Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Sacrament of Matrimony
Chapter 25: The Opinions on the Impediment of Kinship Are Brought Forward
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. III, De Sacramento Matrimonii, the fifth general controversy on the sacraments. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
These things being premised, the question is within which degrees kinship, or affinity too, lawfully hinders the contract of Matrimony; for that it hinders within some degree there is no one who denies. And I find five opinions of the heretics on this matter.
The first is John Wyclif's, who in book 4 of the Trialogus, chapter 20, affirms that kinship hinders marriage in the first degree only, and that in the direct line; but that in the transverse line there is no prohibition; from which he gathers that Matrimony can be joined between brothers and sisters, because this is not forbidden by divine law, but only by human invention.
Wherefore Dominic Soto was deceived, on book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 40, article 3, where he relates that Wyclif held that the prohibitions which are had in Leviticus keep their force by divine law even among Christians. For Wyclif did not hold this, but plainly the contrary. For these are the words in his book, which I have by me: “Nor do I delight in the multitude of causes of divorce, since many are ordained by men without foundation, as is plain especially of kinship. For in the time of the first man brothers and sisters were so married by divine ordinance; and in the time of the patriarchs, as Abraham, Isaac and the like, fairly near. Nor does any reason remain why it would not be lawful today, except human ordinance.” So he; and therefore Thomas Waldensis, tome 2 On the Sacraments, chapter 133 (whom Soto also cites), contends against Wyclif that the precepts of Leviticus belong by divine law to Christians also.
The second opinion is Luther's, in the book On the Babylonian Captivity, the chapter on Matrimony, and in the sermon on Matrimony published in the year 1525 at Strasbourg; and Martin Bucer's, in the commentary on chapter 19 of Matthew; who acknowledge as impediments of Matrimony only the degrees of kinship which are had in Leviticus, chapter 18, and altogether reject the rest added by the Church. And so they will have it that in the degrees expressed in Leviticus it is in no way lawful to contract marriages, nor do they admit any dispensation of the Church, since that law is divine, not human; and on the contrary they will have it that in all other degrees one can freely contract, notwithstanding human law or custom, since God knew best what was to be forbidden and what not.
And this opinion was followed by those who persuaded Henry, king of the English, that the Roman pontiff could not have dispensed with him to take the wife of his dead brother; because, namely, the divine law, Leviticus 18, expressly forbids it.
The third opinion is that of Philip Melanchthon, in the Commonplaces, under the title on marriage, and of Martin Chemnitz, in the second part of the Examination of the Council of Trent, page 1230 and following; who agree with Luther and Bucer that the precepts of Leviticus about the degrees of kinship contain the natural norm of justice, and by this have force even among Christians, and are altogether unchangeable; but they differ as to the other degrees not expressed in Leviticus. For they say that some other degrees were rightly forbidden by the ancient Church, and can be forbidden even now, provided it be done with the liberty of conscience kept, if it is done otherwise.
But there are three contradictions in Chemnitz's disputation. For first, on page 1231, he says that the precepts of Leviticus about the degrees of kinship are natural commands which belong to all men and all times, as norms of justice unchangeable in the divine mind and will; and yet on page 1230, just before, he had said that God dispensed with the sons of Adam, so that brothers were joined to sisters; which is the first degree in the transverse line, expressly forbidden in Leviticus. If that law of Leviticus extends to all men and all times, and is a norm of justice unchangeable in the divine mind, how was it changed by God himself immediately at the beginning of the world?
Then, on page 1238, Chemnitz affirms that all marriages which do not fight against the divine prohibitions are joined by God, and therefore cannot be broken, since Christ said, “What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder”; and yet on the same page and the one before he had granted that the Church with the magistrate can set up some degrees next to those which the divine law had set up; and on pages 1234 and 1235 he had approved, from Ambrose and Augustine, the civil law forbidding the marriages of cousins, although the divine law did not forbid them. But if all marriages which do not fight with the divine prohibition are from God and cannot be broken, then no marriages can be forbidden which God did not forbid, nor any degrees set up which God did not set up, unless we will forbid and break marriages which God has joined. How then can men set up degrees which are not in Leviticus, as about cousins?
Lastly, on page 1237, Chemnitz will have it that certain degrees can be set up by human laws within which marriages are not lawful, but yet with the liberty of conscience safe. But these plainly fight. For marriages contracted within degrees prescribed by human law will be either lawful or unlawful. They cannot be lawful, since they are against the law, or certainly the law itself will be unjust and bad, the contrary of which Chemnitz asserts; therefore they will be unlawful. Therefore it will be evil in conscience to contract them; unless perhaps it is not evil in conscience to commit fornication under the name of marriage. Therefore that law, though human, binds in conscience; the contrary of which Chemnitz affirmed.
Add also the manifest lie of Chemnitz, on page 1238: for he says that the Roman pontiff will have consciences bound by papal prohibitions no less than by divine ones. But that this is a lie is clear, because the supreme pontiff often dispenses in papal prohibitions, in divine ones never. For those which seem to Chemnitz divine prohibitions, and in which the pope sometimes dispenses, we shall, God willing, prove plainly a little after are not divine among Christians.
The fourth opinion is Brenz's, who in the Württemberg Confession, the chapter on marriage, and in the apology for the same confession, will have the civil law of the emperors kept in the degrees of kinship. But he treats this more fully in the commentaries on Leviticus, on chapter 18; and what he has in that place can be brought back to five heads.
First he affirms that the divine law which is had in Leviticus does not belong to Christians inasmuch as it is Mosaic and Levitical and judicial, since it has been abrogated through Christ, but only inasmuch as it contains in some way the law of nature. For the law of nature commands that there be a distinction between persons in contracting marriages, but what that distinction is it does not expressly teach.
Second he adds that it is not to be left to the choice of each one to set up the distinction of persons, and so the degrees of kinship, but that there is need of some lawgiver.
Third he says that there are three lawgivers who have made laws about these degrees, Moses, the Roman pontiff and Caesar, but that none of these can simply be admitted. For Moses does not belong to us, since his polity has been abrogated through Christ. The Roman pontiff has no authority of making law. Caesar is indeed a true lawgiver, but because in this business of Matrimony he subjected his laws to the papal canons, therefore he too lost his authority.
Fourth he says that, since no law about marriages remains, the law of nature must be followed; and to know which degrees are forbidden by the law of nature, he orders it observed in which degrees the law of Moses and the law of the Roman emperor agree. For the degrees which are forbidden by both laws ought without doubt to be judged forbidden by the law of nature; and in these no dispensation is to be admitted; but those which are forbidden only by the law of Moses, or only by the law of the Roman emperor, are to be held forbidden by political law, not by the law of nature.
Fifth, lastly, he adds that not only the law of nature is to be kept in the degrees of kinship as regards marriages, but also the law of the Roman emperor, and the custom of the place, and even the judgement of prudent men. For although the law of the Roman emperor lost its authority when he subjected himself to the papal canons, yet otherwise it was just; and as a certain man appealed from a drowsy king to a waking one, and another from a drunken one to a sober one, so we shall appeal from those deceived by fraud to those rightly taught, or from the administrators of the laws to the laws themselves.
In which opinion of Brenz the first and second statements are most true; the third and fourth false, and to be refuted in the following chapter; the fifth most absurd, and plainly fighting with the third. For if the Roman civil laws lost their authority, as Brenz most openly says in the third statement, they can bind no one any longer, and by this no marriages will be unlawful except those which are forbidden by natural law; the contrary of which the fifth statement holds.
Nor does that appeal of Brenz, from those deceived by fraud to those better taught, stand in the way. For the Roman emperors are still such as they formerly were, namely Catholics, and still subject their laws to the canons; for there has not yet been any Lutheran emperor. To which emperor, then, will Brenz appeal?
But perhaps for this reason he added that he appeals from the administrators of the laws to the laws themselves. But it is unheard of and most absurd that anyone should appeal from a judge to the law; and although it might in some way be tolerated that one appeal from some inferior judge to the law, yet that one should appeal from the prince who made the law (for Brenz calls him the administrator of the law) to the law is altogether intolerable, since the law has its authority from the prince, not the prince from the law, nor can the prince be deprived of authority without his laws too at once ceasing to be laws.
But perhaps Brenz thinks the Roman laws are not as coercive laws, but as prudent admonitions, in the way in which the laws of Plato or Aristotle about the commonwealth, or of Marcus Tullius about duties, could be kept. But neither can this be said. For those laws which lack the authority of a prince do not make marriages lawful or unlawful, and especially in the external forum; but Brenz speaks of those laws which make marriages lawful or unlawful: for he writes that the political laws of the Romans are to be kept not only for conscience's sake but also on account of successions and inheritances, which belong only to lawful sons; and those are lawful sons who are begotten of a lawful Matrimony. Brenz is compelled, then, to admit these two contradictory things: that the Roman laws on the degrees of kinship have lost their authority, and yet that they bind, and must necessarily be kept as most true laws. But enough of Brenz.
John Calvin does not explain his opinion sufficiently. For he only blames the Church, in book 4 of the Institutes, chapter 19, the last section, for having set up degrees of kinship beyond the polity of other nations and of Moses himself, and for having willed spiritual kinship to be an impediment of Matrimony. But from the opinion of Theodore Beza, Calvin's chief disciple, it will be possible to know Calvin's opinion.
There is, then, the fifth opinion, of Theodore Beza, in the book on repudiations and divorces, who first blames the way of reckoning degrees which the canonical doctors use, as absurd, and contends that only the way of reckoning is to be followed which the civil jurists use.
Then he affirms that the degrees which are numbered in Leviticus are to be kept by divine law, and that marriages contracted in those degrees are altogether null.
Third he teaches that not only those degrees which are expressly had in Leviticus are to be kept by divine law, but also those which are gathered from them by likeness. As, because in Leviticus the marriage of a nephew with his aunt on the father's or mother's side is forbidden, Beza asserts that the marriage of an uncle on the father's or mother's side with his niece from a brother or sister ought also to be understood as forbidden; and because in Leviticus the marriage of a father with his daughter and of a grandfather with his granddaughter is forbidden, he himself gathers that all marriages in the direct line are understood to be forbidden, because in the direct line the elder always holds the place of father in respect of the younger; and by the same reason he will have the marriage of the uncle forbidden not only with his niece but also with his grandniece and great-grandniece, and with all lower ones. And so he orders many degrees to be kept by divine law, although they are not expressly had in Leviticus.
Fourth he teaches that the civil laws too about the degrees of kinship are to be kept, yet so that marriages are not contracted in these degrees, but, if they have been contracted, are not broken. Which yet in truth is not to keep the civil law: for the civil law makes void marriages contracted within the forbidden degrees. But of these things we shall discourse afterward.
This is to be observed here in passing, that Beza, as befitted a heretic, goes about in that book well furnished with slanders and lies; of which it has pleased me to note two. On page 44 he draws this figure, a table of kinship of John, Peter, James, Andrew, Paul, Rachel, Susanna and Joanna, and says: “The canonists grant that Peter, the great-great-uncle, may take as wife Joanna, the great-great-granddaughter of his brother, who by the right reckoning, which is to be followed, is distant from him by six degrees; but not James the same Joanna, although they are distant by as many, that is by six degrees; nay, not even Andrew could take Joanna by their canons, from whom yet he is distant by seven degrees. So within the sixth degree they grant marriages even with one who holds the place of a parent, as we have just said; within the same, where he is not in the place of a parent, they do not grant it, namely between James and Joanna; nor even in the seventh degree, as between Andrew and Joanna. So far does that second fictitious rule of theirs about counting degrees in the unequal transverse line drive them from the right.” So he. In which few lines there are almost as many errors as words, so that I am compelled to doubt whether he wrote these things asleep or awake.
First, he falsely affirms that the canonical doctors grant to the great-great-uncle that he may take as wife his brother's great-great-granddaughter: for since between these according to the canons there is the fourth degree of consanguinity, none of the canonists would say that marriage between them is lawful. For it is most well known, and cited above by Beza himself, that in the fourth degree Matrimony is forbidden, the chapter Non debet, on consanguinity and affinity.
Second, he falsely affirms that between these there is the sixth degree according to the right reckoning. For by the right one he understands the legal, as is certain from the foregoing; for he always fights for the legal against the canonical. But according to the legal reckoning there are five degrees between Peter and Joanna, not six; for there are so many persons, the stock being taken away.
Third, he falsely affirms that the marriage of Joanna, which would be granted to Peter, is denied to James and Andrew. For it is denied to all, because all are with her in the fourth degree; but if it were granted to Peter, it would be granted in consequence also to James and Andrew, who are in the same degree in respect of Joanna. Nor will Beza find any canonist who teaches otherwise.
Fourth, he falsely affirms that according to the reckoning of the laws Joanna is distant from James by as many degrees as she is distant from Peter, namely six; for no one can doubt that this is false, since according to the laws Peter is one degree nearer to Joanna than James is to the same Joanna. And so Peter is distant from her by five degrees, James by six, Andrew by seven, if we follow the reckoning of the laws; but according to the canons all three are with Joanna in the fourth degree.
And from these four manifest errors it follows that that whole conclusion is false which concludes that the canonical doctors grant marriages within the sixth legal degree to him who is in the place of a father, and within the same do not grant them to him who is not in the place of a father; for these are such things as could hardly have fallen from one raving in a fever.
Then on page 49 Beza writes that Martin V was not ashamed to relax for someone a Matrimony with his own full sister, and calls this a most wicked deed. But Martin V, a pontiff by the consent of all most wise and most good, did not permit a marriage with the man's own full sister, as Beza lies, but with the sister of her whom he had before known by fornication, as St. Antoninus relates, part 3 of the Summa of Theology, title 1, chapter 11; and this affinity we do not read expressly in Leviticus. Nor can the adversaries deny that it is far more tolerable to take a relative by affinity from fornicating union than a relative from lawful Matrimony, or a blood relative in the first degree; and yet this very thing the pontiff did not permit (as Beza again lies) on account of money given him, but on account of the enormous scandal which was feared from the separation of that marriage, since the case was hidden; and that from mature counsel and a long discussion of many theologians, as can be understood from the same St. Antoninus, who lived at the same time.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXV.
Senlcnliac ndfcrunlur dc impedimcnlo
cognalionis.
His praemissis, quaeslio esl, inlra quos gradus
cognalio, sive oliam nlTiuitas Mntrimonii coiitra-
ctum jiire impodial: impedire eiiim intra graduui
iiliipiem neino esl, qui ncgct. Quidquc invenio de
hac rc scntculias hacrclicorum.
Prima cst Jicinnis Wiclophi, qui iii 4. lib. tri;i-
logi ciii^.^O. nfTirni;»! cogiuilioiHMU iii primo sidiiui
grndu im|)(Mlirc conjngium, iihpie iii rcclo ordiiic.
in Iransvorso aulom nulliun ossc prohibitionom: cx
(pio colligil, inlcr fralrcs ct sororos Miilriiuonium
posso conjuiigi,(piin id non csl proliibilnm jurcdi-
viiio, scd taiilum pcr humnnam invcnlioucm.
840 m: SACUAMLMO MATIUMOMI
Qii;.re dcccplus csl Doininiciis a Solo in 4. scn- innnulabilis ([uo pnclo ab Ipso Dco sl;ilini inilio
ifiili.n-uMi tiislincl. i(>. ;u'lic. W. ubi rcifcri, Wiole- niiindi inulal;\ csl?
plium scnsisse. prohibilioncs tiujc iKibcnUir in l^eiiulc piig. 12;{8.;inirninl Kcmnilius. ouinia M;i-
I.i'vi[ico. viin suam jurc divino eliain apud (lliri- Irimonia.quae non pufinanl conlra diviiias probibi-
sliaiios rclinere. .\on eiiim id scnsil WielepliiK-, liones. csse a Deo conjuncla, cl idco diriini non
>ed plane conlrarium. llacc cnini sunl vcrba in li- posse.euin ClirisUis dixeril:(;)iiO(i Dcun conjunxil,
bro ipsius, (]uein apud me babeo: I\^ec delcclor m homo non separet; cl laineu in cadein jiagina cl
inulliludine caussurunidLi'orlii,cu)n nudtae ainl siipeiiorc, coiiccsseral possc l']eclcsl;iin cuui ma-
infundabilHer li}(fnanitus ordinataejitpalct spe- £,nslriilii, gradiis ali(]nos coiislilucrc iis proximos,
iialiter de cotjnatiune. iSani tcmpore prinii ho- (\nns lex diviiia conslilucrat: cl pag 12.34-. cl 12:J.V.
ininis, fralres el sorores faerunl ex ordinatione approbaveral cx Ambrosio cl Auguslino, legcin
divina laliter conju(]ati: et tenipore patriarcha- civilein proliilicnlem conjtigia consobrinorum,lic(;t
runijit Abrahani, Isaac el taliuin: satis propin- ea non probibucril lex divina. Al si omnia MaUi-
tiuae. Acc super est ralio, quare non licerct ho- monia,quac non pugnanl cum divina probibilione,
ilie.nisi huinana ordinatio.U-acc ille:el ideo Tlio- snnl a Dco, cl dirimi nequeunl: crgo nulla Malri-
iiias Waldensis, lomo 2. de sacramenUs cap. llii. nionia probibcri possunt,quacDcus non proliibuil,
(.|uein-eliam SoUis cital) conlra Wiclcpbum con- neque ulli gradus consUlui, quos Deus non consLi-
lendil, pracccpla LeviUci jurc divino od Cbrislia- luil, nisi probiberc velimus ac diriracrc Malrimo-
jios etiani perlincre. nia, quac Deus conjunxil. Quomodo ergo possunl
Allera senlenlia esl Lullieri in lib.dc caplivilalc bomines gradus consliUicrc; qui non sunl in Lcvi-
babylonica cap. de Malrimonio. cl in serm. de Ma- lico, ul de consobrinis?
irimonio, edilo anno 1525. Argenliae; el Marli- Postremo pag. 1237. vull Remnilius possc con-
iii Buceri in comnicnl. oap. 19. M;itUiaei;qui solus slitui per leges bumanas cerlos gradus, inlra quos
gradus congnationis,qui liabculur in Levil.cap. 18. non sinl legilima Matrimonia; scd lamen salv;i li-
iil Malrimonii inipcdimenta agnoscunl, caeteros ab berlale conscienUae:At isla manifesle pugnanl.Nani
ilcclesia addilos omnino rejiciont. Daque nolunt vel iMatrimonia inlra gr;idus lcge liumana praescri-
in gradibus iii Lcvilieo expressis uUo modo licere plos contracta. erunl lcgilima, vel illegilima. Le-
Malrimonia conlrabcre,ncquc ullam admillunt Ec- gitim;i esse non polerunl, cum sint contra lcgem,
clesiae dispensaUoncm,cum lex illa divina sit, non aul cerle lex ipsa iniqua erit et raala, cujus con-
Immana: et coiilra volunt, in omnibus aliis gradi- Irarium Kemnitius asserit;ergo erunl illegitima.Er-
bos Iibere posse conlrabi.non obslanle bumana le- go in conscientia malum erit illa conlrabere; nisi
ge, vcl co nsuelndinc, cum Deus oplime noverit forle non sit malura, in conscientia noniine conju-
(]oid probibendum, quidve non probibendum fue- gi rornicationem commillere; Ergo lex illa, quam-
ril. vis bumana in conscienlia obligat, cujus contrari-
El lianc senlenliam sequebanlur, qui pcrsuase- um Kemnilius afrirmabat.
niiil llcnrico regi Anglorum; non poluissc roma- Adde etiam manifeslum Kemnitii mendacium,
iium ponUncem cuin ipso dispensare, ut accipe- pagina 1238. dicit enim romanum ponlificem vel-
rel uxorem fr;ilris sui dcfuncU; quod id videlicet le eonscienlias pontificiis probibilionibus non mi-
expressc probibeal lex divina Levil. 18. nus teneri,quam divinis. Al hoc mendacium esse,
Terlia senlenlia esl Pbilippi Melancblbonis in perspicuum est, quia summus pontifex in ponlin-
locis, tit. de conjugio, el Murlini Kemnilii in 2. ciis proliibitionibus saepe dispensat; in divinis
parl. examinis condlii Iridenlini pag. 1230.cl se- numciuara. Nam quae videnlur Kemnitio divinae
(pionlibus, qui conveniunl oum Lulhero el Bucero, probibitiones,et in quibus aliquando papa dispen-
ijuod praecepla Levilici circa gradus cognalionis sat, eos nos paulo post, non esse divinas apud
iialuralem justiliae normam contineant, el per boc Clirislianos, Deo volcnte manifesle probabimus.
•'liam apud ChrisUanos vim babeanl, el omnino Quarta scnlcnlia Brentii esl, qui in confessiohc
immubibilia sint: sed discrepanl, quoad alios gra- Wirlembergensi, cap. de conjugio, ct in apologia
(liis in Levitico non expressos. Dicunt cnim^aii- pro eadem confessione,vuIt in gradibus cognalio-
quos alios gradus ab Ecclesia anliqua recle fuisse nis legem civilera iraperalorum servandam esse.
prohibilos, el nunc eliain posse probiberi, modo Sed fusius hoc traclat in coramenlariis in Leviti-
id fial scrvala libertale conscienliae, si secus cura ad cap. 18. quae aulera eo loco habet, ad
ti;il. quinque capita revocari possunl.
Sed Ires sunl in dispulatione Keinnitii conlradi- Primo arfirraal legem divinam, quae in Levitico
"tiones. Prinium enim pagina 1231. dicil, praece- babelur,ac Cbristiaiios non perlinere,qualenusMo-
j>ta Levilici de gradibus cognationis,esse mandala saic;i et Levitic;i judicialis est,cura sit per Cbristuin
naluralia, qnae'ad omnes bomines, et ad omnia abrogata:sed solum quatenus continet aliquo inodo
tempora pertineant, tamquam norinae jusUUae,in legem nalurae. Lex enim nalurae jubet, discrimen
Mu-nte el volunlale divina immutabiles: el lamen esse inter personas in contrahendis Malrimoniis,
pag. 1230. proxirae praecedenli dixeral, Deura di- sed quod sit illud discrimen, non expresse docet.
spensasse cura filiis Adami.ul fralres sororibus co- Secondo addil: !N'on csse relinquendum in arbi-
pularentur; qui esl gradus primus in linea Irans- trio uniuscujusque, ut discriinen personarum, et
versa, in Levilico cxpresse prohibilus. Si lex illa proinde gradus cognationis consliluat, sed opus
Levilici nd oranes homines et omnia tempora se esse aliquo Icgislalorc.
exlcndil, et csl noriTKi jusUliac in menlc divina Terlio dicit:Trcs essc legislalores,qui dehisgra-
LlBEli PIU31LS
841
(libus leges posuerunl, Moyscm, romanum ponli-
ficum el Caesarem, sed nullum horum simpliciter
milli posse. Moyses enim ad nos non perlinel,
cum ejus polilia pcr Christum abrogala sil. Roma-
iius ponlifex non habel auctoritalem legis ferendi.
Caesar esl quidemvcrus legishitor,sed quia inhoc
negotiodcMatrimoniosubjecit legessuascanonibus
ponlidciis, ideo ipse quoque auclorilalem amisit.
Quarto clicit:Cum nulla sit reliqua lex de nuptiis,
seclandam esse legem naturae, et ad cognoscen-
dum qui gradus sint prohibili jure nalurae, ob-
servari jubet, in quibus gradibus convenial lex
Moysis et lex imperatoris romani.Nam qui gradus
prohibenturab ulraque lege, ii sine dubio censeri
debent prohibili jure naturae; el in iis nulla dis-
pensatio admiltenda est: qui autem prohibentur a
lege Moysis tantum, aut a lege romani imperatoris
lantum, ii habendi sunt prohibili legc politica,non
jure naturae.
Quinto denique addit.non solum scrvandam esse
legem naturae in gradibus cogiiationis, quod atti-
net ad ilatrimonia, sed ctiam legem romani impe-
raloris el consucludinem loci, et arbitrium etiam
prudcnlium virorum. Licet enira lex romani impe-
ratoris aucloritalcm pcrdiderit, cum se canonibus
ponlificiis subjecit ; tamen alioqui jusla erat: et
quemadmodum quidam appellavit a regc somno-
lenlo ad vigilantem, et alius ab ebrio ad sobrium,
ita nosappellabimus a deceptisfraudcad recleedo-
clos,aut a legum adminislraloribus ad ipsas leges.
In qua senlentia Brenlii, primuin ct secundum
pronuncialum verissima sunt; lcrtium et quartum,
fiilsa et in sequcnti capite refulanda; quinlum ab-
surdissimum esl,et cum tcrtio manifestc pugnans.
INam si legcs civiles romanae amiserunt auctorila-
tem, ut iipertissime in tertio pronunciato Brcntius
ait, nullum jam obligarc possunt, ac per hoc nulla
crunt illegilima Malrimonia, nisi quae prohibenlur
lege naturali:cujuscontrarium habcl quinlum pro-
nunciatum.
Ncque obstat illa appellatio Brcnlii, a dcceptis
fraude, ad melius edoclos. Nam imperalores ro-
mani adhuc sunt, quales olim fucruut , nimirum
catholici, ct adhuc subjiciunt legcs suas canoni-
bus;ncque enim ullus adhuc fuil impcralor Luthe-
ranus: ad quem igilur impcratorcm lirentius ap-
poll.ibil?
Scd idco forlassc a(ldidit,sc appcllare ab admi-
nislratoribuslegum ad ipsas legcs. Ad hoc inaudi-
lum ct ahsurdissimum est,ut quis a judicc ad Ic-
gcm appellel:el (luamvis ulcunKpie tolcrari |)Osscl,
ul ai)pellarclur a judice aliquo inferiorc ad Icgcm:
lamen ut a principc, qui lcgcm condidil (hunc c-
iiiin vocit Hrcnliiis legis adminislralorem) appel-
lelur ad legcm, oinnino inlolcrabilc cst , cum lcx
a principe, non princcps a lege auctoritutein ha-
bcat, ncc possil princeps auctorilalc privari, quin
et ipsiiis lcgcs contiiuio desinant csse lcges.
Sed forlassc Urcnlius lcgcs romiinas essc cen-
scl, non ul lcges coactivas, scd ut prudcntes ad-
innnitiones,ad qucm inodum ctiam lcgcs IMalonis,
vel Aristolclis dc republica, vcl Marci Tullii dc
olliciis scrvari posscnt. At ncfjuc hoc dici potcst.
Nam legcs islae, qiiac carcnt princii)is auclorilalc,
non faciunt lcgilima, vcl illegilima Malrimonia, ac
praesertim in loro cxterno, Brcntius autcm dc iis
legibus loquitur, quae faciunt legilima, vcl illegi-
tima Malrimonia: scribit enim politicas leges Ro-
manorum scrvandas csse, non solum propter con-
scientiam, sed eliam propter succcssiones et hac-
reditatcs,quae ad legilimos filios lantum pcrlinenl;
el ii sunt filii legitimi, qui cx legilimo Malrimonio
procreantur. Cogitur ergo Brentius duo ista pu-
gnantia admitlcrc, leges romanas dc gradibus co-
gnationis perdidisse auctoritatem, el tamen obli-
gare, ac necessario ut verissimas lcgcs essc ser-
vandas. Sed de Brentio satis.
Joannes Calvinus non salis explical sentcntiam
suam. Solum enim lib. 4. Inslitut. cap. 19. § ulti-
mo reprehendit Ecclesiam , quod gradus cogna-
tionis consliluerit praeteraliarum gentium,et ipsius
etiam Moysis politiam: et quod spirilualem cogna-
tionem impcdimentum Malrimonii esse volucrit.
Sed ex sentenlia Theodori Bczac primarii Calvini
discipuli, senlentiam Calvini cognoscerc liccbit.
Esl igitur quinta sententia Tlieodori Bczac in li-
bro de repudiis el divorliis, qui primo reprclicn-
dit modum supputandi gradus, quo utunlur cano-
nici doctorcs, tamquam absurdum; ct solum sc-
quendum esse conlendit modum supputandi, quo
uluntur jureconsulti civiles.
DeinJe affirmat gradus, qui numeranlur in Le-
vitico, jure divino servandos esse, et Malrimonia
in illis gradibus conlracla, esse omnino nulla.
Tertio docet: Non solum gradus illos, qui ex-
prcsse habentur in Levilico, jurc divinoscrvandos
essc , sed eliam eos, qui a simili colligunlur. Ut,
quia in Levilicoprohibelur conjugium ncpolis cum
amita, vel materlcra, asserit Beza, prohibitum ct-
iam intelligi dcbere conjugium patrui, vcl avun-
culi cum nepte ex fratrc vcl sororc: ct quia in
Lcvilico prohibelur conjugium palris cuin fi-
lia, cl avi cum ncpic, colligil ipsc, proliibita in-
(elligi omnia conjugia in linca recta, quia sempcr
major in linea recta habct locum palris respcclu
junioris; et eadcm ralionc vult cssc piohibitum
conjugiuin patrui non solum cum ncple , sed cum
proncptc eliam, et cum abncptc, et cum omnibus
infcrioribus.liaquemullosgradusjurcdivinoscrvari
jubet,quamvis expressc inLcvitico non hid)canlur.
Quartodocet:Leges ctiain civiles degriulibiis co-
gnalionis scrvandas essc, sic tamcn ut 3Ialrimonia
in liis gradibus non conlrahanlur, sed si contracta
fuerint, non diriinantur. Quod laincn rcvcra non
esl lcgcm civilcm scrvarc: Icx eniin civilis irrilat
Malrimonia inlrii gradus prohibitos contracta. Sed
de his postca dissercmus.
illiid liic ohitcr est ol)scrviin(liim.Bcznm,ut liac-
rcticum (lcccl)at,in eo libro caliimniis el mcndaciis
satis inslructuin inccdere: e quibus duo annolarc
placuit. l*ag. 44. depingit hanc figuram.
Joanncs
Petrus
Jiicobus
Aiidrcas
Paulus
Rachci
Susanna
.lolianna
m
l)K SACIIA.MMMO MVllWMd.MI
ac (lifil: ConciHlitul canoniri Johannani /hi/r/s
abnrploin duccir Pclro ixilnio moxiino. (jitac ah
co ai rcclain liitpjmtaUoncin scquaoinr. scx (/ra-
dibits di.<la(: Jacobo vero Johannam non ilcm .
quamvis (otidcni.. idcsl. ticx gradihus dislcnt.ini-
vio nc Jahannoin tjuidcni Andrcas acripcrc c,v,
Hlorum ('(inonibus poicrii. a (jua Innicn scptam
dishit firadihus. lUuiuc inlra t^cxUim (iradum
conccdunt nuplias cliam cum co. qui parcnlis
loco noni^il.ut modo di.rimus: iiilra cundcin.iiul
parenlis loconon sit.non concpdunt,ncmpe inirr
Jacohum cl Johannain: ncc in scpiimo quideni
[iradu ut intcr.indrram cl Joh^innain.Usqneadco
procui eos a rcclo coqit dcjlcclcre sccunda Ula
rc;iuhi commcntitia dc (/radihusin transversa li-
nca inacquali numcrandis. Il.icc illi». Iii qiiiliiis
piuiois liiieis lol siiiil fcriiic criiilii, qiiol vcibii: a-
<lfo iil .luhiliirc cogar, dormiens nc , aii vij,'ilans
ill.i scrips(>rit,
Priino fiilso alTirmat canonicos doclorcs concc-
derc palruo maximo, nl ribiic|)lcm c.v IViilrc ducal
n\orcin:nam cnm inlor lios sccundum canones sil
qiiiirlns griidiis consiinirninitalis , ncmo cnnonico-
rnin diccrct. inlcr cos conjugiiim cssc licitnm.No-
lissimum cnim esl, clsupra eliam ab ipso Bcza ci-
lalum. in quiirlo gradu 31iilrimonium proliibcri ,
cap. yon dchct. de fons;in(Tiii:iii. oi iiirinilale,
Secundo: Falso aniimal inlcr bos esse gradum
sexlum. sccundnm rcclam suppulationcm.Nam per
rcclam. inlclligil Icjjiilom, iit cx supcrioribus con-
slat:scmper cnim pro Ic<,'iili conira ciinonicain pu-
gnal. Al secundum legiilcni su[)pulalionem inicr
Pclrnm clJ(diiinnnm.snnl iiradus qiiiriquc,non sc.v:
lol eniin suiil pcrsonae dciiipio slipilc.
TerliorFalso afrirmal nnptias Jobannae.quae cnn-
cedcbiinlur Pclro ncgiiri Jacobo el Andreae. Nam
omnibns quidcm neganlnr, qnia snnl omncs cnin
ea in quarlo gradu: al si Pclro conccderentur.con-
cederenlur eliam consequenlcr Jacobo et Andreae,
qui iu codem gradii sunt respectu Johannae. Nc-
que uilum Ceza canonislam inveuiel.qui secus do-
ceal.
Quarlo:Falso airirmatsecundum logum siipputa-
lioiicm, lotidcm gradibus distiirc Joliann;im a Ja-
cobo. quot ca dislala Pclro, niniirum so.\; id enim
falsum esse, nemo dnWlarf* potest,cum secundum
legcs nno gradu sil propinquior Pclrus Johannae,
quam Jacobus eidcm Johannac.llaquc Pclrusquin-
que gradibus ab ea dislal, Jacobus sex, Andreas
septcm, si lcgum supputationcm scquamur: se-
cuiidum canones autem,omue6 trcs in quarlo gra-
du cum Johanna sunt.
Ex his autem quatuor manifeslis erroribus sc-
quitur. ul tola illa conclusio sit falsn: qnu conclu-
dit,canonicos doctorcs conccdere nuplias ir.lra sc-
xtum gradum legalem ei, qui loco patris sit,etin-
tra eundcm non concedere ei, qui loco palris non
sil: cjnsmodi enim baec sunLut vix pcr fcbriin dc-
liranti exciderc potucrint.
Deinde pag. 41). Ueza scribil Marlinum V. non
puduisse, Malrimonium cum sorore germana cui-
dam relaxare. idque sceieralissimum factum ap-
pellat. Al Marlinus V. pontife.x omnium consensu
sapienlissimus cl oplimus, non permisil conju-
giiim ciim sororc suagermana, ul Mcza inciililnr ,
scd cuni soron; ejns. (piam anlc;i cognovcnil pcr
loriiicalionciii. ul siinclns Anlonimis rcfcrl.:?.p;irl(!
sumniac thcologiciic, tiliilo 1. Ciip.ll. hiinc, iiulcni
iilliniliitcm non cxprcsse l(>giinns in Lcvilico..^'c(iiio
iic^^iirc possiinl ;idvi'rsiirii. loiigi; toicr;ibilius esse,
dnccrc ;dlliiciii r\ (;i»pnl;i forniciiria liKaani. qiiani
iiniiMMii c\ lcgilimo Miitrinionio, vel consaiigui-
iKMiii in prinio griidn:ci liiiiicn hoc ipsiim iioii jier-
nii>;il punlihix (iil rnrsus iiiciililnr HcziiV ob pccii-
iiiiis sibi diilas; scd ob sciind;ilniii iiigcns, quod ex
illiiis conjiigii scparationo timiibatur, cuin casus
<!sscl occullns: idqiK; (!\ ninlnro consilio cl longa
disccphilionc ninlloruiii llicologoriim,ul ex codcm
sancto Anlonino, qni codem tcmpore vixit, inlelli-
gi polest.