Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Members of the Church · On the Laity or Secular Persons (Book III)
Chapter 9: The Question of the Power of the Magistrate Proposed
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. III, De Laicis sive Saecularibus (De Membris Ecclesiae, Book III), On the Laity or Secular Persons (On the Members of the Church, Book III). The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
There follows the third question: whether it is lawful for a Christian magistrate to make laws, exercise judgments, and punish the wicked. Now there are two errors to be refuted. The first is that of the Waldensians and Anabaptists, who deny all these things. Their arguments are: that the obligation of laws takes away Christian liberty; that judgments are forbidden (Matthew 5): “If anyone will contend with thee in judgment and take away thy coat, give him thy cloak also”; and 1 Corinthians 6: “It is already a fault among you that you have lawsuits one with another; why do you not rather suffer wrong? Why do you not rather endure being defrauded?” Finally, that punishing with the sword seems forbidden to Christians (Matthew 5): “It was said to them of old, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; but I say to you, not to resist evil” — and it is established that in the old law it was not permitted, except to the magistrate, to inflict the penalty of retaliation; therefore Christ forbids this very thing, who also (Matthew 26) says: “All that take the sword shall perish by the sword.”
The second error is that of Calvin, who, although in Book IV Institutes, chapter 20, he proves against the Anabaptists that in the Church there ought to be civil laws, judgments, and the sword, yet in Book IV Institutes, chapter 10, section 5, asserts that civil laws do not bind in conscience — which before him John Gerson had taught (On the Spiritual Life, lecture 4) and Almain (On Ecclesiastical Power, question 1, chapter 10). Their reasons are these.
First, because political power is temporal; therefore it has nothing to do with conscience. Second, because the end of civil laws is external peace. Third, because the prince does not judge of internal things. Fourth, because the prince cannot inflict a spiritual penalty; therefore neither can he bind to it. Fifth, because the prince cannot absolve; therefore neither can he bind. Sixth, because the same sin would be punished twice, once here, once in the other world. Seventh, because the prince for the most part does not intend to bind under fault. Eighth, because we ought rather to transgress the gravest civil law than the slightest divine one — such as that about not telling an officious lie; but this binds only under venial fault; therefore the former binds to nothing. For if it bound under sin, especially mortal, one would have to beware of the mortal rather than the venial.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT IX. Proponitur queestio de potestate magistratus. Sequitur tertia quaestio : Liceatne Chris¬ tiano magistratui leges condere , judicia exercere, et punire improbos. Sunt autem duo errores refellendi. Primus est Walden- sium et Anabaptistarum, qui haec omnia negant. Argumenta vero eorum sunt, quod legum obligatio tollat Christianam liberta¬ tem; judicia autem prohibeantur, Matth. Y : Si quis voluerit tecum judicio contendere, et tunicam tuam tollere, da ei et pallium. Et I. Corinth:- YI : Delictum est in vobis, quod judi¬ cia habetis inter vos ; cur non magis fraudem patimini ? Quare non magis injuriam accipitis ? Denique punire gladio interdictum videtur Christianis, Matth. V. Dictum est antiquis , oculum pro oculo, dentem pro dente, ego autem dico vobis non resistere malo ; constat autem in lege veteri non fuisse permissum, nisi magistratui, poenam talionis inferre : ergo hoc ipsum Christus prohibet, qui etiam Matth. XXYU ait : Omnes qui acceperint gla¬ dium, gladio peribunt (5). Secundus error Calvini est, qui etsilib.IV. Institut. cap. 20. probat contra Anabaptis- tas, in Ecclesia debere esse leges civiles, ju¬ dicia et gladium, tamen lib. IV. Institut. cap. 10. §. 5. asserit leges civiles non obli¬ gare in conscientia : quod ante illum docue¬ rat Joannes Gerson de vita spirituali lect. 4. et Almain de potestate Ecclesiastica quaest. I. cap. 10. Rationes hae sunt. Prima, quia potestas politica est tempora¬ lis : ergo nihil ei cum conscientia. Secunda, quia finis legum civilium est pax externa. Tertia, quia Princeps non judicat de internis. Quarta, quia Princeps non potest inferre’ (1) I. Reg. XII, 16 et 17. — (2) Matth. V, 45. — (3) Isai XLV, 1. — (4) Tob. XXXIV, 30. — (b) Matth. V, 40; I. Cor. VI, 7; Matth. V, 38; Id. XXVI, 52. LIBER III. 16 poenam spiritualem : ergo nec ad illam obli¬ gare. Quinta, quia Princeps non potest ab¬ solvere, ergo nec ligare. Sexta, quia bis puniretur idem peccatum, semel hic, semel in alio saeculo. Septima, quia Princeps ut plurimum non intendit obligare ad culpam. Octava, quia potius debemus praevaricari gravissimam legem civilem, quam levissi¬ mam divinam, ut illam de non mentiendo officiose ; at ista non obligat, nisi ad venia¬ lem culpam : ergo illa ad nihil obligat; nam si obligaret ad peccatum, praecipue mortale, oporteret potius cavere mortale, quam ve¬ niale.