Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Members of the Church · On the Laity or Secular Persons (Book III)
Chapter 10: The First Proposition: It Is Lawful for a Christian Prince to Make Laws
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. III, De Laicis sive Saecularibus (De Membris Ecclesiae, Book III), On the Laity or Secular Persons (On the Members of the Church, Book III). The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Against these errors this will be the first proposition: “It is lawful for a Christian prince to make laws.” It is proved. For first it is proper to a prince to make laws, according to that of Proverbs 8: “By me kings reign, and the makers of laws decree just things.” And Isaiah 33: “The Lord is our King, the Lord is our Lawgiver”; for it belongs to a king to command, and by commanding to direct. Now a law is the very command and rule; therefore if Christians can be princes, certainly they can also make laws. And it is confirmed from Augustine (Book XIX On the City of God, chapter 17): “The heavenly city, while it leads, as it were, a captive life of its pilgrimage among the earthly city — having already received the promise of redemption and the spiritual gift as a pledge — does not hesitate to obey the laws of the earthly city by which those things are administered which are accommodated to the sustaining of mortal life.” And below: “This heavenly city, therefore, while it is a pilgrim on earth, calls citizens out of all nations and gathers a pilgrim society in all tongues, not caring what is diverse in the manners, laws, and institutions by which earthly peace is sought or maintained — rescinding or destroying nothing of them, nay, even preserving and following them.”
Secondly, it is proved from the necessity of civil laws. Christians, from the fact that they are Christians, do not cease to be men and citizens, and accordingly members of the temporal commonwealth; therefore they ought to have some rule of their human actions, by which they may be directed in their dealings and intercourse with other men. Now the natural law does not suffice, because it shows only general principles and does not descend to particulars. Neither does the evangelical law suffice, because it treats only of divine and heavenly things, as is well known; and the divine political law of the Old Testament has now ceased, for it suited only that one people of the Jews, and in that state. Therefore some other human rule is necessary, namely the discretion of the prince, or a civil law established by the prince’s authority. And although the discretion of the prince can in some way suffice, when the prince is wise and the people small, yet it is absolutely necessary that the people be ruled by laws, not by the prince’s discretion alone, if it is to be rightly ruled. That the prince’s discretion sometimes suffices is plain, because kingdoms are older than laws. Justin (Book I of the history) says that of old peoples were wont to be governed without any laws, by the discretion of the princes alone; and from Livy (Book III) it is established that the Roman commonwealth was governed for 300 years without laws. Finally, the most ancient lawgiver is either Moses, as Josephus contends (in Book II against Apion), or certainly Phoroneus, who was 300 years older than Moses, as Eusebius (in the Chronicle) and Augustine (Book XVIII On the City of God, chapter 3) teach. And yet before Phoroneus were established the kingdoms of the Assyrians, the Argives, the Egyptians, and others.
And that it is better for a people to be ruled by laws than by the prince’s discretion alone — nay, that this is in some way necessary — Aristotle affirms (Book III Politics, chapter 11). And it is proved, first, because it is easier to find one or two good and wise men than very many. If the commonwealth were to be ruled by the discretion of a good prince, it would need an infinity of good princes, one succeeding another; but if it is governed by laws, it suffices that once there were some, or one, wise man who made the law.
Secondly, those who make laws are many, and examine them diligently; but the prince is one, and often must judge on the spur of the moment.
Thirdly, those who made the laws judged without love and hatred, for they judged of absent matters; the prince judges of present matters, where friends, kinsmen, gifts, terrors, and the like have place. Whence the judgment of laws is a judgment of reason alone; the judgment of a man is a judgment of reason and appetite, that is, of man and beast.
Fourthly, the judgment of the prince, even if most right, scarcely ever lacks suspicion, envy, complaints, revilings; but the judgment of law lacks all these, since it is known that it cannot be corrupted by gifts.
Fifthly, government by laws can persist the same for a very long time; but the judgments of men are often changed.
Sixthly, government by laws can be reduced to an art and made easier; but not government by the discretion of a man.
Seventhly, the government of a prince by himself is better than by deputies; but government without laws necessarily requires many deputies, who all judge by their own discretion; whereas when there is government by laws, the prince himself is deemed to judge all things by himself, since judgment is by his laws.
Thirdly, it is proved: for if it were not lawful for a Christian prince to bind the people by laws, this would be on account of Christian liberty; but this cannot be said. For so far is a law from being opposed to Christian liberty that rather it is opposed to the servitude contrary to that same liberty — which I show from the very nature of Christian liberty. For Christian liberty is opposed to the servitude of sin (John 8): “Amen, amen, I say to you, that whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin; and the servant abideth not in the house forever, but the son abideth forever; if therefore the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed.” And Romans 6: “Being made free from sin, you are made the servants of justice.” Now this justification from sin is called a certain liberty, because he who is in sin, until he is freed by grace, cannot will the good ordered to eternal life. He has indeed free choice, because he can out of many evils choose one, and even choose a moral good; but he cannot choose a divine good, unless at least he begins to be freed by God’s prevenient grace, because he is held captive by the devil to his will, as is said (2 Timothy 2); but free choice freed by grace can will and do the divine good. But a greater liberty was in the state of innocence, because then man could never will any evil, which now not even the just can do; but the greatest will be in heaven, where we shall not be able to will any evil.
And so there is a threefold degree of liberty, as also a threefold degree of bodily life. The first is that of the Blessed, who will be able so to live that they cannot die, and will be able so to act well that they cannot sin. The second was that of Adam and Eve in the state of innocence, who could so live that they might also never die, and could so act well that they might also never sin. The third is ours, who can so live that we cannot but die at some time; and can so act well that we cannot but sin at least venially. Below these three degrees there is no fourth, except not to live and not to act well — which degree pertains to the damned. See Augustine (On Correction and Grace, chapter 11). Since therefore liberty consists in this, that we can choose the good and reject the evil, it is manifest that law does not conflict with liberty; for it does not hinder our being able to choose the good and reject the evil, but on the contrary rather helps, for it furnishes matter for exercising liberty. But law can rightly be said to be opposed to servitude, because it cannot be fulfilled by the servant of sin. Whence Paul (Romans 3): “Do we then destroy the law through faith? God forbid; but we establish the law.” See Augustine (On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 30).
This same is proved, secondly. The divine law does not conflict with liberty; therefore neither does human law. The antecedent is plain, for Adam was created free, and yet a law was imposed on him, that he should not eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (Genesis 2). The consequence is proved; for the divine and human law, as to obligation, are altogether equal, as will be plain in the following chapter.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT X. Prima Propositio. Contra hos errores prima haec erit proposi¬ tio : «Licet Christiano Principi leges conde¬ re. » Probatur; nam in primis proprium est Principis leges condere, juxta illud Proverb. "VIII : Per me Reges regnant, et legum conditores justa decernunt. Et Isaiae XXX III : Dominus Rex noster , Dominus Legifer noster ; nam Re¬ gis est jubere, et jubendo dirigere. Porro lex est ipsa jussio ct regula : ergo si Chris¬ tiani esse possunt Principes, certe etiam possunt leges condere ; et confirmatur ex Augustino lib. XIX. de civit. Dei cap. 17. : « Civitas, inquit, coelestis, dum apud terre¬ nam civitatem, vel ut captivam vitam suae peregrinationis agit-jam promissione redemp¬ tionis, et dono spirituali, tamquam pignore accepto, legibus terrenae civitatis, quibus haec administrantur, quae sustentandae mor¬ tali vitae accommodata sunt, obtemperare non dubitat. » Et infra : « Haec ergo coelestis ci¬ vitas dum peregrinatur in terra, ex omnibus gentibus cives evocat, atque in omnibus linguis peregrinam colligit societatem, non curans quidquid in moribus, legibus, insti¬ tutisque diversum est, quibus pax terrena vel conquiritur, vel tenetur, nihil eorum rescindens, vel destruens, imo etiam ser¬ vans, ac sequens. » Secundo probatur ex necessitate legum civilium. Christiani ex eo quod Christiani sunt, non delinunt esse homines et cives, et proinde membra Reipublicae temporalis : ergo debent habere regulam aliquam actio¬ num suarum humanarum, qua dirigantur in commerciis, et consuetudine cum aliis ho¬ minibus. Non sufficit autem lex naturalis, quia solum principia generalia ostendit, ne¬ que ad particularia descendit. Non sufficit etiam lex Evangelica, quia illa tractat solum de rebus divinis et coelestibus, ut notum est: lex autem divina politica Testamenti vete¬ ris jam cessavit, solum enim conveniebat uni illi populo Judaeorum, et in illo statu: ergo necessaria est alia aliqua regula hu¬ mana, nimirum arbitrium Principis, aut lex civilis auctoritate Principis constituta. Et quamquam arbitrium Principis aliquo modo sufficere p assit, quando Princeps est sapiens, et populus exiguus ; tamen absolute neces- se est, populum regi legibus, non solo ar¬ bitrio Principis, si recte regi debeat. Quod interdum sufficiat arbitrium Principis, patet, quia antiquiora sunt regna, quam leges. Ju¬ stinus lib. I. histor. dicit, olim populos sine ullis legibus, solo Principum arbitrio, gu¬ bernari solitos ; et ex Livio lib. III. constat, Romanam Rempublicam ad annos 300. sine legibus gubernatam. Denique antiquissimus legislator vel est Moses, ut Josephus conten¬ dit in II. lib. contra Appionem, vel certe Phoroneus, qui 300 annis Mose fuit anti¬ quior, ut Eusebius in Chron. et Augustin. lib. XVIII. civit. Dei cap. III. docent. Atqui ante Phoroneum constituta sunt regna Assy¬ riorum, Argivorum, ^Egyptiorum, et alio¬ rum. Quod autem melius sit regi populum legi¬ bus, quam solo Principis arbitrio , imo quod sit hoc aliquo modo necessarium, af¬ firmat Aristotel. lib. III. polit, cap. 11. Et probatur primo, quia facilius est invenire unum vel duos bonos et sapientes, quam plurimos. Si Respubl. debeat regi arbitrio boni Principis , indigebit infinitis bonis Principibus, quorum unus alteri succedat ; at si gubernetur legibus, sufficit semel fuisse aliquos, vel unum sapientem, qui legem fe¬ cerit. Secundo, qui leges condunt multi sunt; et diligenter eas examinant; at Princeps est unus, et saepe repente judicare debet. Tertio, qui leges fecerunt, sine amore et odio judicarunt : nam de rebus absentibus judicarunt. Princeps de praesentibus judi- (1) Prov. VIII, 15; Isai XXXIII, 22. CAPUT XI. n cat, ubi locum habent amici, propinqui, munera, terrores etc. unde judicium legum est judicium solius rationis, judicium homi¬ nis est judicium rationis et libidinis, id est, hominis et bestiae. Quarto, judicium Principis etiamsi rectis¬ simum sit, vix unquam caret suspicione, in¬ vidia, querelis, maledictis ; at judicium le¬ gis his omnibus caret, quippe quod scitur non posse corrumpi muneribus. Quinto, gubernatio per leges potest lon¬ gissimo tempore eadem perseverare; at ju¬ dicia hominum saepe mutantur. Sexto, gubernatio per leges potest reduci ad artem, et facilior effici ; non autem gu¬ bernatio ad arbitrium hominis. Septimo, melior est gubernatio Principis per se, quam per vicarios ; at gubernatio sine legibus necessario requirit multos vica¬ rios, qui omnes ad arbitrium suum judicent; quando autem per leges gubernatur, ipse Princeps omnia per se judicare censetur, cum ejus legibus judicetur. Tertio probatur ; nam si non liceret Prin¬ cipi Christiano legibus obligare populum, id esset propter libertatem Christianam, sed hoc dici non potest. Nam tantum abest, ut lex opponatur libertati Christianae, ut potius opponatur servituti contrariae eidem liber¬ tati, id quod ostendo ex ipsa natura liberta¬ tis Christianae : nam libertas Christiana op¬ ponitur servituti peccati, Joan. VIII : Amen , amen dico vobis, qui facit peccatum , servus est peccati, servus autem non manet in domo in eeternum : filius manet in aeternum ; si ergo vos Filius liberaverit , vere liberi eritis. Et Rom. VI : Liberati a peccato , servi facti estis justi¬ tia; (I). Vocatur autem haec justificatio a peccato libertas quaedam, quia qui in pec¬ cato est, donec non liberatur per gratiam, non potest velle bonum ordinatum ad vitam aeternam ; habet quidem liberum arbitrium, quia potest ex pluribus malis eligere unum, et etiam eligere bonum morale ; at eligere bonum divinum non potest, nisi saltem li¬ berari incipiat per Dei gratiam praevenien¬ tem, quia captivus tenetur a Diabolo ad ip¬ sius voluntatem, ut dicitur ll.Timoth. II. at liberum arbitrium liberatum per gratiam potest bonum divinum velle, et facere. Sed major adhuc libertas erat in statu innocen¬ tiae, quia tunc homo poterat nullum unquam velle malum, quod nunc etiam justi non possunt; maxima autem erit in coelo, ubi non poterimus velle ullum malum. Itaque triplex est gradus Ubertatis, sicut etiam triplex gradus vitae corporalis. Pri¬ mus est Beatorum, qui sic poterunt vivere, ut non possint mori, et sic poterunt bene agere, ut non possint peccare. Secundus fuit Adami et Evae in statu in¬ nocentiae, qui sic poterant vivere, ut possent etiam numquam mori, et sic poterant bene agere, ut possent etiam numquam peccare. Tertius noster, qui sic possumus vivere, ut non possimus aliquando non mori : et sic possumus bene agere, ut non possimus non peccare saltem venialiter. Infra hos tres gradus non est quartus, nisi non vivere, et non bene agere, qui gradus ad damnatos pertinet. Vide August. lib. de corrept. et grat. cap. II. Cum ergo libertas consistat in eo, ut possimus eligere bonum, et rejicere malum, manifestum est, legem non pugnare cum libertate ; non enim impedit, quo mi¬ nus possimus eligere bonum, et rejicere malum, sed contra potius juvat : nam prae¬ bet materiam exercendae libertatis. At servi¬ tuti recte opponi dici potest lex, quia non potest impleri a servo peccati. Unde Paulus Rom. III : Quid ergo , inquit, legem destrui¬ mus per fidem ? absit, sed legem statuimus (2). Vide Augustin. de spiritu et littera, cap. 30. Probatur secundo hoc idem. Lex divina non pugnat cum libertate : ergo nec lex hu¬ mana. Antecedens patet, nam Adam liber creatus est, et tamen lex ei imposita fuit, ut non vesceretnr ligno scientiae boni et mali, Genes. II. Probatur consequentia ; nam lex divina et humana quoad obligationem sunt omnino aequales, ut patebit in seq. capite.