Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book V: On the Merits of Works
Chapter 21: That not the grace of justification, but its increase, falls under merit of condignity
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Now of the grace of justification and its increase the whole matter can be very briefly dispatched. For that a grace of this kind cannot be obtained, neither of condignity nor of congruity, by the merits of works wrought by the sole powers of free choice, we taught against the Pelagians, in book 5 On Grace and Free Choice. Again, that the same grace cannot be obtained of condignity, but only of congruity, by the merits of works proceeding from faith and a special help of God, we taught in the first book On Justification, chapter 21. Besides, that the same grace cannot be obtained by consequent merits — that is, by the good use of grace, as certain men of old absurdly said — St. Augustine teaches in book 2 against the two epistles of the Pelagians, chapter 7, and in book 1 On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 12; which is confirmed chiefly by this argument: because the grace of justification is often given to those who cannot use it well, as to infants soon to die after Baptism, or who will not, as to certain adults who cast away the grace already received, and whose last state becomes worse than the first; and often too is not given to those who would have used it well, if they had received it, which the Lord himself testifies of the Tyrians and Sidonians, Matthew 11. Besides, that none (Christ excepted), however just and holy, can merit grace for others of condignity, a certain reason persuades. For there is extant no covenant, no promise, of the merit of another’s salvation; and Christ alone, as head of the whole Church, had that grace whereby he might merit grace and glory for all the members. “Although (says St. Leo in epistle 97 to Leo, chapter 2) the death of many saints was precious in the sight of the Lord, yet the slaying of no innocent one was the redemption of the world. The just received, they gave not, crowns; and of the fortitude of the faithful were born examples of patience, not gifts of justice.” But as it is certain that one cannot merit grace for another of condignity, so it is not doubtful that this can be done of congruity. In which manner St. Stephen by his prayers before God, and St. Monica by her tears before the same, merited the conversion, the one of the Apostle Paul, the other of St. Augustine, there is none who would deny. And in the Gospel itself we read, Matthew 9: Jesus, seeing their faith, said to the man sick of the palsy, Be of good heart, son, thy sins are forgiven thee. Finally, that a just man can merit of condignity the increase of justice, the Council of Trent teaches, session 6, canon 32. St. Augustine also teaches it, tract 77 on John, although he puts not the name itself of condignity: “It remains that we understand that he who loves has the Holy Ghost, and by having merits to have more, and by having more to love more.”
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXI. . Von gratiam justificationis , sed ejus incremen¬ tum cadere sub meritum de condigno. Jam vero de gratia justificationis, et ejus incremento, tota res brevissime expediri poterit. Nam gratiam ejusmodi non posse obtineri, neque ex condigno, neque ex con¬ gruo meritis operum, solis viribus liberi ar¬ bitrii effectorum, docuimus adversus Pela- gianos, in lib. v, de gratia et libero arbitrio. Rursus, eamdem gratiam non posse obtine¬ ri ex condigno, sed solum ex congruo meritis operum ex fide, et auxilio Dei speciali pro¬ cedentium, docuimus in lib. i. de justifica¬ tione cap. 21. Praeterea, non posse gratiam eamdem obtineri meritis consequentibus, hoc est, bono usu gratiae, ut quidam olim absur¬ de dixerunt, docet S. Augustinus in lib. n. contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum cap. 7. et in lib. i. de praedestinat. Sanctorum cap. 12. quod illo argumento potissimum confir¬ matur : quia gratia justificationis saepe datur illis, qui ea bene uti non possunt, ut infanti¬ bus mox a Baptismo morituris, vel qui non volunt, ut adultis quibusdam, qui gratiam jam acceptam abjiciunt, et fiunt novissima eorum pejora prioribus, saepe etiam non da¬ tur illis, qui ea bene usuri fuissent, si illam accepissent, quod de Tyriis et Sydoniis Do¬ minus ipse testatur Matthaei xi. Adhaec, nullum (Christo excepto) quamvis justum et sanctum posse aliis mereri gratiam de condigno, certa ratio persuadet. Nullum enim exstat pactum, nulla promissio demerito alienae salutis ; et solus Christus, ut Ecclesiae 385 totius caput, eam gratiam habuit, qua mem* bris omnibus gratiam et gloriam mereretur: « Quamvis (inquit S. Leo in epist. 97. ad Leonem, cap. 2.) multorum Sanctorum in conspectu Domini pretiosa mors fuerit ; nul¬ lius tamen insontis occisio, redemptio fuit mundi. Acceperunt justi, non dedere coro¬ nas, et de fortitudine fidelium exempla nata sunt patientiae, non dona justitiae ». Sed sicut certum est, non posse unum al¬ teri ex condigno gratiam promereri, ita non dubium est, posse id ex congruo fieri. Quo¬ modo S. Sthephanum precibus apud Deum conversionem Apostoli Pauli, et S. Monicam lachrymis apud eumdem conversionem S. Augustini promeruisset, nemo est qui ne¬ get. Et in ipso Evangelio legimus, Matthaei ix. Videns Jesus fidem illorum dixit Paralytico, Confide , fili, remittuntur tibi peccata tua (4). Denique posse hominem justum mereri ex condigno augmentum justitiae, docet Conci¬ lium Tridentinum sess. 6. can. 32. Docet etiam sanctus Augustinus, tract. 77. in Joan- nem, quamvis nomen ipsum de condigno non ponat : « Restat, inquit, ut intelligamus Spiritum sanctum habere, qui diligit, et ha¬ bendo mereri, ut plus habeat, et plus haben¬ do plus diligat ».