Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book V: On the Merits of Works
Chapter 18: Objections against the doctrine of the preceding chapter are solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Neither do the arguments which are wont to be objected to the contrary conclude anything. First, there can be objected that of the Apostle, Romans 8: The sufferings are not condign, etc. And those testimonies of the Fathers which we cited above, chapter 14, in the first reason. But all those places are understood of merits according to the substance of the works, not as they proceed from the Holy Ghost and the grace of God, as we said both in that place and in chapter 6. But if we would understand the place of the Apostle universally of all good works, even as they proceed from the Holy Ghost and the grace of God, as St. Fulgentius understood it in book 1 to Monimus, it will be ready to answer that there is not required unto merit of condignity an absolute equality between the merit and the reward, but that a proportional one suffices, as we shall explain a little after more fully. Second, there can be objected St. Augustine, who in book 1 of the Confessions, chapter 4, says: “Who renderest debts, owing to none.” And sermon 16 on the words of the Apostle: “We say not to God, Render, because thou hast received; but, Render, because thou hast promised.” Likewise St. Bernard, who in sermon 1 On the Annunciation says: “For neither are the merits of men such that for them eternal life is owed of right, or that God would do any injury unless he gave it.” Finally St. Thomas, 1a 2ae, question 114, article 1, ad 3, says that God owes not to us, but to his own disposition. But the answer is easy. For God is said to render debts, owing to none, because he owes nothing to anyone absolutely, but only from his promise and gift. By a like reason we say to God, Render because thou hast promised, we say not, Render because thou hast received; because the first foundation of the divine debt consists not in our work, but in his promise. For, the promise removed, he is not bound to accept our work unto a reward. But that God is made a debtor not from the promise alone, but also from our work, Augustine teaches in the same place, when he subjoins: “Render what thou hast promised, because we have done what thou hast commanded.” St. Bernard too says that eternal life is not owed of right, because (as he himself explains in the same place) our merits are born of grace. And thereby he signifies that it is not owed by the rigor of justice (as the theologians speak), which presupposes no grace; and that God would absolutely do no injury to the just, if he deprived them of the wage of justice; yet he denies not that, on the supposition, God would do an injury, if he rendered not eternal life to good works from the convention. Finally St. Thomas says not that God is not made a debtor to us, but that he is not made a debtor to us simply; because (as we said) the first and chief reason of the divine debt arises from the promise and disposition of God himself. Third, they object that between God and man there cannot be justice save in a certain respect, as St. Thomas teaches, 1a 2ae, question 114, article 1; but that justice in a certain respect is not justice simply and absolutely; wherefore it is not to be said absolutely that eternal life is owed to our works of condignity. I answer: a thing is said to be in a certain respect in two ways. In one way, when it lacks that form from which it is denominated in a certain respect — in which way a swan is said to be black in a certain respect, that is, as to its feet, and an Ethiopian white in a certain respect, that is, as to his teeth. In the other way, when it lacks not that form, but only the perfection of it which is found in other things of the same kind — in which way a boy can be said to be a man in a certain respect, if he be compared to a perfect man; and created things are said to be beings in a certain respect, if they be compared to God; and accidents are said to have being in a certain respect, compared to substance. Therefore the things which are said to be in a certain respect in the former way cannot simply and absolutely be named such; but the things which are said to be in a certain respect in the latter way are also simply and absolutely named such, but more imperfectly than others of the same kind. And in this latter way the theologians say that there is justice in a certain respect between God and man, because it presupposes grace; and yet they say also that it is simply justice, but less perfect than that which pre-requires no grace. Fourth, they object that there is the greatest inequality between our works, though they proceed from grace, and eternal beatitude itself; especially if beatitude be considered objectively, as it is written: I am thy reward exceeding great. I answer: it cannot be denied that beatitude far excels the meritorious action, since in it is perfect knowledge and charity, but in this imperfect knowledge and charity; but there is not required an absolute equality between the merit and the reward, according to distributive justice, that the reward can be said to be owed to the merits of condignity, even on the part of the work; but it suffices that there be a certain proportion according to which he who merits can be said worthy of that reward. For here also on earth he who is endued with learning and good morals, and has labored for the Church some time, is wont to be judged worthy of a bishopric, although absolutely the episcopal dignity is most ample, and comparable to no price. In natural things too, the disposition to a form is much more imperfect than the form itself, and yet by a certain natural justice the form is owed to a subject rightly disposed. So, then, he who loves God with his whole heart, and thereby is clean of heart, peaceable, meek, humble, merciful, is worthy to be admitted to that beatitude which is promised to those who love God, the clean of heart, the peaceable, the meek, the merciful, the humble, as to those rightly disposed. But that which was said of objective beatitude, which is God, increases not the difficulty; for as God is the object of beatitude — that is, of the knowledge and love of the blessed — so also he is the object of merit — that is, of the faith and charity of wayfarers. This only is the difference, that faith and charity in this life attain God less perfectly than vision and charity in the other life; but therefore we say that to faith formed by charity is owed of condignity vision with most ardent charity, because it is worthy that a thing begun and disposed by God be at length sometime perfected and completed. For (as St. Fulgentius speaks in book 1 to Monimus, chapter 10) “when God gives eternal life, he perfects his own work, which he began in justifying the impious, in glorifying the just.” Fifth, they object that God, by the common opinion of the theologians, rewards the works of the just above condignity; and thereby that there is not in the works of the just a true condignity to the reward. I answer: that God rewards above condignity is not so to be taken as though good works were not worthy of the reward of eternal life; but that, beyond the reward which is owed to good works of the condignity of merit, God from liberality always adds something. But of this matter we shall discourse in the following chapter.
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CAPUT XV.III. Solvuntur objectiones contra doctrinam capitis superioris. Neque argumenta, quae contra objici so¬ lent aliquid concludunt. Primo, objici potest illud Apostoli, Rom. vm. Non sunt condignae passiones etc. (1). Et illa testimonia Patrum, quae nos supra citavimus cap. 14. in prima ratione. Sed intelliguntur illa omnia loca de meri¬ tis secundum substantiam operum, non ut a Spiritu sancto, et gratia Dei proficiscuntur, ut tum eo loco, tum in cap. 6. diximus. Quod si velimus locum Apostoli universaliter intelligere de bonis operibus omnibus, etiam ut a Spiritu sancto, et gratia Dei proficiscun¬ tur, utS. Fulgentius intellexit in lib. i. ad Monimum, promptum erit respondere, non requiri ad meritum ex condigno absolutam aequalitatem inter meritum et praemium, sed satis esse proportionalem, ut paulo post fu¬ sius explicabimus. Secundo, objici potest S. Augustinus, qui lib. I. Confess. cap. 4. dicit : « Qui reddit debita nulli, debens ». Et serm. 16. de ver¬ bis Apostoli : « Non dicimus Deo, redde, quia accepisti ; sed redde, quia promisisti ». Item S. Bernardus, qui in serm. 1. de An¬ nuntiat. dicit: « Neque enim talia sunt ho¬ minum merita, ut propter ea vita aeterna de¬ beatur ex jure, aut Deus injuriam aliquam faceret nisi eam donaret ». Denique S. Tho- masl. 2. q. 114, art. 1. ad 3. dicit, Deum non debere nobis, sed dispositioni suae. Sed facilis est responsio. Nam dicitur Deus, reddere debita nulli debens : quia ni¬ hil ulli debet absolute, sed solum ex promis¬ sione et dono suo. Pari ratione dicimus Deo, redde quia promisisti, non dicimus, redde quia accepisti ; quoniam fundamentum pri¬ mum debiti divini non in opere nostro, sed in ejus promissione consistit. Nam remota pro¬ missione non tenetur acceptare opus nostrum ad mercedem. Quod autem non ex sola pro¬ missione, sed etiam ex opere nostro Deus efficiatur debitor, docet ibidem Augustinus cum subjungit : « Redde quod promisisti, quia fecimus quod jussisti ». S. quoque Bernai’dus dicit, vitam aeternam non deberi ex jure, quoniam (ut ipse ibidem explicat) merita nostra nascuntur ex gratia. Proinde significat non deberi ex rigore justi¬ tiae (ut Theologi loquuntur) qui gratiam nul¬ lam praesupponit ; et Deum absolute non facturum injuriam justis, si eos privet mer- cede justitiae : non tamen negat, quia ex hypothesi Deus injuriam facturus esset, si vitam aeternam bonis operibus, ex conven¬ tione non redderet. Denique S. Thomas non dicit, Deum non fieri nobis debitorem, sed non fieri nobis sim¬ pliciter debitorem ; quoniam (ut diximus) prima et potissima ratio debit» divini, ex ipsius Dei promissione et dispositione con¬ surgit. Tertio objiciunt, inter Deum et hominem non posse esse justitiam, nisi secundum quid, ut S. Thomas docet, 1. 2. quaest. 114. art. 1. Justitiam autem secundum quid, non es¬ se justitiam simpliciter et absolute : quare non esse absolute dicendum operibqs no¬ stris, ex condigno deberi vitam sempiter¬ nam. Respondeo : Duobus modis dicitur aliquid secundum quid. Uno modo, cum caret ea forma, a qua denominatur secundum quid, quo modo Cycnus dicitur niger secundum quid, id est, secundum pedes, et ^Ethiops al¬ bus secundum quid, id est, secundum den¬ tes. Altero modo cum non caret ea forma, §ed tantum perfectione ejus, quse in aliis re¬ bus ejusdem generis reperitur ; quo modo puer dici potest homo secundum quid, si ad virum perfectum comparetur; et res crea- tse dicuntur entia secundum quid, si confe¬ rantur ad Deum : et accidentia dicuntur ha¬ bere esse secundum quid, ad substantiam comparata. Igitur quse dicuntur secundum quid prio¬ re modo, non possunt simpliciter, et abso¬ lute nominari talia ; quse dicuntur secundum <1) Rom. VIII, 18. UBER y. 38« quid modo posteriore, dicuntur etiam sim¬ pliciter et absolute talia, sed imperfectius, quam alia generis ejusdem. Atque hoc mo¬ do posteriore Theologi dicunt justitiam se¬ cundum quid esse inter Deum et hominem, quia prajsupponit gratiam, et tamen simpli¬ citer etiam dicunt esse justitiam, sed minus perfectam, quam ea sit, qure nullam gratiam piccrequirit. Quarto objiciunt, maximam esse inaequali¬ tatem inter opera nostra, quamvis ex gratia proficiscantur, et ipsam aeternam beatitudi- nem; praesertim si beatitudo objective con¬ sideretur, sicut scriptum est: Ego ero mer¬ ces tua magna nimis. Respondeo : negari non potest, quin bea¬ titudo longe excellat actioni meritoriae, cum in illa sit cognitio et charitas perfecta, in ista vero sit cognitio et charitas imperfecta : sed non requiritur absoluta aequalitas inter meritum et praemium, secundum justitiam distributi vara, ut dici possit praemium debe¬ ri meritis ex condigno, etiam ex parte ope¬ ris: sed sufficit, ut sit proportio quaedam se¬ cundum quam is qui meretur dici possit di¬ gnus eo praemio. Nam hic etiam in terris, qui doctrina et bonis moribus praeditus est, et pro Ecclesia aliquamdiu laboravit, dignus Episcopatu judicari solet, quamvis absolute dignitas episcopalis amplissima sit, et nullo pretio comparabilis : in rebus quoque natura¬ libus, dispositio ad formam multo imperfec¬ tior est ipsa forma, et tamen ex naturali qua¬ dam jdstitia subjecto rite disposito forma de¬ betur : sic igitur qui Deum ex toto corde dili¬ git, ac per hoc mundus est corde, pacificus, mitis, humilis, misericors, dignus est, qui ad beatitudinem illam admittatur, quae diligen¬ tibus Deum, mundis corde, pacificis, mitibus, misericordibus, humilibus, ut rite dispositis promissa est. Quod autem dicebatur de beatitudine ob- jectiva, quae Deus est, non auget difficulta¬ tem, nam sicut Deus objectum est beatitudi'- nis (id est) cognitionis et amoris beatorum ; sic etiam objectum est meriti, id est, fidei et eharitatis viatorum. Hoc solum interest, quod fides et charitas in hac vita minus per¬ lecte Deum attingunt, quam visio et chari¬ tas in alia vita ; sed ideo dicimus ex condi¬ gno fidei formatae per charitatem deberi vi¬ sionem cum ardentissima charitate, quia di¬ gnum est, ut res a Deo inchoata, et disposita tandem aliquando perficiatur et absolvatur. Nam (ut loquitur S. Fulgentius in lib. i. ad Monimum cap. 10) .« cum Deus vitam aeter¬ nam donat, opus suum, quod inchoavit ju¬ stificans impium, perficit, glorificans ju¬ stum. Quinto objiciunt, Deum ex communi sen¬ tentia Theologorum rejnunerare justorum opera supra condignum; proinde non esse in operibus justorum veram condignitatem ad praemium. Respondeo : Deum remunerare supra con¬ dignum non ita esse accipiendum, quasi bona opera non sint digna praemio vitae aeternae ; sed quod ultra praemium, quod ex condigno meriti bonis debetur, Deus ex liberalitate ali¬ quid semper adjungat. Sed de hac re in se¬ quenti capite disseremus.