Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book V: On the Merits of Works
Chapter 13: Objections are solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
But now let us briefly dissolve the arguments which are objected to the contrary. The first objection: the divine Scripture promises eternal life to the obedience of the law. Ecclesiasticus 15: If thou wilt keep the commandments, they shall preserve thee. And Matthew 19: If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments. But it says not, “if thou wilt enter into life, take care to be adopted into a son.” I answer: nay, this very thing the Scripture manifestly cries out, when it says, John 3: Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. And Romans 8: He will quicken your bodies, because of his Spirit that dwelleth in you. And Titus 3: He saved us by the laver of regeneration, etc. But it must be regarded in the holy Scriptures to whom the speech is directed. For when the Scriptures speak with infidels, they preach not so much good works as faith and Baptism; but when they address the faithful and the regenerate, they teach no longer faith and Baptism, but works and the obedience of the law. Which we too must do — namely, that we exhort the faithful in one way, the impious in another — St. Augustine admonishes, in the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 68. The Lord, therefore, in Matthew, and Ecclesiasticus, set forth the obedience of the law as the way to life, because they speak to the faithful. Add that, if anyone should entirely observe all the commandments, without doubt he would be saved. But among all is also that first and greatest concerning the love of God above all things, which by men not yet regenerate cannot be perfectly observed. For the act of the love of God above all things either cannot be had save through grace making pleasing and the Spirit inhabiting the heart; or, if it can be had through a special help of God, straightway upon it, as upon the last disposition, follows the infusion of the grace justifying and regenerating, and adopting into a son of God.
The second objection: the Apostles Peter and Paul, the one Acts 10, the other Romans 2, teach that God accepts not persons, but renders glory and honor to every one that worketh good. Not, therefore, is required unto the merit of eternal life the exaltation of nature to a certain supernatural being, but the sole obedience of the law. I answer: we have often said, with St. Augustine, book 2 against the two epistles of the Pelagians, chapter 7, that acceptance of persons is a vice contrary to justice, not to mercy or liberality; and thereby has place in a judge, not in one who liberally gives of his own. God, therefore, in the judgment will not accept persons, but will render to every one according to his works. But good works are born of grace and justification and preceding regeneration, which grace God renders not as a judge, but gives as a liberal prince. And so, even if in the judgment God regarded not the dignity of the person, but the sole obedience of the law, still that exaltation of nature to a certain supernatural being would be necessary, since without it the merits of eternal life cannot be had. But I add that it is not an acceptance of persons if a judge, about to distribute rewards, consider the dignity of the person, when on that very dignity the merit depends. For to accept a person is not to attend to any quality whatsoever of the person, but to that which pertains nothing to the cause. For if perchance there be a law that only the sons of nobles run for some prize set forth by the king, the judge accepts not the person if he consider not only the swiftness of the course, but also the nobility. So, therefore, since eternal life is a prize set forth only for the just and good, and adopted into sons of God, God accepts not persons when he attends to these qualities of the person — as he would accept them if he considered whether they who work well be Greeks or Jews, free or servants, males or females; and therefore the Apostles, when they say that God accepts not persons, make mention by name of Jew and Greek. Which thing they often repeat and inculcate, because the Jews thought that they alone pertained to the kingdom of God and to grace.
The third objection: the Council of Orange, canon 18, teaches that a reward is owed to good works, if they be done; but grace, which is not owed, goes before, that they be done. Not, therefore, is required unto merit any exaltation of nature, but the sole grace of working well. I answer: the grace of working well, and the grace adopting men into sons of God and exalting them into the fellowship of the divine nature, are one and the same — namely, the charity infused in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us. For if it be considered as a virtue, it is called the grace of working well; if it be considered as a form inhering in the soul, and rendering it beautiful and divine, it is called the grace of the adoption of sons. Wherefore the same Council, in the last canon, says that men must through Baptism be regenerate, that they may be able to fulfil the law as they ought. The fourth objection: St. Augustine, book 1 On Free Choice, chapter 6, says that it is established by the law of nature that the good lead a happy, the evil a miserable, life. I answer: Augustine says not, by the law of nature, but by the eternal law. Nor does he speak of the happy life which consists in the vision of God, but of the happy life in general. And so the opinion of St. Augustine is this: that by the eternal and immutable law it is established that the good receive well, and the evil ill; and if indeed the good be good with a supernatural goodness, they attain a supernatural beatitude; if they be good only with a natural goodness, they be blessed also with a like beatitude. The fifth objection: St. Augustine, in the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 2: “The nature of the human race, and of that one prevaricator, procreated of the flesh, if it can suffice to itself to fulfil the law and perfect justice, ought to be secure of the reward — that is, of eternal life — even if in some nation, or in some earlier time, the faith of the blood of Christ was hidden from it. For God is not unjust, that he should defraud the just of the wage of justice.” For in this place St. Augustine seems to refute the opinion of the Pelagians, who said that a man could by his own powers fulfil the law, and yet needed the grace of adoption and regeneration, that he might be able to obtain the kingdom of heaven. And it follows from this refutation that St. Augustine was of the opinion that there is no need of the grace of adoption and regeneration for obtaining the kingdom of heaven, but only of grace which should help to fulfil the law and perfect justice; and thereby that merit depends simply on the obedience of the law, not on the dignity of the person. I answer: the conditioned proposition of St. Augustine is most true — namely, if a man without the faith of Christ could by his own powers alone fulfil the law, he ought to be secure of the reward of eternal life. But it follows not thence that the grace of adoption is not necessary unto merit. For (as the same Augustine teaches in the cited place, that is, book 1 to Boniface, chapter 2) men live not rightly, and thereby fulfil not the law, nor perfect justice, unless they be first made sons of God. Nor in that place does St. Augustine refute the Pelagians because they thought the grace of adoption necessary. For of this matter in the whole of that book he makes not even mention; but only refutes the error of a certain one who attributed too much to human nature. In other places indeed the same Augustine attributes to the Pelagians that they required the grace of adoption as necessary for laying hold of eternal life; but he reproves them not thence, because they required that grace, but because they denied that it is necessary in infants for purging original sin, in adults for fulfilling the divine commandments. See what we have written of this matter in the first book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 5. But (thou wilt say) from this conditioned proposition of St. Augustine — if a man sufficed to himself to fulfil the law and perfect justice, he ought to be secure of the reward, that is, of eternal life — it follows that the grace of adoption is not necessary on the part of the subject, but only on the part of the work. I answer: it follows not, because (as we said above) the same infused habitual grace which perfects the subject is also the principle of the work. But could not God, without that habitual grace elevating nature, by a special help alone, effect that a man should fulfil the law and perfect justice? He could indeed; but we ask not in this place what God can do, but what he wills and what he does. And it is plain to us from the sacred letters, and from St. Augustine himself, that men live not rightly unless they be made sons of God; and thereby that, according to the ordinary law or power of God, any special help whatsoever suffices not for doing the good works such as are required unto merit, but that the infused grace of adoption is exacted, which elevates nature to a certain supernatural and divine being. The sixth objection: an evil work of its own nature merits punishment, nor is it required that it proceed from a habit destroying nature; therefore also a good work of its own nature merits a reward, even though it proceed not from a habit elevating nature. I answer: it is easier to sin than to work well. And therefore for sinning the liberty of choice suffices; for a good work grace also is required. Besides, that punishment be owed to sin, no covenant or promise is necessary; for he who harms another violates justice, and therefore is bound to satisfy of justice, even though no promise intervene. But that a reward be owed of justice to a good work, a covenant or promise is necessary. For one is not bound to accept the homage of another unless a covenant intervene. But God has not promised the reward of eternal life save to those regenerated and adopted through the grace of Christ, as the Scripture everywhere testifies.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XIII. Solvuntur objectiones. Sed jam argumenta, quae contra objiciun¬ tur, breviter diluamus. Prima objectio. Scri¬ ptura divina promittit vitam aeternam obe- dientiae legis, Ecclesiast. xv. Si volueris man¬ data servare, conservabunt te. Et Matth. xix. Si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata (2). Non autem dicit, si vis ad vitam ingredi, cura ut adopteris in filium. Respondeo : Immo hoc ipsum Scriptura manifeste clamat cum ait Joan. iii. Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu sancto, non potest intrare in regnum Dei. Et Rom. VIII. Vivificat corpora nostra propter inhabitantem spiritum ejus in nobis. Et ad Tit. hi. Salvos nos fecit per lavacrum regenerationis, elc. (3). (1) 1 Cor. II, 9. - (2) Ecd. XY, Ifi; Matii. XIX, 17. — (3) Joan. HI, 3: Rom. VIII, II; Tit. III, 3. CAPUT X1IL Sed intuendum est in Scripturis sanctis ad (juos dirigatur oratio. Nam cum infidelibus Scriptura; loquuntur, non tam opera bona, quam fidem et Baptismum praidicant : cum autem alloquuntur fideles atque regenitos, non amplius fidem 6t Baptismum, sed opera, et legis obedientiam docent. Quod etiam no¬ bis faciendum esse, ut videlicet aliter fideles, aliter impios adhortemur, monet S. Augu¬ stinus in lib. de natura et gratia, c. 68. Do¬ minus igitur apud Matthaeum, et Ecclesiasti¬ cus legis obedientiam tamquam viam ad vitam proponunt, quoniam fidelibus lo¬ quuntur. Adde, quod si quis omnia mandata integre observaret, sine dubio salvaretur. Sed inter omnia est etiam illud primum et maximum de dilectione Dei super omnia, quod ab ho¬ minibus nondum regenitis perfecte observari non potest. Actus enim dilectionis Dei super omnia, vel non potest haberi, nisi per gratiam gratum facientem, et spiritum cor inhabi¬ tantem ; vel si potest haberi per auxilium Dei speciale, continuo ad eum tamquam ad ultimam dispositionem sequitur infusio gra¬ tia; justificantis et regenerantis, atque in fi¬ lium Dei adoptantis. Secunda objectio. Apostoli Petrus et Pau¬ lus, ille Actor, x., iste ad Rom. n. docent, Deum non accipere personas, sed gloriam et honorem tribuere omni operanti bonum. Non igitur requiritur ad meritum vitse aeternee exaltatio naturae ad esse quoddam superna- turale, sed sola obedientia legis. Respondeo : Saepe jam diximus cum san¬ cto Augustino, lib. n. contra duas epist. Pelagianorum cap. 7. acceptionem persona¬ rum vitium esse contrarium justitiae, non misericordiae , vel liberalitati ; proinde in judice locum habere, non in eo qui sua libe- raliter donat. Deus igitur in judicio non ac¬ cipiet personas, sed unicuique reddet se¬ cundum opera sua. At opera bona nascuntur ex gratia et justificatione, ac regeneratione praecedente, quam gratiam Deus non ut ju¬ dex reddit, sed ut princeps liberalis donat. Itaque etiamsi in judicio Deus non respiceret persona; dignitatem, sed solam obedientiam legis, adhuc necessaria esset exaltatio illa naturae ad esse quoddam supernaturale , quoniam sino illa merita vita; aeterna; haberi non possunt. Sed addo non esse acceptionem persona¬ rum, si judex praemia distributurus digni¬ tatem personae consideret, quando ex ipsa ikio dignitate meritum pendet. Accipere enim personam non est attendere ad quamvis qualitatem personae, sed ad eam, quae ad causam nihil pertinet. Nam si forte lex sit, ut soli filii nobilium currant adbravium ali¬ quod a rege propositum; non accipiet per¬ sonam judex, si non solum celeritatem cur¬ sus, sed etiam nobilitatem considerabit. Sic igitur cum vita a;terna sitbravium solis justis et bonis, et in filios Dei adoptatis propositum, non accipit Deus personas, cum has persona* qualitates attendit ; sicut acciperet si consi¬ deraret, an qui bene operantur sint Gra;ei, vel Judafi, liberi, an servi,, masculi, an foe- mina; ; et ideo nominatim Apostoli cum di¬ cunt, Deum non accipere personas, mentio¬ nem faciunt Judafi et Gra;ci. Quam rem sa;pe repetunt et inculcant, quoniam Judaei existimabant se solos ad regnum Dei, et gratiam pertinere. Tertia objectio. Concilium Arausicanum, can. 18. docet, deberi mercedem bonis ope¬ ribus, si fiant; sed gratiam, quae non debetur praecedere, ut fiant. Non igitur requiritur ad meritum aliqua exaltatio natura;, sed sola gratia bene operandi. Respondeo : Gratia bene operandi, et gra¬ tia adoptans homines in filios Dei, et exaltans in consortium divinae naturae, una atque ea¬ dem est, nimirum charitas infusa in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis. Illa enim si considei’etur ut virtus, di¬ citur gratia bene operandi, si consideretur ut forma inhaerens in anima, eamque formosam et divinam reddens, dicitur gratia adoptionis filiorum. Quare idem Concilium, can. ult. dicit, debere homines per baptismum rege¬ nerari, ut possint legem implere sicut opor¬ tet. Quarta objectio, S. Augustinus lib. i. de libero arbitrio, cap. 6, dicit lege natura: constitutum esse, ut boni beatam, mali mi¬ seram vitam ducant. Respondeo : Non dicit Augustinus, lege natura;, sed lege aeterna. Nec loquitur de vita beata, qua; in Dei visione consistit, sed de vita beata in genere. Itaque sententia S. Augustini haec est, lege a;terna, et immuta¬ bili constitutum esse, ut boni bene, et mali male recipiant, et si quidem boni sint boni bonitate supernaturali, supernaturalem bea- titudinem consequantur , si tantum boni sint bonitate naturali, simili etiam beatitu- dine sint beati. Quinta objectio, sanctus Augusti nus in U- U13KK V. bro de natura el gratia, cap. 2. « Natura linquit} humani 'generis et illius unius prai- varicatoris carne procreata, si potest sibi sulficere ad implendam legem, perficien¬ damque justitiam, de praemio debet esse secura, hoc est, de vita aeterna, etiamsi in aliqua gente, aut in aliquo superiori tempo¬ re fides eam latuit sanguinis Christi. Non e- nim est injustus Deus, qui justos fraudet mercede justitiae ». Hoc enim loco videtur sanctus Augustinus refellere sententiam Pe- lagianorum, qui dicebant hominem posse suis viribus legem implere, et tamen egere gratia adoptionis et regenerationis, ut re¬ gnum coelorum valeat obtinere. Sequitur autem ex hac refutatione, sanctum Augu¬ stinum in ea sententia fuisse, ut existimaret non esse opus gratia adoptionis et regene¬ rationis, ad regnum coelorum obtinendum, sed solum gratia, quae juvaret ad implen¬ dam legem, perficiendamque justitiam. Ac per hoc meritum pendere simpliciter ex obedientia legis, non ex dignitate personae. Respondeo : Propositio conditionata sancti Augustini verissima est : videlicet, si homo sine fide Christi possit suis solis viribus im¬ plere legem, de praemio vitae aeternae debet esse securus. Sed non inde sequitur, non esse necessariam gratiam adoptionis ad meritum. Nam (ut idem Augustinus docet, loco citato, id est, lib. i. ad Bonifacium, cap.2j non vi¬ vunt recte homines, ac per hoc non implent legem, neque justitiam perliciunt, nisi prius filii Dei efficiantur. Neque eo loco S. Augustinus refellit Pela- gianos, quod existimarent gratiam adoptionis esse necessariam. Hujus enim rei in toto eo libro ne meminit quidem ; sed tantum re¬ fellit errorem cujusdam , qui naturae hu¬ manae nimium tribuebat. In aliis quidem locis idem Augustinus Pelagianis tribuit, quod requirerent gratiam adoptionis tam¬ quam necessariam ad capescendam vitam aeternam ; sed non eos inde reprehendit, quod eam gratiam requirerent, sed quod negarent, eam necessariam esse in parvulis ad pec¬ catum originale purgandum, in adultis ad im¬ plenda mandata divina. Vide quae scripsimus de hac re in i. lib. de gratia et libero ar¬ bitrio, cap. 5. At (inquies) ex hac propositione conditio¬ nata S. Augustini, si homo sibi sufficeret ad implendam legem, perficiendamque justi¬ tiam, de praemio, id est, de vita aeterna de¬ fieret esse securus ; sequitur, non esse ne¬ cessariam gratiam adoptionis ex parte sub¬ jecti, sed tantum ex parte operis. Respondeo : Id non sequi, quoniam (ut supra diximus) eadem gratia habitualis in¬ fusa, quSi perficit subjectum, est etiam prin¬ cipium operis. At nonne posset Deus sine habituali illa gratia elevante naturam, per solum auxilium speciale id efficere, ut homo legem impleret , justitiamque perficeret ? Posset quidem, sed non quaerimus hoc loco quid Deus possit, sed quid velit, et quid faciat. Constat autem nobis ex sacris litteris, et ex ipso S. Augustino non vivere homines recte, nisi filii Dei efficiantur : proinde non sufficere secundum ordinariam Dei legem, sive potentiam, ad bona opera, qualia re¬ quiruntur ad meritum facienda, quodlibet auxilium speciale, sed exigi gratiam illam adoptionis infusam, quae naturam elevat ad esse quoddam supernaturale, atque divi¬ num. Sexta objectio. Opus malum ex natura sua meretur poenam, nec requiritur ut pro¬ cedat ex habitu destruente naturam, igitur et opus bonum ex natura sua meretur prae¬ mium, etiamsi non procedat ex habitu ele¬ vante naturam. Respondeo : Facilius est peccare, quam bene agere. Et ideo ad peccandum sufficit libertas arbitrii, ad bonum opus requiritur etiam gratia. Praeterea, ut peccato debeatur poena, nulla conventio, vel promissio neces¬ saria est, qui enim alterum laedit, justitiam violat, et ideo satisfacere tenetur ex justitia, etiamsi nulla promissio intercesserit. At ut bono operi debeatur merces ex justitia, con¬ ventio vel promissio necessaria est. Non enim tenetur unus alterius obsequium acceptare, nisi conventio intervenerit. Deus autem non promisit mercedcm vitoe aeternae, riisi per Christi gratiam regeneratis et adoptatis, ut passim Scriptura testatur.