Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book V: On the Merits of Works
Chapter 17: That the good works of the just are meritorious by condignity not only by reason of the covenant, but also by reason of the work
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The other question follows: whether good works are meritorious of condignity by reason of the covenant only, or by reason of the work only, or by reason of both. Nor ought it to be doubted that merit of condignity can be varied in these three ways. For if perchance some work be much inferior to the reward promised by convention — as if the lord of the vineyard should hire workmen, and promise not a penny a day, but a hundred gold pieces for a wage — there would be such a merit of condignity by reason of the covenant, not by reason of the work. But contrariwise, if the work be in truth equal to the reward, or perchance even greater, but no convention have intervened, if such a merit ought to be called of condignity, it will have to be called of condignity by reason of the work, not by reason of the covenant. And in evils indeed we shall easily find a merit of punishment of condignity by reason of the work, not by reason of the covenant, since without any convention he who harms another is bound to satisfy, and can be compelled to punishment by a judge. But whether in goods there be any merit truly of condignity by reason of the work, not by reason of the covenant, we shall see a little after. Finally, if both a covenant intervene, and the work be truly equal to the reward — as when the workmen are hired to the vineyard, according to the Gospel, for a penny a day — that merit will be of condignity by reason of the work and by reason of the covenant. There are not wanting those who judge that the good works of the just are meritorious of eternal life of condignity by reason of the work, even though no divine convention were extant. For so teaches Cajetan, on 1a 2ae, question 114, article 3; and the same seems to have been held by Dominic Soto, book 3 On Nature and Grace, chapter 7. Others, on the contrary, think that good works proceeding from grace are not meritorious of condignity by reason of the work, but only by reason of the covenant and the divine acceptation. So teaches Scotus, in book 1 of the Sentences, distinction 17, question 2, whom others also follow among the old scholastics, and among the more recent Andrew Vega, in the opuscule On Justification, question 3. But this opinion differs very far from the heresy of the Lutherans. For Scotus judges not that good works are not truly good, but sins, if they be examined by the divine law, as the Lutherans judge; but he thinks that the works of the just are good truly and properly, but not so excellent as to have a proportion with eternal life, and therefore that they are indeed accepted by God unto justice and a worthy reward of eternal life, but from the covenant and promise, not from the dignity of the work. To us the middle opinion seems more probable, which teaches that the good works of the just are meritorious of eternal life of condignity by reason of the covenant and of the work at once — not indeed that without the covenant, or acceptation, a good work has no proportion to eternal life, but because God is not bound to accept unto that reward a good work, though equal and even to the reward, unless a convention intervene. Which opinion we doubt not to be conformable to the Council of Trent, and to the princes of the theologians, St. Thomas, in 1a 2ae, question 114, article 1, ad 3, St. Bonaventure, and others, on book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 27.
First, then, that the works of the just, the covenant or promise removed, are not meritorious of eternal life of condignity, or of justice, so that God could not without injustice deny such a reward, has been sufficiently proved above, chapter 14, in the second reason. For the Scripture and the Fathers, wherever they say that God is faithful and just in rendering the reward, always, or almost always, make mention of the promise. But (they say) to a son the inheritance is owed, if he have borne himself well, even though no convention intervene between father and son. But we through grace are sons of God; therefore, if we work well, the inheritance of eternal life will be owed us, even though no convention or promise intervene. I answer: it is one thing to speak of the merit of the person, another of the merit of the work; and again, one thing of eternal life as it is an inheritance, another as it is a wage, a stipend, a prize. For from this, that anyone is a son of God through grace, he merits of condignity the inheritance of eternal life, without any other covenant, but by the merit of the person, not by the merit of the work. For even to infants, who die soon after Baptism, because they are sons of God, the inheritance is owed of right, and they can be said to merit it, not by the merit of the work, but of the person. As also, when public offices or benefices are to be distributed to the better citizens, they are said to merit them of condignity who are the best among the citizens. Further, good works are not required to acquire eternal life as an inheritance, but are required lest the son fall from the adoption, and of right deserve to be disinherited. Wherefore the adoptive son of God, by good works without any other covenant, merits not to acquire eternal life as an inheritance, but merits not to lose it. Which is plain, both from this, that the inheritance is owed him before all good works, by the right of adoption; and because baptized infants, departing from this life, receive eternal life for an inheritance, when yet they have no merits of works, as experience testifies, and the holy Fathers teach — Augustine in epistle 157 to Optatus, and Bernard in sermon 68 on the Canticles. But that the adoptive son of God may obtain eternal life as a wage, or stipend and prize, we say that a promise or covenant is required, and that the grace of adoption suffices not. For although the father is bound to admit the good son to the inheritance, yet he is not bound to admit his works, however otherwise very excellent, for obtaining the prize, unless a covenant or promise intervene. Which would be more openly perceived if the heavenly inheritance and the heavenly prize were altogether distinguished. For then all would understand that the inheritance is owed to the person adopted by God into a son, even though no other promise were extant, according to that, If sons, heirs also, Romans 8; but that the prize is owed to the works from covenant and promise, according to that, He shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised to them that love him, James 1; and, Didst thou not agree with me for a penny? Matthew 20. But although that everlasting glory itself is both an inheritance and a prize, yet as an inheritance it is owed to the person by the right of adoption, without any other covenant, as the objection proves; as a prize it is owed to the works from covenant, as we here teach. And besides, since there are various degrees of the heavenly glory, one only is owed to the person by the right of adoption, without any other covenant; the rest are owed to the works from promise or covenant.
Now that the good works of the just are meritorious of eternal life of condignity, not only by reason of the covenant and acceptation, but also by reason of the work — so that in a good work proceeding from grace there is a certain proportion and equality to the reward of eternal life — is proved by these arguments. First, eternal life is grace for grace, as it is said John 1 — that is, the grace of the reward for the grace of the merits, or the charity of the fatherland for the charity of the way, as it is expounded by St. Augustine, in epistle 105, and in the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 9. But between grace and grace there is without doubt a great likeness and proportion. Second, eternal life is the river making glad the city of God, Psalm 45; but the grace of working well is the fountain of water springing up into life everlasting, as it is said John 4; but a fountain has a proportion to a river, nay contains the whole river virtually. And besides, there is a proportion between the descent and the ascent of water; for so high does it ascend as it descends; but the fountain of living water — that is, the grace of the Holy Ghost poured forth in our hearts — descends from heaven, and therefore by a due proportion springs up into eternal life. Third, eternal life is the penny a day of those laboring in the vineyard, Matthew 20; but the penny a day is the just price of a day’s labor. For therefore is it called a penny a day, because it is wont ordinarily, by common estimation, to answer to a day’s labor. Fourth, grace is the seed of glory, according to that, 1 John 3, His seed abideth in him. But the seed is not indeed equal to the thing whose seed it is as to bulk, yet is equal as to virtue. Nor is the answer of Durandus solid, that grace is the seed of glory metaphorically, not properly. For this very metaphor can aptly and fittingly indicate what we will. For as a seed properly so called — namely, of a tree or an animal — contains by a physical virtue the whole tree or animal, so also the charity of God poured forth in the heart contains, by a moral and meritorious virtue, glory itself. Fifth, eternal life is a certain supernatural action on the part of the object, and of the principle both efficient and also formal; but merit, which consists in love, is also a supernatural action on the part of the object, and of the principle both efficient and formal; therefore they have a proportion between themselves, and the one leads to the other, as a straight way to its term. Sixth, God is he who has decreed that the elect are to be brought through merits to eternal life as to a prize and crown of justice; therefore without doubt he gives them such merits by which they truly and properly, and so of condignity, arrive at the crown. For neither could the power, nor the wisdom, whereby he would do it, be wanting to God. Seventh, our merits depend on the merits of Christ, both because he merited for us the virtue of meriting, and because we merit as living members of Christ, and through the influx which we receive from him as from our head; therefore it is derogated from the glory of Christ if our merits be so imperfect that they are not merits of condignity, save by reason of the acceptation of God.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XVII. Opera bona justorum meritoria esse ex con¬ digno non solum ratione pacti, sed etiam ratione operum. Altera quaestio sequitur, Utrum opera bona sint meritoria ex condigno ratione pa¬ cti tantum, an ratione operis tantum, an ra¬ tione utriusque. Neque enim dubitari debet, quin meritum ex condigno his tribus modis variari possit. Nam si forte opus aliquod sit multo inferius mercede ex conventione pro¬ missa, ut si dominus vineae conduceret ope¬ rarios, et non denarium diurnum, sed cen¬ tum nummos aureos pro mercede promitte¬ ret, esset ejusmodi meritum ex condigno, ratione pacti, non ratione operis. Contra vero si opus sit revera aequale mercedi, vel forte etiam majus, sed con¬ ventio nulla intervenerit; si dici debeat e- jusmodi meritum ex condigno, dici debebit ex condigno ratione operis, non ratione pa¬ cti. Et in malis quidem facile reperiemus meritum poenae ex condigno ratione operis, non ratione pacti, quoniam sine ulla con¬ ventione qui alterum laedit, satisfacere tene¬ tur, atque ad poenam a judice compelli po¬ test. Utrum autem in bonis sit aliquod me¬ ritum vere de condigno ratione operis, non ratione pacti, paulo post videbimus. Denique, si et pactum intercedat, et opus sit vere par mercedi, ut -cum operarii ad vineam juxta Evangelium conducuntur pro denario diurno, id meritum erit ex condigno ratione operis et ratione pacti. Non desunt qui censeant,, opera bona ju¬ storum esse meritoria vitee aeternae ex con¬ digno ratione operis, etiamsi nulla extaret divina conventio. Ita enim docet Cajetanus in 1. 2. quaest. 114. art. 3. Et idem videtur sensisse Dominicus a Soto lib. m. de natura et gratia cap. 7. Alii contra existimant opera bona ex gra¬ tia procedentia non esse meritoria ex con¬ digno ratione operis, sed tantum ratione pacti, et acceptationis divfnse. Ita docet Scotus in 1. seutent. dist. 17. quaest. 2. quem alii quoque sequuntur ex veteribus scholasticis, et ex recentioribus Andreas Yega, in opuscillodc justificatione quaest. 3. Distat autem haec opinio longissime ab hseresi Lutheranorum. Non enim Scotus censet, opera bona non esse vere bona, sed peccata, si ad legem divinam examinentur, ut Lutherani censent ; sed existimat opera justorum esse bona vere et proprie, sed non tam excellentia, ut proportionem habeant cum vita aeterna, et ideo acceptari quidem a Deo ad justitiam et dignam mercedem vi¬ tee ajternae, sed ex pacto et promissione, non ex operis dignitate. Nobis media sententia probabilior esse videtur, quae docet, opera bona justorum meritoria esse vitse aeterna1 ex condigno ra¬ tione paeti, et operis simul, non quidem quod sine pacto, vel acceptatione non ha¬ beat opus bonum proportionem ad vitam aeternam, sed quia non tenetur Deus acce¬ ptare ad illam mercedem opus bonum, quam¬ vis par, et aequale mercedi, nisi conventio interveniat. Quam sententiam conformem esse non dubitamus Concilio Tridentino et principibus Theologorum S. Thomae, in 1. 2. quaest. 114. artic. 1. ad 3, S. Bonaventu- rae, et aliis in 2. sent. distinet. 27. Primum igitur opera justorum, remoto pacto, vel promissione, non esse meritoria vitae aeternae ex condigno, sive ex justitia, ita ut non possit Deus sine injustitia talem negare mercedem ; satis probatum est supia cap. 14. in 2. ratione. Scriptura siquidem ei Patres ubicumque dicunt, Deum fidelem esse, et justum in reddendo praemio, sem- per aut fero semper mentionem faciunt pro¬ missionis. At (inquiunt) filio debetur haereditas, si .bene se gesserit, etiamsi nulla conventio inter patrem et filium intercedat. Nos autem per gratiam filii Dei sumus ; igitur, si bene operemur, debebitur nobis haereditas vitae aeternae, etiamsi nulla conventio vel promis¬ sio intercedat. Respondeo : aliud esse loqui de merito personae, aliud de merito operis. Et rursus aliud de vita aeterna, ut est haereditas, aliud ut est meregs, stipendium, bravium. Nam ex eo quod aliquis est filius Dei per gratiam, meretur ex condigno haereditatem vitae ae¬ ternae, sine alio pacto, sed merito persona1, non merito operis. Nam etiam infantibus, qui decedunt mox a Baptismo, quia filii Dei sunt, debetur jure haereditas, et ipsi eam mereri dici possunt, non merito operis, sed personae. Quemadmodum etiam cum distri¬ buenda sunt officia, vel beneficia publica melioribus civibus, illi dicuntur ea mereri ex condigno, qui sunt optimi inter cives. 380 LIBER Y. Porro bona opera non requiruntur ad vi¬ tam «sternam acquirendam, ut haereditatem, sed requiruntur, ne filius excidat ab ado¬ ptione, et jure mereatur exhteredari. Proinde filius Dei adoptivus per bona opera sine alio pacto non meretur vitam aeternam acquirere ut haereditatem, sed meretur eam non amit¬ tere. Quod patet tum ex eo, quod hae; editas ante omnia bona opera, jure adoptionis illi debetur. Tum quia infantes baptizati, ex hac vita migrantes vitam aeternam accipiunt in haereditatem, cum tamen nulla habeant operum merita, ut experientia testatur, et sancti Patres docent, Augustinus in epist. 157. ad Optatum. Et Bernardus serm. 68. in Cantica. At vero ul filius Dei adoptivus vitam ae¬ ternam obtineat, ut mercedem, sive stipen¬ dium et bravium, dicimus requiri promis¬ sionem, sive pactum : neque sufficere gra¬ tiam adoptionis. Nam etiamsi tenetur pater admittere probum filium ad haereditatem, tamen non tenetur admittere opexa ejus, quamvis alioqui valde egregia ad obtinen¬ dum bravium, nisi pactum, vel promissio interveniat. Id quod magis aperte perspice¬ retur*, si coelestis haereditas, et coeleste bia- vium omnino distiuguerentur. Tunc enim omnes intelligerent, haereditatem deberi personae a Deo in filium adoptatae, etiamsi nulla alia exstaret promissio, juxta illud, si filii, et haeredes (1), Rom. vixi, at bravium de¬ beri operibus ex pacto et promissione, juxta illud, accipiet coronam vitae, quam repromi¬ sit Deus diligentibus se, Jacobi i. Et, nonne ex denario convenisti mecum ? Matth, xx (2). Sed quamquam ipsa gloria sempiterna, haereditas est et bravium ; tamen ut haeredi- tas personae debetur jure adoptionis sine alio pacto, ut objectio probat ; ut bravium de¬ betur operibus ex pacto, ut nos hic doce¬ mus : et praeterea cum varii sint gradus coe¬ lestis gloriae, unus tantum debetur personae jure adoptionis, sine alio pacto ; reliqui de¬ bentur operibus ex promissione vel pacto. Jam vero opex*a bona justorum meritoria esse vitae aeternae ex condigno non solum ratione pacti et acceptationis, sed etiam ra¬ tione operis, ita ut in opere bono ex gratia procedente sit quaedam proportio et aequali¬ tas ad praemium vitae aeternae, probatur his argumentis. Primo, vita aeterna est gratia pro gratia, (1) Rom. Vlll, 17. — (2) Jacob. 1, 12; Mat. XX ut dicitur Joan. i. id est, gratia mercedis pro gratia meritorum, sive charitas patriae pro charitate viae, ut exponitur a S. Augusti¬ no, in epist. 103. et in lib. de gratia et libe¬ ro arbitrio cap. 9. At inter gratiam et gra¬ tiam sine dubio magna similitudo, et pro¬ portio est. Secundo, vita aeterna est flumen laetificans civitatem Dei, Psal. xlv. gratia vero bene operandi est fons aquae salientis in vitam aeternam, ut dicitur Joan. iv. at fons propor- tionem habet ad flumen , imo totum flumen virtute continet. Et praeterea proportio est inter descensum et ascensum aquae; tam enim alte ascendit, quam alte descendit; fons autem aquae vivae, id est, gratia Spiritus sancti diffusa in cordibus nostris, de coelo descendit, et ideo debita propoi*tione salit in vitam aeternam. Tertio, vita aeterna est denarius diurnus laborantium in vinea, Matth. xx. At denarius diurnus justum est pi*etium laboris diurni. Ideo enim vocatur denarius diurnus, quia solet ordinarie ex communi aestimatione re- spondere laboi*i diurno. Quarto, gratia est semen gloriai juxta il¬ lud, i. Joan iii. Semen Dei manet in eo (3). At semen non est quidem aequale rei, cujus est semen, quo ad molem, sed est tamen aequale, quo ad virtutem. Neque Durandi responsio, quod gratia sil semen gloriae, metaphorice, non proprie, so¬ lida est. Nam haec ipsa metaphora satis apte, atque accommodate potest indicare quod volumus. Ut enim semen proprie dictum, ar¬ boris videlicet, aut animantis, physica virtute totam arborem, vel animantem continet, sic etiam charitas Dei in corde diffusa, morali, mexitoi iaque virtute gloriam ipsam continet. Quinto, vita aetei*na est actio quaxdam su- pernatux*alis ex parte objecti, et principii tum efficientis tum etiam formalis ; at me¬ ritum, quod in dilectione consistit, est etiam actio supernaturalis ex parte objecti, et prin¬ cipii tum efficientis, tum formalis; igitur proportionem habent inter se, et unum ad alterum, quasi recta via ad suum terminum ducit. Sexto, Deus est, qui electos per merita ad vitam alternam ut bravium, et coi*onam ju¬ stitiae perducendos esse decrevit, igitur sine dubio ejusmodi merita illis donat, quibus ve¬ re et proprie, atque adeo ex condigno per-* , 3. - (3) I Joan. III, 9. CAPUT XVIII. 381 veniant ad coronam. Neque enim potestas, vel sapientia, qua id faceret, Deo deesse po¬ tuit. Septimo, merita nostra pendent a meritis Christi, tum quia nobis ille meruit virtutem merendi, tum quia nos meremur ut mem¬ bra viva Christi, et per influxum, quem ab illo, ut a capite nostro recipimus : igitur de¬ trahitur de gloria Christi, si merita nostra sint ita imperfecta, ut non sint merita ex con¬ digno, nisi ratione acceptationis Dei.