Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Members of the Church · On the Laity or Secular Persons (Book III)
Chapter 11: The Second Proposition: Civil Law Binds in Conscience No Less Than Divine Law
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. III, De Laicis sive Saecularibus (De Membris Ecclesiae, Book III), On the Laity or Secular Persons (On the Members of the Church, Book III). The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
“Civil law binds in conscience no less than divine law, although this is less firm and stable than that.” I explain: the divine and human law differ as to firmness, because the divine cannot be abrogated by man, the human can; but as to obligation they do not differ, for each binds in conscience, now to mortal, now to venial sin, according to the gravity of the matters themselves — so that there is no better rule for discerning whether a human law binds to mortal or to venial sin than to think of that law as divine, and to see, if it were divine, how it would bind.
It is proved, first: the obligatory force is of the essence of law, as was said (Book IV On the Pontiff, chapter 16), and to bind is a necessary effect of law; therefore every law, by whomsoever it be made — whether by God, or by an angel, or by man, and by a man whether bishop, or king, or father — binds in the same way. The consequence is proved from a similitude: for because it is the essence of man to be rational, and his proper property to be capable of laughter, every man is rational and capable of laughter, whether he be created by God alone, as Adam, or by God from another man, as Eve, or begotten by men, as Cain. The antecedent is plain, for a law is the rule of morals; and it is proper to a rule so to direct intrinsically that a departure from it is a sin in morals, as a departure from the rule in natural things is called a sin of nature, as are monsters, and a departure from the rule in the arts is a sin of art.
Where it is to be noted that, as other things, as to their existence, depend on their agent, but not as to their essence — for essences are eternal, being certain possible participations of the divine essence — so also law, as to its existence, depends on the lawgiver; for it will not be a law unless it be dictated by one who has authority. But as to its essence it does not depend; for that a law binds is something eternal and immutable, and a certain participation of the eternal law of God, who is the first and highest rule. And this Blessed Augustine seems to have meant (Book XXII against Faustus, chapter 27) when he says: “Sin is something said, or done, or desired, against the eternal law of God.” For whether one transgresses the natural law, or the positive, the divine, or the human, one always sins against the eternal law, because every law is a participation of the eternal law. And although it cannot happen that any true law is not from God — since a law cannot be made except by one having power, and there is no power but from God (Romans 13) — yet if (by the impossible) there were a law not from God, it would still bind under fault; just as if (by the impossible) a man existed not made by God, he would still be rational.
It is proved, secondly: for if a law bound only because divine, all divine laws would bind equally, as is plain; for the reason of obligation would be the same in all. But this is false; for the law “thou shalt not kill” binds more than the law “thou shalt not steal”; and the law “thou shalt not steal” more than the law “thou shalt not lie”; and the law “thou shalt not lie” more than the law “thou shalt not speak an idle word.”
Thirdly, that divine law binds more whose violation is more contrary to the end of the law, that is, to charity; for therefore it is worse to kill than to steal, because more against charity; and therefore it is mortal to lie perniciously, venial to lie officiously, because the former is against charity, but the latter is beside charity. But human law too has charity for its end, and orders the means to this end; for what the Apostle says, “the end of the commandment is charity,” is understood of every commandment; and it is plain, for a just civil law is always either a conclusion or a determination of the divine moral law. Therefore they have the same end, and seem to differ only in this: that human law directs human acts in relation to the external acts of love, that is, to the peace and preservation of the commonwealth; but the divine law directs also in relation to the internal acts of charity. Therefore the reason of the divine and human law is the same as regards obligation.
But you will object: if the gravity of a sin is taken from the nature of the thing and from its relation to charity, laws are superfluous; for we are equally bound before the law as after the law to flee that which by its nature harms charity, and to do that which is necessary for preserving charity.
I answer, the consequence is denied. For if there be no law generally commanding or prohibiting something, many things which are evil to one will not be evil to another. For example, if there be no law prohibiting the bearing of arms, it will be evil to bear arms for him who is easily provoked to anger, and who has enemies whom he desires to harm; but it will not be evil for a peaceable man, who desires only to defend himself. Yet if the law prohibit it, then it is evil to all; for a law ought not to regard what is good or evil to this or that man, but what profits or harms the commonwealth. Besides, very many things are necessary or harmful to the common good which yet are not good or evil to anyone in particular unless commanded or prohibited by law. For example, tribute is necessary to the king; yet if there be no law, it is not necessary that I pay, for my tribute alone profits the king little, nor does it pertain to me to see what things the commonwealth needs — and so all could say. Similarly it is harmful to the commonwealth that gold be exported from a province; but it is not notably harmful that I alone export my gold — and so all could say. A law, therefore, is necessary, which, generally commanding and prohibiting, may provide for the public utility.
Fourthly, the divine positive law binds under sin because it constitutes the act which it commands in the genus of virtue, when before it was not so. For if a Jew, not out of contempt but out of appetite for food, ate moderately swine’s flesh prohibited in the law, he would without doubt have sinned; but he would not have sinned formally against obedience, because not out of contempt; therefore against temperance. But to eat swine’s flesh moderately is not of itself against temperance, but a certain indifferent thing; therefore it was the law that made that abstinence a necessary act of temperance. But this same we see in human law; for the divine law makes an act which was of itself indifferent to be an act of virtue for no other cause than that it is a rule of morals laid down by one who had authority to command. But man too can command and establish rules of morals, as we showed above; therefore man can by his law constitute an act, otherwise indifferent, in the genus of virtue. Accordingly the divine and human law are equal as to obligation.
Fifthly, the divine and human law differ as the law of a king and of a viceroy, or the law of a Pontiff and of his legate. But these bind in the same way, and differ only in firmness; therefore so do those. The proposition is plain, for the Scriptures everywhere testify that kings are ministers of God, and have authority from Him, and judge in His place (Proverbs 8, Wisdom 6, Romans 13, 1 Peter 2). The assumption too is plain, for the authority of a viceroy is from the king, and of a legate from the Pope; and experience testifies the same, and it is confirmed from the holy Fathers Augustine and Bernard. Augustine (on the title of Psalm 70): “Where a father commands what is not against the Lord, he is to be heard as God.” And it is certain that the authority of a king is greater than that of a father, as the same Augustine says (sermon 6 on the words of the Lord). Bernard (in the treatise On Precept and Dispensation): “Whether God, or a man the vicar of God, has delivered any command, it must surely be obeyed with equal care, deferred to with equal reverence — provided the man command nothing contrary to God”; where he clearly says that laws differ on the part of their matter, but not on the part of those who command.
But you will object: for Blessed Bernard in the same place, speaking of the commands of men, says that their orders are not neglected without fault, nor contemned without crime; for everywhere both culpable neglect and contempt are damnable — where he seems to say that human law never binds under mortal fault except by reason of contempt. I answer: he speaks of precepts about light matters, for in such there can be no crime except by reason of contempt. For prelates cannot at their discretion bind under mortal fault.
Sixthly it is proved, because it seems to imply a contradiction that princes can bind to punishment and not to fault, since fault and punishment are relative. And Blessed Augustine says (Book I Retractations, chapter 9): “Every punishment, if it is just, is the punishment of a sin.” And (in letter 103 and elsewhere) he asserts that God Himself would be unjust if He condemned any innocent man. How then can princes condemn to death those who transgress their laws, if they have sinned in nothing? if they have contracted no fault in conscience?
You will say: how then do the Rules of certain religious bind to punishment and not to fault? I answer: they bind not after the manner of a law, but after the manner of an agreement and pact, like purely penal laws. Nor is that properly a punishment, but a penal affliction undertaken as an aid to the spirit.
Seventhly and lastly, from the doctrine of the Apostles; for in Romans 13 Paul asserts this in many ways. First, when he says: “Let every soul be subject to the higher powers; for there is no power but from God.” Secondly, when he says: “He that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God.” Thirdly, when he says: “And they that resist purchase to themselves damnation.” For this the Greek and Latin Fathers expound of eternal damnation on this passage. Fourthly, when he says: “Wherefore be subject of necessity.” Fifthly, when he says: “Not only for wrath, but also for conscience’ sake.” Sixthly, when he says: “For they are the ministers of God.” And 1 Peter 2: “Be subject for God’s sake,” that is, not only from fear of punishment. These passages sufficiently demonstrate what we intend. For if princes have from God the power of commanding, certainly those who obey them not offend not only the princes but also God; and if those who resist the prince resist the ordinance of God, certainly they sin in conscience, no otherwise than if they transgressed divine laws; and if those who resist purchase to themselves damnation, certainly they incur a fault worthy of that punishment. And if private persons are subject of necessity to princes, not only for wrath but also for conscience’ sake, how do they not sin in conscience who obey them not? Finally, if princes are the ministers of God and must be obeyed for God’s sake, surely they injure the majesty of God who contemn the commands of princes. To the arguments on the contrary.
To the first, second, and third I answer: from the fact that political power is temporal, and its end is external peace, and man does not judge of internal things, it is rightly gathered that it cannot bind except to temporal and external acts; but not that it cannot bind in conscience. For although this rule directs external acts, yet, because it is a rule, to deviate from it is to sin.
You will say: how can a temporal law or power produce a spiritual effect, that is, bind the conscience? I answer: although political power and its law are called temporal by reason of their object, because they are concerned with temporal and external things, yet in themselves they are spiritual things. Besides, to bind the conscience is not to effect something in a spiritual thing, but only to command another, and so to command that if he obey not he sins, and by the testimony of his own conscience understands, or can understand, that he sins. And so whoever can command can bind the conscience, even if he judge not of internal things nor scrutinize another’s conscience.
To the fourth and fifth I say: the prince cannot inflict a spiritual and eternal punishment, nor can he remit such a punishment, and yet he can bind to it; because he does this by the authority of God, who granted him the one and not the other — just as if a king permitted a viceroy to bind subjects to capital punishment, and yet did not permit him of himself to execute justice or to remit the penalty. Or it must be said that political law binds to eternal punishment, not as it is the law of a man, but as it is the law of a minister of God. For he who offends the minister of God at the same time offends God Himself; wherefore if (by the impossible) God were not in the nature of things, and yet a political law, likewise by the impossible, existed, it would bind in conscience, and its transgression would be a sin, but no spiritual punishment or eternal damnation would follow the transgressor.
To the sixth I say: it is not absurd that the same sin be punished by several, and in several places, when it offends several — as we see that murderers often have their hand cut off in the place where they committed the slaughter, and then have their head cut off in the place of public justice.
To the seventh I say: it depends on the intention of the lawgiver whether he wishes really to command and make a true law, or only to show what is to be done, without any command; but if he wishes seriously to command and make a true law, it is not in his power to prevent the law from binding to mortal or venial sin, according to the magnitude of the matter.
To the last I say: that human law yields to divine law when they cannot both be kept is not because the human does not bind under sin, but because human law is less firmly established; for in such a case it ceases to be a law, and accordingly ceases to bind. See what we said in Book IV On the Pontiff; and besides John Driedo (Book III On Christian Liberty), Adrian (Quodlibet 6), Francisco de Vitoria (in the relection On Civil Power), Alfonso de Castro (Book I On the Power of Penal Law, chapter 4), and Domingo de Soto (Book I, question 6, article 4, On Justice and Right).
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XI. Secunda Propositio. « Lex civilis non minus obligat in cons¬ cientia, quam lex divina, etsi minus firma et stabilis sit haec, quam illa. » Explico, lex divina et humana differunt quo^l firmita¬ tem, quia divina non potest abrogari ab ho¬ mine, humana potest ; at quoad obligatio- (1) Joan. VIII, 34 ; Rom. VI, 18. — (2) Rom. III, 31. Tom. III. 2 18 LIBER III. nem non differunt, utraque enim obligat in conscientia, nunc ad mortale, nunc ad ve¬ niale peccatum pro rerum ipsarum gravi¬ tate ; ita ut nulla sit melior regula ad dis¬ cernendum, utrum lex humana obliget ad mortale, an ad veniale, quam cogitare le¬ gem illam esse divinam, et videre, si divina esset, quomodo obligaret. Probatur primo : vis obligativa est de es¬ sentia legis, ut dictum est lib. IV. de Ponti¬ fice, cap. 16. et obligare est effectus neces¬ sarius legis : ergo omnis lex et a quocumque feratur, sive a Deo, sive ab Angelo, sive ab homine, et homine sive Episcopo, sive re¬ ge, sive patre, eodem modo obligat. Proba¬ tur consequentia a simili, nam quia homi¬ nis essentia est, rationale esse, et propria passio esso risibilem, omnis homo est ratio¬ nalis et risibilis, sive sit creatus a solo Deo, ut Adam, sive a Deo ex alio homine, utEva, sive ab hominibus genitus, ut Cain. Antece¬ dens patet, nam lex est regula morum ; re¬ gula? autem proprium est intrinsece ita diri¬ gere, ut recessus ab ipsa sit peccatum in moribus, sicut recessus a regula in natura¬ libus dicitur peccatum naturae, ut sunt mon¬ stra, et recessus a regula in artibus est pec¬ catum artis. Ubi notandum est, quod sicut res caetera?, quoad existentiam, pendent ab agente, non quoad essentiam, essentiae enim sunt aeter¬ nae ; sunt enim quaedam participationes pos¬ sibiles divinae essentiae : ita etiam lex, quoad existentiam, pendet a legislatore ; non enim erit lex, nisi dictetur ab eo, qui habet auc¬ toritatem. At quoad essentiam non pendet; quod enim lex obliget est quid aeternum, et immutabile, et participatio quaedam legis aeternae Dei, qui est prima et summa regula ; et hoc videtur voluisse dicere B. Augustin. lib. XXII. contra Faustum, cap. 27. cum ait : « Peccatum est dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum, contra aeternam Dei legem. » Nam sive quis pra?varicetur legem natura¬ lem, sive positivam, sive divinam, sive hu¬ manam, semper peccat contra legem aeter¬ nam, quia omnis lex est legis aeternae parti¬ cipatio. Et quamquam non potest fieri, ut aliqua vera lex non sit a Deo, cum lex non possit condi, nisi ab habente potestatem, et non sit potestas nisi a Deo, Roman. XIII. ta¬ men si (per impossibile) esset lex non a Deo, adhuc obligaret ad culpam, sicut si (per im- (1) I. Tim. I, 5. possibile) homo existeret non factus a Deo, adhuc esset rationalis. Probatur secundo ; nam si lex obligaret solum quia divina, omnes leges divina? aequaliter obligarent, ut patet ; nam eadem esset ratio obligationis in omnibus. At hoc est falsum : nam magis obligat lex, non oc¬ cides, quam lex, non furaberis ; etmagis lex, non furaberis, quam lex, non mentieris; et lex, non mentieris, quam lex, non loqueris verbum otiosum. Praeterea tertio, ORtensive, illa lex divina magis obligat, cujus violatio est magis con¬ traria fini legis, id est, charitati ; ideo enim pejus est occidere quam furari, quia magis contra charitatcm; et ideo mortale est men¬ tiri perniciose, veniale est mentiri officiose, quia illud est contra charitatem ; hoc vero praeter charitatem : sed lex humana etiam habet pro fine charitatem, et ordinat media ad hunc finem; quod enim ait Apostol. : binis praecepti est charitas (1), de omni prae¬ cepto intelligitur, et patet, nam lex civilis justa, semper est vel conclusio, vel determi¬ natio legis divinae moralis : ergo habent eumdem finem, et solum in hoc • videntur differre, quod lex humana dirigit actus hu¬ manos in ordine ad actus externos dilectio¬ nis, id est, ad pacem et conservationem Rei- publicae ; lex autem divina dirigit etiam in ordine ad internos actus charitatis: igitur eadem est ratio legis divinae et humanae, quod attinet ad obligationem. Sed objicies : si ex natura rei, et ex or¬ dine ad charitatem sumitur gravitas pec¬ cati, superflua? sunt leges, nam aeque obli¬ gamur ante legem, ac post legem ad id fu¬ giendum, quod natura sua laedit charitatem, et ad id faciendum, quod est necessarium ad conservandam charitatem. Respondeo, negatur consequentia: nam si lex non adsit generaliter aliquid pra?ci- piens, aut prohibens, multa qua? sunt mala uni, non erunt alteri mala, v. g. si lex non sit, quae prohibeat gestare arma, erit malum gestare arma ei, qui facile provocatur ad iram, et qui habet inimicos, quibus cupit nocere : at non erit malum homini pacifico, et qui solum cupit seipsum defendere. Ta¬ men si id lex prohibeat, jam est malum omnibus ; lex enim non debet respicere, quid huic aut illi sit bonum vel malum, sed quid prosit, aut obsit Reipublica:. Praeterea * CAPUT XI. 19 plurima sunt necessaria vel noxia bono communi, quae tamen non sunt bona vel mala ulli in particulari, nisi lege praecipian¬ tur, vel prohibeantur : v. g. tributum neces¬ sarium est Regi, tamen si lex non adsit, non est necessarium ut ego solvam ; nam parum prodest meum solius tributum Regi, neque ad me pertinet videre, quibus rebus indi¬ geat Respublica, et sic possent omnes di¬ cere. Similiter noxium est Reipublicae ex¬ portari aurum ex provincia, at non est no¬ xium notabiliter, quod ego solus exportem meum aurum, et sic omnes dicere possent ; Lex ergo necessaria est, quae generaliter praecipiens et pi’ohibens, publicae utilitati prospiciat. Quarto, lex divina positiva ideo obligat ad peccatum, quia constituit actum, quem praecipit in genere virtutis, cum ante non esset: nam si Judaeus non ex contemptu, sed ex cibi appetitu moderate comedisset camera suillam in lege prohibitam, sine du¬ bio peccasset, non autem peccasset forma- liter contra obedientiam, quia non ex con¬ temptu, ergo contra temperantiam ; at mo¬ derate vesci carne suilla, ex se non est contra temperantiam, sed res quaedam in¬ differens, ergo lex fuit, quae illam abstinen¬ tiam fecit actum temperantiae necessarium. At hoc idem videmus in lege humana : nam lex divina non alia de causa facit esse ac¬ tum virtutis eum, qui ex se erat indifferens, nisi quia est regula morum ab eo posita, qui habuit auctoritatem praecipiendi. Sed homo etiam potest praecipere, et regulas morum constituere, ut supra ostendimus ; potest igitur homo lege sua constituere ac¬ tum, alioqui indifferentem, in genere virtu¬ tis : proinde pares sunt lex divina et huma¬ na, quoad obligationem. Quinto, lex divina et huniana ita diffe¬ runt, ut lex Regis et Proregis, sive lex Pon¬ tificis et ejus Legati. At istae obligant eodem modo, et solum differunt firmitate, ergo et illae. Propositio patet, nam Scripturae pas- sim testantur, Reges esse ministros Dei, et ab illo habere auctoritatem, et loco ejus ju¬ dicare, Proverb. VIII. Sap. VI. Rom. XIII. I. Pet. II. Assumptio etiam patet, nam auc¬ toritas Proregis est a Rege, et Legati a Papa ; et experientia idem testatur, et con¬ firmatur ex sanctis Patribus Augustino et Bernardo. Augustinus in titulum Psal.LXX : « Ubi, inquit, hoc jubet pater, quod contra Dominum non sit, sic audiendus est, quo¬ modo Deus etc. » Certum autem est, majo¬ rem esse Regis, quam patris auctoritatem, ut idem Augustinus dicit serm. 6. de verbis Domini. Bernardus tract. deprtecept. et dis¬ pensat. « Sive Deus, sive homo vicarius Dei mandatum quodcumque tradiderit , pari profecto obsequendum est cura, pari reve¬ rentia deferendum, ubi tamen Deo contraria non praecipit homo» ; ubi clare dicit, differ¬ re leges ex parte materiae, non autem ex parte praecipientium. At objicies : nam B. Bernardus ibidem loquens de mandatis hominum, dicit, jussa sine culpa non negliguntur, sine crimine non contemnuntur, ubique enim et culpa¬ bilis neglectus, et contemptus damnabilis est : ubi videtur dicere, legem humanam numquam obligare ad culpam mortalem, nisi ratione contemptus. Respondeo : loqui¬ tur de praeceptis rerum levium, in talibus enim non potest esse crimen, nisi ratione contemptus. Nec enim possunt Praelati pro arbitrio obligare ad culpam mortalem. Sexto probatur, quia videtur implicare contradictionem, posse Principes obligare ad paenam, et non ad culpam, si quidem cul¬ pa et poena relativa sunt. Et B. Augustinus dicit lib. I. retract. cap. 9 : « Omnis poena si justa est, poena peccati est. » Et in epist. 103. et alibi, Deum ipsum fore injustum as¬ serit, si quemquam damnaret innoxium. Quomodo igitur possunt Principes damnare ad mortem eos, qui leges suas praevarican¬ tur, si illi nihil peccaverunt ? si culpam in conscientia non contraxerunt? Dices : quomodo ergo Regulae quorumdam religiosorum obligant ad poenam, et non ad culpam ? Respondeo : obligant non per mo¬ dum legis, sed per modum conventionis et pacti, ut leges pure poenales. Nec illa est proprie poena, sed poenalis afflictio suscepta in auxilium spiritus. Septimo et ultimo ex doctrina Apostolo¬ rum; nam Roman. XIII, Paulus multis mo¬ dis id asserit. Primo, cum ait : Omnis anima potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit ; non enim est potestas, nisi a Deo. Secundo, cum ait: Qui potestati resistit, Dei ordinationi resistit. Tertio, cum ait : Qui autem resistunt, ipsi si¬ bi damnationem acquirunt. Id enim de aeter- na damnatione exponunt Patres Graeci et Latiui in hunc locum. Quarto, cum ait: /deo necessitate subditi estote. Quinto, cum ait : Non solum propter iram, sed etiam propter conscientiam. Sexto, cum ait : Ministri enim 20 LIBER III. Dei sunt. I. Pet. II : Subjecti estote propter Deum (I), id est, non solum timore poenae. IIa;c loca satis demonstrant quod volumus : Nam si Principes a Deo potestatem habent imperandi, certe qui eis non parent, non so¬ lum Principes , sed etiam Deum offendunt ; et si qui Principi resistunt , Dei ordinationi resistunt ; certe peccant in conscientia, non secus ac si divinasleges praevaricarentur: et¬ si "qui resistunt, damnationem sibi acquirunt, certe culpam ea paena dignam incurrunt. Et si necessitate subditi sint privati Principibus non solum propter iram sed etiam pi'opter conscientiam, quomodo non peccant in con¬ scientia qui eis non obediunt? Denique si Principes, Dei ministri sunt et eis propter Deum parendum est, profecto majestatem Dei laedunt, qui Principum mandata con¬ temnunt. Ad argumenta in contrarium. Ad primum, secundum, et tertium res¬ pondeo, ex eo, quod potestas politica est temporalis, et ejus finis est pax exterior, et homo non judicat de internis, recte colligi, eam non posse obligare, nisi ad actus tem¬ porales et exteriores ; non autem non pos¬ se obligare in conscientia: nam etsi ista re¬ gula dirigat actus exteriores, tamen quia re¬ gula est, ab ipsa deviare, peccare est. Dices : quomodo potest lex, vel potestas temporalis producere effectum spiritualem, id est, ligare conscientiam ? Respondeo : li¬ cet potestas politica et ejus lex dicantur temporales ratione objecti, quia versantur circa temporalia, et exteriora ; tamen in se res sunt spirituales. Praeterea, ligare cons¬ cientiam non est aliquid efficere in rem spi¬ ritualem, sed solum imperare alteri, et sic imperare, ut si is non obediat peccet, et tes¬ timonio propriae conscientiae intelligat, vel intelligere possit, se peccare. Itaque qui¬ cumque potest jubere, potest ligare cons¬ cientiam, etiam si is de internis non judicet, nec scrutetur conscientiam alterius. Ad quartum et quintum dico, Principem non posse inferre poenam spiritualem et aeternam, nec posse dimittere ejusmodi poe¬ nam, et tamen posse obligare ad illam; quia id facit auctoritate Dei, qui ei conces¬ sit unum, et non alterum; sicut si Rex per¬ mitteret Proregi obligare subditos ad poe¬ nam capitis, et tamen non permitteret ei per se exercere justitiam, vel condonare suppli¬ cium. Vel dicendum est, legem politicam obligare ad poenam aeternam, non ut est lex hominis, sed ut est lex ministri Dei. Qui enim ministrum Dei offendit, simul etiam Deum ipsum offendit; quocirca si (per im¬ possibile) Deus non esset in rerum natura, et tamen lex politica similiter per impossibi¬ le extaret aliqua, illa obligaret in conscien¬ tia, et ejus praevaricatio peccatum esset, sed nulla sequeretur praevaricatorem poena spi¬ ritualis aut aeterna damnatio. At sextum dico, non esse absurdum, idem peccatum puniri a pluribus, et pluri¬ bus in locis, quando plures offendit, sicut videmus homicidis saepe abscindi manus in eo loco, tibi caedem patrarunt, et deinde in loco publicae justitiae abscindi caput. Ad septimum dico, ex intentione legisla¬ toris pendere ; an velit revera imperare, et veram legem condere, an vero solum osten¬ dere quid agendum sit, sine alio imperio : sed si velit serio imperare, et veram legem condere, non est in ejus potestate impedire, quin lex obliget ad mortale, aut veniale, pro rei magnitudine. Ad ultimum dico, quod legi divinae cedat humana, quando simul servari nequeunt, non esse causam, quia humana non obliget ad peccatum, sed quia lex humana minus firmiter statuta est; in tali enim casu desi¬ nit esse lex, et proinde etiam pbligare. Vi¬ de quae diximus in lib. IV. de Pontifice ; et praeterea Joannem Driedonem in III. lib. de libertate Christiana; Adrianum quodlib. 6. Franciscum Victoriam in relectione de po¬ testate civili; Alphonsum a Castro, lib. I. de potestate legis poenalis, cap. 4. et Domi¬ nicum a Soto, lib. I. quaest. 6. art. 4. de justitia et jure.