Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book I: On Justifying Faith
Chapter 7: That justifying faith is not so much knowledge as assent is proved from the Scriptures
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book I. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Now against Calvin it is briefly to be proved that faith is not so much knowledge as simple assent — which was also proved a little before from the definition which the Apostle delivered. For Calvin not only defines faith through cognition, book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 2, but also insults the Catholics for saying that they reverently believe whatever the Church teaches, even though they understand it less; contrariwise, he himself affirms that the kingdom of heaven is entered not by ignorance, nor by the submission of our sense, but by certain and well-examined cognition; and he alleges the Apostle condemning those who are always learning, and never arrive at the knowledge of the truth, 2 Timothy 3.
It is proved, then, that faith is not knowledge, but assent. For in the first place Isaias, chapter 7, openly protests: Unless you believe, you shall not understand. Where we see that faith is not understanding, but the way and step to understanding — which that Philosopher also said, in other words, of natural things: “The learner must believe.” Likewise, in the first to the Corinthians, chapter 13, the Apostle distinguishes the knowledge of mysteries from faith as two diverse gifts: If I should have all knowledge, and should know all mysteries, and all faith. And 1 Corinthians 12, enumerating the gifts of God, he says that to one is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, to another faith — that is, eminent faith, which can even remove mountains. Again, in the second to the Corinthians, chapter 10, he says that through the preaching of the Gospel he brings into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ; but certainly there is no need to take the intellect captive where there is knowledge of the truth. To which also pertains the obedience of faith, of which the same Apostle so often preaches; for to what end would obedience in believing be needed, if through faith knowledge were afforded? But let us hear on this matter the opinion of the ancient Fathers.
St. Irenaeus, book 2, chapter 45 [al. 26]: “It is better that one knowing nothing at all should believe God, and persevere in his love, which gives life to man, than through subtleties of questions and much speaking to fall into impiety.” Clement of Alexandria, book 3 of the Pedagogue, chapter 11: “Faith is the possession not of the wise according to the world, but of those who are wise according to God; and it is learned even without letters; and its writing — which pertains both to the rude and to the ignorant, and is divine — is called charity.” St. Hilary, book 8 On the Trinity, before the middle: “It has not so much pardon as reward, to be ignorant of what thou believest; for the greatest wage of faith is to hope for the things thou knowest not.” St. Augustine, in epistle 102 to Evodius: “If Christ was born only for those who can discern these things with certain understanding, we labor in the Church almost in vain.” And that it is truly so experience testifies: since the greatest part of the faithful — whether on account of boyish age, or the female sex, or dullness of talent, or unskillfulness in letters and sciences (such as are almost all country folk) — not only do not understand the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation, and the like things necessary to salvation, but scarcely conceive anything in the mind beyond the sound of the words; and yet they are deservedly numbered among the faithful, since they profess that they believe God to be Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, according to the sense of the Church. Wherefore the same Augustine, in the book against the Epistle of the Foundation, chapter 4: “Not liveliness of understanding, but simplicity of believing, makes the crowd most safe.” And tractate 27 [al. 22] on John he says that the understanding of the mysteries is the reward of faith. And tractate 40 [al. 27]: “Not because they knew did they believe; but they believed that they might know. For what is faith, but to believe what thou seest not?” And sermon 189 On the Season, which is the first on the holy Trinity: “Consider that thou art called faithful, not rational. In fine, having received baptism, we say this: I have been made faithful; I believe what I know not.” St. Prosper, book 1 On the Contemplative Life, chapter 19: “The Apostle saying, Unless you believe, you shall not understand, it is given to be understood that not faith exists from understanding, but understanding from faith; nor does he who understands believe, but he who believes understands.” And so faith precedes understanding, and thereby to believe is not to understand. St. Gregory, book 2 of the Morals, chapter 25 [al. 30], treating that of Job 1, The oxen were ploughing, and the asses feeding beside them, teaches that by the oxen are signified learned men, by the asses unskilled men, who, simply believing, acquiesce in the understanding of their betters.
Finally, in him who believes there are two things: apprehension, and judgment, or assent. But the apprehension is not faith, but something preceding faith; for even unbelievers can apprehend the mysteries of faith. Moreover, apprehension is not properly called knowledge if it be rude and confused; and a distinct and clear one is not necessarily required for faith. For it can befall that a heathen Philosopher apprehend the mystery of the Trinity not only confusedly but even distinctly, and by most subtle understanding discern the essence and the relations, and other things of that kind, and yet not believe; while contrariwise a Catholic countryman apprehends those three names only confusedly, and yet truly believes. But judgment, or assent, is twofold. For the one follows reason and the evidence of the thing; the other, the authority of him who proposes. The former is called knowledge (if we would speak properly); the latter, faith. For so speaks St. Augustine, in the book On the Profit of Believing, chapter 11 [al. 25]: “That we understand something, we owe to reason; that we believe, to authority.” Therefore the mysteries of faith, which surpass reason, we believe, we do not understand; and thereby faith is distinguished against science, and is better defined through ignorance than through knowledge. And that which Calvin objects — “always learning, and never arriving at the knowledge of the truth” — makes nothing to the matter. For although faith be distinguished from science, yet the science of divine things is also useful and praiseworthy, seeing that it ever kindles the love of God more and more; and as they are worthy of praise who advance by learning, so they are deservedly reprehended who are always learning and never arrive at knowledge.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT VII. Fidem justificantem non tam esse notitiam , quam assensum, probatur ex Scripturis. Nunc adversus Calvinum breviter proban¬ dum est, fidem non tam esse notitiam, quam simplicem assensum, quod etiam paulo ante probatum est ex definitione, qnam tradidit Apostolus, Calvinus enim non solum definit fidem per cognitionem, lib. m. Instit.cap. 2. sed etiam insultat Catholicis, quod dicant, se reverenter credere quicquid Ecclesia do¬ cet, etiamsi minus ea intelligant. Contra vero ipse affirmat, non ignorantia, nec sen¬ sus nostri submissione, sed cognitione ceida et explorata regnum coelorum adiri ; et allegat Apostolum damnantem eos, qui semper discunt, et ad scientiam veritatis numquam perveniunt. II Timoth. m. Probatur igitur, fidem non esse notitiam, sed assensum. Nam in primis Isaias cap. vn. aperte protestatur : Visi credideritis, non in- telligetis. Ubi videmus, fidem non esseintel- ligentiara, sed viam, et gradum ad intelli- gendum. Quod aliis verbis dixit etiam de rebus naturalibus ille Philosophus : « Addi¬ scentem oportet credere ». Item in priore ad Corinthios cap. xm. Apostolus distinguit no¬ titiam mysteriorum a fide tamquam duo diversa dona : Si habuero , inquit, omnem scientiam , et noverim mysteria omnia , et om¬ nem fidem (1). Et I Corinth. xn. enumerans dona Dei, dicit, alii dari sermonem sapien¬ tia;, alii sermonem scientise, alii fidem, id est, eximiam fidem, ‘quae montes etiam transferre possit. Rursus in posteriore ad Corinth. cap. 10. dicit, se per Evangelii praedicationem in captivitatem redigere om¬ nem intellectum in obsequium Christi. At certe non est necesse, captivare intellectum, ubi est notitia veritatis. Quo etiam pertinet obedientia fidei, de qua tam saepe idem Apo¬ stolus concionatur. Quoi*sum enim obedien¬ tia in credendo opus esset, si per fidem no¬ titia praeberetur ; sed audiamus in hac re sententiam veterum Patrum. S. Irenseus lib. ii. cap. 45. « Melius, in¬ quit, est nihil omnino scientem credere Deo, et perseverare in ejus dilectione, qua; ho¬ minem vivificat, quam per questionum sub¬ tilitates, et multiloquium in impietatem ca¬ dere » . Clemens Alexandrinus lib. m. Paeda¬ gogi, cap. 11. «Fides, inquit, non sapientium secundum mundum, sed eorum, qui secun¬ dum Deum sunt sapientes, possessio est. Illa autem etiam absque litteris discitur. Ejus autem scriptum, quod et ad rudes, et ad ignorantes pertinet, et est divinum, cha- ritas vocatur » . S. Hilarius lib. vili, de Trinit. ante me¬ dium : « Habet, inquit, non tam veniam, quam praemium, ignorare quod credas, quia maximum stipendiurfl fidei est, sperare qua; nescias » . S. Augustinus in epist. 102. ad Evodium : « Si propter eos solos, inquit, Christus na¬ tus est, qui certa intelligentia possunt ista discernere, pene frustra in Ecclesie labora¬ mus » . Et sane ita esse, experientia testatur, cum maxima pars fidelium, vel propter aeta¬ tem puerilem, vel propter sexum mulie¬ brem, vel propter ingenii hebetudinem, vel propter imperitiam litterarum et scientia¬ rum, quales sunt pene omnes rustici, non solum non intelligant mysteria Trinitatis et Incarnationis, et similia necessaria ad salu¬ tem, sed vix quidquam animo concipiant, praeter sonum verborum ; et tamen inter fideles merito numerantur, cum fatentur se credere, Deum esse Patrem, et Filium, et Spiritum sanctum, juxta sensum Ecclesiae. Quare idem Augustinus in libro contra epistolam Fundamenti, cap. 4. « Turbam, in¬ quit, non intelligendi vivacitas, sed credenti simplicitas tutissimam facit. » Et tract. 27. in Joanem dicit, intelligentiam mysteriorum esse praemium fidei. Et tract. 40. « Non quia cognoverunt, inquit, crediderunt, sed ut co1 gnoscerent, crediderunt. Qui enim est fides, nisi credere quod non vides ». Etserm. 189. de tempore, qui est primus de sancta Trini¬ tate; « Considera, inquit, quod voceris fide¬ lis, non rationalis. Denique accepto bapti¬ smo hoc dicimus, fidelis factus sum, credo' quod nescio j. (1) Cor. XIII, 2. 1G0 LIBEK !. S. Prosper lib. i. de vita contemplativa, cap. 19. (( Dicente, inquit, Apostolo, nisi credideritis, non intelligetis, datur in telligi, quod non fides ex intellectu, sed ex fide in¬ tellectus existat : nec qui intelligit, credat, sed qui credit, intelligat » . Itaque fides in¬ tellectum praecedit, ac per hoc credere, non est intelligere. S. Gregorius lib. n. Moralium, cap. 25. tractans illud Job. i. Boves arabant , et asi¬ nas pascebantur juxta eos (1); docet, per boves significari homines doctos, per asinas homi¬ nes imperitos, qui simpliciter credentes in intelligentia majorum acquiescunt. Denique in eo*qui credit, duo sunt, appre¬ hensio, et judicium, sive assensus : sed ap¬ prehensio non est fides, sed aliquid fidem praicedens. Possunt enim etiam infideles apprehendere mysteria fidei. Praeterea, ap¬ prehensio non dicitur proprie notitia, si sit rudis et confusa ; distiifcta autebi et perspi¬ cua non. necessario requiritur ad fidem. Nam accidere potest, ut Philosophus Ethni¬ cus apprehendat npn solum confuse, sed etiam distincte mysterium Trinitatis, et subtilissime intelligendo discernat essentiam et relationes, atque alia id genus, et tamen non credat. Contra autem rusticus Catholi¬ cus, non apprehendat nisi confuse tria illa nomina, et tamen vere credat. Judicium autem, sive assensus duplex est. Alter enim sequitur rationem, et evidentiam rei, alter auctoritatem proponentis : prior dicitur notitia (si proprie loqui velimus) po¬ sterior fides. Sic enim loquitur sanctus Au¬ gustinus, in libro de utilitate credendi, cap. 11. « Quod, inquit, intelligimus aliquid, ra¬ tioni debemus ; quod autem credimus, au¬ ctoritati » . Igitur mysteria fidei, quae ratio¬ nem superant, credimus, non intelligimus, ac per hoc fides distinguitur contra scientiam, et melius per ignorantiam, quam per noti¬ tiam definitur. Illud autem, quod objicit Calvinus, semper discentes, et numquam ad scientiam verita¬ tis pervenientes, nihil ad rem facit. Nam tametsi distinguatur fides a scientia, tamen utilis est etiam, et laudabilis scientia rerum divinarum, quippe quse amorem Dei semper magis et magis accendit : et sicut laude digni sunt, qui discendo proficiunt, ita me¬ rito reprehenduntur, qui semper discunt, et ad scientiam numquam perveniunt.