Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book V: On the Merits of Works
Chapter 22: That reparation after a fall, and perseverance unto the end, do not fall under merit
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Of reparation after a fall, and perseverance unto the end, the opinion of the theologians is concordant, that these fall not under merit of condignity. And (to pass over the other arguments) if those two fell under merit of condignity, there would be no one of the just who would not also be of the number of the elect and predestinate to life. Which error was Jovinian’s and Calvin’s, and has been refuted by us in the third book. But that the gift of perseverance can be obtained by prayers, we taught in the second book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 12; and that he who is just can merit reparation after a fall of congruity, St. Thomas indeed denies, in 1a 2ae, question 114, article 7; but the same he seems to grant on the epistle to the Hebrews, chapter 6, lecture 3, as St. Bonaventure also openly grants, in book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 28, explaining the words of Peter Lombard. And certainly there are not wanting the best of reasons by which it may seem it can be proved. For in the second book of Paralipomenon, chapter 19, it was said to Josaphat, king of Juda: Thou helpest the ungodly, and thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord; and therefore thou didst deserve indeed the wrath of the Lord; but good works are found in thee, etc. From which we understand that that holy king by good works obtained with God that even when he sinned he was not deserted by God, nor punished according to his merits. Likewise in Psalm 70 the Prophet prays, as it becomes us also to pray: When my strength shall fail, do not thou forsake me. And certainly such a prayer would be made in vain, if no obtaining could answer to it. Besides, if a just man can merit of congruity — that is, obtain — conversion for another, why can he not also ask and obtain for himself that, if he fall, he be not deserted, but recalled to penance? Moreover, a man not yet reconciled can, through works of penance, obtain and merit of congruity the grace of justification, as was demonstrated in the first book; why, then, shall not the same man, while he is just and a friend of God, be able to obtain and merit of congruity reparation, if perchance he fall? Nor does that objection convince — that by sin all preceding merits are lost, therefore it cannot come to pass that reparation after a fall be by any reason rendered to good merits. For this argument proves indeed that reparation cannot be a wage to be rendered of justice. For he who has lost all merits, how can he of justice demand a wage? But it proves not that it is not congruous that God should look from his clemency to the preceding good works, and in view of them have mercy on him who has fallen. But (thou wilt say) the more merits one has had, the more grievously he offends God when he sins; because our merits are gifts of God, and he who has received more benefits, if he offend his benefactor, is the more ungrateful, and the less worthy of indulgence. I answer: the argument rightly concludes against those who sin from malice and contempt of their benefactor; but not against those who fail from ignorance and infirmity, of whom alone we speak. Wherefore St. Thomas, in 2a 2ae, question 186, article 10, teaches that the sins of religious, even mortal, but committed from ignorance or infirmity, are less grievous, and more easily pardoned, than those of other men, on account of the good works which religious assiduously do.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXII. Reparationem post lapsum, et perseverantiam usque in finem non cadere sub meritum de condigno, sed solum de congruo. De reparatione post lapsum, et perseve¬ rantia usque in finem concors est sententia Theologorum, non cadere ea sub meritum de condigno. Ac (ut caetera argumenta praeter¬ eam) si caderent illa duo sub meritum de condigno, nemo justorum esset, qui non esset etiam de numero electorum et praedestina¬ torum ad vitam. Qui error fuit Joviniani et Calvini, et a nobis in tertio libro confutatus est. Posse autem donum perseverantiae preci¬ bus impetrari, docuimus in ii. lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio, cap. 12; posse vero repa¬ rationem post lapsum, eum qui justus est, mereri ex congruo, negat quidem sanctus Thomas, in 1. 2. quaest. 114. art. 7. sed id* (4) Mat, IX, 2 386 LIBEH Y. ipsam concedere videtur in epist. ad Hebr. cap. vi. lect 3. ut etiam aperte concedit S. Bonaventura, in 2. sentent. distinet. 28. ex¬ plicans verba Petri Lombardi. Et certe non desunt optimae rationes, quibus id probari posse videatur. Nam in ii. lib. Paralipom. cap. xix. dictum est ad Josaphat regem Juda : Impio prxbes auxilium et his qui oderunt Dominum, amicitia jungeris, et idcirco , iram Domini merebaris, sed bona opera inventa sunt in te etc. (1). Ex quo intelligimus sanctum illum regem bonis operibus apud Deum ob¬ tinuisse, ut etiam cum peccaret, a Deo non desereretur, nec pro meritis puniretur. Item in Psal. lxx. orat Propheta, quod nos etiam orare convenit : Cum defecerit virtus mea, ne derelinquas me. Et certe frustra fieret talis oratio, si nulla ei respondere posset impe¬ tratio. Adhsec, si potest justus mereri de congruo, id est, impetrai'e alteri conversionem, cur non et ipse sibi postulare et impetrare pos¬ sit, ut si labatur non deseratur, sed ad poeni¬ tentiam revocetur ? Praeterea, potest homo nondum reconcili¬ atus per opera poenitentia} impetrare et me¬ reri ex congruo gratiam justificationis, ut in i. lib. demonstratum est, cur igitur non po; terit idem ipse, dum est justus et amicus De1 impetrare et mereri ex congruo reparatio¬ nem, si forte labatur ? (1) II Par. XIX, 2. — (2) Psal. CLXX, 9. Neque objectio illa convincit, per pecca¬ tum amittuntur omnia merita prmcedentia, igitur fieri non potest, ut reparatio post la¬ psum bonis meritis ulla ratione reddatur. Nam probat quidem hoc argumentum, repa¬ rationem non posse esse mercedem, quie sit reddenda ex justitia. Qui enim amisit omnia merita, quomodo potest ex justitia postulare mercedem ? At non probat non esse con¬ gruens, ut Deus respiciat ex clementia sua ad bona opera prmcedentia, et illorum in¬ tuitu misereatur ejus qui cecidit. At (inquies) quo quis plura merita habuit, eo gravius Deum offendit, cum peccat. Quo¬ niam merita nostra munera Dei sunt, et qui plura beneficia accepit, si benefactorem offendat , magis est ingratus, et minus dignus indulgentia. Respondeo : argumentum recte concludit adversus eos, qui ex malitia et contempu benefactoris peccant ; at non ad¬ versus eos, qui ex ignorantia; et infirmitate delinquunt. De quibus nos tantum loquimur. Quare sanctus Thomas in 2. 2. quajstione 186. artic. 10 docet, peccata religiosorum» etiam mortalia, sed ex ignorantia, vel infir¬ mitate commissa minus, esse gravia, et faci¬ lius codonari, quam aliorum hominum, pro¬ pter hona opera, qurn religiosi assidue fa¬ ciunt.