Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Sacrament of Matrimony
Chapter 26: That the Canonical Way of Reckoning Degrees Is the Best Is Defended against Beza
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. III, De Sacramento Matrimonii, the fifth general controversy on the sacraments. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Against all the errors above I shall lay down some sentences, or propositions, that the truth may be explained more easily part by part.
First proposition: The way of reckoning the degrees of kinship which the sacred canons use is the best. This I assert against Beza in the book cited, on repudiations. For since kinship is the bond of those who are propagated from one, no better way of reckoning degrees can be imagined than by the distance from that one. And it is confirmed because, although the civil way of reckoning degrees is also good, yet it cannot be denied that the canonical is better, since in the transverse line it places a first degree: for it seems to carry something absurd with it that there should be a second degree without a first, as in truth there is in the civil way of reckoning. And although they may answer that in that way of reckoning there cannot be a first, yet who will deny that the canonists did well, who devised another way by which they might cure that inconvenience too?
But let us see Beza's arguments against the canonists' way of reckoning. “There are three rules,” he says, “in which the whole opinion of the canonists is comprehended; there is none of them which is not foolish and absurd; therefore their whole opinion is absurd.”
He proves the major proposition, and first as to the first rule. For the first rule is: In the direct line as many degrees are to be counted as there are persons, one being taken away. “But this rule,” says Beza, “although it lays down nothing foreign to the truth, yet is not rightly conceived; for it leaves the mind in suspense why one is to be taken away, and which one is to be taken away.”
I answer: why one is to be taken away, and that the one to be taken away is the first, could not be doubtful to one looking at the tree, or lines, of kin. For since a degree is the distance of one from another, the first person cannot make a degree, since it is distant neither from itself nor from any higher one; otherwise it would not be first. But the second, which first begins to be distant and separated from another, makes the first degree. And so the first person is as it were the point from which a line is drawn, by which the second person is distant from the first; and that intermediate line is the first degree, which begins from the first and ends in the second; and so it cannot be called a degree except when the second person has been produced.
Beza then proves the same of the second rule, which is this: In the transverse line, if two are equally distant from the stock, they are distant from each other by as many degrees as either of them is distant from the stock. “But,” says Beza, “that this enumeration is foolish and false even common sense itself could have told: for nature itself shows that there must be as many degrees as there are generations; nor can one come from brother to brother except by passing through the common father.”
I answer: Beza is deceived, because he imagines that one must pass from brother to brother through the father as if on some line, through the middle point, two brothers held the two extremes; for so without doubt one brother would be distant from the other by two degrees. But that imagination is false: for beyond the father there is no progress to another person except to him from whom the father himself proceeds, namely to the grandfather. And so in the direct line one passes through one person to another, because one person proceeds from another: as the grandson is distant from the grandfather by two degrees, because one cannot ascend from the grandson to the grandfather except through the father. But from brother to brother one does not pass through the father, since there is no procession of brother from brother, neither immediate nor mediate; but each brother is joined in the father; nor has a brother any joining or relation with his brother except inasmuch as he is one with the father. Wherefore, if anyone wishes to know the distance between brothers, he ought to attend only to how far one of them is distant from the father; for so far also will they be distant from each other, since one has no relation to the other except as he is one with his father, as we have said: for that he himself too is distant from the father by one degree is accidental in respect of the distance from the other brother.
Someone will say: a son seems nearer to his father than to his brother; for both the love is more vehement and the obligation of justice too is greater between father and son than between two brothers. But the son is distant from the father by one degree; therefore a brother is distant from a brother by more than one degree; therefore by two, unless one will now imagine half degrees.
I answer: the nearness of son to father is greater than of brother to brother, if one may so speak, intensively, not extensively: for a brother is not farther from a brother than a son from a father, but in equal distance there is a greater joining, and so greater love and obligation. And the reason is that those degrees are not of the same nature. For the son is joined with the father as an effect with its nearest cause, and therefore is like him by force of the production, whence love arises, and depends on him, whence obligation arises. But brother is joined with brother as effects proceeding from a common cause; and between two effects proceeding from one cause there is not that dependence which is between cause and effect, although the distance is not greater.
Lastly Beza proves that the third rule is false and contains an intolerable error; and this is the third rule: In the unequal transverse line they are distant from each other by as many degrees as he who is more remote is distant from the stock. “But this rule,” says Beza, “betrays so gross and shameful an error that even alone it plainly shows that these Antichrists were truly given over to a spirit of giddiness, that the Lord through them might avenge in the whole world the contempt of his truth. For to whom, I beseech you, unless altogether out of his mind, could it come into his head to think that, given a double series of kin, one to the right, the other to the left, the difference of generations is seen on the one side, but not on the other?” So he.
And the force of the argument lies in this, that from our third rule this absurdity follows: that one person is equally distant from many who are unequally distant. For if from the stock, who is Thare, there descend on one side Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, and on the other Nachor, Bathuel, Laban: if you ask in what degree Joseph is distant from Nachor, it will be answered, the fourth; if you ask in what degree the same Joseph is distant from Bathuel, it will likewise be answered, the fourth; and the same will be said of Laban. But it seems altogether absurd that the same Joseph should be equally distant from those three, who are distant from one another by single degrees.
I answer: this argument, if it proves anything, proves also against the second rule: for in the equal transverse line too, he who is last on one side is equally distant from all who are on the other side. Wherefore this argument is brought in vain properly against the third rule.
But in truth the argument has no force against either rule. For those who are on one side have no relation to those who are on the other except by reason of the stock in which they are united; and therefore it is accidental whether they are distant from one another or not, as far as the relation to the persons of the other side goes. Wherefore it is not absurd, but plainly fitting, nay necessary, that Joseph be as far distant from Nachor as from Bathuel or even from Laban, although those are distinguished among themselves by single degrees: for those three look to Joseph only inasmuch as all three are united in Thare, the first stock, from whom Joseph is distant by four degrees.
But someone will perhaps ask how it comes about that, if we consider the person more remote from the stock, we find him equally distant from all the persons of the other side, as we said of Joseph; but if we consider the nearer one, we find him distant unequally from each of the other side. For certainly Abraham, who is next to the stock, that is, Thare, is distant from Nachor, who is first on the other side, by one degree; from Bathuel, who is second, by two; from Laban, who is third, by three.
I answer: the reason of this is that when we consider the person more remotely distant, as Joseph, then we attend to his distance from the stock, and in the stock are understood all who are on the other side; and therefore that more remote person is as far distant from the stock as from all the persons of the other side. But when we consider the nearer person, as Abraham, then we do not attend to his distance from the stock, but to the distance of the stock from the persons of the other side, and in the stock we then understand that nearer person; and because the stock is distant unequally from the persons of the other side, therefore that nearer person too, that is, Abraham, is unequally distant from all the persons of the other side.
You will say again: why, in considering the remote person, as Joseph, do we attend to his distance from the stock, and do not do this also when we consider the near person, as Abraham?
I answer: because if, in considering the near person, we attended to his distance from the stock, it would follow that some persons of the other side are nearer to their collateral than to the stock; which is altogether impossible, since collaterals are not joined except through the stock. And that this absurd and impossible thing follows is clear. For if we attend to the distance of Abraham from Thare, and in Thare understand all the persons of the other side, then Abraham will be distant from all the persons of the other side by one degree only, as he is distant by one degree only from the stock, who is Thare. Then Abraham and Laban will be in the first degree. Then Laban will be nearer to Abraham himself than to Thare himself: for from Abraham he will be distant by one degree, from Thare by three; which is impossible, since Laban is joined with Abraham through Thare.
And this is the foundation of the third canonical rule, namely that collaterals in the unequal line are distant from each other by as many degrees as the more remote is distant from the stock, and not by as many degrees as the nearer is distant from the same stock; from ignorance of which rule came that empty boasting and rashness of Beza.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXVI.
Balionem canodicam suppulandi rjradus,
oplimam essc, dcfejidilur oonlra Jiezam.
Advcrsus omncs supcriorcs crrorcs, slaluam a-
liquol senlenlias, scu proposilioncs, nl pcr parles
facilius vcriliis explicclur.
Prima jiroposiiio: Italio sappulandi qradus co-
gnalionis, qua uluntur sacrt, canojies , ojiiima
esl. Ilanc asscro conlra Bezam in libro ciliilo dc
repudiis. Nam cum cognatio sit vinculum eoriim ,
qui propag;inlur ab uno, non potcsl fingi iiiclior
ralio stippuliindi gradus, qnam pcnes distanii;im
ab illo uno. Et confirmatur, (juia licet ralio civilis
supputiindi gradus sit eliam bona, tiimen iioii po-
tesl ncgnri.quin canonica sit mclior, curn in linca
lransv(M-sa primum griidum ponal:vi(lclur ciiini nc-
scio quid absurdi prae se ferrc.quod dclur secun-
dus gnidus sine primo, ut rcvcrii diilur in ralione
snppulandi civili. El quamvis ipsi rcsponderc pos-
sint, non posse dari primum in ilia ratione suppu-
tandi: tamcn quis ncgabit,rccle fecisse cnnonisliis,
qui aliiim ralioucm cxcogilarunt, qua illi eliam iii-
cominodo mcdcrcntur?
Sed videamus argumenla Bcziic conlraralioncin
snppnlnndi cnnonisliirnrn: Trcs. inqnil. sunt rcgu-
lac quihus comprchcndilur toUi scnlcntia cano-
nisinrum: nulla illarum esl. quacnonsit inepla
et absurda: ergo tola senlentia ipsoruin est ab-
surda.
Probat majorem propositioncm: el Primo quoad
primam rcgulam. Niim Prima regula esl: {In recla
linea tot nuniorendos cssc gradus.quotsunl j)er-
sonac, unadcmpla). Ilaec vcro reguUi , inqnit
Bcza, etsi niliit c/ficit,a vcritate aUcnum, lamcn
non rccte conccjUa cst:reUnquit enim suspcnsum.
animum, cur demenda sit uiia , et quaeuani sil
denicnda.
Kespondeo: Cur sit demenda una, et quod de-
menda sit prima, dubium esse non polcral inspi-
cienti arborem, sive lincas cognalorum. Nam cum
gradus sit dislanlia unius ab alia, prima persona
non potest graduni faccre, cum nec a seipsa , ncc
LIBK!! PRIMUS • S43
ab ulla siii3eriore dislel, alioqui non essel priina. (juae inler caussam el clToclum,licel dislanlia non
sed secuncia. quae jiritno incipit dislare el sepa- sil niajor,
rari ab alia,el primum graduin facii. Ilaque prima Tandem probal Ceza lerliom rcgulam csse fal-
j)ersuna esl veluli punclum, a quo ducilur linea : sam et inlolerabilem crrorem coiilinere, esl au-
per quam dislal secunda persona a prima, el illa lem baec regulaTerlia: (//i linea Iransvcrsainac-
linea inlcrmedin, csl primus t,Madus, qui incipil a quaii, lol gradibus inlc.r se distant. quot gradi-
prima cl tenninalur iii secnndiim; proinde nou bus dislat a slipile Hle, qui est renwlior). Uaec
potcsl dici gradus,nisi cum producla fucril secun- vero regula. iiiquil Bcza. larn crassiitn cl pudcn-
da persona. dum errorcm prodit.ut vel sola nianip'slc oslen-
Probat deinde Bcza idcm de Sccunda rcgula , dat,islos Anlicliristos verc fuissc verli()inis spi-
quae csl lalis: (/n ordine transverso si duo aequi rilui mancipatos, ut Dominus pcr eos ulciscerc-
distcntastipite.tot rjradibusintcrscdislant.quot tur in univcrso mundo suae vcrilalis contcm-
aslipilc quivis illorum distatj.Alqui. in^iuil Heza. j>/(i??i. Cui cnim obsccro. nisi prorsus mcnte ca-
incptam ct falsam essc lianc cnumeralioncm, vcl pto, vcnire in mcntcm poluit.ut cxislimnrct.data
ipsc communis sensus dictarc potuil: natura c- dupUci seric cognatorum. una ad dexteram, al-
nim ipsa ostendit. lot esse oporlcre rjradus,quot tcva ad sinislram.conspiciquidcm cx una parle
sunt (jencraliancs: nec posse pcrveniri a fralrc discrinien (jencrationum , in allcra non item?
ad fralrem.nisi transilu pev patrcm communcm Ihcc ille.
facio. Vis aulem argnmcnli in boc sila csl, quod ex
Rcsi)ondeo: Dccipilur Bcza. quia fingil ila a fra- noslra lcrlia regula scqualur lioc absurdum , ut
trc ad Iralrcm Iranscundum essii pcr palrcm, ac una pcrsoiia acipjaiilcr dislcl a mnllis inacqualiler
si in aliqua linea pcr mcdium punctum, diio fra- distanlibus.Nam si a slipilc, qui sil Tbare.dcscen-
(rcs. dun cxtrcnia lcnerciU: sic cnim baiid dubic d.int ab una parle Abrabam, Isaac. Jaoob, Josepb;
unus fratcr ab alio duobus gradibus dislarel, Sed idj allcra Nacbor, Balliucl.Laban:si quacras quoto
falsa ista imaginalio est:non enim ultra patrcm csl gradu distet Josepli a Nacbor,respon(iebilnr;quar-
))rugressio ad aliain [)crsonam, nisi ad illam a qua lo: si quaeras quolo dislcl idcm Joscpli a nalliuel,
patcr ipse proccdil, iiiinirum ad avum.Elsic iii li- rcs[)ondcbilur ilem quarlo, cl idcm dicclur dc La-
nea rccta pcr unam personam Iransiturad aliam , ban. .\bsurdum aulcm omnino videtur.ul idcm Jo-
quia una persona procedil ab alia: ut, nepos duo- scpb acqiialiicr dislel ab illis Iribus, qui inler sc
bns giadibus dislat ab avo, quia non polcsl a nc- singulis gradibns dislanl.
l)ole ad avum ascendi nisi pcr palrciu. At a fralrc Kespondeo: lloc argumcntum, si quid probal ,
ad fratrem non transilur per patrcm, cuin nulla probal eliam conlra sccundam regulam: nam el-
sil processio fratiis a fralre, nec iinmcdiala . nec iiun in linca Iransversa aeqiiali, qui cst poslremus
mediala. scd fratcr utcr(]ue in palrc conjungitur; in uiio lalcrc, dislal aequalilcr ab onuiibus , qui
ncc habcl conjunclioncm fralcr cum fralrc,vcl lia- sunt iu allero lalcrc. Quarc frustra adducilurboo
hiludineri), nisi qualenus cst unum cum palre. argumenlum propric contra tcrtiam rcgulam.
Qnare si quis distantiam iiilcr fratrcs cognosccrc ^^cd arguincnlum rcvcraconlra iiculram rcgnlam
cupil, dcbcl id solnm allendcrc, qiiantum distel iillain vim tiabct. Nam qui sunt in uno lalere, nou
alter eornin a patre: tanium enim iiitcr sc eliam babcnt liabitudincm ad eos, qui sunt in altcro,nisi
dislabunl, cum non babcat aller babitudiiicm ad ralionc slipilis, iu quo uniunlur, cl idco pcr accl-
ailerum, nisi ul cst unuin cum palrc suo . ul jam dens csl. quod inler sc dislcnt, vcl non disteiit ;
diximus: ([uod cnim ctiam ipi^c a palrc di^lcl iino qnanluin ad babiludinem ad personas albirius la-
gradu, pcr accidens csl respeclu distantiac ab al tcris. Quarc non esl absurdum, sed planu conve-
tcro fratrc. nicns, immo et ncccssarinm,ul Joscpb laiilnm di-
Dicct aliquis: Filius palri propincjuior cssc vi- slcl a INacbor, quantum a Balbuel. vcl rli;ini a L;i-
delur (luain fralri; nam el amor vcbcmcnlior. ct o- banjiccl illi inlcr sc singulis gradibus dislinguan-
bligalio (,diam jnslitiac major est inlcr i^alrem el tur: iiain Ircs iili Joscpbnm res[)iciunt s()lum,(]Uii-
lilium, quiim int(U' duos biilrcs. Ai lilius a [liitrc t)Mius omncs Ires uniuntur iii Tliarc [)riino sli[)ilc,
uno gradu distal. ergo friitcr a fralre lUiigis. (|n;iin a (|uo Josejili ([Uiiluor gradibus dist;il.
uno gradu distiit; crgo duobus distat , nisi griidus Scd pelel aliqiiis forlasse, undc fi;il, iil si con-
dimidiatos qnis jiim fingcre vclit. sidcri^mus pcrsonain rcmotiorcm a slii)il(>,invcnia-
licspondco: 3iajor est [)io[)in(|uilas filii ad Pa- mus illiun a(!(|ua!ilcr dislarc ab oinnibus [)crsoiiis
trem, quam fralris ad fralrcin, si sic lo{|ui liccl,in- alterius latcris. ul diximus dc Joscph: si vero con-
tensive, non exlcnsivc: non cnim longins disl-il sidcrcmus ])ri)pin(|iiior(Mn, invcniiimiis illiim di-
friiler a fratre. (piain liliiis a [jiilrc ; scU iii ac([i)ali sbirc inac(]u;ililcr a singulis allcrius hitcris. Nam
(lislantiii nwijor cst coiiiuncliu, ct iiroindc inajor ciirlc Abriilnun, qiii cst proximus sli[)iti.idcsl,Tlia-
amor el obligatio. VA ratio csl. quiii noii sunt gra- rc, dislal ii N;iclior.qui esl priinus in altcro liilcre,
dus illi (ijnsdcm r;ilionis. rilius cnim cum p;itre unogradii; a B;illiU(d. qui csl sccuiidns. du()l)us:a
[ungiiur, ul cflcc.lus cum siiii [iroxima ciiuss;), cl Lahan, (lui csl lciliiis, liibiis,
idco illi similiscst ex vi produc.lionis, undc oriliir l{cs|)oii(lco: U;itioncm bujus csse, (inia qiiando
amor cl ab illo [iciidcl, uii(l(! oriliir oblignlio, Al considiiriimiis iicrsoniim rcmolius disliinlcm, ul
iratcr cuni fralic conjungilni', iil cncctns a coin- Jo.scpb, tuiic altcndinins dislantiiim ipsius a sti|)i-
muni caussa proccdcns: inlcr duos antcm «(rccliis te, clin slipitc inlclligunlur oinncs , (pii sunl iii
ab una caussaproccdcnlcs noii esl ca dcpcndcnlia, allcro lalcrc: cl ideo liinlum dislat [icrsona illa re-
8U
OE SACHAMRNTO MATniMONII
niolior a slipilc, qunnlum ;ib omni!)us iiorsonis
allorius hilcris.Al (itiiuulo c()nsiil(!ra(nus p(>rs()naiu
I>ropin(iuior(Mu. ul Ahraluun, Uuu*. non allcndiinus
(lislanliaui ojus a slipile: sed (lislanliam slipilis
ad |)ersonas allcrius laleris, el iu stipilc lunc in-
lclligimus personam illam propinquiorem: ot quia
.slips (iislal inacqualiler a pcrsonis allerius laleris,
idco etiam pcrsomi illa propinquior, idcsl; Abra-
liau), inaoqualilcr dislal ab omuibus pcrsouis al-
terius laleris.
Diocs riusus:Quare considcrando pcrsonam re-
molam. ul Josci)Ii, allcndiiuus distanliam ojus a
slipile; et uou ctiam id facimus, qnaiulo conside-
ranuis personam propinquam. ul Abraham.
Kcspoudco:Qnia si considcrando pcrsonampro-
pimpiam, allciulcrcnuis dislanliam ojus a sti|>ite ,
soqucrclur pcrsonas ali(|nas allcrius lalcris osso
prupiiu]iiiores suo collalcrali, (luam stipiti, quod
cst 0[uuino impossihilc; cum non conjuuf^anlur
collalerales. nisi per slipilcm. Hoc aulein ahsur-
dum el impossibilc scqui, pcrspicuum csl.Nam si
allcndamus distanliam Abrabac a Thare,cl in Tha-
rc inlellitiamus oinnes persomis allerius latcris ;
lunc dislabil Abraham ab omnibus personis alle-
rius latcris uno tanlum gradu.quemadmodum uno
tanlum gradu distat a slipilc. qui esl Thare. Ergo
Abraham cl Laban crunt in priino gradu.Ergo l.a-
ban propinquiur eril ipsi Ahrahnc, quam ipsi Tha-
rc: nam ab Abraham (iislabil uno gradu, a Tliare
tribus, qiiod csl impossibile,cum per Thare Laban
conjungatur cum Abraham.
Atque bocest fundamenlum terliae regulaecnno-
nicae, nimiru(u, lot gradibus in linea inaequali di-
stare inler se coUaterales, quot gradibus dislal rc-
molior a stipile; non aulem quol gradibus propin-
quiordistal abeodem slipile;ex cujus regulae igno-
ratione processil iuanis illa jaclantia, atque teme-
rilas Bczac,