumus in acquisitionem anima}, et a qua qui se sub¬ trahit, in perditionem ruit. Deinde in reli¬ quo capite non semel Apostolus repetit, hanc esse fidem, sine qua impossibile est placere Deo, et per quam Sancti omnes Deo placuerunt. Definitur igitur fides justifi¬ cans. Quod autem haec fides non sit fiducia, sed aliquid ad intellectum pertinens, probat pri¬ mo, illud verbum « substantia ». Nam sub¬ stantia rei futura; (ut ostendimus) dicitur fi¬ des, quia facit pratentia ea, qua} sunt alio- qui futura ; at repraesentare non est volun¬ tatis, ubi est fiducia, sed intellectus. Ille enim rem apprehendens per speciem sibi impressam, facit rem esse antequam sit. Secundo, idem probat illud verbum « ar¬ gumentum » Nam IXsyx0?, id est « de¬ monstratio, )) et convictio ad intellectum - pertinet, ut etiam ipsum nomen Latinum e argumentum » ; ejus enim est convinci argumentis, cujus est assentiri et judi¬ care. Tertio, accedit illud quod sequitur : « Fide intelligimus aptata esse sa}cula Ver¬ bo Dei ». Ubi describitur actus fidei per vo¬ cem intelligendi, qua} nullo modo ad fidu¬ ciam accommodari potest. Quarto, idem confirmat illud : c Fide Noe metuens aptavit arcam, etc » . Ubi fidei ac¬ tus non potest esse fiducia, quia fiducia non gignit metum, sed expellit ; proinde fidei actus in Noe fuit, credere certo futurum di¬ luvium ; nam ex illo actu credendi metus exortus, causa fuit cur fabricaretur arca. LIBER I. m Quinto, denique idem probant illa. vcrlni : « Sine fide impossibile est placere Deo. Nam accedentem ad Deum oportet credere, quia est, et inquirentibus se remunerator sit. » Ubi sine dubio per verbum q credere » , ex¬ plicatur actus fidei justificantis, neque po¬ test ulla ratione ipsum « credere » detorque¬ ri ad fiduciam. Non enim confidimus Deum esse, sed certo judicamus et assentimur. Quod autem fides justificans non sit pro¬ prie notitia, sed assensus in rem etiam in¬ cognitam, probat illud « argumentum non apparentium " hinc enim intelligimus, fidei officium non esse, efficere, ut res obscura; fiant perspicua;, sed ut credantur, etiamsi non appareant. Mire enim conjunxit Aposto¬ lus <( argumentum » eum « non apparen¬ tium » ut significaret, fidem id facere, quod faciunt argumenta, sed alio modo. Nam ar¬ gumenta, et maxime demonstrationes, fa¬ ciunt, ut intellectus omnino assentiatur, sed hoc faciunt, per evidentiam rei intellectum convincendo, dum causas ipsas, et proprie¬ tates aperiunt. At fides facit quidem, ut in¬ tellectus omnino assentiatur, sed non per evidentiam rei, et notitiam causa;, et pro¬ prietatum, sed cedendo auctoritati dicentis. Itaque in fide manet res obscura ut antea erat, sed creditur propter auctoritatem di¬ centis; non igitur fides proprie loquendo est notitia, sed assensus. Quod autem Apostolus ait : « Fide intelli¬ gimus, aptata osse sa;cula Verbo Dei », non significat, fide plane cognosci creationem seeculorum, sed per verbum intelligendi ex¬ primere voluit apprehensionem, et assensum intellectus. Omnis enim actus intellectus, significari potest per verbum intelligere. Quod fides justificans non habeat pro ob¬ jecto misericordiam specialem, sed omnia, qua; Deus revelavit, probatur primum ex illis vocibus : « Sperandarum rerum ». Nam specialis misericordia non est res aliqua spe¬ randa, sed donum prmsens, aut praeteritum, ut ipsimet adversarii docent, qui ad fidem pertinere dicunt, ut unusquisque credat sibi esse remissa peccata, seque per Christum gratum esse Deo, et pro justo reputari. Se¬ cundo, idem probatur ex illis verbis : « Fide intelligimus aptata esse smcula verbo Dei ». Et ex illis : « Accedentem ad Deum oportet credere, quia est, ctc. ». Denique ex toto il¬ lo capite, ubi fidei tribuuntur plurima : et specialis misericordia; nulla fit mentio. Denique quod una et eadem sit fides histo¬ rica (si tamen hoc nomine appellare fas est, assensum, quem adhibemus narrationi re¬ rum promeritarum, non ob hominum, sed ob Dei ipsius, quia ea revelavit, auctoritatem) fides miraculorum ct promissionum, ac per hoc fides justificans non sit sola fides pro¬ missionum : perspicue probatur ex hoc eo¬ dem loco ; nam eidem fidei quam definivit, et quam justificantem esse ostendimus, tribuit Apostolus, quod per eam intelligamus ap¬ tata esse sfecula Verbo Dei, quod ad histo¬ riam pertinet. Item quod per eam sancti vi¬ cerint regna, obturaverint ora leonum, ex¬ stinxerint impetum ignis, etc. Quse perlinent ad miracula. Denique quod per eamdem adepti sint repromissiones quod ad promis¬ siones spectat. Ad hunc locum Kemnitius respondero co¬ natur, ac duo dicit. Primo, fatetur multa esse fidei objecta, ea videlicet omnia, qua; continentur in Verbo Dei, sed qumstionem esse ait, quid illud sit, in quod proprie fides justificans intueri debet ; quod quidem non esse aliud, nisi misericordiam specialem. Secundo addit, Apostolum hoc loco tractare de variis exercitiis fidei, qua; illis conve¬ niunt, qui fide justificati sunt. Sed ista nihil faciunt ad absolutionem ar¬ gumenti. Nam in primis quamvis multa sint objecta (idei, materialia tamen, non ideo multa; sunt fides. Una enim fides est pro¬ pter unam, ct eamdem rationem formalem, qua creduntur omnia. Alioqui cum in sym¬ bolo fidei numerentur articuli duodecim, duodecim quoque essent fides, quod est iu Ecclesia Dei hactenus inauditum. Deinde Apostolus hoc loco non solum ex¬ plicat varia objecta, vel exercitia fidei, sed ipsam fidem initio definit ; cur igitur in ea definitione, qua; ( ut ostendimus ) est fidei justificantis, non meminit illius misericordia; specialis, si ea est objectum proprium fidei justificantis Praeterea si qua; in isto capite narrantor sunt exercitia, vel objecta lidci ; peto, cujus fidei ? certe justificantis, nam illius fidei exercitia, et objecta explicantur, qua; initio definita est : igitur fides justificans non so¬ lum respicit, vel apprehendit misericordiam specialem, sed etiam credit mundi creatio¬ nem, et operatur miracula : proinde ipsa fides justificans, est etiam fides historica et miraculorum. Quid, quod idem Apostolus in hoc eodem loco disertis verbis tradit, fidem justificorc, quatenus por eam credimus ea, queo gignunt timorem, ac per hoc quatenus non est fi¬ ducia misericordiae ? « Fide, inquit, Noe responso accepto dc iis, quee adhuc non videbantur, metuens aptavit arcam in salu¬ tem domus suae per quam damnavit mun¬ dum, et justitiae, quae per fidem est, haeres est constitutus ». Yidesnc hoc loco, sanctum Noe justitiam fidei esse adeptum, ac per hoc fide justificatum, quia credidit Deo di¬ centi, futurum fuisse diluvium generale, et ex ea fide metuens arcam fabricavit ? Ideo enim damnavit mundum incredulitatis, et ipse haeres justitiae fidei constitutus est, quia mundus credere noluit diluvium futurum, ipse autem credidit. Quid hic responderi potest ? Ubi hoc loco mentio misericordiae specialis ? Simile est quod paulo infra legimus : « Sancti per fi¬ dem vicerunt regna, operati sunt justitiam, adepti sunt repromissiones etc. ». Ubi etiam fidei tribuitur justitiae operatio, et miracu¬ lorum ostentio. Sed de hoc loco satis multa dicta sunt.