Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Members of the Church · On Monks (Book II)
Chapter 13: The Objections Answered
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. II, De Monachis (De Membris Ecclesiae, Book II), On Monks (On the Members of the Church, Book II). The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
On the contrary side there are three arguments of the Pelagians, and fourteen of the Calvinists, which Peter Martyr diligently collected from Calvin and others (in his commentary on 1 Corinthians 9).
The first is (Matthew 19): the Lord says, It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven; the former is impossible, therefore so is the latter. I answer, with Augustine (epistle 89, question 4), that in the same passage is the solution; for the Lord says: What is impossible with men is possible with God.
But they insist that it is said to be possible with God, because God through His Gospel taught to sell all and give to the poor, which whoever does can enter into the kingdom of heaven. I answer that if it were so, then it would also be possible with men. For even the heathen philosophers could cast away all their goods, as Blessed Jerome reports of Crates the Theban and of Antisthenes (in epistle 26 to Pammachius, on the death of Paulina his wife). Just as with men too it is possible for a camel to enter through the eye of a needle, if it cease to be a camel and be reduced to the fineness of a hair. But Christ says that that which is impossible for men is possible for God — that is, to introduce a camel, being a camel, through the eye of a needle, and a rich man into the kingdom of heaven; therefore a rich man can be saved, if, aided by the grace of God, he use his riches well.
The second argument (Luke 14): Unless a man renounce all that he possesseth, he cannot be my disciple. I answer, with Augustine (epistle 5 and epistle 89, question 4), that the Lord speaks of the preparation of mind; for a little before, among the things which one must renounce, the Lord numbered a wife and one’s own soul.
Thirdly (Matthew 5), Be ye perfect, is said to all Christians; but he who wishes to be perfect ought to sell all and give to the poor (Matthew 19); therefore, etc. I answer that in the first passage it treats of necessary perfection, in the second of useful perfection; for there are various degrees of charity, as has elsewhere been explained.
The first argument of Peter Martyr is this. God commands Himself to be loved with the whole heart, with the whole soul, and with all our strength; whence nothing remains not due which we might expend; for whatever we do, we do with heart, soul, mind, and strength; wherefore all our things are bound over to God. Augustine (Book 1 On Christian Doctrine, chapter 22): “When,” he says, “He says with the whole heart, the whole mind, the whole soul, He left no part of our life which ought to be free.”
To this: that the precept of love, as also the precept of not coveting, cannot be fulfilled in this life, Augustine affirms (in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, last chapter): “To that now immortal life belongs, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart; but to this, Let not sin reign in your mortal body; to that, Thou shalt not covet; to this, Go not after thy concupiscences.” And in the book On the Perfection of Justice, before the middle: “In that fullness of charity — namely, in the fatherland — that precept will be fulfilled, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart; for when there is still something of carnal concupiscence which is bridled by containing, God is not loved in every way with the whole soul.”
Add also Saint Bernard and Blessed Thomas. For Bernard (sermon 50 on the Canticle): “If it please thee,” he says, “that the commandment was given rather of the affective, I do not thence contend, provided thou too grant me that it can least of all in this life be fulfilled by any of men.” Saint Thomas (2a2ae, question 44, article 6) says that in this life the precept of love is imperfectly fulfilled; and (question 184, article 3) says that by this precept love is so commanded without measure that no degree of charity remains which is of counsel. Wherefore, if in this life we can never perfectly fulfill the first precept, certainly much less can we do more than is commanded us.
I answer: the force of the principal argument is placed chiefly in two things. First, in that enumeration of the powers — of heart, soul, mind, all strength. Secondly, in that particle, with the whole. For hence it seems to be gathered that a man can do nothing at all for God, whether with heart or with body, which he is not bound to do. I will show, then, that on neither side does the argument conclude.
As to that enumeration, some of the Fathers thought that all those things are diverse, and therefore tried to show their distinction — namely, that soul signifies the part of the vegetative soul, heart the sentient, mind the intelligent, or something of that kind. See Gregory of Nyssa (in the book On the Creation of Man, chapter 8), Theophylact and Anselm (in their commentaries on Matthew chapter 22), Augustine (Book 1 On Christian Doctrine, chapter 22), Bernard (sermon 20 on the Canticle), and Saint Thomas (2a2ae, question 44, article 5).
But simpler and more conformable to Scripture is the opinion of those who teach that all these things signify the same, and that after the manner of Scripture many and various names are set down to explain the same thing, for the sake of greater expression. And so it is the same to love with the heart, and to love with the soul, and to love with the mind — namely, to love truly, sincerely, not feignedly, not in pretense. For first Hilary, Jerome, and Chrysostom (in their commentary on Matthew chapter 22), and Ambrose (on Luke chapter 10), where they explain this precept, deliver nothing at all of the distinction of these words.
Then Matthew chapter 22, Mark chapter 12, and Luke chapter 10 report the precept of love from the book of Deuteronomy chapter 6, and yet none of these authors agrees with another in the number and order of these words, which is an evident argument that there is no mystery in that enumeration. Moses had said: Thou shalt love with thy whole heart, with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength. Matthew set down: With thy whole heart, with thy whole soul, with thy whole mind. Mark: With thy whole heart, with thy whole soul, with thy whole mind, with thy whole strength. Luke: With thy whole heart, with thy whole soul, with all thy strength, and with thy whole mind.
Besides (3 Kings 14) it is said of David that he followed the Lord with his whole heart; but of Josiah (4 Kings 23) it is said that he followed the Lord with his whole heart, his whole soul, and his whole strength; and yet no one would dare to prefer Josiah to David. Likewise Moses requires (Deuteronomy 4) that a man seek God with his whole heart and with his whole soul, if he desires to find Him; but Samuel (1 Kings 7) requires only that God be sought with the whole heart. It appears, then, that by all those words this one thing is commanded, that we love God sincerely.
Further, those words, with all thy strength, do not signify with all the powers of the soul, but with all vigor, and, as we commonly say, according to one’s strength; for in the Greek codices there is nothing else but ex holes ischyos, which nevertheless the translator now renders “with all vigor,” now “with all strength,” now “with all one’s powers.” Wherefore Luther ineptly contends (in the assertion of article 31) that this precept cannot be fulfilled, because a certain one of the powers of the soul — namely, the sensitive appetite — does not love God, whereas we are commanded to love God with all our strength. But even if, according to the former exposition, the various powers of the soul were enumerated, and we were commanded to exercise them all to the glory of God, still the adversaries would gain nothing. For since this precept is affirmative, it would have to be said that it is commanded only that we exercise those powers for God when the necessity of procuring His glory required it; but at another time, if this were done, it would be a work of counsel and of supererogation.
Now as to that particle, with the whole, there are also two expositions of the Fathers. One is that of the saints Augustine, Bernard, and Thomas, in the places noted, who teach that with the whole signifies that by this commandment are commanded to us all the degrees of charity which we can have either in this world or in another, so that we always love God, nor is there in us any motion of desire, either voluntary or involuntary, fighting with the love of God; from which they rightly deduce that this commandment cannot be perfectly fulfilled in this life. Which opinion does not fight with our opinion of the evangelical counsels, although it does not seem altogether conformable to the sacred letters. And that it does not fight with our opinion appears from this, that the same Fathers affirm that this precept, though it cannot be perfectly fulfilled in this life, yet does not make transgressors if it be not fulfilled.
And that this may be understood, it is to be observed that a thing can be commanded in two ways: in one way, that only the thing to be done be indicated; in the other way, that there be indicated by the precept both the thing to be done and the end for the sake of which it is to be done. If a commander say to his soldiers, Fight against that city, he only indicates the thing to be done; but if he say, Take that city, he indicates the thing to be done, and also the end of that work; for it is the same as if he said, Fight to this end, that you may take the city. But there is much difference between these two ways of commanding; for when it is commanded in the former way, he is a transgressor who does not do all that is commanded; but when it is commanded in the latter way, he is not a transgressor who does not do all that is commanded, but yet he is a transgressor who does not do that which is indicated as a means to the end. For a precept, properly, does not oblige inasmuch as it indicates the end, but only inasmuch as it commands the means. And so, if the commander say, Fight, the soldiers sin if they do not fight; but if he say, Take the city, they do not sin if they do not take the city, provided they fight, and by fighting give their labor to take it.
The Fathers above cited, then — Augustine, Bernard, Thomas — think that by this precept, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, the means is at once commanded and the end indicated; and therefore they teach that this precept cannot be perfectly fulfilled in this life, and yet that he is not a transgressor who does not perfectly fulfill it. Augustine (On the Spirit and the Letter, last chapter), after he had said that this commandment cannot be fulfilled in this life, added: “But therefore this is commanded us even now, that we might be admonished what to demand by faith, whither to send forward our hope.” And below: “For if there cannot yet be so great a love of God as is due to that full and perfect knowledge, it is not therefore to be reckoned to fault,” etc. And in the book On the Perfection of Justice: “Why,” he says, “should not this perfection be commanded to man, although no one have it in this life? For one does not run rightly if it be not known whither one must run; and how would it be known, if it were shown by no precepts?” And at the end of the same book the same Augustine teaches that the involuntary motions of concupiscence, although forbidden by this precept, yet are so far from being sins that there is no need to say for them, Forgive us our debts.
Saint Bernard (sermon 50 on the Canticle): “Nor was it hidden from the Lawgiver,” he says, “that the weight of the precept exceeds the strength of men, but He judged it useful that from this very thing they be admonished of their insufficiency, and that they might indeed know to what end of justice they ought to strive according to their strength. Therefore, by commanding impossible things, He did not make men transgressors, but humble.” So too Blessed Thomas only teaches that this precept is imperfectly kept, inasmuch as it indicates the end; and in the same sense he says that no degree of love is of counsel, but all of precept, inasmuch, namely, as this precept contains both the means and the end. For nothing can be added to that love which is proposed as the end; for the end is sought without measure. Wherefore in the same place Saint Thomas affirms that it is no sin not to fulfill this precept in its whole latitude, but that it is enough if it be observed in some manner.
On which account there yet remains a place for counsels even concerning this precept. For even if I can add nothing to this precept, inasmuch as it indicates the end, yet I can add inasmuch as it indicates the means; and if I do not sin, according to the opinion of Saint Thomas, in loving God only by one degree of love, certainly I am not bound in strictness to love more; for it implies a contradiction that I should not sin by not doing what I am bound to do; therefore, if I add another degree of love, I love more than I am bound, and in that way I do an act of supererogation and of counsel.
We have demonstrated, then, that this opinion of the Fathers is not contrary to our opinion of the evangelical counsels. But that this opinion is not conformable to the divine letters we shall now show. There is, then, another opinion: that with the whole heart does not signify all the acts of the heart, or every possible intention, so that it be commanded that we do nothing with the heart but love God, and that with the highest vehemence of love, but only that we love God with a principal love, and prefer or equal nothing to Him in love; and accordingly that in this precept is contained only that which is to be done, not also the end for which it is to be done. From which follow, as it were, six corollaries.
The first is that to this precept are opposed all mortal sins, because in every mortal sin the creature is preferred to the Creator. The second, that to this precept is not opposed the honest love of kindred and friends, though it be not actually referred to God, because we are not bound to love God alone, but Him chiefly. The third, that venial sins are not opposed to the same precept, because venial sins do not change the last end. The fourth, that to the same precept are not opposed the involuntary motions of concupiscence, even of things otherwise most grave — such as of infidelity, blasphemy, adultery, and so forth; for since the charity of God is in the will, only voluntary motions are opposed to it. The fifth, that this precept can be perfectly kept in this life, because it requires only that we love God more than creatures. The sixth, that God can be loved with the whole heart more and less; for because he who for God’s sake abstains from lawful things loves more than he who only abstains from unlawful things, and yet each loves with the whole heart.
And that this explanation is truer and more conformable to the Scriptures than the former can be proved in many ways. First, because in the Scriptures that word, whole, or all, is often so taken, as (Matthew 2) Herod was troubled, and all Jerusalem with him; and (Acts 21) All Jerusalem was in confusion. For in these passages it is signified that a great part of those who were in Jerusalem were troubled, not all absolutely, and yet Scripture says simply, All Jerusalem was troubled, and, All Jerusalem is in confusion. So also (Genesis 31) Jacob says: You know that with all my strength I have served your father; and yet Jacob had done many other things at the same time. (2 Kings 15) With their whole heart all Israel followeth Absalom; and other things of this kind are found most frequently. For Scripture often uses common phrases. And in common speech we say absolutely, I am wholly in this matter, or, I will do this with all my strength, when nevertheless we wish to signify nothing else than that we apply ourselves with principal care and zeal.
Secondly, Scripture teaches that this precept is easy, and presupposes that it can be kept, which would not be true if it could not be fulfilled in this life. Deuteronomy 10: And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and love him, and serve him with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul? And chapter 13: The Lord your God trieth you, that it may appear whether you love him with your whole heart, and with your whole soul, or not. Luke 10: to the lawyer asking, What shall I do to possess eternal life? the Lord answered, What is written in the law? how readest thou? He said, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, etc.; and the Lord, Do this, and thou shalt live. Certainly all these presuppose that this commandment can be fulfilled in this life; otherwise the answer would have been ready at hand.
Thirdly, God promised that He would bring it about that in the time of the New Testament He would be loved with the whole heart, the whole soul, etc. Therefore either God — which cannot be — lied, or this commandment is simply fulfilled in this life. Deuteronomy 30: The Lord will circumcise thy heart, and the heart of thy seed, that thou mayst love him with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, that thou mayst live. Jeremiah 24: I will give them a heart to know me, and they shall be my people, and I will be their God, because they shall return to me with their whole heart.
Fourthly, many fulfilled this commandment; therefore it can be fulfilled in this life. Deuteronomy 30: The Lord will rejoice in thee, as he rejoiced in thy fathers, if yet thou return to him with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul. 3 Kings 14: Thou hast not been as my servant David, who kept my commandments, and followed me with his whole heart. Ecclesiasticus 47: With his whole heart he praised the Lord, and loved him that made him. 4 Kings 23: There was no king before him like unto him, that returned to the Lord with all his heart, and with all his soul, and with all his strength, according to all the law of Moses. Psalm 118: With my whole heart have I sought after thee.
Let there come in last the consensus of the Fathers, who teach that nothing impossible has been commanded us by God. See Origen (homily 9 on Joshua); Basil (on that, Attend to thyself); Hilary (on that of Psalm 118, Thy commandment is exceeding broad); Jerome (Book 3 against the Pelagians); and Augustine (in the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 69), which author not only says in general that God commanded nothing impossible, but also in particular of the commandment of love: “How,” he says, “is it grievous, since it is the commandment of love?” And (on Psalm 56) of this very commandment: “For neither,” he says, “would God command this to be done, if He judged it impossible to be done by man.” Where Augustine seems either to have changed or certainly explained his former opinion. Bernard too (sermon 50 on the Canticle), although he expounded this commandment in one way of the love which cannot here be perfectly had, yet inclines more to this latter opinion, which also Bonaventure follows (on Book 3, distinction 27, article 2, last question), and most Doctors on the same distinction.
The second argument: the Lord says (Matthew 7) of His law: How narrow is the gate, and strait is the way that leadeth to life, and few there are that find it. How then do they not err who preach it so broad and easy that they even say a man can do more than the law requires?
I answer: the same Lord says of His law (Matthew 11): My yoke is sweet, and my burden light. And David of the law of the Lord under the same metaphor (Psalm 118): Thy commandment is exceeding broad. And the Apostle (1 John 5): And his commandments are not heavy. Wherefore the law of the Lord is both difficult and easy: difficult by its own nature, because it is difficult to attain the mean in which virtue consists, but easy to stray from the mark; it is made more difficult also by the corruption of nature; for it is difficult for the avaricious to give alms, for the lustful to be continent, and so forth. But it is easy for him who has grace and charity; for grace both heals nature and directs it, and inclines it to attaining the mean; just as it is difficult also for a fat and burdened man to enter a gate even somewhat broad, but for a thin and naked man it is not difficult to enter a gate even somewhat narrow. Whence Saint Leo (sermon 5 on the Epiphany): “Nothing,” he says, “is arduous to the humble, nothing harsh to the meek.” And Blessed Augustine (in the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 69): “All things,” he says, “are easy to charity.” And David (Psalm 118): I have run the way of thy commandments, when thou didst enlarge my heart. But certainly he who runs, when he is only bound to walk, does more than is commanded him.
The third argument. In our work something is always lacking; therefore we never fulfill the law; therefore much less can we do works of supererogation. The antecedent is proved, because Paul (Romans 7) says that he serves with the mind the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin; and Job feared all his works (Job 9); and Isaiah (chapter 64) calls all our justices as the rag of a menstruous woman; and David cries out (Psalm 142): Enter not into judgment with thy servant, for in thy sight no man living shall be justified.
I answer: the antecedent is to be denied. For if we could in no way keep the law, John would lie when he says, And his commandments are not heavy (1 John 5); and the Lord, when He says (Matthew 19), If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments, would not have taught that young man, but deluded him, as if He said, If thou wilt ascend into heaven, make thyself a rowing of wings, and fly through the air. Nay, it would follow that a man never sins; for he does not sin who does not do what he cannot; and God would be more iniquitous and cruel than any tyrant, seeing that He would demand a tribute which no one could pay, and would demand this of His friends. Add that Basil (in the oration on that, Attend to thyself) says it is impious to assert that God commanded anything impossible; which same all the Fathers teach.
To the first passage, then, I say that Paul speaks of the involuntary motions of concupiscence, which are not sins but penalties.
To the second I say that the contrary is drawn thence; for Job feared all his works, because he was afraid lest he mix something of imperfection in them; but those properly fear who see that the evil they fear can be avoided; for hope and fear are always joined; for those who know for certain that a thing cannot be avoided despair and grieve rather than fear. Whence Blessed Gregory, writing on this passage, says: “Our very goods, because they cannot escape the sword of the ambushing fault unless they be daily fortified with solicitous fear, are now rightly said by the holy man: I feared all my works.”
To the third I say, with Jerome in the same place, that the Prophet speaks in the person of most grievous sinners, who, if they did any good works, at least morally, defiled them by the admixture of many crimes. But we speak not of sinners, but of the just, when we say that men can keep the law and even do more. Nor do we admit that all the works of a sinner are necessarily sins; for Isaiah does not compare the works of sinners to filth, but to a soiled rag, in which there are clean parts and stained parts.
To the last I say, with Augustine (in the book On the Perfection of the Just), Jerome (in the epistle to Ctesiphon), and Gregory (on this Psalm), that a man cannot be justified before God, because there is no one who does not have venial sins, which nevertheless do not prevent a man from being just and doing many good works, even of supererogation; for David does not say, No work shall be justified, but, No man living. Or it may be said, with Arnobius, Hilary, Jerome, and Euthymius on this passage, that no one can be justified if he be compared with God; for so sublime is the justice of God that in comparison with it all the justice of men and angels seems injustice, just as a lighted candle before the sun seems not to shine, but to make a shadow.
The fourth argument. The words of Christ (Luke 17), says Martyr: When you shall have done all these things, say, We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do — these utterly exclude that invention; and it is confirmed: for a servant, whatever he is, is his master’s, and whatever he does, he is bound to do for his master.
I answer: Peter did not here play the faithful martyr, for he omitted those words in which the solution lay hidden. For the Lord does not say, When you shall have done all things, say, We are unprofitable servants, etc.; but, When you shall have done all these things which are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do. Whence Ambrose (in the book On Widows): “This,” he says, “the virgin does not say, nor does he say it who sold his goods, but as though awaiting rewards laid up, as the holy Apostle says: Behold, we have left all things, and have followed thee; what therefore shall we have? For he does not say that he, as an unprofitable servant, did what he ought, but, as one profitable to the Lord, who multiplied with sought-for interest the talents committed to him, awaits the reward of faith and virtue, well conscious to himself and secure of his merits.” Add that the Lord does not say, You are unprofitable servants, but, Say, We are unprofitable servants; for He wishes us to be humble and not to boast of our merits; but He Himself afterward says, Well done, good and faithful servant; and He will call unprofitable servant only him who has not obeyed the precepts, as appears (Matthew 24) in the parable of the talents: Cast ye the unprofitable servant, he says, into the exterior darkness.
To the confirmation, I confess that a servant, whatever he is, is his master’s, and whatever he does turns to his master’s gain. But it does not thence follow that he does of debt whatever he does; for what if he wishes to subtract something from the sleep allowed him, that he may do something for his master? will he not do more than he is bound?
The fifth argument. We are commanded daily to say to God, Forgive us our debts; therefore we never do as much as we ought; therefore much less do we do more than we ought. I answer that we say daily to God, Forgive us our debts, on account of venial sins, of which in this life we are either never or rarely free; notwithstanding which, we can both be just and do works of supererogation.
The sixth argument. The Apostles (Matthew 19) not only did not think of works of supererogation, but even doubted of salvation itself, saying, Who then can be saved? To whom the Lord did not say, You can not only be saved, but also supererogate, but said, What is impossible with men is possible with God. I answer that with men it is impossible both to be saved and to do works of supererogation; with God each is possible.
The seventh argument. Jeremiah says: Cursed be he that doth the work of God negligently (chapter 48). But there is no one on whom some negligence does not creep; therefore no one satisfies his debt toward God. I answer that he speaks of grave negligence, which takes away the friendship of God; whence in the Hebrew the word signifies rather fraud than negligence, as Jerome too renders it.
The eighth argument. Christ says: This is my commandment, that you love one another, as I have loved you (John 13). But Christ so loved us that He died for us; therefore we too ought to lay down our lives for the brethren, as John concludes (1 John 3); but this is the highest charity, to which nothing can be added: Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends (John 13). Therefore no place remains for counsels and works of supererogation. I answer that we are not bound to lay down our lives for the brethren, except when it is necessary for their eternal salvation; if, then, we do this when it is not necessary, but only useful, we do a work of counsel and of supererogation; and similarly, if I do good to my neighbor when he is not in extreme or grave necessity, I do a work of supererogation.
The ninth argument. God commands (Deuteronomy 4) that nothing be added to His precepts; therefore counsels are wrongly added. I answer: God commands that nothing be added to a precept which corrupts it, but not something which perfects it; but counsels perfect, not corrupt, the precepts, as is evident. See more, if you please, on this argument in Book 4 On the Pontiff, chapter 17.
The tenth argument. We are so obligated to God that we can never do as much as we ought; therefore we never supererogate. The antecedent is evident; for whatever good we have, we have from Him; therefore all our things are due to Him, and if a thousand times we lay down our life for God, yet we shall never render Him anything equal.
I answer: the argument proves that God could have exacted from us whatever we can, but not that He willed to. For it is established from the divine letters that God, of His benignity, imposed on us a sweet yoke and a light burden. Besides, this argument proves that a man can never do more than he ought, nay, not even as much as he ought, if we consider the benefits conferred on us by God; for we shall never render Him an equal; and yet we can do more than we ought, if we consider the law imposed on us by God, and accordingly we can do more than we are really bound to do; for although we cannot surpass or equal God’s benefits by our works, yet we are not therefore made guilty, because we are not bound to render that, but only that which God commanded.
The eleventh argument. To the Philippians 4 it is said: For the rest, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever modest, whatsoever just, whatsoever of good fame, if there be any virtue, if any praise, think on these things, which you have both learned, and received, and heard, and seen in me; these do ye, and the God of peace shall be with you. “Let those acute men,” says Peter Martyr, “find what can be added over to this precept of Paul.” I answer that all these things ought to be taken negatively, so that the sense is: Think nothing, nor do anything, but what is just, what true, what chaste, etc. And in this way many affirmative things can be added over; otherwise, if Paul commanded that we think all things that are true, we should have to think not only all holy Scripture, but also all Philosophy, and especially the mathematical demonstrations, which are most true.
The twelfth argument. “I ask thee,” he says, “whether thou canst do anything beyond the law, or not? If thou canst not, we agree; if thou canst, then thou art bound to do it. For the law requires all thy strength, and whatever thou canst; therefore it implies a contradiction that thou canst do anything beyond the law.” I answer, I deny that the law requires all our strength and whatever we can; for it requires only that we fulfill what is commanded, whether strength be left over to us or not. Otherwise (1 Corinthians 7) Paul could not say of an unmarried man, Let him do what he will; he sins not, if he marry. For thus I will argue: either he can be continent, or not; if not, then he is bound to marry, as Calvin and Martyr teach; if he can, then he is bound to be continent, for the law requires whatever we can; therefore there is never a time when it is lawful to say, Let him do what he will; he sins not, if he marry.
The thirteenth argument. It is not without infinite pride and arrogance for thee to say that thou doest more than thou art bound, and that there is done to Christ no vulgar injury, who will be said to have died in vain, if thou couldst fulfill the law, or do more than was commanded in it.
I answer: those virgins did not fear that infinite pride who, as Augustine testifies (sermon 18 on the words of the Apostle), said, By loving thee we do more than thou enjoinest; nor did all those Fathers whom we have cited above. But this truly is not without infinite pride, to set oneself, on account of such feeble little reasons, against all the sacred Doctors, nay, and against Scripture itself, which Peter Martyr does. And that about Christ is a manifest calumny; for we do not say that a man can by his own strength, or without the grace of Christ, keep the law or add anything over.
The fourteenth argument. To be unwilling to love God more, if thou canst do more, is a most grievous sin; therefore thou canst add nothing over which thou owest not. The antecedent is proved: first, because he denies that God is the highest good who does not wish to love Him as much as he can; secondly, because he abuses God’s gift who can love more and will not; for to be able to love more is without doubt a gift of God. Add that he who hides his talent is punished by God (Matthew 25), and it is a sin of ingratitude to be unwilling to do what thou canst for Him to whom thou canst not render equal.
I answer that to be unwilling to love more, if thou canst do more, is a sin, if it be done out of contempt, or if necessity require that greater love; or if it be done out of pride, as though thou thinkest thyself perfect enough; or finally if out of sloth and laziness thou art unwilling in any way to advance further. For this is repugnant to the state of a wayfarer. But if thou dost indeed wish to love more and to advance, but according to thy condition and degree, even though thou art unwilling to ascend to a higher state, though thou canst, thou dost not sin. For example, he who is commanded to set out for Venice, if he stop in the middle of the way and be unwilling to go forward, sins; but if he wish to go forward, but by the common road, not by shortcuts, and if he wish to walk on that road, not to run, he does not sin.
Therefore to the first I say that he denies God to be the highest good — at least in deed — who does not wish to love Him with the highest love, that is, above all other things; but he who loves God above all things holds God for the highest good, even though he love Him not so ardently as perhaps he could, or do not for Him all that he could. Otherwise we should always be perplexed, nay, we should always be sinning; for however ardently we love God, yet we always seem able to love a little more ardently, if we strove a little more.
To the second I say that he abuses God’s gift who does not use it when it is necessary; but he who is ready to use it if it be necessary, even though perhaps he never use it, is not said to abuse it. For he to whom Paul says (1 Corinthians 7), Let him do what he will, could without doubt be continent, and yet it is said to him, He sins not, if he marry. And Blessed Augustine (On the Good of Marriage, chapter 21) says that Abraham had the gift of continence no less than John had, so that he could always be continent, and yet never was continent, not even in extreme old age; and that John the Evangelist had the gift of suffering martyrdom no less than Peter, and yet did not exercise that gift, as Peter did. But to accuse Abraham or John, as though they abused God’s gifts, is of extreme madness.
To that about ingratitude I say that he is not ungrateful to his benefactor who is present to his benefactor when his necessity demands it, or when he himself requires our labor, and who satisfies his will. Further, God is content that we keep His law, nor does He require anything else of us, even though we could render more.
To that about the talents I say that that servant was condemned because he had a precept of trading; just as now he who has the talent of remitting, and at the same time has a precept, because he is a bishop, will be punished if he do not remit. But he who has the same talent, but has no precept, will not be punished, as is evident of Saint Anthony, and so forth.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPOT XIII.
Solvuntur objectiones.
In contrarium sunt argumenta tria Pela-
gianorum, et 14 Calvinistarum, quae dili¬
genter collegit ex Calvino et aliis Petrus
Martyr in comment. I. ad Corinth. IX.
Primum est,Maft. XIX. Dominus ait: Faci¬
lius est camelum per foramen acus transire ,
quam ' divitem intrare in regnum coelorum ;
illud est impossibile, igitur et hoc. Respondeo
cum Augustino epist. 89. quaest. 4. in eodem
loco esse solutionem; nam Dominus ait :
(1) Math. XIX, 24 et 26. — (2) Luc. XIV, 33. —
Quod impossibile est apud homines, possibile
est apud Deum (1).
Sed instant, ideo possibile apud Deum
dici, quia Deus per Evangelium suum docuit
vdndere omnia, et dare pauperibus; quod
qui fecerit, poterit intrare in regnum coelo¬
rum. Respondeo, si ita esset, tunc esset etiam
possibile apud homines. Nam etiam Ethnici
Philosophi potuerunt abjicere omnes facul¬
tates, ut deCrate Thebano, et de Antisthene
refert B. Hieronymus in epist. 26. ad Pam-
machium de obitu Paulinae uxoris. Sicut
etiam apud homines possibile est camelum
intrare per foramen acus, si desinat esse
camelus, et redigatur ad subtilitatem setae.
Christus autem dicit : Id quod impossibile
est hominibus, possibile esse Deo, id est, in¬
troducere camelum, existentem camelum,
per foramen acus, et divitem, in regnum
coelorum ; potest ergo dives salvari, si gra¬
tia Dei adjutus bene utatur divitiis.
Secundum argumentum Lucae XIV : Nisi
quis renuntiaverit omnibus , quce possidet , non
potest meus esse discipulus (2). Respondeo
cum Augustino, epist. 5. et epistol. 89.
quaest. 4. loqui Dominum de praeparatione
animi ; nam paulo ante inter ea, quibus re¬
nuntiare oportet, numeravit Dominus uxo¬
rem, et propriam animam.
Tertio, Matt. V, Estote perfecti { 3), dicitur
omnibus Christianis ; at qui vult perfectus
esse, debet omnia vendere, et dare pauperi¬
bus, Matth. XIX, ergo etc. Respondeo in
primo loco agi de perfectione necessaria, in
secundo de perfectione utili, sunt enim va¬
rii gradus charitatis, ut alias expositum
est.
Argumentum Primum Petri Martyris tale
est. Deus jubet se diligi ex toto corde, ex
tota anima, et ex omnibus viribus; unde
nihil superest non debitum quod erogemus;
quidquid enim agimus, corde, anima, mente,
ac viribus agimus, quare omnia. nostra Deo
sunt obstricta. Augustinus lib. I. doctr.
Christ. cap. 22: « Cum autem, » inquit, « ait
toto corde, tota mente, tota anima, nullam
vitae nostrse partem reliquit , quae vacare
debeat. »
Ad haec, praeceptum dilectionis, ut etiam
praeceptum non concupiscendi, in hac vita
impleri non posse, Augustinus affirmat lib.
de spiritu et littera cap. ult: « Ad illam, » in¬
quit, « vitam jam immortalem pertinet, Di-
(3) Math. V. 48.
*
CAPUT XIII.
535
liges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde
tuo : ad hanc autem, non regnet peccatum
in vestro mortali corpore : ad illam, non
concupisces, ad istam, post concupiscentias
tuas non eas. » Et in lib. de perfectione jus-
titiee ante medium : « In qua plenitudine
charitatis, nimirum in patria, praeceptum
illud implebitur, Diliges Dominum Deum
tuum ex toto corde tuo ; nam cum est adhuc
aliquid carnalis concupiscentiae, quod vel
continendo fraenetur, non omni modo ex
tota anima diligitur Deus. »
Adde etiamS. Bernardum, et B. Thomam.
Nam Bernardus serm. 50. in Cantic : « Si
placet, » inquit, « tibi magis de affectuali
datum fuisse mandatum, non inde contendo,
dummodo acquiescas et tu mihi, quod mini¬
me in vita ista ab aliquo hominum possit,
vel potuerit adimpleri. » S. Thomas in 2. 2.
quaest. LXIV. art. 6. dicit, in hac vita prae¬
ceptum dilectionis imperfecte impleri : et
CLXXXIV. art. 3. dicit, hoc praecepto ita
imperari dilectionem sine mensura, ut nul¬
lus gradus charitatis remaneat, qui sit in
consilio. Quare si in hac vita praeceptujn
primum numquam perfecte implere possu¬
mus, certe multo minus possumus amplius
facere, quam sit nobis praeceptum.
Respondeo ; Yis argumenti principalis po¬
tissimum in duobus prosita est. Primo, in
illa enumeratione potentiarum cordis, ani¬
mae, mentis, virium omnium. Secundo, in
illa particula : Ex toto. Hinc enim videtur
colligi debere, nihil omnino posse hominem
propter Deum facere, sive corde, sive cor¬
pore, quod non teneatur facere. Ostendam
igitur neutra ex parte argumentum con¬
cludere.
Quod attinet ad illam enumerationem,
quidam ex Patribus existimarunt, illa omnia
esse diversa, et ideo conati sunt distinctio¬
nem eorum ostendere, ut videlicet anima
significet partem animae vegetativae , cor
sentientem, mens intelligentem, vel aliquid
ejusmodi. Vide Gregorium Nyssenum in libro
de creatione hominis cap. 8. Theophylac-
tum et Anselmum in commentariis cap.
XXII Matthaei. Augustinum lib. I. doctrinae
Christianae cap. 22. Bernardum ser. 20. in
Cantica, et S. Thomam in 2. 2. quaest.
XLIV. art. 5.
Sed simplicior et Scripturae conformior
est eorum sententia, qui docent ista omnia
idem significare, et more Scripturae multa,
et varia nomina poni ad rem eamdem expli¬
candam , majoris expressionis gratia. Itaque
idem esse, diligere corde, et diligere anima,
et diligere mente, nimirum diligere vere,
sincere, non ficte, non simulate. Nam in
primis Hilarius, Hieronymus, et Chrysosto-
mus, in commentario ad cap. XXII Mat¬
thaei, et Ambrosius ad cap. X Lucae, ubi
hoc praeceptum explicant, nihil omnino de
distinctione harum vocum tradunt.
Deinde Matthaeus cap. XXII. Marcus cap.
XII. et Lucas cap. X. referunt praecepttfm
dilectionis ex libro Deuteronomii cap. VI.
et tamen nullus horum auctorum convenit in
numero, ^ordine harum vocum cum altero,
quod est evidens argumentum, nihil esse
mysterii in illa enumeratione. Moses dixe¬
rat : Diliges ex toto corde , ex tota anima , et
ex tota fortitudine tua. Matthaeus posuit : Ex
toto corde , ex tota anima , ex tota mente. Mar¬
cus : Ex toto corde , ex tota anima , ex tota
mente , ex tota virtute. Lucas : Ex toto corde \
ex tota anima , ex omnibus viribus , et ex tota
mente (1).
Praeterea III Regum XIV. de Davide di¬
citur, quod secutus sit Dominum in- toto
corde suo ; de Josia autem IV Regum
XXIII. dicitur, quod secutus sit Dominum in
toto corde, tota anima, et tota virtute, nec
tamen ullus auderet Josiam Davidi antepo¬
nere ; Item Moses requirit Deut. IV. ut ho¬
mo quaerat Deum in toto corde, et in tota
anima, si eum invenire desiderat : At Sa-
muel I Regum VII. solum requirit, ut Deus
quaeratur in toto corde. Apparet igitur illis
omnibus verbis id unum imperari, ut Deum
sincere diligamus.
Porro illa verba : Ex omnibus viribus , non
significant ex omnibus potentiis animae, sed
omni virtute, et quod vulgo dicimus, pro
viribus ; nam in Graecis codicibus nihil est
aliud nisi o\r,q tV^uos, quod tamen interpres
nunc vertit ex omni virtute , nunc ex
omni fortitudine, nunc ex omnibus viribus.
Quare inepte Lutherus in assert. art. 31.
contendit , hoc praeceptum impleri non
posse, quia una quaedam ex viribus ani¬
mae, nimirum appetitus sensitivus , non
diligit Deum, cum tamen diligere jubea¬
mur Deum ex omnibus viribus. Sed etiam
si juxta priorem expositionem enumera¬
rentur variae potentiae anima;, ac jubere-
(1) Deut. VI, 5 ; Matii. XXII, 37; Mare. XII, 30; Lue. X, 27.
536
LIBER II.
mur illas omnes exercere ad gloriam Dei,
adhuc nihil adversarii obtinerent. Quoniam
enim praeceptum hoc affirmativum est, ideo
dicendum esset solum praecipi, ut exercere¬
mus eas potentias propter Deum, quando id
necessitas gloriae ejus procurandae requireret,
alio autem tempore si id fieret, opus esset
concilii, et supererogationis,
Jam vero quantum ad illam particulam :
Ex toto, sunt etiam duae Patrum expositio¬
nes; Una est sanctorum, Augustini, Bernar-
di, et Thomae, locis notatis, qui docent illud:
Ex toto , significare, imperari nobis hoc
mandato omnes gradus charitatis, quos vel
in hoc mundo, vel in alio habere possumus,
ita ut semper Deum amemus, e|pion sit in
nobis ullus motus cupiditatis, neque volun¬
tarius, neque involuntarius, cum Dei amore
pugnans ; ex quo recte deducunt hoc man¬
datum in hac vita perfecte impleri non pos¬
se. Quae sententia non pugnat cum sententia
nostra, de conciliis Evangelicis, tametsi non
videtur admodum conformis sacris litteris.
Quod autem non pugnet cum sententia nos¬
tra, exeo patet, quod iidem Patres affirmant,
hoc praeceptum, licet non possit perfecte
impleri iri hac vita, non tamen facere prae¬
varicatores, si non impleatur.
Ut autem id intelligatur, observandum est
duobusmodis posse aliquid praecipi : Uno mo¬
do, ut solum indicetur id quod faciendum est:
Alio modo, ut indicetur praecepto id quod fa¬
ciendum est,etfinis, cuj us gratia id faciendum
est. Si dicat Imperator militibus, pugnate ad¬
versus illam urbem, solum indicat id quod fa¬
ciendum est : si vero dicat, capite illam
urbem, indicat quod faciendum est, et finem
etiam illius qperis ; idem enim est, ac si
diceret, pugnate ad hunc finem, ut urbem
capiatis. Interest autem multum inter hos
duos modos praecipiendi; nam cum praecipi¬
tur priore modo, praevaricator est, qui non
facit id totum quod praecipitur : cum vero
praecipitur posteriore modo, non est prae¬
varicator , qui non facit id totum , quod
praecipitur , sed is tamen praevaricator
est, qui non facit id, quod indicatur per
modum medii ad finem. Praeceptum enim
proprie non obligat, quatenus indicat finem,
sed solum quatenus praecipit medium. Itaque
si dicat Imperator, pugnate, peccant milites,
si non pugnent; si vero dixerit, capite ur¬
bem, non peccant si urbem non capiant,
modo pugnent, ac pugnando dent operam
ut illam capiant.
Patres igitur supra citati, Augustinus,
Bernardus, Thomas, existimant hoc prae¬
cepto : Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto
corde tuo, simul imperari medium, et indi¬
cari finem; et ideo docent, non posse im¬
pleri perfecte hoc praeceptum in hac vita,
et tamen non esse praevaricatorem, qui non
perfecte illud implet. Angustinus de spiritu
et littera, cap. ultim. posteaquam dixerat,
non posse impleri hoc mandatum in hac vita,
addidit : « Sed ideo nobis hoc etiam nunc
praeceptum est, ut admoneremur, quid fide
exposcere , quo spem praemittere debea¬
mus. » Et infra : « Neque enim si esse non¬
dum potest tanta dilectio Dei, quanta illi
cognitioni plenae perfectaeque debetur, jam
culpae deputandum est etc. » Et lib. de per¬
fectione justitiae : « Cur, inquit, non praeci¬
peretur homini ista perfectio, quamvis eam
in hac vita nemo habeat ? Non enim recte
curritur, si quo currendum est nesciatur ;
quomodo autem scire.tur, si nullis praeceptis
ostenderetur?» Et ad finem ejusdem libri
docet idem Augustinus, motus involuntarios
concupiscentiae, licet hoc praecepto prohibiti
sint, tamen adeo non esse peccata, ut non
sit opus dicere pro eis : Dimitte nobis debita
nostra.
S. Bernardus serm. 50. in Cantica : « Nec
latuit, inquit, praeceptorem, praecepti pon¬
dus hominum excedere vires, sed judicavit
utile ex hoc ipso suae illos insufficientiae ad¬
moneri, et ut scirent sane, ad quem justitiae
finem niti pro viribus oporteret ; Ergo man¬
dando impossibilia non praevaricatores ho¬
mines fecit, sed humiles.» Sic etiam B. Tho¬
mas solum docet, hoc praeceptum imperfecte
seryari, quatenus indicat finem, et in eo¬
dem sensu dicit, nullum gradum dilectionis
esse in consilio, sed omnes in praecepto, qua¬
tenus videlicet hoc proeceptum continet et
medium, et finem. Nihil enim addi potest
ad eam dilectionem, quae ut finis proponi¬
tur ; finis enim sine mensura appetitur.
Quare in eodem loco S. Thomas affirmat,
nullum esse peccatum, non implere hoc prae¬
ceptum in tota sua latitudine, sed satis esse
si aliquo modo observetur.
Quocirca remanet jamsuus locus consiliis
etiam circa hoc . praeceptum. Nam etiamsi
nihil possim addere huic praecepto, quate¬
nus indicat finem, tamen possum addere
quatenus indicat medium : et si non pecco,
ex sententia sancti Thomae, si non amem
Deum, nisi uno gradu amoris, certe non te-
CAPUT XIII.
537
neor in rigore amplius amare ; implicat enim
contradictionem, quod non peccem, non fa¬
ciendo quod facere teneor; ergo si addam
alterum gradum amoris, amo plusquam te¬
neor, atque eo modo facio actum superero-
gationis, et consilii.
Demonstravimus igitur, sententiam istam
Patrum, non esse contrariam sententiae nos¬
trae de consiliis Evangelicis. Quod autem
haec sententia non sit conformis divinis litte¬
ris, mox ostendemus. Est igitur alia sen¬
tentia, illud : Ex toto corde, non significare
omnes actus cordis, vel omnem intentionem
possibilem, ita ut imperetur, ut nihil corde
agamus, nisi Deum diligere, idque summa
vehementia amoris, sed solum ut amemus
Deum praecipuo amore, nihilque illi inamore
anteponamus, vel aequemus, ac proinde so¬
lum in hoc* praecepto contineatur id, quod
faciendum est, non etiam finis oh quem fa¬
ciendum est. Ex quo sequuntur sex quasi
corollaria.
Primum est , huic praecepto adversari
omnia peccata mortalia, quia in omni pec¬
cato mortali anteponitur creatura creatori.
Secundum, huic praecepto non adversari
amorem honestum affinium, et amicorum,
licet non referatur actu in Deum, quia non
tenemur Deum solum amare, sed eum prae¬
cipue. Tertium, non adversari peccata ve¬
nialia eidem praecepto, quia peccata venia¬
lia non mutant ultimum finem. Quartum,
non adversari eidem praecepto motus invo¬
luntarios concupiscentiae , etiamsi rerum
alioqui gravissimarum, ut infidelitatis, blas-
phemiae, adulterii etc. nam cum charitas
Dei sit in voluntate, non adversantur ei, nisi
motus voluntarii. Quintum, hoc praeceptum
perfecte in hac vita servari posse, quia non
exigit, nisi ut amemus Deum plusquam
creaturas. Sextum , posse Deum ex toto
corde magis et minus diligi ; quia enim pro¬
pter Deum abstinet se a licitis, magis diligit,
quam qui solum se abstinet ab illicitis, et
tamen uterque diligit toto corde.
Quod autem haec explicatio sit verior, et
Scripturis conformior, quam superior, mul¬
tis modis probari potest. Primo, quia in
Scripturis passim ita accipitur illa vox :
Totum, vel omnis , ut Matth. U1 : Turbatus est
Herodes, et omnis Hierosolyma cum illo. Et
Actor. XXI. Tota confunditur Hierusalem (I).
In his enim locis significatur, magnam par¬
tem eorum, qui erant in Hierusalem turba¬
tos fuisse, non autem omnes omnino, et ta¬
men simpliciter Scriptura dicit : Omnis Hie¬
rosolyma turbata est. Et : Tota confunditur
Hierusalem. Sic etiam Gen. XXXI. dicit Ja-
cob : Scitis , quod totis viribus servierim patri
vestro ; et tamen multa alia eodem tempore
Jacob fecerat. II. Reg. XV : Toto corde uni¬
versus Israel sequitur Absalon, (2) aliaque id
genus frequentissime inveniuntur. Scriptura
enim utitur ssepe communibus phrasibus.
Vulgo autem absolute dicimus : Totus sum
in hac re, vel totis viribus hoc agam, cum
tamen nihil aliud significare velimus, nisi
praecipua cura, ac studio nos incumbere.
Secundo, Scriptura docet hoc praeceptum
esse facile, ac preesupponit servari posse,
quod tamen non esset verum, si in hac vita
impleri non posset. Deuteron. X : Et nunc
Israel quid Dominus Deus tuus petit a te, nisi
ut timeas Dominum Deum tuum, et diligas eum ,
ac servias ei in toto corde tuo, et in tota ani¬
ma tua. Et cap. XIII. Tentat vos Dominus Deus
vester, ut palam fiat, utrum diligatis eum in
toto corde vestro, et in tota anima vestra, an
non. Lucae X. quaerenti jurisperito : Quid
faciendo vitam ceternam possidebo ? Dominus
respondit : In lege quid scriptum est ? quomodo
legis ? ait ille : Diliges Dominum Deum tuum
ex toto corde tuo etc. Et Dominus : Hoc fac ,
et vives. (3) Certe haec omnia praesupponunt
mandatum hoc in hac vita impleri posse,
alioqui in promptu fuisset responsio.
Tertio, promisit Deus se facturum, ut tem¬
pore novi Testamenti diligatur in toto corde,
tota anima etc. Igitur aut Deus, quod esse
non potest, mentitus est, aut hoc mandatum
in hac vita simpliciter adimpletur. Deutero-
nom. XXX : Circumcidet Dominus cor tuum,
et cor seminis tui, ut diligas eum in toto corde,
et in tota anima, ut possis vivere. Hieremiae
XXIV : Dabo eis cor, ut sciant me, et erunt
mihi in populum, et ego ero illis in Deum, quia
revertentur ad me in toto corde suo. (4)
Quarto, multi hoc mandatum impleve¬
runt ; igitur in hac vita impleri potest. Deu¬
teron. XXX : Gaudebit Dominus in te, sicut
gravisus est in Patribus tuis, si tamen rever¬
taris ad eum in toto corde tuo, et in tota anima
tua. III Reg. XIV : Non fuisti sicut servus
meus David, (fui custodivit mandata mea, et
(1) Math. II, 3; Act. XXI, 31. — (2) Gen. XXXI, 6; II. Reg. XV, 13.
3; Luc. X, 25 ct seq. — (4) Deut. XXX, 6; Jerem. XXIV, 7.
(3) Deut. X, 12; XIII,
538
LIBER II.
secutus est me in toto corde suo. Ecclesiast.
XLYII : De omni corde suo laudavit Dominum ,
et dilexit eum , qui fecit illum. IV Regum.
XXIII : Similis illi non fuit ante eum Rex, qui
reverteretur ad Dominum in omni corde suo , et
in tota anima sua , et in universa virtute sua ,
juxta omnem legem Moysi. Psalm. CXVIII :
In toto corde meo exquisivi te. (1)
Accedat postremo consensus Patrum, qui
nihil impossibile nobis a Deo mandatum esse
docent. Yide Origenem homil. 9. in Josue ;
Basilium in illud : Attende tibi', Hilarium in
illud Psal. CXVIII : Latum mandatum tuum
nimis (2) ; Hieronymum lib. III. contra Pe-
lagianos, et Augustinum lib. de natura et
gratia, c. 69. qui auctor non solum in ge¬
nere dicit, Deum nihil impossibile praece¬
pisse, sed etiam in specie de mandato di¬
lectionis : « Quomodo, inquit, est grave,
cum sit dilectionis mandatum?» Et in Psal.
LVI. de hoc ipso mandato : « Neque enim,
inquit, imperaret hoc Deus, ut faceremus,
si impossibile judicaret, ut ab homine fie¬
ret. » Ubi videtur Augustinus aut mutasse,
aut certe explicavisse priorem sententiam.
Bernardus etiam sermon. 50. in Cantica,
etsi exposuit hoc mandatum uno modo de
dilectione, quae hic perfecte haberi non po¬
test, tamen magis propendet in sententiam
hanc posteriorem, quam etiam sequitur Bo-
navent. in III. dist. 27. art. 2. quaest ult. et
plerique Doctores in eadem distinet.
Argumentum secundum , Dominus ait
Matth. VII. de lege sua : Quam angusta porta
est , et a, reta via, quae ducit ad vitam , et pauci
sunt qui inveniunt eam. (3) Quomodo ergo non
errant, qui eam tam latam et facilem praedi¬
cant, ut etiam dicant, posse hominem plus
facere, quam lex exigat ?
Respondeo : idem Dominus ait de lege
suaMatth. XI : Jugum meum suave est , et onus
meum leve. (4) Et David de lege Domini sub
eadem metaphora Ps. CXVIII : Latum man¬
datum tuum nimis. Et Apostolus I. Joan. V :
Et mandata ejus gravia non sunt. (5) Quare
lex Domini difficilis est, et facilis : difficilis
ex natura sua. quia difficile est attingere
medium, in quo virtus consistit, facile vero
est aberrare a scopo ; difficilior etiam red¬
ditur ex naturae corruptione ; difficile enim
est avaro facere eleemosynam, luxurioso
continere etc. At facilis est habenti gratiam
et charitatem ; gratia enim et naturam sa¬
nat, et dirigit, atque inclinat g.d medium at¬
tingendum ; ut etiam difficile est homini
pingui, et onusto ingredi portam etiam ut¬
cumque latam, at homini tenui, et nudo non
est difficile ingredi portam, etiam utcum¬
que angustam. Unde S. Leo serm. 5. de
Epiphania : « Nihil, inquit, arduum est hu¬
milibus, nihil asperum mitibus. » Et B. Au-
gustin. lib. de natura et gratia, cap. 69 :
« Omnia, inquit, sunt facilia charitati. » Et
David Psal. CXVIII : Viam mandatorum tuo¬
rum cucurri , cum dilatasti cor meum (6); certe
autem qui currit , cum solum ambulare
teneatur, plus facit, quam ei imperatum
sit.
Argumentum tertium. In opere nostro
semper aliquid deest : ergo numquam im¬
plemus legem : ergo multo minus possumus
facere opera supererogationis. Probatur an¬
tecedens, quia Paulus ad Rom. VII. dicit,
se mente servire legi Dei, carne autem legi
peccati; et Job verebatur omnia opera sua ,
Job IX. et Isaias cap. LXIV. vocat pannum
menstruatee omnes justitias nostras ; et David
clamat Psal. CXLII : ne intres in judicium cum
servo tuo , quia non justificabitur in conspectu
tuo omnis vivens. (7)
Respondeo : negandum esse antecedens;
nam si nullo modo legem servare posse¬
mus, mentiretur Joannes, cum ait : Et man¬
data ejus gravia non sunt. I. Joan. V. et
Dominus, cum ait Matth. XIX : Si vis ad vi¬
tam ingredi, serva mandata, (8) juvenem illum
non docuisset, sed delusisset, ac si dixisset :
si vis in coelum ascendere, fac tibi remigium
alarum, et vola per aerem. Imo sequeretur
hominem numquam peccare ; non enim pec¬
cat qui non facit quod non potest, et Deus
esset omni Tyranno iniquior, et crudelior,
quippe qui tributum peteret quod nemo pos¬
set solvere, et hoc ab amicis suis peteret.
Adde quod Basilius oratione in illud : At¬
tende tibi, dicit impium esse asserere, ali¬
quid impossibile Deum praecepisse , quod
idem docent omnes Patres.
Ad primum ergo locum dico , Paulum
loqui de motibus concupiscentiae involun¬
tariis, qui non peccata, sed poenae sunt.
Ad secundum dico, contrarium inde elici,
(1) Deu*. XXX, 9 et 10; III. Reg. XIV, 8; Eccl. XLVII, 10; IV Reg. XXIII, 25 ; Psal. CXVIII,
10. — (2) Psal. CXVIII, 96. — (3) Math. VII, 14. — (4) Math. XI, 30. — (5) I. Joan. V, 3. —
(6) Psal. CXVIII, 32. —(7) Rom. VII, 25; Job. IX, 28; Isai. LXIV, 6; Psal. CXLII, 2. —
(8) I. Joan. V, 3 ; Math. XIX, 17.
CAPUT XIII.
539
ideo enim Job verebatur omnia sua opera,
quia metuebat ne aliquid in eis imperfectio¬
nis misceret ; illi autem proprie metuunt,
qui vident posse vitari malum quod me¬
tuunt; semper enim conjuncta sunt spes, et
metus ; qui enim certo sciunt non posse vi¬
tari, desperant et dolent potius quam me¬
tuunt. Unde B. Gregorius in hunc locum
scribens, ait : « Ipsa bona nostra, quia in-
sidiantis culpse evadere gladium nequeunt,
nisi sollicito quotidie timore muniantur, per
sanctum virum nunc recte dicitur ; Verebar
omnia opera mea. »
Ad tertium dico cum Hieronymo ibidem,
Prophetam loqui in persona gravissimorum
peccatorum, qui si qua opera bona facie¬
bant, saltem moraliter, ea inquinabant ad¬
mixtione multorum criminum ; Nos autem
non de peccatoribus, sed de justis loquimur,
cum dicimus homines posse legem servare,
et etiam amplius facere. Nec tamen admitti¬
mus omnia opera peccatoris necessario esse
peccata ; nam Isaias non comparat opera
peccatorum sordibus, sed panno sordidato,
in quo sunt partes nitidae, et portes macu¬
latae.
Ad ultimum dico, cum Augustino lib. de
perfectione justor. Hieronym. in epist. ad
Ctesiphontem, et Gregorio in hunc Psalmum,
non posse hominem justificari coram Deo,
quia nemo est, qui non habeat peccata ve¬
nialia, quae tamen non impediunt quin homo
sit justus, et multa opera bona faciat, etiam
supererogationis ; non enim dicit David, non
justificabitur omne opus, sed omnis vivens ;
vel dicendum cum Arnobio, Hilario, Hiero¬
nymo, et Euthymio in hunc locum, non
posse ullum justificari si comparetur cum
Deo ; tam sublimis enim est Dei justitia, ut
ejus comparatione omnis hominum et Ange¬
lorum justitia, injustitia videatur, sicut can¬
dela accensa coram sole, non lucere, sed
umbram facere videtur.
Argumentum quartum. Verba Christi Lu-
cee XVII. inquit Martyr : Cum feceritis hcec
omnia , dicite , servi inutiles sumus , quae debui¬
mus facere , fecimus (1) istud commentum
prorsus excludunt, et confirmatur : nam ser¬
vus quidquid est, Damini est, et quidquid
facit, Domino facere tenetur.
Respondeo : Petrum non egisse hoc loco
fidelem martyrem, nam omisit ea verba, in
quibus latebat solutio. Non enim Dominus
ait, cum feceritis omnia, dicite, servi inuti¬
les sumus etc. Sed, cum feceritis hcec omnia ,
quce praecepta sunt vobis , dicite , servi inutiles
sumus , quce debuimus facere , fecimus. Unde
Ambrosius lib. de Viduis : «Hoc, inquit,
virgo non dicit, hoc non dicit ille, qui bona
sua vendidit, sed quasi reposita exspectat
praemia, sicut sanctus Apostolus ait : Ecce
nos reliquimus omnia, et secuti sumus te ;
quid ergo erit nobis? Non enim quasi inu¬
tilis servus, quod debuit facere, fecisse se
dicit, sed quasi utilis Domino, qui commissa
sibi talenta quaesitis multiplicavit usuris,
mercedem fidei, atque virtutis, bene sibi
conscius meritorumque securus, exspectat.»
Adde quod Dominus non ait, servi inutiles
estis, sed dicite, servi inutiles sumus; vult
enim nos humiles esse et non jactare nostra
merita, sed ipse tamen postea dicit : Euge
serve bone et fidelis ; inutilem autem servum
vocabit eum dumtaxat, qui praeceptis non
obedierit, ut patet Matth. XXIV. in parabola
de talentis : Inutilem , inquit, servum proji¬
cite in tenebras exteriores (2).
Ad confirmationem, fateor, servum, quid¬
quid est, Domini esse, et quidquid agit, in
lucrum Domini cedere. At non inde sequi¬
tur ex debito eum facere quidquid facit :
quid enim si velit sibi de somno concesso
aliquid subtrahere, ut pro Domino suo ali¬
quid agat, nonne plus faciet quam tene¬
tur ?
Argumentum quintum. Jubemur quotidie
dicere Deo : Dimitte nobis debita nostra : e rgo
numquam facimus quantum debemus : ergo
multo minus facimus plusquam debemus.
Respondeo, quotidie nos Deo dicere ; Dimitte
7iobis debita nostra , propter peccata venialia,
quibus in hac vita aut numquam, aut raro
caremus, quibus tamen non obstantibus, et
justi esse, et supererogationis opera facere
possumus. ?
Argumentum sextum. Apostoli Matth. XIX.
non solum non cogitaverunt de operibus
supererogationis, sed etiam de ipsa salute
dubitarunt, dicentes : Quis poterit salvus esse?
Quibus Dominus non ait, non solum «alvi
esse, sed etiam supererogare potestis, sed
ait : Quod impossibile est hominibus, possibile
est apud Deum (3). Respondeo, apud homines
impossibile esse et salvari, et opera supere¬
rogationis facere ; apud Deum utrumque
esse possibile.
(1) Luc. XVII, 10. — (2) Math. XXIV, '30. — (31 Math. XIX, 25 et 26.
540
LIBER II.
Argumentum septimum, Hieremias dicit :
Maledictus qui facit opus Dei negligente r, cap.
XLVIII (1). Nemo autem est, cui non subrepat
aliqua negligentia : ergo nemo satisfacit de¬
bito suo erga Deum. Respondeo, loquitur
de negligentia gravi, quae amicitiam Dei tol¬
lat, unde in Hebraeo niDl fraudem potius,
quam negligenliam significat; sicut Hiero¬
nymus etiam vertit.
Argumentum octavum. Christus ait : Hoc
est prceceptum meum , ut diligatis invicem, sicut
ego dilexi vos , Joann. XIII. At Christus sic
nos dilexit, ut pro nobis sit mortuus ; ergo
et nos debemus pro fratribus animas ponere,
ut concludit Joannes, I. Joan. III. at haec est
summa charitas, cui nihil addi potest : Ma¬
jorem enim charitatem nemo habet , quam ut ani¬
mam quis ponat pro amicis suis, Joan. XIII (2).
Ergo nullus remanet locus consiliis, et ope¬
ribus supererogationis. Respondeo, non te¬
nemur animas ponere pro fratribus, nisi
auando id necessarium est ad eorum salu¬
tem aeternam ; si ergo id faciamus, cum non
est necessarium, sed utile tantum, opus con¬
silii et supererogationis faciemus : et simili¬
ter si proximo benefaciam, quando non est
in extrema vel gravi necessitate, opus facio
supererogationis.
Argumentum nonum. Jubet Deus Deute-
ron. IV. nihil addi praeceptis suis; male ergo
adduntur consilia. Respondeo : jubet Deus
nihil addi praecepto, quod ipsum corrumpat,
non autem aliquid, quod ipsum perficiat;
consilia autem perficiunt, non corrumpunt
praecepta, ut patet. Vide plura, si libet, de
hoc argumento in lib. IV. de Pontifice,
cap. 17.
Argumentum decimum. Ita sumus Deo
obligati, ut non possimus unquam facere,
quantum debemus : ergo numquam supere¬
rogamus. Antecedens patet; nam quidquid
habemus boni, ab illo habemus : ergo om¬
nia nostra sunt ei debita, et si millies pro
Deo vitam ponemus, numquam tamen red¬
demus ei aliquid aequale.
Respondeo : argumentum probat, potuisse
Deum a nobis exigere quidquid possumus,
non tamen voluisse. Constat enim ex divinis
litteris, Deum pro sua benignitate imposuisse
nobis jugum suave, et onus leve. Praeterea
probat hoc argumentum, numquam homi¬
nem posse facere plusquam debet, imo
etiam nec quantum debet, si consideremus
beneficia Dei nobis collata ; numquam enim
ei reddemus aequale; et tamen possumus
facere plusquam debemus, si consideremus
legem nobis a Deo impositam, et proinde
possumus facere plusquam revera facere
teneamur ; nam etsi non possumus superare,
aut aequare Dei beneficia nostris operibus,
tamen non propterea rei efficimur, quia non
tenemur id praestare , sed id solum, quod
Deus imperavit.
Argumentum undecimum. Ad Philipp. IV.
dicitur : Quod reliquum est , fratres , qucecum-
que sunt vera , qucecumque honesta , qucecumque
justa , qucecumque boni nominis , si qua virtus ,
et si qua laus , hcec cogitate , quce et didicistis,
et accepistis , et audistis , et vidistis in me, hcec
facite , et Deus pacis erit vobiscum (3). Inve¬
niant, inquit Petrus Martyr, «isti acuti ho¬
mines, quod huic praecepto Pauli superaddi
possit. » Respondeo, haec omnia debere ac¬
cipi negative, ut sensus sit. Nihil cogitetis,
neque agatis, nisi quod justum est, quod
verum, quod pudicum etc. Et hoc modo
multa possunt superaddi affirmativa ; alio-
qui si juberet Paulus, ut omnia, quae sunt
vera cogitaremus, deberemus cogitare, non
solum omnem Scripturam sanctam, sed
etiam totam Philosophiam , ac praesertim
Mathematicas demonstrationes, quae veris¬
simae sunt.
Argumentum duodecimum. Te , inquit,
interrogo, an possis aliquid facere ultra
legem, vel non? si non potes, convenimus ;
si potes, ergo teneris id facere. Nam lex re¬
quirit omnes tuas vires, et quidquid potes :
ergo implicat contradictionem, quod possis
ultra legem aliquid facere. Respondeo, nego,
legem requirere omnes vires, et quidquid
possumus, solum enim requirit, ut implea¬
mus, quod praecipitur, sive nobis superent
vires, sive non. Alioquil. ad Corinthios VII.
Paulus non potuisset dicere de homine so¬
luto : Quod vult faciat : non peccat , si nubat.
Sic enim argumentabor : aut ille potest con¬
tinere, aut non: si non, ergo tenetur nubere,
ut Calvinus etMartyr docent; si potest, ergo
tenetur continere ; lex enim requirit quid¬
quid possumus : ergo numquam datur tem¬
pus, quo liceat dicejje : Quod vult , faciat ;
non peccat , si nubat (4).
Argumentum decimumtertium. Non caret
superbia et arrogantia infinita, ut dicas, te
plus facere, quam tenearis, et Christo sit in-
(1) Jerem. XLVIII, 10. — (2) Joan. XIII, 34 et seq. — (3) Philipp. IV, 8. — (4) I. Cor. VII, 36.
CAPUT XIV.
541
i
juria non vulgaris, qui frustra dicetur mor¬
tuus ; si valuisses legem praestare, aut plus
efficere, quam in illa praeceptam fuerit.
Respondeo : non timuisse istam super¬
biam infinitam illas virgines, quae, teste Au¬
gustino, serm. 18. de verbis Apostoli, dixe¬
runt : Amando te plus facimus, quam prae¬
cipis : neque illos omnes Patres, quos supra
citavimus. Sed hoc revera non caret super¬
bia infinita, propter tam debiles ratiunculas
opponere se omnibus sacris Doctoribus, imo
et ipsi Scripturae, quod Petrus Martyr facit.
Illud autem de Christo est manifesta calum¬
nia ; non enim dicimus, posse hominem suis
viribus, aut sine Christi gratia legem ser¬
vare, vel aliquid superaddere.
Argumentum decimumquartum. Nolle
Deum plus amare , si plus possis, gravissi¬
mum peccatum est : ergo nihil potes super¬
addere, quod non debeas. Probatur antece¬
dens; primo, quia negat Deum esse summum
* bonum, qui non vult eum amare quantum
potest; secundo, quia abutitur Dei dono, qui
potest plus diligere, et non vult; nam posse
plus diligere sine dubio Dei donum est. Adde,
quod qui talentum abscondit, a Deo punitus
est, Matth. XXV. et peccatum est ingratitu¬
dinis, nolle facere quod potes pro eo , cui
non potes referre paria.
Respondeo, nolle plus amare si plus pos¬
sis, esse peccatum, si ex contemptu id fiat,
vel si necessitas exigat majorem illum amo¬
rem ; vel si id fiat ex superbia, quasi putes
te satis esse perfectum; vel denique si ex
acedia et pigritia nolis ullo modo amplius
proficere. Id enim repugnat statui viatoris,
at si velis quidem plus diligere et proficere,
sed juxta conditionem et gradum tuum,
etiamsi nolis ad altiorem statum ascendere,
quamvis possis, non peccas. Verbi gr. cui
est imperatum, ut proficiscatur Venetias, si
in media via consistat, et nolit progredi,
peccat : At si velit progredi, sed per viam
communem, non per compendia ; et si velit
in ipsa via ambulare, non currere , non
peccat.
Igitur ad primum dico, illum negare Deum
esse summum bonum, saltem factis, qui non
vult eum summo amore diligere, id est, super
omnia alia ; qui autem diligit Deum super
omnia, ille Deum habet pro summo bono,
etiamsi eum non tam ardenter amet, quam
forte posset, vel non faciat pro eo omnia,
• (1) Cor. VII, 36.
quae posset. Alioqui semper essemus per¬
plexi , imo etiam semper peccaremus ;
quantumvis enim ardenter Deum diligamus,
semper tamen videmur paulo ardentius pos¬
se diligere, si paulo amplius conemur.
Ad secundum dico, illum abuti Dei dono,
qui eo non utitur quando est necessarium ;
qui autem paratus est eo uti, si necessarium
sit, etiamsi numquam fortasse utatur, non
dicitur eo abuti. Nam ille, cui Paulus dicit
I. Cor. VII : Quod vult , faciat , sine dubio
potuit continere, et tamen ei dicitur : Non
peccat , si nubat (1). Et R. Augustinus de bo¬
no conjugali cap. 21. dicit : Abrahamum
habuisse donum continentiae, non minus,
quam Joannes habuerit, ita ut potuerit sem¬
per continere, et tamen numquam conti¬
nuisse, ne in extrema quidem senectute ; et
Joannem Evangelistam habuisse donum pa¬
tiendi martyrium, non minus quam Petrum:
et tamen non exercuisse illud donum, ut
fecit Petrus : Accusare autem Abrahamum,
vel Joannem, quasi donis Dei abusi sint,
extremae dementiae est.
Ad illud de ingratitudine dico, non esse
ingratum benefactori eum, qui benefactori
adest, cum necessitas ejus id postulat, aut
cum ipse operam nostram requirit, et qui
voluntati ejus satisfacit. Porro Deus conten¬
tus est ut legem ejus servemus, neque aliud
a nobis requirit , etiamsi possimus plura
praestare.
Ad illud de talentis dico, servum illum
fuisse damnatum, quia habuerat praeceptum
negotiandi : quomodo nunc qui habet talen¬
tum condonandi, et simul habet praeceptum,
quia est Episcopus, punietur, si non condo¬
netur. At qui habet idem talentum, sed non
habet prteceptum, non punietur, ut patet de
sancto Antonio etc.