Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Members of the Church · On Monks (Book II)
Chapter 14: The Name and Definition of a Vow Explained
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. II, De Monachis (De Membris Ecclesiae, Book II), On Monks (On the Members of the Church, Book II). The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
There follows the third disputation, which is on monastic vows, of which disputation there will be six parts. For first we will briefly expound the name and definition of a vow. Then we will explain the opinion of the adversaries. Thirdly, we will prove that everything which is done by vow is a worship of God. Fourthly, we will show that vows are not proper to the Jews, but are rightly made also by Christians. Fifthly, that of things commanded — such as the promise made in Baptism — vows are not properly wont to be made. Sixthly, we will demonstrate that of things not commanded, and namely of continence, poverty, and obedience, vows are rightly made.
As to the first, the name “vow” among the Latins is ambiguous; for it signifies a promise, and a prayer, and a desire. For we say, I have undertaken a vow of continence — that is, I have promised continence to God; likewise, continence succeeds to me according to my vow — that is, as I desired; and I poured out vows to God for continence — that is, I prayed to God for continence. Among the Greeks there is not the same name for vow and prayer, yet there are two kindred names; for euche signifies a vow, proseuche a prayer. Among the Hebrews the names of vow and prayer have no kinship; for a vow is called neder, prayer tephillah. The reason of which is that among the Greeks and Latins, when these names were invented, there was scarcely any true piety, and therefore men vowed nothing to God or the gods except for the obtaining of that which they desired, and therefore they always annexed prayers to vows, according to that of Virgil (Aeneid 6): Dost thou delay in vows and prayers?
Hence, then, the Greeks, as Gregory of Nyssa observed (oration 2 on the Lord’s Prayer), called prayer proseuche, because it was made after the vow, which they called euche. But the Latins (as we said) called by the same name both the promise made to God and the prayers to God. But the Hebrews, because they worshiped God piously, and were wont to make even absolute vows without any relation to prayers — as we Christians also do — therefore named these two things by proper and diverse names.
Now a vow can be defined: “A religious promise of some more excellent good, made to God by free will.” It is called a promise, as it were a certain contract between God and man. For it does not suffice for a vow to have proposed and determined to do something, unless it be also promised; for a vow includes an obligation of one to another; for a vow obliges not only by reason of truth — that is, because he who vowed is bound to make true what he said — but also by reason of fidelity, because he is bound to keep faith given to another. And this obligation cannot arise from a purpose alone, which one conceives within himself, but necessarily requires a promise. It is called religious, that it may be signified of what virtue a vow is the act — namely, of religion.
And it is to be observed that in a vow there are always two actions, the one material, the other formal. The material is that concerning which the vow is made, as to fast, to sacrifice, and so forth. The formal is the very promise of fasting or sacrificing, and the fulfillment of the promise. Wherefore the formal action is always an act of religion; but the material is sometimes of religion, as if one vow to offer sacrifice daily, sometimes of another virtue, as if one vow always to fast on Friday. It is called of a more excellent good, that the matter of a vow may be determined; for nothing can be vowed but that which is better to do than to omit.
From which it is evident that five kinds of things are excluded from the matter of a vow. First, sins, as when the Jews vowed that they would kill Paul (Acts 23); for to vow sins is not to promise a gift to God, but to threaten. Secondly, indifferent works, as not to go to the market; for that cannot please God which is vain and useless; for a foolish promise displeaseth him (Ecclesiastes 5). Thirdly, impossible works, as if one vow that he will set out to Jerusalem without a ship. Fourthly, necessary works, as if one vow that he will die when it shall please God. Fifthly, good works which nevertheless impede greater goods, as if one vow that he will take a wife. Although this very thing, at a certain time and to a certain person, can be better to do than to omit; and then it will be a legitimate matter of a vow, even though absolutely the contrary is to be judged.
It is called made to God, that we may understand that vows differ from oaths, although both are acts of religion, and agree nearly in matter; for vows are made to God, oaths to men by God. But hence are not excluded the vows which are made to the saints; for either they are vows materially, not formally, as some teach, who think that in the vows of the saints there are two promises — one to the saints, to whom something is promised; the other to God, to whom is promised the fulfillment of the promise made to the saints, and this alone they say is properly a vow — or (which I think truer) vows are truly made to the saints, but as they are saints, that is, as in a most excellent manner they participate the nature and glory of God, concerning which we disputed in Book 3 On the Church Triumphant, chapter 10.
We add lastly, by free will, that a vow may be distinguished from a common law; for a vow is a certain private law, and obliges after the manner of a law; but a common law obliges even the unwilling and reluctant; but a vow is a law which we ourselves lay upon ourselves, and accordingly obliges none but him who has of his own accord made the vow. And hence vows made before the use of reason are not held ratified, nor those which on account of ignorance or fear are reckoned involuntary.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XIV. Explicatur nomen , et definitio voti. Sequitur Disputatio tertia, quae est de vo¬ tis monasticis, cujus disputationis sex erunt partes. Primum enim exponemus breviter nomen, et definitionem voti. Deinde, expli- LIBER II. 542 cabimus sententiam adversariorum. Tertio, probabimus omne quod sit ex voto esse cul¬ tum Dei. Quarto, vota non esse propria Judaeorum, sed etiam a Christianis recte fieri ostendemus. Quinto, de rebus praeceptis, qualis est promissio facta in Baptismo, non solere proprie fieri vota. Sexto, de rebus non praeceptis, ac nominatim de continentia, paupertate, et obedientia, vota recte fieri demonstrabimus. Quoad primum, nomen voti apud Latinos ambiguum est; significat enim promissio¬ nem et orationem, ac desiderium ; dicimus enim, suscepi votum continentiae, id est, pro¬ misi Deo continentiam ; item, pro voto mihi continentia succedit, id est, ut desiderabam, et vota pro continentia Deo fudi, id est, pre¬ catus sum a Deo continentiam. Apud Graecos non est idem nomen pro voto, et oratione, tamen sunt duo affinia nomina; nam iuxv? significat votum , npo^ewri, orationem. Apud Hebraeos voti et orationis nomina nullam habent affinitatem ; votum enim dicitur “pa oratio nbsn cujus rei ea est ratio, quod apud Graecos et Latinos, cum haec nomina in¬ venta sunt, vix erat ulla vera pietas, et ideo nihil homines Deo, vel Diis vovebant, nisi ad id, quod desiderabant impetrandum, et propterea semper votis annectebant preces, juxta illud Yirgilii dEneidos YI : Cessas in vota precesque. Hinc igitur Graeci, ut observavit Gregorius Nyssenus orat. 2. orationem Dominicam, vo¬ caverunt orationem npocrsvxYiv, quia post vo¬ tum fiebat, quod vocabant euxv?v. Latini autem (ut diximus) eodem nomine promissionem Deo factam, et preces ad Deum appellabant. At Hebraei, quia Deum pie colebant, et ab¬ soluta etiam vota facere consueverant sine ulla relatione ad preces , ut nos quoque Christiani facimus, propterea propriis et di¬ versis nominibus, haec duo nominabant. Potest autem- definiri votum : « Religiosa promissio alicujus excellentioris boni, Deo facta libera voluntate. » Promissio dicitur, quasi contractus quidam inter Deum et homi¬ nem. Nec enim sufficit ad votum, propo¬ suisse ac statuisse aliquid facere, nisi etiam promittatur; votum enkn includit obligatio¬ nem unius ad alterum ; non enim obligat votum solum ratione veritatis , id est, quia tenetur qui vovit, verum facere quod dixit, sed etiam ratione fidelitatis, quia tenetur alteri fidem datam servare. Hsec autem obli¬ gatio non potest nasci ex proposito solo, quod quis apud se concipit, sed necessario promissionem requirit. Religiosa dicitur, ut significetur, cujus virtutis actus sit votum, nimirum religionis. Est autem observandum, in voto semper esse duas actiones, alteram materialem, alte¬ ram formalem. Materialis est, de qua sit votum, ut jejunare, sacrificare etc. Formalis est ipsa promisso jejunandi, vel sacrificandi, et promissionis adimpletio. Quare formalis actio semper est actus religionis ; materialis autem interdum est religionis, ut si quis vo¬ veat quotidie sacra facere, interdum alterius virtutis, ut si quis voveat sexta feria semper jejunare. Excellentioris boni dicitur, ut de¬ terminetur materia voti, nec enim voveri potest, nisi id, quod melius sit facere, quam omittere. Ex quo perspicuum est, quinque rerum genera excludi a materia voti. Primo, pec¬ cata, ut cum Judaei voverunt se occisuros Paulum, Actor, xxm. nam vovere peccata, non est Deo munus promittere, sed minari. Secundo, opera indifferentia, ut non ire ad forum ; non enim potest Deo placere, quod est vanum, et inutile : Displicet enim ei stulta promissio , Eccles. V. (1). Tertio, opera im¬ possibilia, ut si quis voveat se profecturum in Hierusalem sine navi. Quarto, opera ne¬ cessaria, ut si quis voveat se moriturum quando placuerit Deo. Quinto, opera bona, quae tamen majora bona impediunt, ut si quis voveat se ducturum uxorem. Quam¬ quam hoc ipsum certo tempore, ac certae personae potest esse melius facere, quam omittere : proinde tum erit legitima voti materia, etsi absolute contra judicandum sit. Deo facta dicitur, ut intelligamus, vota differre a juramentis, licet utraque sint actus religionis, et in materia fere conveniant ; vota enim fiunt Deo, juramenta hominibus per Deum. Non autem hinc excluduntur vota, quae tiunt sanctis; namvel ea suntvota materialiter, non formaliter, ut quidam do¬ cent, qui existimant in votis Sanctorum duas esse promissiones; unam Sanctis, quibus aliquid promittitur; alteram Deo, cui pro¬ mittitur adimpletio promissionis factae Sanc¬ tis, et hanc solam proprie votum esse dicunt; vel (quod verius puto) vota fiunt vere Sanc- (1) Eccl. V, 3. CAPUT XYI. 543 tis, sed ut Sancti sunt, id est, ut excellentis¬ simo modo participant Dei naturam et glo¬ riam, de qua re disputavimus in lib. III. de Ecclesia triumphante cap. 10. Addimus ultimo, Libera voluntate, ut dis¬ tinguatur votum a lege communi; votum enim est lex quaedam privata, et obligat more legis, sed lex communis obligat etiam nolentem, et invitum ; votum autem est lex, quam nos ipsi nobis ferimus, et proinde non obligat, nisi eum, qui sponte votum fecerit, et hinc non habentur rata vota facta ante usum rationis, nec ea, quae propter ignoran¬ tiam, aut metum censentur involuntaria.