Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Sacrament of Matrimony
Chapter 27: That Not All the Precepts of Leviticus on the Degrees of Kinship Are of the Law of Nature
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. III, De Sacramento Matrimonii, the fifth general controversy on the sacraments. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Let the second proposition now be: Not all the precepts about degrees which are had in Leviticus bind Christians by divine law. This is against Luther, Bucer, Melanchthon, Chemnitz, Calvin and Beza.
But it is first to be observed that it is agreed between us and the adversaries that the precepts of Leviticus do not bind Christians inasmuch as they are properly Levitical, that is, positive and judicial, but only inasmuch as they are natural. But the whole controversy is whether all those precepts which are had in Leviticus about the degrees of kinship are natural, or some, or all, judicial. And the adversaries will have all to be natural, and so not dispensable by the Church; but we teach that not all are natural, and therefore that in some the Church can dispense, as the Council of Trent affirms, session 24, canon 3.
It is to be noticed, second, that those precepts are natural which are known by the natural light alone, without any reasoning, or at least by a very easy reasoning of reason, and are the same among all, both as to knowledge and as to rightness. For those which need a supernatural light are called positive divine; those which are set up by a prince through human reasoning are called human, and such are not the same among all.
And a forbidding precept can be called natural in three ways. First, because it is about a thing intrinsically evil, so that it is always and among all evil, nor can it become good by a change of circumstances: such as to lie, to commit adultery, to hate God, and so on; and these properly have the force of law, and are altogether indispensable.
Second, because it is about a thing evil always and among all, extreme necessity excepted: such as to take another's thing against the owner's will. For this is evil among all and always, extreme necessity excepted; for then what was another's ceases to be another's, and becomes common. And such too seems to be Matrimony with one's own sister: for everywhere among men who use right reason it is judged evil, unless the most extreme necessity of all compels, such as was at the beginning of the world. And these precepts too have the force of natural law, and are indispensable, unless the obligation ceases when extreme necessity comes.
In the third way, because it is about a thing evil if that thing is taken barely and absolutely; which yet, circumstances being changed, can in various ways be made honorable and become good: such as to kill a man. For homicide, taken absolutely and barely, sounds something evil among all, and in this way is had in the Decalogue, “Thou shalt not kill”; yet if various circumstances are added, as that it is done by public authority, for the common good, against one who is pernicious to the commonwealth, it no longer sounds evil; and therefore in the same law of Moses men are often commanded to be killed, as sorcerers, adulterers, murderers. And such too is an oath: since, taken barely, it sounds something evil, being a certain sign of unbelief and of human frauds. For if faith flourished among men and suspicion of frauds ceased, no one would demand an oath. And therefore the Lord, Matthew 5, forbids swearing, namely taken barely; and yet there can be no doubt that an oath adorned with its circumstances, or companions as they call them, is good and lawful.
In this third way, then, natural precepts have the force of law if it is a question of the thing taken barely. But if it is a question of the thing with various circumstances added, they do not have the force of law, because then those things are changeable, nor are they the same among all; and therefore it is necessary that they be sanctioned by a special positive law, if they are to be altogether forbidden; and especially if they are to not only hinder Matrimony but also break it. For there are many things which, if they are done against right reason, are evil, and yet, when done, hold, unless they are made void by a special law, as we said above of the marriage of children against the will of their parents.
Now, then, when in the conclusion we deny that all the precepts of Leviticus about the degrees of kinship are natural, we understand it in the first and second ways: for in the third way it could be granted that all are natural, as most of the old theologians grant, on book 4, distinction 40, as Bonaventure, Richard, Paludanus and others. But it does not follow from this that all those precepts have the force of law, unless it is a question of the degrees taken barely. And so many of those degrees, if they are considered as they can be changed by various circumstances, will not be forbidden by natural law, nor will they break Matrimony by the law of nature.
It is to be observed, third, that we do not say in the conclusion that no precepts of Leviticus are natural, but that not all are natural; because of some we gladly confess it, as of the first degree of consanguinity; but of all we do not grant it. Whence also the Council of Trent did not say that the Church can dispense in all, but only in some.
The proposition is now proved, first, from chapter 20 of Leviticus. For in chapter 18 laws are given about the degrees in which Matrimony is forbidden; but in chapter 20 penalties are added for those who may have contracted marriage within those degrees. And from those penalties we gather the greatest difference between those degrees. For marriage in the first degree of affinity in the direct line God punishes with death, and joins this sin with adultery and sodomy, which are manifestly against the law of nature; and the reason is the same, or rather greater, of consanguinity in the first degree in the direct line. For it cannot be doubted that he is worthy of death who has taken his mother, if he is worthy of death who has taken his stepmother. Then the law laid down the same penalty of death for those who are joined in the first degree of consanguinity in the transverse line, as when a brother takes his sister. But marriage in the second degree of consanguinity in the transverse line, as of a nephew with his aunt on the father's or mother's side, is not punished with death, but with a lighter penalty. And likewise marriage in the first degree of affinity, as of one with his dead brother's wife, and in the second degree, as of a nephew with his uncle's wife, are not punished with death, but only with the loss of children, that is, that children be not reckoned to them. Which penalty shows plainly enough that these marriages are not forbidden by the law of nature, but by positive law proper to the Jews; for common reason does not dictate among all men that this is a just penalty of this crime.
Second, it is proved. For if all those precepts were natural, they would always have bound, even before the law was given, as the law about not killing, not committing adultery, not stealing, not lying bound before the law was given by God through Moses to his people; and if those laws had always bound, holy men and friends of God would never have contracted marriages against those laws. But we have not a few examples of saints who, in the law of nature, joined marriages in the degrees forbidden in Leviticus.
Let the first example be the patriarch Jacob, who took two sisters, living at once, as wives, Lia and Rachel, Genesis 29; and this is expressly forbidden in Leviticus 18, and is the first degree of affinity in the transverse line; nay, there was a double affinity in that marriage, for each sister was a relative by marriage by reason of the other.
The second example is the patriarch Juda, who, Genesis 38, gave to his second son the wife of the dead firstborn, and, he too being dead, promised the same to the third son; which degree yet is forbidden in Leviticus, and is also the first degree of affinity in the transverse line.
The third example is Moses, who was born of the marriage of a nephew with his aunt. For in Exodus 6 we read thus: “Amram took to wife Jochabed his patruelis, who bore him Aaron and Moses”; and in that place the name patruelis is taken for the father's sister, not for a cousin. For the Hebrew word dodah signifies word for word the father's sister, as dod signifies the father's brother; for the Hebrews do not have a distinct name for the father's sister, as we Latins have the name amita. And Jerome, not to say patrua, which is unusual in Latin, preferred to say patruelis.
But besides the Hebrew word there is a manifest place in Numbers. For properly Jochabed was the aunt of Amram himself, as is plain from chapter 26 of Numbers, where we have that Amram was the son of Caath, the son of Levi, and took as wife Jochabed, the daughter of Levi, who was born to him in Egypt; where you see most openly that Jochabed was the sister of Caath, Amram's father, and so the aunt of Amram her husband.
To this argument the adversaries answer in two ways. Some say that these marriages were made by God's dispensation, on account of some mystery. But this solution is not solid: for from chapter 29 of Genesis it appears sufficiently that it was the custom of the place that two sisters could be joined to one man. For Laban, when he had deceived Jacob by thrusting one sister on him for the other, offered him the other too; and he, not doubting at all, at once agreed; nor did his parents afterward blame him, nor did he excuse the deed. But certainly, if it had been an unusual and singular thing, and one which could have begotten scandal, the holy man would certainly either not have done it or would have given a reason for his deed. The same appears in the deed of Juda, who, when he joined his brother's wife to the other brother, did not allege a dispensation, but the reason of custom, namely that the seed of the dead might be raised up. Moreover, no cause of this dispensation appears. For what mystery does it contain that relatives by marriage or blood are joined to one another? And what necessity was there of these marriages? Could not three wives have sufficed Jacob? Or were there no other women in the land besides those two sisters?
Another solution, then, is Philip's, in the Commonplaces, under the title on marriage, and Beza's, in the book on repudiations and divorces, which he also indicates to be Calvin's: that these patriarchs sinned, and are not to be excused in all things. But this can in no way be said. For although the holy patriarchs sometimes, as men, sinned, yet to remain perpetually in sin is not of saints and friends of God, such as they without doubt were. But if all the precepts of Leviticus (as the adversaries say) were of the law of nature, and marriages contracted against them were void, not only would Jacob and Amram have sinned, but they would always have remained in sin; and their children would have been bastards and illegitimate; and so a part of the sons of Jacob, and Moses himself, would have been born of an unlawful Matrimony.
Third, it is proved. For if all those precepts of Leviticus about degrees had been set up by the law of nature, without doubt they would be universal, so that within the same degree all marriages would be unlawful. But Moses in Leviticus forbade some marriages and permitted others in the same degree; therefore that prohibition is not of the law of nature, but judicial and positive. The proposition is most certain; for what is forbidden by the law of nature is forbidden always and everywhere; nor do the adversaries deny this. The assumption is proved. For that law of Leviticus does not forbid the marriage of an uncle, on the father's or mother's side, with his niece from a brother or a sister, although the nephew and the aunt, the uncle and the niece, are in the same degree. Moreover, the law forbids marriage with a wife's sister only while she lives, and so does not forbid it with the sister of a wife already dead; and yet it is exactly the same degree of affinity with a wife's sister and with a brother's wife.
To this Beza answers, in the book on repudiations and divorces, that all these marriages are forbidden even if they are not expressed in Scripture: for like precepts are deduced from like.
But on the contrary. For, first, an argument from like does not usually hold in forbidding laws: for forbidding laws are odious; and odious laws are not to be widened, but narrowed, as the rule of law has it.
Then the consequences which Beza draws are not altogether from like, but from lesser. For although the nephew with the aunt and the uncle with the niece are in the same degree, yet it is more shameful that a nephew be joined with his aunt than an uncle with his niece: since ordinarily the aunt is older than the nephew, and by reason of her degree has over the nephew a quasi-parental authority. But the wife must be subject and ruled; wherefore it is unbecoming that the aunt be the wife of the nephew, because she would have at once to rule and be ruled, to be subject and to preside. But the uncle is ordinarily older than the niece and has authority over her; and it is not unbecoming that the husband be older than the wife and preside over her. For this cause, then, the law forbade the one and granted the other. By a like reason, as it is more shameful that one woman have two husbands at once than that one man have two wives, so in its way it seems more unbecoming that one woman be the wife of two brothers even successively than that one man be the husband of two sisters successively; and therefore the law granted the one and forbade the other. But although this difference was a sufficient reason why by a positive judicial law marriage in the same degree was now forbidden, now granted, yet if that degree were forbidden by the law of nature, certainly this small other difference would not suffice to bring it about that in that degree Matrimony should sometimes be lawful. For that difference is not in the degree of nearness itself, but in something extrinsic added over it, namely in age, or sex, or some like circumstance.
This reason is confirmed. For Matrimony between cousins is not forbidden by the law of nature, as the adversaries too grant; and yet cousins are in the same degree in which is the aunt with her nephew; for all are in the second degree. That second degree, then, is not forbidden by the law of nature; and so the marriage of a nephew with his aunt is forbidden in Leviticus by positive law, not by the law of nature.
Nor does it stand in the way that according to the legal reckoning cousins are in the fourth degree, and the aunt with the nephew in the third. For although, by counting persons, as the legal reckoning bids, cousins and the aunt with the nephew are in a different degree, yet as regards nearness or distance they are altogether in the same. For, as we showed above, the aunt, or her son, cannot have kinship with the brother's son except as united with the stock; and so she is not more distant from him than the nephew is distant from the same stock. But the nephew is distant from the stock by two degrees; therefore both the aunt and her son are distant from the brother's son, who is the aunt's nephew and the cousin of the aunt's son, by two degrees only. Further, the prohibition of degrees without any doubt looks to nearness, not to the multiplication of persons; and therefore the third and fourth legal degree coincide in the second canonical, as regards the prohibition of marriages.
This same reason is confirmed lastly by the example of Abraham and his brother Nachor, who (as is had in Genesis 11) took as wives two daughters of their brother Aran. From which it follows that it is not against the law of nature that an uncle take his niece, and in consequence not against the law of nature that a nephew take his aunt, since they are in the same degree; and lastly it follows that the prohibition which is had in Leviticus, that no one take his aunt, is judicial, not natural.
To this Beza would answer in four ways, as is gathered from his book on repudiations. First, that Aran, the father of Abraham's wife, was not Abraham's brother, but another man distinct from that Aran who was Abraham's brother. But this fights not only with the common exposition of the interpreters of that place, but also with chapter 20 of Genesis, where Abraham says that Sara his wife is his sister, the daughter of his father and not the daughter of his mother; which is commonly expounded as that she was his niece on the father's side, not on the mother's, because Abraham and Aran were not of the same mother. But if Aran, Sara's father, was some other man, distinct from Abraham's brother and father, how was she Abraham's sister on the father's side?
Second, he says: perhaps Sara was the stepdaughter of Thare, Abraham's father. But he himself refutes this opinion: because if Sara had been Thare's stepdaughter, Abraham would not have said of her, “She is the daughter of my father, and not the daughter of my mother,” but on the contrary, “the daughter of my mother, not the daughter of my father.” And if anyone says that she was a stepdaughter from another wife, not from Abraham's mother, we shall answer that this could not be, because then she would not have been Abraham's sister, nor in any way related to him by affinity, as is well known; and yet he himself says, Genesis 20, “Truly she is my sister.”
Third, he says that Sara was Abraham's full sister. But that this is false I shall show below, when we come to the place about the marriage of brothers and sisters. But in this place there is no need to refute it: for this opinion fights most of all against the adversaries. For if Abraham took as wife his full sister, which is the first degree of kinship, much more would it have been lawful to take an aunt or a niece, who are in the second degree.
Therefore, fourth, he says that Abraham sinned in that matter, and that this is no wonder, because he was not yet a believer when he took her. But this solution cannot be tolerated. For if that Matrimony was void by the law of nature, Abraham would have sinned not only in contracting, but also in remaining in the marriage; for he would have persevered in incest almost his whole life; which can in no way be believed of a most holy man. What of this, that God approved that marriage when he promised him a son of Sara, in whom all nations were to be blessed, Genesis 17?
From which what Beza writes in that book on repudiations, page 48, is convicted of falsehood: that God tolerated that marriage, but never approved it. For how did he not approve it, when he said to him, “Sarai thy wife thou shalt not call Sarai, but Sara. And I will bless her, and of her I will give thee a son, whom I will bless,” Genesis 17? Who would believe that God willed the heir of Abraham, from whom the Messias was to be born and in whom all nations were to be blessed, to be raised up from an unlawful and incestuous marriage?
Our proposition is proved lastly from chapter 25 of Deuteronomy, where it is commanded that if anyone dies without children, his brother take his wife and raise up seed to his brother. This law commands nothing against the law of nature; for what is more absurd than that the author of nature should fight against nature? It is not, then, against the law of nature that for some just end one should take his brother's wife; therefore what we read in Leviticus, chapter 18, that no one take his brother's wife, is not a natural precept, if it is understood simply, as the adversaries will have it.
And it is to be observed that many have tried to reconcile these two places, but with diverse intention. For some wished to bring about from these places that marriage with a brother's wife is not forbidden by the law of nature, and therefore that the pontiff can dispense in it. Others on the contrary reconcile these places so that they may assert that, notwithstanding the law of Deuteronomy, marriage with a brother's wife fights with the law of nature.
First, then, John Major, on book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 40, question 2, says that marriage with a brother's wife is nowhere forbidden in the law; for that that precept in Leviticus was added by the fault of copyists. But this reconciling gives a handle for denying the most open Scriptures when they seem to fight with others: for there is no reason why Major should deny that that precept is of the text in Leviticus, except that it seems to fight with the precept of Deuteronomy. For otherwise the words of that precept are had in all the Hebrew, Greek, Chaldaic and Latin copies, nor is there any suspicion that it was added by anyone.
Second, some have said that in Leviticus marriage with a brother's wife is not forbidden absolutely, but only with the wife of a living brother, just as in the same place marriage with a wife's sister is forbidden, and it is expressly added, “while she lives.” This exposition is Radulph's, in the commentary on this place, and favors our cause, that is, the Catholics', who constantly affirm that the supreme pontiff dispensed by right with the king of the English, that he might take the wife of his dead brother.
Yet this opinion does not seem true. For marriage with the wife of a living brother is adultery. But adultery had been expressly forbidden in the same chapter; therefore this prohibition about marriage with a brother's wife would have been added in vain. Moreover, in Leviticus 20 adultery is punished with the penalty of death, but marriage with a brother's wife with a far lesser penalty. Marriage with a brother's wife, then, is not understood as adultery; therefore it is not understood as marriage with the wife of a living brother, which cannot be without adultery. Nor does it stand in the way that in the same chapter marriage with the sister of a living wife is forbidden. For intercourse with several women was not adultery in the time of the Jews, because polygamy was lawful for a husband with several wives, but not for a wife with several husbands.
Third, others say that in Leviticus marriage is forbidden with the wife of a brother living but repudiated. This opinion also favors the Catholics, yet is not probable, since no mention of repudiation is made in that place of Leviticus, and because it would follow that all those precepts could be restricted in the same way to a repudiated woman; or all those precepts would be confused.
Fourth, others will have it that the precept of Deuteronomy is not understood of a full brother, but of a near relative in another degree in which it is lawful by the law to contract Matrimony, as of a cousin on the father's or mother's side; for these too are usually called brothers among the Hebrews. Calvin follows this opinion, in the commentary on chapter 18 of Leviticus.
But the opinion is improbable and false, and is refuted by Beza himself, Calvin's disciple, in the book on repudiations, page 70. For it is certain from the Scriptures that the law is understood principally of full brothers, although it is extended to other near relatives too. In Genesis 38 Juda joined the same wife to full brothers; and in Ruth 1 Noemi exhorts her widowed daughters-in-law not to wait for the brothers of the husbands they had had, as spouses, but to marry other men. And that she speaks of full brothers is plain from these words of hers: “Are there yet sons in my womb, who may be your husbands? Return, and go your ways, my daughters; for I am older than to be able to have a husband.” And in Matthew 22 the question of the Sadducees about the woman who married seven brothers seems altogether to compel that the law be understood of full brothers. Add that the law of Deuteronomy itself shows sufficiently that the matter is to be understood of a full brother. For it does not say absolutely, “let the brother take her,” but: “When brethren dwell together,” it says, “and one of them dieth without children, the wife of the deceased shall not marry to another: but his brother shall take her”; where brothers are described who dwell in the same house, such as ordinarily are not except full brothers.
But they object the Hebrew word which is had in Deuteronomy: for it is not said, “let ach, that is, the brother, take her,” but yabam, that is, the kinsman.
I answer: that word yabam properly signifies the levir, that is, the brother of the dead husband; whence also the verb yabam in the piel signifies to take a brother's wife. For this same word is had in Genesis 38, verse 8, and Ruth 1, verse 15, where without controversy it is a question of full brothers. Moreover, in this chapter 25 of Deuteronomy, to what end would Scripture say, “When brethren dwell together, and one of them dieth without children,” and so on, unless it meant by yabam to signify the brother of the dead brother? Lastly, in the same place a little after Scripture adds, “The firstborn whom she shall bear shall be of the dead brother”; where Scripture expressly calls the dead man his brother whom it called yabam; therefore this man too is that man's brother. Properly, then, yabam is what in Latin is called levir; although it is derived also to other near relatives, just as the law itself also belonged to others, when brothers were lacking, or would not take her; for then the nearer relative succeeded in the right of taking her, as the history of Ruth, chapter 4, openly declares.
Fifth, others will have it that the law of Deuteronomy is understood indeed of a full brother, but is a certain exception to the law given in Leviticus. So St. Augustine teaches, question 61 on Leviticus, and Lyra and others in the commentary on this place; Beza follows the same, in the book on repudiations, page 78.
Which opinion is probable, but profits the adversaries nothing. For this exception, or law excepting and declaring another law, plainly shows that that law of Leviticus was not natural but judicial. For this law of Deuteronomy, which is a declaration or exception of the Levitical law, is either natural or judicial. It cannot be called natural, because it would have to be kept at this time too, which yet all deny, and most of all the adversaries, and those especially who defend the divorce of King Henry VIII from Queen Catherine. For since Arthur, Henry's elder brother, died without children, Henry not only could, but by divine and natural law would have had to, take his wife, that is, Catherine, as spouse. Therefore they are compelled to confess, as they do confess, that the law of Deuteronomy is judicial, and so now abrogated through Christ. But if the exception is judicial, then the law too from which it is an exception is judicial: for an exception is made from things which are of the same nature and order. Or if that law was natural, the exception too will be natural; such as is that, that in extreme necessity it is lawful for a brother to take his sister; for the natural law allows this natural exception.
Moreover, whatever that exception is, whether natural or judicial, it proves that marriage with a brother's wife is not of itself and intrinsically evil; for what is intrinsically evil cannot become good by any circumstance. Wherefore we have from this exception that the Levitical law is not natural of the first order.
Again, this same exception proves that marriage with a brother's wife is not evil always, extreme necessity alone excepted, such as we said marriage with a full sister is. For this case excepted in Deuteronomy was not extreme necessity, but a certain piety toward a dead brother. Therefore the Levitical precept is not natural of the second order either, but only of the third, that is, of those things which are evil on account of some extrinsic shamefulness, which yet can be taken away by some circumstance whose honorableness overcomes the former shamefulness: for then such a marriage is made lawful according to right reason, the positive law ceasing. And as marriage out of piety toward a brother is not against reason, nay according to reason, so if another like exception is made, or even of some greater good, as if, for preserving peace among princes, one takes his dead brother's wife, such a marriage will not be against reason, nor in any way unlawful, except on account of the ecclesiastical law, in which a dispensation can be given.
You will perhaps say that there was a dispensation in the law of nature made by God. But a dispensation is not a law, nor does it command anything to be done, but only takes away the obligation of a law in some particular case, and permits one to do otherwise than the law commands. But in Deuteronomy a law is plainly laid down, commanding that the brother take the wife of his dead brother, and setting a penalty on the transgressor.
Add lastly that, although it is not improbable, on account of Augustine's authority, that that is an exception, yet it is more probable that it is not. For to add an exception after the law has been made, and especially at another time and place, is not of God, who knows all things, but of men, who learn little by little by experience that their laws cannot be kept unless something is excepted.
Wherefore most probable is the exposition of Cajetan, in the commentary on Leviticus, and of others, who will have it that marriage with the wife of a dead brother is not forbidden in Leviticus except by taking such a marriage barely and by itself, as homicide is taken in the Decalogue when it is said, “Thou shalt not kill.” Which law does not hinder particular positive laws being made afterward which forbid marriage with a brother's wife with some circumstance and command it with another; in the same way as the law of the Decalogue, “Thou shalt not kill,” does not hinder particular laws being made which command a robber and a sorcerer to be killed, and on the contrary command him not to be killed who by chance, or in defending himself, has killed another, and so on.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXVII. ^0)1 omnia praecepta Levitici de gradibus cognalionis, esse de jure nalurae. Sil jnm Sccunda proposilio: ISon ohligant jurc divino Cliristianos praecepta omnia , quae de gradibus liabentur in Leviiico. Hnec est conlra Lulherum, Bucerum, Melancblhonem, Remnilium, Calvinum et Bezam. Sed est In primis cbservandum inter nos.et ad- versarios convenire, praecepta Levitici non obli- garc Christinnos, quatenus proprie Levitica, idesl, posiliva etjudicialia sunt, sed tantum quatenus naluralia. Sed tola controversia est, an omnia illa praccepla, quae habentur in Levitico de gradibus cognalionis, sinl naturnlia; an aliqua, vel omnia judicialia. Et quidem adversnrii volunt,omnia esse naturalia, et proinde per Ecclesiam indispensabi- lia: nos autem docemus.non esse omnia naluralia, et ideo in quibusdam posse per Ecclesiam dispen- sari, ut concilium tri(jeulinum afllrmat, session. 42. canon. .3. Advertendum cst Secnndo, nnluralia praoccpla illa osse, (piae solo luimne nalurali siue ali(pio discursu, aut corle pcr disoursum ralioiiis facilli- nium cognoscunlur, et apiid omnes sunt oadeni , tum quoad notiliam, tuin quoad rectiludincm.INam qune indigenl liunine supernalurali, diounlur divi- iia posiliva: quae pcr discursuiu humanum a prin- cipe constiluunlur, dicuntur Iiumana, el talia non sunt oadem npud omnes. Polest aulem Irihus modis aliquod prncceptu^n prohibons dici nalurale. Priino, quia sit de re in- trinsccc mala, ila ut semper , el apud omnes sit mala, nec possit per nuilntionem circumslantia- rum fieri bona: (jualia sunt luenliri, mocchnri, o- disse Deum elc. et haec proprie vim legis Iiabent, et sunl omniiio indispensnbilin. Secundo: Quia sitde, re innla semper , cl npud omncs, excepla exlrema necessitale: quale esI,toI- lere alieuiun invilo Domino. Id euim apud omnes, el semperesl mnlum, excepla ullima noccssitate : lunc cnim quod ernl nlienum, desinil esse nlie- num. et fit commune. El tale etiam esse videtur , Matrimonium cum propria sorore: nam ubiqiie a- pud homines, qui recla ratione utunlur id judica- lur malum, nisi extrema omuinn cogentc neoessi- late, qualia fuil initio mundi. El baec eliam prae- cepla vim babenl legis naluralis, et sunt iiidispen- sabilia, nisi cesset obligalio, exlrema nccessilate advenienle. Tertio modo: Quia sil de re mnla, si res illa nu- de el absolutc sumatur; quae tnmen possit muta- tis circumstanliis variis modis honcslari, ac lieri bonn: quale esl occidere hominem. Nam bomici- dium nbsolule el unde sumpluin , quid malum so- nat apud omnes,cl hoc modo habelur in decalogo: Non occi(ies;lamen si addanlur varine circumstan- tiae, ut, quod fial publica auctoritntc , ob bonum commune, in eum qui perniciosus est reipublicae; jam non sonal malum, ct ideo in eadem lege Moy- sis, saepe jubenlur occidi bomines, ut malefici, a- dulleri, homicidae. El tale elinm est juramenlum: siquidem nude sumplum, quid malum sonat, cum silquoddam signum incredulilatis, et fraudum hu- manarum. Si eniin inter homines fides vigeret, et suspicio frauduin cessaret, nemo expeteret jura- mentum. Et ideo Dominus Matlh. 5.prohibet jura- menlum, nimirum nude sumplum: et tamen du- bium esse non polest, quin juramentum suis cir- cumslanliis seu comitibus, ut vocanl ornatum, sit bonum el licitum. lloc igitur Terlio modo praecepta naluralia vim babenl legis, si agalur de re nude sumpla. Si au- lem agatur de re adhibitis variis circumslantiis, non habenl vim Iegis,quia tunc res illae mutabiles sunt, neque sunl apud oinnes eaedem, et ideo ne- cesse esl, ut sanciantur speciali lege posiliva, si omnino prohibendae sunl: ac praeserlim si non solum Matrimonium impedire, sed etiam dirimere debeant. Nam mulla suul, quae si fiant contra re- ctam rationem, mala sunl, et tamen facla lcnenl , nisi speciali lege irrilcnlur , ut supra diximus de conjugio filiorum invilis parentibns. Jam igilur cum in conclusionc negamus, omnia praecepla Levitici de gradibus cognalionis.essena- Lir,i:u PHijiLs ms turalia, intelligimus primo el secundo modo: nam lerlio modo posset concedi, omnia essc naluralia , ul coneeduiil pleriquc theoiogorum velerum,in 4. dislincl. 40. ul Bonaventura, Richardus , Paluda- nus el alii. Sed non inde sequilur , omnia illa praccepla vim legis habere; nisi agotur de gradi- bus nude sumptis. Proinde mulli ex illis gradibus, si considerenlur, ul variis circumslonliis mutari possunt; non erunljure naturnli prohiblti ; neque diriment jure nalurae Matrimonium. Obscrvandum estTerlio,iios in conclusionc non dicere, nulla praecepta Levitici esse naluraIia,sod non omnia esse naturalia, quia de aliquibus id li- bcnler fatemur, ul de primo gradu consanguini- talis; scd de omnibus id non concedimus. Unde etiam concilium Iridentinum, non dixit Ecclesiam posse dispensare in omnibus , sed tantum in ali- quibus. Probalur nnnc proposilio, Primo ex cap. 20. Le- vilici. Nam cap. 18. feruntur leges de gradibus. in quibus Malrimonium prohibelur: capile autem 20. adduntur poenae iis, qui inlra eos gradus conju- gium forlc contraxerinl. Colligimus autem ex poe- nis illis maximam diversitatem inler illos gradus: Nam conjugium in primo gradu affinitatis in rccla linea, Deus punil morte, el conjungit hoc pec(;a- lum cum adulterio, et cum sodomia , quae sunt manifeste contrajus naturae; et eadem esl ratio , vel polius ma.ior, de consanguinitate in primo gra- du in linea direcla.Neque enira dubitari polesl,quin sil dignus mo."lc, qui duxerit malrem suam, si esl dignus mortc, qui duxerit novercam suam. Deinde eandem poenam raorlis lex staluit in eos, qui Jun- guntur in primo gradu cunsanguinitatis in linea Iriinsversa, ut cum fraler accipil sororem. Al conju- giurn in secundo gradu consanguinitatis in liuea Iransversa, ulnepolis cum amila vel malerlera,non punilur morte, sed poena leviori. Et simililer con- jugium i[i pi-imo gradu airinitatis, ut qui cum uxo- re fralris defuncti, et in secundo gradu, ut nepolis cum uxore palrui, non puniunlur morlc, scd lan- tuin priviilionc filiorum, idest, ut fiiii non adscri- banlur ipsis. Quac poena salis aperlc indicat, con- jugia isla non prohiberi jurc nalurae, sed juro po- silivo. pro[)rio Jud;jeorum: non enim comtnunis ralio dictiit apud oinnes homiiies,islam esse jusliiui poenam hujus criminis. Secundo probatur. Nam si omnia illa praocopla essent nnturidi;i, scmpor obligiissent, etinm iiiiio lcgem diitam, queinadinodum obligabal lcx do non cccidendo, non moechando , non furando , noii menliendo: nntequinn lox a Deo per Moysom [)0[)u- lo siio daretur: si aulem loges illae sem|)or oldi- gassenl, numquam sancli viri et amici Dci conli;i eas Icgfts Miitrimonia contraxisscnl. Habemu.'? au tem exempla non pauoa siinctoruin.qui in loge iiii- lurae, in gradibus in Lcvilico prohibitis, coiiiiiibiii junxor;int. Primuin exemplum sil patriarchne Jiicob. ([ui duas sorores vivenles siinul accepit uxorcs, Li;im cl Uachelcm Gcnes. 29. id aulem expresse prohi- bclur Levit.18.el est [iriinus gr^idusalliiiitnlis in li- nen transversn:iu)mo du|)lox cr;it in (!0 coiijii},'io nlli- nilns;n;iin utri([uc soror eral alliiiis r;itione altorius. HEi,i.Aitni.M Vdl. III Secundum exemplum csl Judae palriarcliae, qui Genes. JJ8. dedit lllio suo sccundogenito uxorem primogenili deluncii,et illo etiam defunclo eandem promisit tertio filio, qui tninen gradus in Levitico prohibetur; et csl eliam primus gradus afTinitalis iu linea Iransversa. Terlium exemplum est Moysis, qui natus esl ex conjugio nepolis cum ainila. N;tin Exod. G. sic le- gimus:Aecepi( Amram uxorem Jockabed palrue- lemsuam, quac peperit ei Aaron ct Moysem; eu aulem loco nomen patruelis accipilur pro patrun . non pro sorore palruele. Nam vox hobiaea n^*^ ad verbum significal palruam, sicut *ni significai palruum: non enim Iinbent Hebraei dislinclum no- raen pro sorore palris, ut nos Lalini noraen ami- tae. Hieronyraus autcm ne diceret palruam, quod laline esl inusilatum, maluit dicerc palruelem. Scd praeter vocem hebraeam esl locus manife- stus in Numeris. Proprie enim Jochnbed erat ami- ta ipsius Amrnm, ut patot ox cap. 26. Nuineri, ubi habemus Amram fuissc filium Caat filii Levi, et ac- cepisse uxorern Jochnbcd filinm Levi, quae nal;i esl ei in Aegypto, ubi aperlissime vides, Jochabed fuisse sororem Caat pntris Amram, et proinde ami- tam ipsius Amram viri sui. Ad hoc nrgumentum res[Dondcnl adversarii dn- plicitcr. Aliqui dicuiit conjugla isla facla fuisse Deo dispcnsante, ob aliquod mystcrium.Sed haec solulio non esl solida: nnm cx cnp. 28. Genes. sn- tis apparel fuisse consuetudinem loci, ul duae so- rores uni viro conjugi possenl. Nam Laban cuni decepisset Jacnbum obtruendo ei unam sororein pro alia, oblulit ei etiam alternm: ille vcro nilul omnino dubilans, continuo acquieviUneqiie paren- les poslea eum reprehenderunl,neqiie ipse factuni purgavit. At cerle si fuissct rcs insolim et singu- laris, el quae scandalum gignere poluisscl, profe- clo vir sanclus, aut id non fecisset, aut facli sui rationem reddidisset. Idcra apparel in fnclo Judae. qui cum uxorem fratris alleri fratri conjunxit, non allegavit dispens;itionem.scd ralionem consueludi- nis, ul scilicct semcn dcfuncli suscilarelur. Prae- lerca nuUa npparet caussa hujus dispensulionis. Quid enim myslerji conlinct, quod anines.vol con- sanguinei inter se conjungnntur? et (|u;ie necessi- tas eral liarum nupliarum? non poternnl Jacobo suITIcere tres uxores? aut nullae crnnt |)r;ielere;i miiliercs in terrn. prnelor du;is illns sorores? Alia ergo solulio esl Philippi in loois, tiiulo do conjugio^et Beznc in libro dc repudiis ol divurliis, quam ctiam indic;it esse Cnlvini ; peccasse islos pntri;ircli;is, neqiie in omnibus excusaiidos esse. Al id nullo modo dici potesl. Nnm licel sancti pa- trinrcliae nliquando^ iil homines , jieccavorint, ta- men [lerpoluo in poccnlo innnere, non est sanclo- ruin ot amiroriim l)ci,(iualos illi sinc diibioeranl. Si autem omiii;i pr;iocC|ita Levitici (ut iidversiini dicunt) essciil jiiris miturne, ct Mnlrimonin conlrii illa conlriictii hiisscnl irriln, noii soluni Jncob ci Ainraiii pecc;issenl, sed in |)ecc;ilo sein|)er in;inbis- senl; el eornm iilii spuril et illegitinii fuissenl i nlque iln [inrs (lunednm filioruin Jncob , cl ipst; Moyses ex illegilimo Malriinonio nnli esscnl. Terlio pndialur. INnm si oinnia ilia praccepla 107 SiC DESACUAMLiMU iMAIHl.MOi^lI Levilici do i^ra.libus.jiire nalurao ronslilula cssent, Wetiue obslat.quod juxla suppulnlioncm b-galeni sine ilubio univcrsalia esscnt, ila ul inlra eundiMii i>airuelcs sint in quarlo ^m\u1u:cI an)ila cuni ncpolo gratluin omnla Malrinionia cssenl illicila. Al Moy- in lcrlio. iVani licel nuincrando pcrsonas, ul jubet scs in Lcvilico quaclain conju^Ma proliibuit, cl Icjjalis suppulalio.in (Jivcrso j^radu sinl paliucles qiiacdani pcrinisil in codeni i,'radn: crso non csl el ainila ciun ncpolc: laincii (luod allincl ad pro- iila proiiibilio juris nalurac, sed judicialis cl posi- pinquilalcin,vcl dislanliam, sunlomnino in eodcm. tiva. Prnposilio ccrlissima cst; (luod ciiiin jure na- Nain iil supra ostcndimus,non polcsl amila vcl cjus lurae proliibclur, scmpcr el ubiipie proliibclur ; lilius, cum niio fralris cognalioncm liabcrc,nisi' ul noque id advcrsarii ncgant. Assumplio probalur. cum slipileunilur:proindc nonmagis ab illo distat, Nam Icx illa Lcvitici probibcl conjug-.uin palrui , quam ab codcin slipilc dislal ncpos.Ncpos aulcm a vel avunculi cum ncplc exfralrc, vcl c.\ sororc ; slipile duobiis gradibus distat; crgo tam amila, cum lamcn sinl in codem gradu nepos el amila : quam cjus lilius, a filio fralris qui amilac ncpos, palruus ct ncplis. Praetcrea lcx probibct conju- el amilac Hlio patruclis csl, duobus lanlum gradi- jiium cum sororc uxoris.nisi ea vivcnlc.ae proindc bus dislat. l>orro gradiium proliibilio sine ulfo dii- iion prohibct cum sororc uKorisjam dcfunclac: cl bio propinquitalcin rcspicil,non pcrsonarum mul- lamcn esl idem prorsus gradus amnilalis cuin so- liplicationcm; el ideo lerlius el quarlus gradus rore uxoris cl cum uxorc fralris. ^ lcgidis in sccundum canonicum coincidunt, quod Ad boc respondcl Bc/a in libro dc rcpudiis cl di- alliiicl ad conjugiorum probibitioncm. vorliis, probibila esse ista omnia coi)jugia,etiamsi Connrmalur ullimo bacc ipsa rnlio , cxemplo in Scriplura non exprimantur: nam a simili dcdu- Abrabae cl fralris ejus Nacbor, qui (ut babclur cuntur pracccpla similia. Gencs. M.) duxcrunl uxores, duas filias fralris Sed conlra. Nain In priinis argumcnlum a simili sui Aran. Ex quo scquilur,non essc conlra jus na- in lcgibusprobibcntibus non solcl valcre: leges turac, palruus neplem ducat,ct consequcnlcr non cnim probibcnlcssunl odiosae; odiosac nulcm lc- csse conlra jus naturac, ul ncpos ducat ainilam; gcs iion sunl laxandac, sed rcstringen^ae, ul lia- cum sinl in eodcm gradu: ctlandcm sequitur,pro- Lct rcgula juris. bibilionem quae babctur in Levilico, ne quis ami- Deiiule coiisciiucnliac, quas Beza facit.non sunt lam ducal, judicialcm esse, non naluralem. omnino a simili. scd a minori. Nam licet sint iii Ad boc Bcza qualuor modis rcspondcrel, ul ex <20(Iem gradil ncpos cum amila,cl palruus cum ne- libro ejus de rcpudiis colligilur. Primo Aran pa- pte,tamen turpius est conjungi nepotem cum ami- Irem uxoris Abrabae, non esse fralrem Abrabam, la, quam palruum cum ncpte: si(iuidcm ordinaric scd alium qucndam bominem dislinclura ab illo ainiia csL seiiior ncpolc, ct ralione sui gradus ba- Aran, qui fralcr Abrabae fuit. Scd hoc repugnat bet in ncpolem, quasi palriam auclorilalcin. Uxor non solum communi cxpositioni inlerprelum "ejus aulcm subjici ac regi dcbcl: quare indccens esl , loci, sed ctiam cap. 20. Geneseos, ubi Abral»ara ul amiia sit uxor iippolis.quia dcberet simul rege- dicit, Snram uxorem suam esse sororem suam, reelrcgi: subjici el pracesse. Al palruus csl or- filiam palris sui, et non iiliam inatris suac: quod dinarie senior nepte.el in iliam auclorilalem habcl: exponilur communiler,ul fuerit neplis ejus ex pa- non estautem indeccns, ul vir sit uxore senior, el !re, non ex malre, quod ulerini non esscnt Abra- illi praesit. Hac igilur de caussa Icx unum prolii- bam et Aran. Al si Aran paler Snrac alius quidam Luil, altcrum conccssit. Pari ralione sicul lurpius rral a fralre cl palre Abrahae distinclus, quomodo est ut una mulicr duos simul marilosbabcal,quam erat illa soror Abrahae ex palre? iil uiius vir duns sinuil uxorcs: ila suo modo in- Sccundo dicil: Forle Snram fuisse privignam deccnlius vidctur . ut una sit uxor duorum fra- Tbare palris Abrabam.Scd refellil ipse idem banc Irum eliam succcssivc ; quam ul unus sit vir opinionem; quia si Sara fuisset privigna Thare, dunrum sorornm successive : et idco lex unum non dixisset Abrahain dc illa:Fitia esipa^ns ?7iei. concessit , allcrum probibuil. Scd qunmquam non filia malris meae', sed a conlrario, lilia esl isla divcrsiias luerit sufficiens ralio . cur lcgc malris ineae, non fdia palris mci. Quod si quis di- positiva judiciali in eodem gradu conjugium modo cal, fuisse privignam ex alia uxore, non ex malre probibcreiur, modo conccdcrclur: lamen si gra- Abrahami. Ilespondebimus id fieri non potuisse, dus illc jure nnlurae inlerdiclus csseLprofecto non quia lunc non fuissct soror Abrahae, neque ullo sufliceret modica alia diversitas ad id eniciendum, modo illi affinis, ul notum cst, el taraen ipse ait ul in eo gradu Malriraonium esset aliqunndo lici- Genes. 20. Tere soror mea est. lum.Non enim illa diversitas est in ipso grndu pro- Tertio dicil: Fuisse Saram sororem germanam pinquitalis.sed inaliquoexlrinsecosuperaddito,ni- Abrahami. Sed hoc falsum esse, infcrius demon- mirum in aelale.vcl sexu, vel aliqua simili circura- slrabo, ubi perventura fuerit ad locura de con u- slanlia. gio fra.lrura el sororum. Hoc aulem loco, non est Confirraatur haec ralio.Nara Malrimoniura inter opus id refellere: nam senlentia ista maxirae pu- pnlrueles non csl prohibilum jure nalurae,ul enim gnal contra adversarios. Si enim Abraham sororem adversarii concedunt;cl tamen in eo gradu sunt pa- sunrn germanam conjugem acccpit.qui esl primus truelcs, in quo esl amila cum suo nepote: orancs gradus cognationis, multo magis duccre licuissel enim sunt in secundo gradu. Non igilur sccundus amilain, vel neplem quac sunt in secundo gradu. ille gradusjure naiurae prohibilus esUproindecon- Ideo Quarto dicil:Abrahainura in ca re pcccasse: jugium nepolis cura ainila prohibilum csl in Levi- neque id esse mirum, quia nondum erat fidelis, lico lcgc positiva, non jure nalurae. quando illara accepit. Al haec solulio lolerari non fl L\m\ pnnius 847 polesl.Nam sijure nalurae irrilum erat Malrimoni- um illud, non solum peccassel Abraham conlra- hendo, scd eliam in conjugio perraanendo, nam lola fere vila sua in inceslu persevorassel: quod de viro sanclissimo nullo modo credi polest. Quid quod Deus conjugium illud approbavil,cum cxSa- ra filium illi promisit,in quo omncs genles benedi- cendae erant, Genes. 17. Ex quo falsum esse convincilur, quod Beza scri- bil in eo libro de repudiis pag.48. Deum tolerasse, sed numquam id conjugium comprobasse.Quorao- do enim'non tomprobavit, cum ei dixil; Sarai u- xurem tuam non vocabis Sami, sed Saram; et benedicam ei, et ex illa dabo libi filium, cui be- nediclurus su/Ji.^Gen.l7.quiscredat ex illegilimo et inceslo conjugio vuluisse Deum excitari haere- dem Abrahae, ex quo Messias nascilurus erat, et in quo benedicendae erant omnes Genles. Probatur Ullimo noslra proposilio ex cap. 2j. Deuleronomii, ubi praecipilur, ul siquis absque liberis moriaiur, ducat frater ejus uxorem illius, el sruscitel semen fralri suo. Lex isla nihil jubet conlrajus nalurae: quid enim absurdius, quam ut nalurae auclor conlra naturam pugncl? Kon igilur esl conlra jus naturac,ut ob juslura aliquem finem quis ducat uxorem fratris sui: ergo quod in Levi- lico legimus, cap. 18. nc quis ducat uxorem fra- Iris sui,non est naturale praeceplum, si inlelliga- lur sirapliciter, ut adversarii volunt. Esl aulera Observandum mullos conatos esse haec duo loca conciliare, sed inlenlione diversa. Alii cnim voluerunl ex his locis efTicere, conjugi- um cum uxore frairis non esse prohibitum jure nalurae,el ideo posse in eo ponlificem dispensare. Alii contra haoc loca couciliant,ut possiut asscrere, non obslanle legc Deuteronomii, conjugium cura uxore fratris pugnare cum jure naturae. Primo igilur Joan. major. in 4. sent. disl. 40. quaest 2. dicit, nusquam in lcge prohibilum esse conjugium cum uxore fralris;in Levilico enim illud praeceptum vilio scriplorum superaddilum fuisse. Al haec conciliatio ansam praebet negandi aper- lissimas Scripluras,quando eae cum aliis pugniirc videnlur: nulla enira est ralio, cur Major negel, praeceptura illud csse de texlu inLevitico,nisi (|uia pugnare videlur cuin praeccplo Dculcronomii.Nam alioqui praeeepli illius verba habcnlur in omnibus codicihus hcbracis, graecis, chaldaicis, lalinis, nequti ulla suspicio est, hjissc ah aliquo. Secundo quidam dixeruut,inLevilico non prohi- beri conjugiura cum uxore frahis absolule,se(l lan- tum cura uxore fralris vivcnlis, ([uemadmodura in eodem loco prohibclur conjugiura cum sororo uxo- ris, ct expressc addilur: Illavivente. Haecexpo- silio est Uadulphi iu connneulario hujus loci, et favel caussae noslrae , idesi, calholicorura, (pii constanter alfirinant ponlilicem maximum jure di- spensasse cum r(;ge Anglorura, ul uxorein fralris sui defuncii accipere posset. Tamon haec sentenlia non videlur vera, Nam conjugium cum uxore fratris viveniis, esl adulle- rium. Adulteriuin autem iii codcm capitc expr(!S- 56 prohibilum fiicral; crgo frusira liacc prohibitio de conjugio cum uxore fralris addila fuissel.Prae- lerea Levil. 20. adullerium punilur poena mortis : conjugium aulem cuin uxore fratris punilur poena longe minnri. Non igilur per conjugiuin cum uxorc fratris inlelligiUir adulterium;ergo non inlelligilur conjugium cum uxore iVatris vivenlis , quod sine adullerio esse non poiesl. Ncquc obslal, quod in eodein capite prohibelur conjugiuin cura sorore uxoris vivenlis. Nam non erat adulleriuin lemporc Judaeoruin, consueiudo cura pluribus mulieribus, quia polygamia erat licila viri cum pluribus uxo- ribus, non aulem uxoris cum pluribus viris. Tertioalii dicunt, in Levitico prohiberi conju- gium cura uxore fralris viveniis, sed repudiala. Ilaec ctiam senlenlia calholicis favel,lamen non est probabilis, cum nuUa fiat in eo loco Levilici meniio repudii et quia sequeretur, posse eodem modorestringi, omnia illa pracceplfl ad repudia- lam; vel confundereniur omnia illa praecepta. Quarto alii volunt , praeceplum Deuicronomii non inlelligi de fralre germano,sed de proximo in alio gradu, in quo liceat secundum legem conlra- here Malrimonium, ut de patrueli, vel de conso- brino: nam eliam isli apud nebracos dici solent fraires.llancsenteniiam sequilur Calvinus in com- ment. ad cap. 18. Levilici. Sed est sentenlia improbabilis et falsa el ab ipso Beza Calvini discipulo refulalur in lib. dc re- pudiis, pag. 70. Nam ex Scripturis conslat, legom inlelligi de fratribus germanis principaliter , licet ad alios ctiam propinquos exlendatur. Genes. 38. Judas fralribus germanis uxorem eandem conjun- xii; et Rulh. 1. Noemi horlatur nurus suas viduas. ul non expeclenl in conjuges.fralres virorum,quos antehabuerant, scd aliis viris nubanl. Loqui au- tem illam de fralribus gcrmanis, palet ex illis ver- bis ejus: An adhuc in ulero meo sji)t< (lIH, qui fkini mariti veslri? Revertimini et abile fdiae meae; quoniam seuior sum, quam ut viruin lia- bc.re queam. EtMallh,22. inlerrogalio Sadducaco- ruin dc muliere, quae nupsilsepiem frniribiis, vi- dclur omnino cogere, ut de gcrmaiiis friilribus lex iiilclligi debeai. Adde, quod lex ipsa Dculerono- mii satis indicat de fralre gcrmano rera csse inlel- ligendara. Nain non dicit absolule accipial cani IViiler. Scd: Sihabilaverinl, iiiquil, fratres simul, et unus morialur sine libcris ; non exibit iixor ejus cxlra dumum , sed duccl cam fralcr alius; lihi describunlur fralres, qui in eadciii dumo liii- bilant, quales ordinarie nun sunt, ni^i IVaircs gcr- mani. Sed objiciunt vocem hehraioam; quae liabetiir in Deuicronomio: non ciiim dicilur, accipicleam n><. idest. fraier, sed D^', idest, cognalus. jtcspondeo: Vocem illum □IS"' proprie sigmn- carc levirum, idesl. fratrcm m;inli dcluncii: undc cliam vcrhum QS^ iu piel, sigiiificat accipere u- xorem fralris. Ihibctur cnim hacc cailem vox Go- iH!S. :i8. vcrs. 8. cl Uiilh. 1. vcrs. i:i. iihi sine conlroversia agilur dc IValrihus gcrmiiuis. Praele- rca in hoc cap. Ti. Dculcronom. quorsum Scri- ptiira dicerct: Si hahilavcrinl fratrcs simul, ct u- nusmorialur sinc liberis ctc. nisi \cllcl per 03» siguilicare fralrcm dehincli fratris? Deni(iue ibi- dcm paulo poslScriplura sul)junt'll:/Vi/»i'»f7e7iin(s, $iS DE SACH.VME^^TO MAHUMOMl (lucminiriet mulier, eril fralris defancli: ubi ex- pressc dffiiiu-iuni Scriptura vocal IValrem ejus, (iuom vccavil D-"' crgo el islc esl fraler illius. Tropric igilur 22"» fsl i'l, quoii lalinc dicilur lc- vir: quamvis denvelur etiam ad alios propinquos, sicul eliam lcx ipsa ail alios perlincbal: quaiulo fralres decranl, aul nou volebanl illam acciperc ; lunc enim propinquior succedebal iu jurc iilam duccndi, ul liisloria Uulh cap. 4. aperle (iecbiral. Qninlo alii volunl, legem Dculcrononui inlellij^i (luidem dc fralrc germano. scd essc exceplionem quandam legis in JjCvilico lalae. Ila doccl s. Au- ^•nsiiuus, qoaest. 01. in Levilicnm ol Lyranus el alii in conuncnlario liujus loci: candem sequilur IJeza in libro de repudiis. pag. 78. Quac senlcnlia probabilis esl; sed nibil adversn- riis prodcst. Niun exccplio isla, sivc lcx cxcepliva i'l declaraliva allcrius legis, aperle dcmonstral, lc- gem illam Levilici non fuissc naluralem, scd judi- 'cialem. Nam lex isla Dculeronomii, qnae esl legis Lcvilicae declaralio, sivc exceptio; vel esl nalura- lis, vel judicialis. ?ion polesl dici naluralis, quia etiam boc tempore servanda cssct, quod tamcn o- nincs neganl. et maximc advcrsarii. cl ii potissi- nmm qui divorlium regis Ilcnrici VIII. a Calbarina regina defendunt. IVam cum Arlurus Henrici frater nalu major sinc libcris dcccsserit, non solum po- tuisscl, sed jurc divino et naturali debuisset Ilen- ricus fralcr uxorcm ejus, idest. Oatbarinam con- jugcm duccre. Ergo coguntur faleri, ul eliam fa- lenlur, legcm Deuleronomii esse judicialem, et l>roinde nunc per Christum abrogatam. Quod si cxccplio judicialis est, crgo el lex, a qua sit exce- ptio, judicialis esl: exceptio enira sit ab iis, quae sunt ejusdem naturae et ordinis. Vel si lex illa ualuralis erat, el exceptio erilnaturalis: qualis esl ilia, quod in ultima necessitale liceal fralri soro- rcm ducere; lex enim naturalis palilur banc nalu- ralem exceplionem. Praelerea qualiscumque sil illa exceplio , sive naturalis. sive judicialis.convincit.conjugium cum uxore fratris non esse per se, et intrinsece malum; non enim quod esl inlrinsece malum , per ullam clrcumslantiam potest fieri bonum. Quare babe- nius ex hac excoplione iegem Lcviticam non esse nahiraiem primi ordinis. Rursus isla eadem exceplio convincit , conju- gium cum uxore frairis non esse malum semper , o.xcepla sola ullima necessilate,quale diximus csse oonjugium cum sorore germana. Nam isle casus in Denteronomio exceptus, non erat ultima neces- silas. sed pietas quaedam in fralrem mortuum. Er- go praeceplum Leviticum non est etiam nalurale ^ecundi ordinis.sed tantum terlii, idesl, earum re- rum, quae sunl malae , ob cxtrinsecam aliquam lur[)iludinem, quae tamen potesl tolli peraliqua.n circumstantiam,cujus bonestas vincal priorem tur- pitudinem: lunc enim tale conjugium bcilum red- flitur secundum rcclam rationem , cessantc legc positiva. El sicul non esl conlra rationem, immo secundum ralionem, conjugium ob pietalem in fratrem: ila si fiat alia sirailis exceptio, vel eliam majoris alicujus boni, ut, si modo ad pacem inler principes conservandam, ducat quis uxorem fra- Iris defuncli; non crilconlra ralioncm lalc conju- ginm, nec ullo modo illicitum , nisi ob lcgcm cc- clesiasticam, in (jua dispcnsari |)olesl. Dices fortassc, fuisse dispensationem in legc naturae a Deo faclam. Aldispensatio non csl lcx , noc jubot aliquid lieri, sed tanliun tollit obligalio- nv.iu legis in aliciuo parlicnlari casu , et pcrmillil secus fieri, quam lex praecipiat. In Deutcronomio auloin lex planc statuilur. jubens ut fratcr uxorem fralris demortui ducat, et poenam in transgrcsso- rem (U)nstiluil. Adde Ullimo, quod licel non sit improbabilc ob Auguslini auctorilalcm, illam exccplioncm cssc : tamen probabilius est non essc. I\am exceptioncm addere posl legcm conditam, el maxime alio tem- porc cl loco, non csl Dei, qui omnia novil: scd bominum, qui experimento paulalim discunt, suas lcges non posse servari, nisi aliquid excipialur. Quarc probabilissima cst Cajetani expositio in commcnlario Levitici, et aliorum, qui volunt non prohiberi in Levilico Malrimonium cum uxore fra- Iris defuncti;nisi accipiendo tale coniugium nude elsolilarie, queraadmodura accipitur homicidium in decalogo, cum dicitur: Non occides. Quae lex non impedit quo minus fiant postea leges positivac particularcs, quae conjugium cum uxore fratris cum aliqua circumstantia prohibeant, cum alia jubeanl:ad quem raodura non irapedit lex decalogi: Non occides, quo minus fiant leges parliculares, quae jubcant occidi lalronem el maleficum; ct conlra jubeanl non occidi eum, qui casu, vel se ipse defendendo alium occideret elc.