Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book V: On the Merits of Works
Chapter 12: That for merit the state of grace and of the adoption of sons is required
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The other question is to be treated on account of the fifth condition of merit. It is asked, then, whether unto the merit of eternal life it be necessarily required that a man be just, and pleasing to God, and adopted into a son through regeneration. And the question can be understood in two ways. First, whether that elevation of nature to the state of the sons of God be required on the part of the works — because, namely, he cannot perfectly fulfil the law who has not through justifying grace been made a son of God. Second, whether it be required on the part of the subject — because, namely, even if one should perfectly fulfil the law, yet he would not merit eternal life unless he were elevated to that supernatural state. There was the opinion of a certain more recent writer, many of whose sentences were condemned by Pope Pius V, that eternal life is owed to good works from this, that they are a true obedience of the law, not because they are done by a person elevated through grace to the state of the sons of God. And that Doctor holds not only that the elevation of nature is not necessary on the part of the subject, but neither on the part of the works. For he thinks that works truly meritorious of eternal life can be done by a man not yet reborn through Baptism, or not yet reconciled through the sacrament of Penance. And so, by his opinion, catechumens and penitents, before the remission of sins, keeping the commandments through a special help of God, merit eternal life. The contrary opinion is common, and has been, in the Schools of Catholic theologians. And not only now, in the state of corrupt nature, but even in the state of entire nature, the theologians teach that it was necessary unto the merit of eternal life that a man be, through the grace of justification and the indwelling Spirit, adopted into a son, and raised to a certain supernatural and divine state. See the Master and the theologians on book 2 of the Sentences, distinctions 24, 27, 28, and 29. And that this very opinion is the Council of Trent’s, and thereby the universal Church’s, is certain from session 6, chapter 16, where the Council teaches that eternal life is a grace mercifully promised to the sons of God through Christ, and at the same time a reward faithfully to be rendered to their good works from the promise of God. The same is plain from canon 32, where the Council declares those works to be meritorious which are done by the justified through the grace of God, as living members of Christ. Finally there was a Bull of Pope Pius V, renewed by Gregory XIII, in which these two propositions are condemned: “It is the opinion of Pelagius that a good work done without the grace of adoption is not meritorious of the heavenly kingdom. Good works done by the sons of adoption receive not the notion of merit from this, that they are done through the spirit of adoption inhabiting the hearts of the sons of God, but only from this, that they are conformable to the law.” We, therefore, shall prove that the grace of adoption is required for constituting merit, by various arguments, of which some show that this grace is necessary on the part of the works, others on the part of the subject.
This opinion is proved, first, from the divine letters. Genesis 4: God had respect to Abel and to his offerings. St. Gregory notes, book 22 of the Morals, chapter 12, that this was said because God has not the offerer pleasing on account of the gifts, but the gifts on account of the offerer. Nor does he understand it on account of the mere intention of the offerer, but on account of his goodness and purity; for he says that he ought to be purged from all malice who desires that his gifts please the Lord. John 15: Abide in me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you, unless you abide in me. I am the vine, you the branches; he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same beareth much fruit. There is required, therefore, unto fruit — that is, unto doing good works — not any grace whatsoever, but that which makes a man to be a living member of the body of Christ. For it is the same to be a branch of the vine and a member of the body. Besides, the Scripture everywhere teaches that the kingdom of heaven is the glory and inheritance of the sons. John 8: The servant abideth not in the house for ever, but the son abideth for ever; if therefore the son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed. Romans 8: You have received the spirit of adoption of sons. And if sons, heirs also. And below: And the creature itself also shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God. Galatians 4: Therefore now he is not a servant, but a son; and if a son, an heir also through God. And below: But what saith the Scripture? Cast out the bondwoman and her son. For the son of the bondwoman shall not be heir with the son of the free woman. Like things are had, Ephesians 1, Colossians 3, Titus 3, Hebrews 1, 1 Peter 1, and elsewhere, where eternal life is called an inheritance, which properly pertains to sons. Not, then, shall he who is a servant be able by any merits to obtain eternal life; for an inheritance is not the wage of servants, even though they should serve a thousand years, but the proper portion of sons. Wherefore without doubt a necessary condition unto the merit of eternal life is regeneration and adoption of the sons of God. Moreover, the Scripture testifies that merit is so founded in friendship with God that, as soon as anyone offends God, he loses all good merits. Ezechiel 18: If the just man turn himself away from his justice, and do iniquity, all his justices shall not be remembered. And James 2: Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all. But if merit depended not on the state and quality of the person, but on the sole obedience of the law, he who offends God ought not to lose the good merits before gotten through the obedience of the law — even as he who has labored in cultivating another’s vineyard, hired for a certain wage, loses not his wage if perchance he become an enemy of the lord of the vineyard; for that merit is founded not in friendship, but in the work and labor alone. Therefore the merit of eternal life, which is straightway lost when one provokes God to anger, has its foundation not in the work alone, but also in the friendship and dignity of the person. And hence it is that the Scripture testifies eternal life to be promised to those that love God: John 14, 1 Corinthians 2, 2 Timothy 4, James 1, and elsewhere.
The same truth is proved, second, by the testimonies of St. Augustine, who in book 1 to Boniface, against two epistles of the Pelagians, chapter 2: “Men live not rightly unless made sons of God. But men become not sons of God save through regeneration, in which sins are remitted and grace making pleasing is infused.” Likewise book 1 to Simplician, question 2: “But in some the grace of faith is so great as suffices not for obtaining the kingdom of heaven — as in catechumens, as in Cornelius, before he was incorporated into the Church by the participation of the sacraments.” And not only in the state of corrupt nature, but even in the state of entire nature, Augustine acknowledges the necessity of grace for gaining good merits. For thus he says in the Enchiridion, chapter 106: “Although without grace not even then could there have been any good merit.” But that Augustine speaks not of some grace of general help, or even of a special transient help, but of charity itself, infused and inhering, is plain from book 12 of the City of God, chapter 1, where, speaking of the holy angels: “With chaste love he created them, at once both founding in them their nature and bestowing grace.” And soon: “It is therefore to be confessed, with due praise of the Creator, that not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels it can be said that the charity of God is poured forth in them by the Holy Ghost, who is given to them.” That grace, therefore, without which not even then (that is, in the state of entire nature of men or angels) could there have been any good merit, is the charity of God poured forth by the Holy Ghost, who is given to them. Hither pertain also those things which we said in the second book On Justification, where we proved that a man is justified through habitual justice — that is, through grace making pleasing, inhering and permanent. For, as the same Augustine says in the book On Faith and Works, chapter 14: “Good works follow a man justified, they go not before to justify him.” And in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 26: “Incorporated through the Spirit, and made his member, each one can, he giving increase within, work justice.”
The same is proved, third, by reasons. The first reason: the vision of God, in which properly eternal life consists, is a thing not only supernatural, but so far exceeding every created nature that it can neither be known, nor desired, nor thought of, save by God himself revealing it: Eye hath not seen (says the Apostle, citing Isaias, 1 Corinthians 2), nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love him. But for a supernatural and divine end are required works supernatural and divine, especially since God disposes all things wisely and sweetly. But a man cannot do divine and supernatural works unless he first himself be made divine and supernatural, as St. Dionysius reasons, in the book On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 2, part 1. A man must, therefore, through inhering grace and the indwelling Spirit be raised to the fellowship of the divine nature, that he may be able to do divine works — that is, works meritorious of eternal life. And this is the reason of St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and other illustrious theologians. The second reason: if merits depended not on the state and dignity of the person, but only on the work itself, or the obedience of the law, certainly the merits of Christ would not be of infinite price, nor would they be much greater than those of other just men; for where only the work is regarded, it matters nothing whether he who works be a king or a soldier, noble or ignoble, honest or dishonest. But it is certain that the works of Christ were of infinite price, seeing they were a propitiation for the sins of the whole world, and with him was plentiful redemption; therefore the dignity of the person confers very much to the value of merit. And this reason is confirmed. For of Christ no Catholic will dare to deny that his merits were of the greatest price on account of the dignity of the person. For (to omit other things now) there is extant a decretal epistle of Clement VI, which begins Unigenitus, in which we are taught that one drop of the blood of Christ, on account of the infinite dignity of the person, could have sufficed for the redemption of the whole world. But the reason of merit in the head and in the members ought not to be dissimilar. Therefore, as the merit of Christ, so also the merits of other just men will receive their force from the dignity of the person. The third reason: if adoption and regeneration be not required unto merit, certainly a man will be able, before the remission of sin, through a special help of God, to merit eternal life; which, though it be granted by the adversary, is not only false, but seems even to contain a repugnance. For the same man will merit at once eternal life and eternal death. For he will be guilty of eternal death on account of sins once committed and not yet remitted; and at the same time will have a right to eternal life on account of good merits acquired through the obedience of the law. But to merit at once eternal life and eternal death includes a repugnance, since eternal death signifies the privation of eternal life; wherefore he who were such ought to live for ever and not live for ever, to die for ever and not die for ever. The fourth reason: if he who is not yet regenerate could truly merit eternal life by his works, certainly he could also properly merit the grace of justification. For if he can merit glory, which is grace consummated, why shall he not be able to merit grace, which is glory inchoate? But that the grace of justification — that is, justice itself, through which we are formally justified — falls not under merit properly so called, all theologians agree, and the Council of Trent itself in express words affirms, session 6, chapter 8. Whence also St. Augustine, in epistle 105 to Sixtus, writes that eternal life is in the Scriptures called both a reward and a grace; but that justice itself is never called a reward, but only a grace.
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CAPUT XII. Ad meritum requiri statum gratiae et adoptionis filiorum . ♦ Altera quaestio tractanda est propter quin¬ tam conditionenf meriti. Quaeritur igitur, <i Utrum ad meritum vitae aeternae necessario requiratur, ut homo sit justus, et gratus Deo9 et in filium per regenerationem adopta¬ tus». Potest autem quaestio duobus modis intel- ligi. Primo, utrum requiratur elevatio illa naturae ad statum filiorum Dei, ex parte ope¬ rum : quia videlicet non possit legem perfe¬ cte implere, nisi qui per gratiam justifican- tem factus est filius Dei. Secundo, utrum re¬ quiratur ex parte subjecti, quia videlicet, etiamsi quis legem perfecte impleret, tamen non mereretur vitam aeternam, nisi esset elevatus ad statum illum supernaturalem. Fuit opinio cujusdam recentioris, cujus multae sententiae a Pio V. Pontifice damnatae fuerunt, operibus bonis vitam aeternam de¬ beri, ex eo quod sunt vera legis obedientia, non quia fiant a persona elevata per gratiam ad statum filiorum Dei. Intelligit vero Doctor ille non solum non esse necessariam eleva¬ tionem naturae ex parte subjecti, sed neque ex parte operum. Existimat enim opera vere meritoria vitae aeternae, posse fieri ab homine nondum renato perBaptismum, vel nondum reconciliato per sacramentum Poenitentiae. itaque ex ejus sententia Catechumeni, et poenitentes, ante remissionem peccatorum servantes mandata, per auxilium Dei specia¬ le, vitam merentur aeternam. Contraria sententia communis est, et fuit in Scholis Catholicorum Theologorum. Ne¬ que solum nunc in statu naturae corruptae, sed etiam in statu naturae integrae Theologi docent necessarium fuisse ad meritum vitae aeternae, ut homo per justificationis gratiam, et Spiritum inhabitantem adoptaretur in fi¬ lium, et ad statum quemdam supernaturalem et divinum eveheretur. Vide Magistrum et Theologos in 2. Sentent. dist. 24. 27. 28. et 29. Atque hanc ipsam sententiam esse Conci¬ lii Trident. ac per hoc Ecclesiae universae, certum est ex sess. 6. cap. 16, ubi Concilium docet, vitam aeternam esse gratiam, miseri¬ corditer filiis Dei per Christum promissam, et simul mercedem bonis eorum operibus fi¬ deliter ex Dei promissione reddendam. Idem constat ex can. 32. ubi Concilium declarat, opera meritoria illa esse, quae fiunt a justi¬ ficatis per gratiam Dei, ut sunt viva Christi membra. Denique erat Bulla Pii V. Pontificis, a Gre- gorio XIII. renovata, in qua damnantur hae duae propositiones. « Pelagii sententia est, opus bonum citra gratiam adoptionis factum, non esse regni coelestis meritorium. Opera boua a filiis adoptionis facta, non accipiunt rationem meriti ex eo, quod fiunt per spiri¬ tum adoptionis inhabitantem corda filio¬ rum Dei, sed tantum ex eo, quod sunt con¬ formia legi ». Nos igitur probabimus, gra¬ tiam adoptionis ad meritum constituendum requiri, variis argumentis, quorum aliqua ostendunt, eam gratiam esse necessariam ex parte operum, alia ex parte subjecti. Probatur igitur hac sententia primo ex divinis litteris. Genes, iv. Respexit Deus ad Abel, et ad munera ejus ( 1). NotatS. Gregorius lib. xxii. Moralium, cap. 12. hoc ideo dictum esse, quia Deus non habet gratum offerentem propter munera, sed munera propter offe¬ rentem. Neque intelligit proptersolam inten¬ tionem offerentis, sed propter bonitatem et puritatem : dicit enim, debere ab omni ma¬ litia esse purgatum, qui cupit, ut sua munera Domino placeant Joan. xv. Manete in me, et ego in vobis, sicut palmes non potest ferre fructum n semetipso , n>si manserit in vite, $ic (t) Gon. IV, i. CAPUT Aii. • et vos, nisi m me manseritis : ego sum vitis , et vos palmites ; qui manet in me, et ego in eo , hic fert fructum multum (i). Requiritur igitur ad fructum, id est, ad bonaoperafacienda, non quaecumqiie gratia, sed ea, quae facit homi¬ nem esse vivum membrum corporis Christi Idem enim, est, esse palmitem vitis, et mem¬ brum corporis. Adhaec Scriptura passim docet, regnum coelorum esse gloriam et haereditatcm filio¬ rum. Joan. vili. Servus non manet in domo in aeternum, filius manet in aeternum, quod si vos filius liberavit, vere liberi eritis. Itoman. vili. Accepistis spiritum adoptionis filiorum. Si autem filii et haeredes. Et infra : Et ipsa creatura liberabitur a servitute corruptionis in libertatem gloriae filiorum Dei. Galat. m. 4. It acpue jam non ■ est servus, sed filius; quod si filius et haeres per Deum. Et infra : Sed quid dicit Scriptura ? Ejice ancillam et filium ejus. Non enim erit haeres filius ancillae cum filio liberae (2). Similia habentur ad Ephes. i. ad Coloss. iii. ad Tit. ili. ad Hebr. I. I Petri i. et alibi, ubi vita aeterna dicitur haereditas, quae proprie ad filios pertinet. Non igitur qui servus est, vitam aeternam ullis meritis obtinere poterit; non enim haereditas mer¬ ces est servorum, etiamsi annis mille servi¬ rent, sed propria portio filiorum. Quare sine dubio necessaria conditio ad meritum vitae aeternae est regeneratio, et adoptio liliorum Dei. Praeterea, Scriptura testatur ita fundari meritum in amicitia cum Deo ut statim atque aliquis Deum offendit, amittat omnia bona merita. Ezechielis xvm. Si averterit se justus a justitia sua, et fecerit iniquitatem , omnes justitiae ejus non recordabuntur. Et Jacobi. ii. Si quis totam legem servaverit, offendat autem in uno, factus est omnium reus (3). At si merita non penderet a statu, et qualitate personae, sed a sola obedientia legis, non deberet is, qui Deum offendit, amittere bona merita per obedientiam legis antea parta. Quemadmo¬ dum qui laboravit in colenda vinea alicujus certa mercede conductus, non perdit merce- dem suam si forte inimicus fiat domino vi¬ neae, non enim meritum illud in amicitia, sed in solo opere et labore fundatur. Igitur meritum vitae aeternae, quod statim perditur cum quis Deum ad iracundiam provocat, non in solo opere, sed etiam in amicitia et dignitate persome fundamentum habet. At¬ que hinc est, quod Scriptura vitam aeternam diligentibus Deum promissam esse testatur Joan. xiv. I Corinth. ii. II Timoth. iv. Ja- cohi. i. et alibi. Probatur secundo eadem veritas testimo¬ niis sancti Augustini, qui in lib. i. ad Boni- faeium, contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, cap. 2. « Non vivunt (inquit) recte homines, nisi effecti filii Dei. At non fiunt homines filii Dei, nisi per regenerationem, in qua re¬ mittuntur peccata, et infunditur gratia gra¬ tum faciens ». Itera lib i. ad Simplicianum, qua3st.2. «Sed in quibusdam», inquit, «tan¬ ta est gratia fidei, quanta non sufficit ad ob¬ tinendum regnum coelorum sicut in Cate¬ chumenis, sicut in Cornelio, antequam sa¬ cramentorum participatione incorporaretur Ecclesiae ». Neque solum in statu naturae corrupte, sed etiam in statu naturae integra; agnoscit Augustinus gratiae necessitatem ad bona me¬ rita comparanda. Sic enim ait in Enchiridio, cap. 106. « Quamvis sine gratia nec tunc ullum bonum meritum esse potuisset ». Non loqui autem Augustinum de aliqua gratia auxilii generalis, vel etiam specialis trans¬ euntis, sed de ipsa charitate infusa et inhae¬ rente, perspicuum est ex lib. xn. de civ. Dei, cap. 1. ubi de sanctis Angelis loquens : «Cum amore », inquit, « casto eos creavit, simul in eis et condens naturam, et largiens gratiam » , Et mox : a Confitendum est igitur, cum de¬ bita laude Creatoris, non ad solos sanctos homines pertinere, verum etiam de sanctis Angelis posse dici, quod charitas Dei diffusa sit in eis per Spiritum sanctum, qui dalus est eis ». Illa igitur gratia, sine qua nec tunc (id est, in statu natura; integrae hominum, vel Angelorum) ullum bonum meritum esse potuisset, est charitas Dei diffusa per Spiri¬ tum sanctum, qui datus est eis. Huc etiam pertinent, quae diximus in it. lib. de Justificatione, ubi probavimus justificari hominem, per justitiam habitualem, id est,, per gratiam gratum facientem, inhaerentem et permanentem. Nam utidem Augustinus ait in libro de fide et operibus, cap. 14. « Se¬ quuntur bona opera hominem justificatum, non praecedunt justilicandum ». Et in lib. de Spiritu et littera, cap. 2l). « Per spiritum in¬ corporatus, factusque membrum ejus potest (1) Joan. XV, 4.- (2) Joan. VIII, 35; Rom. VIII, 15; ibid. 21 ; Gal. IV, 7; ibid. 3.— 3) Ezecl). XVII 1, 24; Jacob. II, 10. 368 LIBER V. quisque, illo incrementum intrinsecus dante, operari justitiam » . Probatur tertio rationibus. Prima ratio. Visio Dei, in qua proprie vita aeterna con¬ sistit, res est non modo supernaturalis, sed usque adeo naturam omnem creatam excedit, ut nec agnosci, nec appeti, nec cogitari possit, nisi Deo ipso revelante : Oculus non vidit (inquit Apostolus Isaiam citans, I Corinth. u). auris non audivit , in cor hominis non ascende¬ runt , quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se (1). Atqui ad finem supernaturalem et divinum re¬ quiruntur opera, supernaturalia et divina, praesertim cum I^eus omnia sapienter, suavi - terque disponat. Non potest autem divina et supernaturalia opera facere, nisi prius ipse divinus et supernaturalis efficiatur, ut S. Di¬ onysius ratiocinatur, in lib. de Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, cap. 2. par. 1. Debet igitur homo per gratiam inhaerentem, et Spiritum inhabi¬ tantem evehi ad consortium divinas naturae, ut opera divina, id est, vitae aeternae meritoria facere valeat. Atque haec est ratio sancti Thomae, S. Bonaventurae, et .aliorum illu¬ strium Theologorum. Secunda ratio. Si merita non penderent a statu et dignitate personae, sed solum ab ipso opere, sive legis obedientia ; certe merita Christi non essent infiniti pretii, neque multo essent majora, quam caeterorum justorum : nam ubi solum spectatur opus, nihil interest, utrum qui operatur sit rex, an miles, nobilis, vel ignobilis, probus, aut improbus. At cer¬ tum est opera Christi fuisse infiniti pretii, quandoquidem propitiatio fuerunt pro pec¬ catis totius mundi, et copiosa fuit apud eum redemptjo ; igitur dignitas personae plurimum confert ad valorem meriti. Et confirmatur haec ratio, nam de Christo nullus Catholicus negare audebit, quin ejus merita fuerint maximi pretii propter dignitatem personae. Nam (ut alia nunc omittam) exstat epistola decretalis Clementis VI. quae incipit, Uni¬ genitus, in quo docemur guttam unam san¬ guinis Christi propter infinitam personae di¬ gnitatem ad totius mundi redemptionem suf¬ ficere potuisse. At non dissimilis esse debet ratio meriti in capite, et membris. Igitur sicut Christi meritum, ita etiam merita justo¬ rum aliorum vim accipient a dignitate per¬ sonae. Tertia ratio. Si non requiritur ad meritum adoptio et regeneratio'; certe poterit homo ante remissionem peccati per auxilium Dei speciale mereri vitam aeternam, id vero ta¬ metsi ab adversario concedatur non solum est falsum, sed etiam repugnantiam continere videtur. Nam idem ipse merebitur vitam ae¬ ternam et mortem aeternam. Ileus enim erit mortis aeternae propter peccata olim admissa, et nondum remissa; et simul jus habebit ad vitam aeternam propter bona merita per legis obedientiam acquisita. Mereri autem simul vitam aeternam et mortem aeternam repu¬ gnantiam includit, quoniam mors aeterna ca- rentiam significat vitae aeternae, proinde qui talis esset, deberet vivere in aeternum, et non vivere in aeternum; mori in aeternum, et non mori in aeternum. Quarta ratio. Si posset qui nondum rege¬ neratus est, vitam aeternam operibus suis vere mereri : certe posset etiam gratiam ju¬ stificationis proprie mereri. Nam si mereri potest gloriam, quae est gratia consummata, cur mereri non poterit gratiam, quae est glo¬ ria inchoata ? At gratiam justificationis, id est, justitiam ipsam, per quam formaliter justificamur, non cadere sub meritum pro¬ prie dictum, Theologi omnes consentiunt, el ipsum Concilium, Tridentinum, disertis ver¬ bis affirmat, sess. 6, cap. 8. Unde etiam S. Augustinus, in epist. 105. ad Sixtum scribit, vitam aeternam in Scripturis appellari mer- cedem et gratiam : ipsam autem justitiam numquam appellari mercedem, sed solum gratiam.