Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book I: On Justifying Faith
Chapter 6: That justifying faith is not Confidence is proved from the divine writings
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book I. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Now we shall bring forward the testimonies of Scripture by which we may prove separately, first, that faith is not confidence; then, that it is not knowledge, but assent; last, that it has not for its object special mercy, but the whole of what is contained in the word of God.
That faith, then, is not confidence is proved, first, from those words of Romans 4: “He was not weak in faith; neither did he consider his own body now dead, and the dead womb of Sara. In the promise also of God he staggered not by distrust, but was strengthened in faith, giving glory to God, most fully knowing that whatsoever God has promised, he is able also to perform. And therefore it was reputed to him unto justice.” Where the Apostle speaks of justifying faith, as is clear from the last words; and what that faith was he explains by a negating and an affirming proposition: by the negating, when he says, “he considered not his own body now dead,” etc. — and consideration pertains to the intellect, to which confidence does not pertain; by the affirming, when he says, “most fully knowing that whatsoever God has promised, he is able also to perform.” To know most fully is of the intellect, not of the will — as, contrariwise, to have confidence is of the will, not of the intellect. Further, the Greek word plerophoretheis properly signifies “most fully persuaded,” or “holding for certain” — all of which pertain to the intellect. Nor ought that to move us, “he staggered not by distrust”; for distrust is set in that place for unbelief; in the Greek it is apistia.
Second, the same is proved from that of 1 Corinthians 13: And now there remain faith, hope, and charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity. Where the Apostle distinguishes faith from hope, and says they are two diverse things; but it is manifest that confidence is nothing else than hope strengthened. Whence in Job 8 it is said: The hope of the hypocrite shall perish... and his trust a spider’s web. And for what David said, Psalm 39, Blessed is the man whose trust is in the name of the Lord, Jeremias said, chapter 17, Blessed be the man that trusteth in the Lord, and the Lord shall be his confidence. And so confidence arises indeed from faith, but cannot be the same as faith — unless we would confound what the Apostle himself so openly distinguished.
Third, it is proved from that of 2 Corinthians 10: bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ. Where blessed Paul says that through faith the intellect is led captive into the obedience of Christ, because it is compelled to believe what it does not understand; accordingly faith manifestly pertains to the intellect, not to the will.
Fourth, it is proved from those words, Ephesians 3: In whom we have boldness and access with confidence through the faith of him. But if we have access to God in confidence through faith, it certainly follows that faith is not confidence, but the cause of confidence; otherwise the sense of this place would be, “we have access in confidence through confidence” — which there is no doubt is absurd. Not dissimilarly is faith distinguished from confidence in Matthew 9: Be of good heart, daughter; thy faith hath made thee whole — where that woman is aroused to conceive confidence who had already been healed from faith. And in the first to Timothy, chapter 3: They that have ministered well shall purchase to themselves a good degree, and much confidence in the faith which is in Christ Jesus — where confidence is said to be acquired in the faith, because there can be faith without such confidence.
Fifth, let all those places come which teach that the object of justifying faith is all the things that God has revealed — which places will be brought forward in chapter 8; for confidence cannot extend so widely, since it regards only good things, and those as future.
Sixth, let those places also come where the act of faith is said to be “to believe,” as Romans 4, “Abraham believed God,” etc. For if the divine Scripture understood by faith confidence, it would explain its act by the verb “to trust,” not by the verb “to believe.” And if the adversaries contend that even “to believe” is used in the sacred writings for that which is “to trust,” or confide, they will be compelled to explain very many places most absurdly and most ineptly — as, for example, when it is said, John 14: Believe you not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me?... otherwise believe for the very works’ sake. Acts 8: I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God. Romans 10: With the heart we believe unto justice. And below: If thou believe in thy heart that God hath raised him up from the dead, thou shalt be saved. These and the like cannot be taken for confidence except most ineptly.
Nor does Chemnitz satisfy, who in his Examination of the Council of Trent says that to faith pertains not only confidence, but also knowledge, or the assent of the intellect. For he writes that in faith there is, first, the knowledge, or thought, of the promises of God; second, the assent, by which each one determines that that promise pertains to himself; third, that from that knowledge and assent there arises in the will the desire of justification; fourth, at last, that confidence is aroused in him who approaches the throne of grace, which apprehends justification. This Chemnitian philosophy makes little to the matter. For all those acts cannot pertain properly and of themselves to one virtue, since the two former are in the intellect, the latter in the will; nor can it come to pass that one virtue be in two powers distinct in kind. Wherefore the question still remains, which of those acts pertain to justifying faith. For we contend that the two former, which are in the intellect, are acts of faith; the adversaries, contrariwise, will have the two latter, which are in the will — and above all the last — to be the act of faith, since to it alone they attribute the office of justifying. And all the arguments we have made hitherto openly demonstrate that faith is in the intellect, and thereby that confidence, which is in the will, in no way pertains to it. To which we can add the testimony of St. Augustine, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 2, where he says that to believe is nothing else than to think with assent — so that thought is as it were the genus, assent as it were the difference. For, as he teaches in the same place, many think who do not believe — nay, sometimes they think precisely in order not to believe — but no one believes who does not think. In which place St. Augustine manifestly confirms our opinion, and demonstrates that of those four acts which Chemnitz distinguished, only the two former pertain to faith.
But Chemnitz presses: Scripture attributes to the heart both what pertains to the intellect and what pertains to the will, since it says, Why do you think evil in your hearts? Matthew 9; and, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, Matthew 22. Why then could there not also be attributed to faith both what pertains to the intellect and what pertains to the will? He adds also, last, the testimony of St. Bonaventure, who writes that hope, as to certainty, pertains to the intellect; as to expectation, to the will. But the response is easy. For the heart in the sacred writings is taken for the whole soul, so that it signifies the whole interior man; for on that account it is opposed to the flesh, or the body: Psalm 23, The innocent in hands, and clean of heart; Psalm 83, My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God; 1 Peter 3, the hidden man of the heart. Wherefore it is no wonder if to the heart are attributed the acts both of the intellect and of the will, since in the interior man each power is found. But the case of faith is not the same, which is a certain special virtue, and pertains to one special power. Further, St. Bonaventure, on 3 Sentences, distinction 26, article 1, question 5, teaches the contrary of what is attributed to him by Chemnitz. For he affirms that hope, even as to certainty, pertains to the will; for he distinguishes a twofold certainty: one of faith, which is in the intellect; the other of hope, which is in the will. Let Chemnitz see, then, where he found that opinion of Bonaventure. And if that testimony of Bonaventure were genuine, it would be ready to answer that hope is placed by him in the intellect, as to certainty, not essentially but causally — because, namely, hope is certain for this reason, that it presupposes the certainty of faith concerning the omnipotence and faithfulness of God. But we do not contend with the heretics about the subject of the cause of hope, but about the subject of hope itself.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT VI. Fidem justificantem non esse Fiduciam, probatur ex divinis litteris. Nunc adferemus testimonia Scripturae, quibus seorsim probemus, primum, fidem non esse fiduciam ; deinde, non esse no¬ titiam, sed assensum ; postremo, non ha¬ bere pro objecto misericordiam specialem, sed in totum, quod in verbo Dei continetur. Fidem igitur non esse fiduciam, probatur primo ex illis verbis Roman. iv : « Non infirmatus est fide, nec consideravit corpus suum emortuum, et emortuam vulvam Sarae, in repromissione etiam Dei non haesi¬ tavit diffidentia, sed confortatus est fide, dans gloriam Deo, plenissime sciens, quia quaecumque promisit Deus, potens est et facere. Ideo et reputatum est ei ad ju¬ stitiam ». Ubi loquitur Apostolus, de fide justificante, ut perspicuum est ex ultimis verbis : quid autem fuerit illa fides, explicat per propositionem negantem et affirmantem ; per negantem, cum dicit : « Non considera¬ vit corpus suum . emortuum etc » . Conside¬ ratio autem ad intellectum pertinet ; ad quem non pertinet fiducia : per affirmantem, cum ait : « Plenissime sciens quia quaecum- que promisit Deus, potens est et facere » . Plenissime scire, intellectus est, non volun¬ tatis, sicut contra, fiduciam habere, volu li¬ taris est, non intellectus. Porro vox Graeca ■7v>xv,po3>of t,0eic, significat proprie, plenissime persuasus, sive pro certo habens, quae omnia ad intellectum pertinent. Neque movere nos debet illud, non haesitavit diffidentia, nam diffidentia posita est eo loco pro increduli¬ tate, in Graeco est dmaxi' a. Secundo idem probatur ex illo, I Oor- rinth. xm. Nunc autem manent fules , spes charitas , tria h;ec, major autem horum est. c/iaritas. Ubi distinguit Apostolus fidem a spe, et dicit esse duo quaedam diversa ; manifestum autem est fiduciam nihil esse aliud, nisi spem roboratam. Unde Job. vm. dicitur :’S pes hypocritae peribit , et sicut tela aranearum fiducia ejus. Et pro eo, quod dixit David Psalm.xxxvui. Beatus vir , cujus est nomen Domini spes ejus. Dixit Hieremias cap. xvii. Beatus vir , qui confidit in Domino,' et erit. Dominus fiducia ejus (1;. Itaque fiducia ex fide quidem oritur, sed non potest idem esse cum fide, nisi confundere velimus,, quae tam aperte Apostolus ipse distinxit. Tertio, probatur ex illo, II Corinth. x. in captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi (2). Ubi B. Paulus per fi¬ dem dicit, intellectum captivum duci in obse¬ quium Christi, quia cogitur credere, quod non intelligit. Proinde fides manifeste ad ad intellectum non ad voluntatem pertinet. Quarto, probatur ex illis yerbis, ad Ephe¬ sios. Hi. In quo habemus fiduciam , et acces¬ sum in confidentia per fidem ejus (3). Quod si habemus accessum ad Deum in confidentia sen fiducia per fidem, certe sequitur, ut iides non fiducia sit fiducia, sed fiducia; causa, alioqui sensus hujus loci esset, ha¬ bemus accessum in confidentia per con¬ fidentiam, quod absurdum esse non dubium est. Non dissimiliter distinguitur fides a fiducia Matth. ix. Confide , filia, fides tua te salvam fecit (4). Ubi excitatur ad fidu¬ ciam concipiendam mulier illa, qua; jam ex fide sanata fuerat. Et in priore ad Thirno- theum cap. ili. Qui bene ministraverint , gra¬ dum bonum sibi acquirent, et multam fiduciam (I) 1 Corin. XII, 13; Job. VIII, \\ : Psal. XXXIX, 5 ; Hier. XVII, 7. - (2)11 Cor. X, 5. - i3) Epln III, 12, - (4) Matth. IX, 22. 158 LIBER I. in fide quae est in Christo (1). Ubi fiducia in fide acquiri dicitur, quia potest esse fides sine tali fiducia. Quinto, accedant omnia illa loca, qua) do¬ cent, objectum fidei justificantis esse illa omnia, qurn Deus revelavit, qua) loca cap. 8. adferentur ; neque enim fiduciam tam late patere potest, cum solum bona, et ea ut fu¬ tura respiciat. Sexto, accedant etiam loca, ubi actus fidei dfeitur esse, credere ; ut Rom. iv. « Credidit Abraham Deo etc». Nam si Scri¬ ptura divina per fidem intelligeret fiduciam, actum ejus explicaret per verbum fidere, non per verbum credere. Quod si adversarii contendant, ipsum etiam (credere) usurpari in sacris litteris, pro eo quod est (fidere) aut confidere ; cogentur absurdissime, atque ineptissime loca plurima explicare, ut exem¬ pli gratia, cum dicitur Joan. xiv. : Non cre¬ ditis , quia ego in Patre , et Pater in me est ? ulioqui propter opera ipsa credite. Actor, viii. Credo filium Dei esse Jesum Christum. Rom. x. Corde creditur ad justitiam. Et infra : St in corde tuo credideris , quia Deus eum suscitavit a mo)'tuis, salvus eris (2). Haec et similia non possunt nisi ineptissime accipi pro fiducia. Neque satisfacit Kemnitius, qui in suo examine Concilii Tridentini dicit, ad fidem pertinere non solum fiduciam, sed etiam no¬ titiam, sive assensum intellectus. Scribit enim in fide primo, esse notitiam, sive co¬ gitationem promissionum Dei. Secundo as¬ sensionem, qua unusquisque statuit eam promissionem ad se pertinere. Tertio ex illa notitia, et assensu oiiri in voluntate deside¬ rium justificationis. Quarto, demum excitari fiduciam accedenti ad thronum gratiae, quae apprehendit justificationem. Haec philosophia Kemminitiana parum fa¬ cit ad rem, nam non possunt isti omnes actus ad unam virtutem proprie, et per se perti¬ nere, cum priores duo sint in intellectu, pos¬ teriores in voluntate, nec fieri possit, ut una virtus sit in duabus potentiis genere distin¬ ctis. Quare adhuc restat quaestio, quinam ex illis actibus ad fidem justificantem perti¬ neant. Nos enim contendimus, duos priores, qui sunt in intellectu, esse actus fidei : ad¬ versarii contra, duos posteriores, qui sunt in voluntate, et maxime postremum actum fidei esse volunt, cum illi soli tribuant justi¬ ficandi officium. Argumenta autem omnia, qua) fecimus hactenus, aperte demonstrant, fidem esse in intellectu, ac per hoc ad eam nullo modo pertinere fiduciam, quae est in voluntate. Quibus addere possumus testimonium S. Au¬ gustini in lib. de pixedestinatione Sancto¬ rum, cap. ii, ubi dicit, credere, nihil esse aliud, nisi cum assensu cogitare ; ita ut co- gitatio sit quasi genus, assensus quasi dif¬ ferentia. Nam ut ipse ibidem docet, multi cogitant, qui non credunt, imo etiam ali¬ quando cogitant, ut non credant, sed nullus credit, qui non cogitet. Quo loco S. Augu¬ stinus, manifeste confirmat sententiam no¬ stram. Et ex quatuor illis actibus quos Kem¬ nitius distinxit, duos tantum priores ad fidem pertinere, demonstrat. At instat Kemnitius : Scriptura tribuit cordi, quie ad intellectum, et qua) ad volun¬ tatem pertinent, cum dicat : Ut quid cogita¬ tis mala in cordibus vestris. Matth. ix. Et : Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo. Matth. xxn (3). Cur igitur non poterunt etiam fidei tribui, qum ad intellectum, et quae ad voluntatem pertinent ? Addit etiam postremo testimonium S. Bonaventura, qui scribit, spem, quantum ad certitudinem, pertinere ad intellectum, quantum ad expe- ctationem pertinere ad voluntatem. Sed facilis est responsio. Cur enim in sa¬ cris litteris pro tota anima accipitur, ut vide¬ licet totum interiorem hominem significet nam idcirco carni, vel corpori opponitur. Psal. xxiii. Innocens manibus , et mundo cor¬ de. Psal. lx xxiii. Cor meum et caro mea exul- taverunt in Deum vivum. I Petr. in. Qui in abscondito est cordis homo. Quare non est mirum, si cordi tribuantur actus, tam intel¬ lectus, quam voluntatis, cum in homine in¬ teriore utraque potentia reperiatur. Non est autem eadem ratio fidei, quae specialis quae¬ dam virtus est, et ad unam specialem po¬ tentiam pertinet. Porro S. Bonaventura in 3. sentent. dist. 2G. art. 1. qumst. 5. contrarium docet, ejus, quod a Kemnitio illi tribuitur. Siquidem af¬ firmat, spem etiam quoad certitudinem per¬ tinere ad voluntatem. Distinguit enim du¬ plicem certitudinem, unam fidei, qua) est in intellectu, alteram spei, quie est in volun¬ tate. Itaque viderit Kemnitius ubi senten¬ tiam illam Bonaventura) repere rit. Quod si testimonium illud Bonaventura) germanum (1) Tini. III, 13. - (2) Joan. XV, 11 ; Act. VIII, 37; Rom. X, 10, 9. - (3) Matth. IX, 4; ibid. XXII, 37. — (4) Psal. XXIII, 4; ibid. LXXXI1I, 3; I Pet. III, 4. CAPUT VII. 159 esset, promptum esset respondere, ab eo poni spem in intellectu quoad certitudinem ; non essentialiter, sed causaliter, quia vide¬ licet ideo spes certa est, quia praesupponit certitudinem fidei de omnipotentia et fideli¬ tate Dei. Nos autem cum hereticis non con¬ tendimus de subjecto causae spei, sed de subjecto ipsius spei.