Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Members of the Church · On the Laity or Secular Persons (Book III)
Chapter 12: The Third Proposition: It Is Not Unlawful for Christians to Exercise Public Judgments
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. III, De Laicis sive Saecularibus (De Membris Ecclesiae, Book III), On the Laity or Secular Persons (On the Members of the Church, Book III). The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
“To exercise public judgments is not unlawful for Christians.” It is proved, first, because it is proper to a prince to judge. For Scripture is wont almost always to join king and judge. Psalm 2: “And now, O kings, understand; receive instruction, you that judge the earth.” Isaiah 33: “The Lord is our King, the Lord is our Lawgiver, the Lord is our Judge.” Jeremiah 23: “A king shall reign, and shall be wise, and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth.” If therefore it is lawful for Christians to have a prince, why not also a judge?
Secondly, because laws would profit nothing if there ought to be no judgments; but laws are not to be done away with, as was shown above; therefore neither judgments.
Thirdly, the Scripture of both Testaments admits judgments. For thus we read (Deuteronomy 16): “Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all thy gates, that they may judge the people with just judgment.” 1 Corinthians 6: “If therefore you have secular judgments, set those to judge who are the most contemptible in the Church; is there not any one among you wise enough who can judge his brother?” Where the Apostle warns the Corinthians that in those causes in which they were not necessarily bound to go to the tribunals of the Gentiles, they should appoint a judge among themselves.
Nor will it be difficult to solve the arguments set down at the beginning. To those words then (Matthew 5): “If anyone will contend with thee in judgment and take away thy coat, leave him thy cloak also,” I answer with Saint Augustine (in letter 5 to Marcellinus) that these ought to be understood only according to the preparation of the mind; for in the same place the Lord says: “If anyone strike thee on one cheek, offer him the other also.” And yet the same Lord Himself (John 18), when struck on the cheek, did not offer the other, but said: “Why strikest thou me?” By which example He taught how the precepts are to be understood.
To the words of the Apostle (1 Corinthians 6): “It is a fault among you,” and so on, I say, first, that the word “fault” is in Greek hettema, which signifies not sin, but imperfection; and so Theodoret expounds it. I say, secondly, if “fault” signifies sin, as Chrysostom and Ambrose expound on this passage, and Augustine (in the Enchiridion, chapter 78, and Book II On the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, chapter 15, and sermon 24 on Psalm 118) — I say, then, that it is called a fault, not because it is a sin in itself, but because for the most part it is not without sin: whether by reason of the end, as when men litigate out of avarice; or by reason of the means, as when they litigate with hatred, rancor, quarrels; or by reason of injustice, as when deceits and frauds are mixed in; or by reason of scandal, as happened to the Corinthians, who litigated to the offense of the Gentiles. I say, thirdly, that judgments are reprehended not on the part of the judge, but on the part of the litigants. And so even if it were a sin to litigate, yet it would not be a sin to judge; for judgments put an end to lawsuits, which is a good.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XII. Tertia propositio. «Judicia publica exercere non est illicitum Christianis. » Probatur Primo, quia proprium est Principis judicare. Scriptura enim fere conjungere solet Regem et Judicem, Psal II: Et nunc Reges inlelligite, erudimini qui judi¬ catis terram. Isaiae XXXIII : Dominus Rex (1) Rom. XIII, 1 et seq.; I. Petr. II, 13. CAPUT XIII. 21 noster, Dominas Legifer noster , Dominus Ju¬ dex noster. Hieremiae XXIII : Regnabit Rex, et sapiens erit, et faciet judicium et justitiam in terra (1). Si ergo licet Christianis habere Principem, cur non et Judicem? Secundo, quia nihil prodessent leges, si nulla esse deberent judicia : at leges tolli non debent, ut supra ostensum est, igitur nec judicia. Tertio, Scriptura utriusque Testamenti judicia admittit; sic enim legimus Deut. XVI : Judices et Magistros constitues in omni¬ bus portis tuis, ut judicent populum justo ju¬ dicio. I. Corinth. VI : Scecularia judicia si habueritis, contemptibiles qui sunt in Ecclesia, hos constituite ad judicandum ; sic non est sa¬ piens quisquam in vobis, qui judicare possit fra¬ trem suum (2). Ubi Apostolus monet Corin¬ thios, ut in iis causis, in quibus non tene¬ bantur necessario adire tribunalia Genti¬ lium, constituerent inter se judicem. Neque difficile erit argumenta solvere, quae initio posita sunt. Ad illa igitur verba Matth. V : Si quis voluerit tecum judicio con¬ tendere, et tunicam tuam tollere, 7'elinque illi et pallium. Respondeo cum S. Augustino in in epist. 5. ^d Marcellinum, ea solum intel- ligi debere secundum animi praeparationem: nam ibidem Dominus ait: Si quis te percus¬ serit in unam maxillam, praebe illi et alteram. Et tamen idem ipse Dpminus Joann. XVIII, percussus in maxilla, non praebuit alteram, sed dixit : Cur me caedis ? (3) Quo exemplo docuit, quemadmodum praecepta intelligen- da sint. Ad verba Apostoli I. Corinth. VI : Delic¬ tum est in vobis etc (4). dico primo, vocem Delictum , Graece esse fo-njfta, quod non pec¬ catum, sed imperfectionem significat, et sic exponit Theodoretus. Dico secundo, si de¬ lictum significet peccatum, ut exponunt Chrysostomus et Ambrosius in hunc locum, et Augustin. in Enchirid. cap. 78. et lib. II. de serm. Domini in monte, cap 15. et conc. 24. in Psalm. CXYIII. dico, inquam, vocari delictum, non quod in se peccatum sit, sed quia ut plurimum norl caret peccato, vel ra¬ tione linis, ut quando litigatur ex avaritia, vel ratione medii, ut quando litigatur cum odio, rancore, jurgiis, vel ratione injusti¬ tiae, ut quando miscentur doli et fraudes, s vel ratione scandali, ut accidebat Corinthiis, qui cum offendiculo Gentilium litigabant. Dico tertio, non reprehendi judicia ex par¬ te judicis, sed ex parte litigantium. Itaque etiamsi peccatum esset litigare, non tamen peccatum esset judicare ; judicia enim finem imponunt litibus, quod est bonum.