Bellarmine · De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus · On the Power of the Supreme Pontiff in Temporal Matters, against William Barclay
Chapter 12: The Arguments against the Theologians' Opinion on the Power of the Supreme Pontiff in Temporal Matters Are Dissolved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. XII, De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaium, a treatise of 1610. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
In the twelfth chapter Barclay tries of set purpose to affirm and show that the Supreme Pontiff has no power in temporal matters over kings and other Christian princes. His first argument is that the whole of Christian antiquity always held kings to be less than God alone. Which argument he had already proposed before in chapter 8, where we also answered him copiously. For this author has it as a thing peculiar to him, to repeat and press the same arguments again and again, I know not whether to make the book larger, or to obtain by importunity the assent which he cannot wring out by the force of reasons. This first argument, then, being passed over, let us hear the second.
“What of this,” he says, “that the Pontiffs themselves confess that kings have no superiors in temporal matters? chapter Per venerabilem, which children are legitimate. They have, and they have not, cannot be true at the same time. It is false, therefore, that kings have no superior in temporal matters, if another can by right take temporal things from them and confer them on another.” I answer: the opinion of the Pontiff in that chapter is that kings are supreme temporal princes, and therefore have no temporal prince above them, as dukes and other inferior princes in the same kingdom have the king as their superior in temporal matters; for so Ecclesiastes speaks in chapter 5: There is another higher than the high, and above these there are others more eminent, and moreover there is the king that reigneth over all the land subject to him; and Saint Peter in the first epistle, chapter 2: Be ye subject to every human creature for God's sake, whether it be to the king as excelling, or to governors as sent by him. It is the same thing, then, for a king not to have above him another king or another temporal prince; otherwise he would not be a supreme king in the order of temporal or political principality. And this perhaps is the reason why the same Innocent in the same chapter Per venerabilem had said a little before that “some princes acknowledge no superior among men, except the Roman Pontiff”; for he added that exception so that, when he afterwards said, “the king of the Franks acknowledges no superior in temporal matters,” we might understand that the discourse was of temporal superiors; for the king acknowledges no temporal prince above him, but he acknowledges the Roman Pontiff, a spiritual prince, who can judge also of temporal things in order to spiritual. “But,” says Barclay, “they have, and they have not, cannot be true at the same time.” I answer: they have, and they have not, of the same thing, cannot be true at the same time; of a different thing, nothing hinders their being true. He has a scarlet cloak, and he has not a scarlet cloak, cannot be true at the same time; but he has a scarlet cloak, and he has not a black cloak, can be true at the same time. So then, the king has in temporal matters a temporal superior, and has not in temporal matters a temporal superior, cannot be true; but the king has in temporal matters a spiritual superior, and has not in temporal matters a temporal superior, can be, and are, most true at the same time.
But Barclay presses: “The distinction,” he says, “which they set up in the words directly and indirectly does not pertain to the faculty of judging and the effect of the judgment, but only to the manner and way of acquiring so great a power. For the canonists say that the Pope received directly from Christ the temporal dominion of the whole world. But these deny that he received such dominion directly, as you might say of itself, simply and without consideration of another thing, but only indirectly, that is, by consequence, by reason of that spiritual power which he received directly from the Lord. This difference from those words, then, ought to be referred to the beginning and manner of acquiring the temporal power, not to its force and effect.” So he, who would have it that the Pontiff, by the opinion of the theologians, has a temporal power over kings indirectly acquired, and is their judge in temporal matters; which seems at odds with Innocent in the chapter cited, where Innocent says that kings have no superior in temporal matters. I answer: a distinction is needed, that it may be plainly understood whether Barclay gathers truly or falsely that the Pontiff has temporal power over kings and is their judge. If by temporal power is understood the power of disposing of temporal things, whether the power itself in itself be spiritual or temporal, he gathers truly that the Pontiff has temporal power over kings; but if by temporal power is understood a power which is in itself temporal, as is the power of kings and other political princes, he gathers falsely that the Pontiff has temporal power over kings by the opinion of the theologians. For the theologians attribute to the Supreme Pontiff temporal and spiritual power only in the ecclesiastical dominion, which power Innocent calls full power in the patrimony of Saint Peter, in the chapter Per venerabilem; over the other Christian provinces and Christian princes they attribute to the Pontiff only a spiritual power, which of itself and properly regards spiritual things, but regards temporal things as they are subordinated to spiritual. And therefore, when we speak properly, we say that the Pontiff has power in temporal matters, but not that he has a temporal power, as he is Pontiff. From which it follows that the distinction of the words directly and indirectly is not referred, properly speaking, to the manner of acquiring the power, as Barclay falsely says, but to explaining the secondary and consequent object of the supreme spiritual power, which, as we said above, primarily and directly regards spiritual things, secondarily and indirectly, that is, in order to spiritual things, regards temporal; which opinion of the theologians is in no way at odds with the words of Innocent in the chapter Per venerabilem, as is clear from what has been said.
Barclay adds besides this argument: “But if there is room for the adversaries' opinion, Christian kings and princes will be not only vassals and clients of the Pope in temporal matters, but (what is baser) will possess their kingdoms and principalities from him as it were at his pleasure. This I show easily from the very principles of the adversaries, thus: the Supreme Pontiff can take a kingdom from one and confer it on another, if it is necessary for the salvation of souls; but to judge and decide whether it is necessary belongs to the same Pontiff, of whose judgment, whether it be fair or unfair, no one can judge; therefore whenever he pleases he will be able to deprive anyone of his kingdom and confer it on another.” I answer: Christian kings and other princes, excepting those who are feudatories of the Church, ought not to be called clients of the Supreme Pontiff, although it pleased Barclay so to call them, to stir up ill will against the Church; much less do they possess their kingdoms and principalities from him at his pleasure; but they are true kings and true princes, and so much nobler and happier than heathen kings and princes, as they not only reign on earth for a time, but also after this life, if they have reigned justly and piously, are translated to the heavenly and everlasting kingdom. But Barclay's argument is faulty in every part; for that proposition, the Supreme Pontiff can take a kingdom from one and confer it on another, if it is necessary for the salvation of souls, needs explanation; for it can be understood both well and otherwise, and can be both true and false. The Pontiff can indeed, if it is necessary for the salvation of souls, take a kingdom from someone; but if he has first admonished him, if he has given him space to come to his senses, if he has perceived him to be pernicious and incorrigible. He can also confer the kingdom on another, yet not at his pleasure on whom he likes, for so kings would truly reign at pleasure; but on him to whom it is due by right, whether succession or election has place. And if perhaps it is due to no one, on him to whom reason dictates that it should be given. For so Innocent IV in the council of Lyons, when he had deposed the emperor Frederick, left the election of a successor free to the Electors, to whom it belongs by right; so also Gregory VII after the deposition of Henry confirmed Rudolf, elected by the princes. So also Zachary adjudged the kingdom of the Franks to Pepin, because he in fact administered the kingdom, and the nobles desired him. Leo III also transferred the Western empire from the Greeks to the Franks, because they were most powerful in the West, and alone could sustain that dignity, and the Roman people most desired them. So also in the Old Testament the high priest Jehoiada, after he had ordered Queen Athaliah, who had seized the kingdom, to be killed, conferred the kingdom on the son of the dead king, to whom it was due by hereditary right, 4 Kings 11; and the high priest Azariah, when King Uzziah was separated from the company of men on account of the leprosy divinely sent, left the administration of the kingdom not to whom he wished, but to whom it was due, that is, to the king's son, 2 Chronicles 26. That proposition of Barclay, then, is either false if badly understood, or, rightly explained, does not bring it about that kings reign at pleasure. Now that assumption, but to judge and decide whether it is necessary belongs to the same Pontiff, of whose judgment, whether it be fair or unfair, no one can judge, is like the proposition; for wrongly understood it is false; rightly explained it is indeed true, but it is not concluded from it that kingdoms given by the Supreme Pontiff are possessed at pleasure, which is Barclay's conclusion. It belongs indeed to the Pontiff to judge whether it is necessary for the salvation of souls to deprive some king of his kingdom; but it does not belong to him to invent necessities at his whim, or under the colour of necessity to serve his desires. And because this matter is most grave, and the necessity ought to be manifest and settled, therefore the Pontiffs have ordinarily done these things in synods of bishops, or consistories of the Cardinals of the holy Roman Church, the reasons being set out and the Fathers consenting, as we showed above.
Barclay goes on, and after he has amplified and repeated the foregoing reason with many words after his manner, adds these words: “But also all power, and all dominion and jurisdiction, is acquired either by divine law or by human law; and he who possesses or holds something, if he possesses it by neither of these, possesses it unjustly, as Augustine excellently reasons against the Donatists, tract 6 on chapter 1 of John, canon Quo jure, distinction 8. It cannot be, therefore, that the Pope justly exercises any temporal command over kings and secular princes, unless it is established that it was given him by divine or human law.” I answer: by divine law a power over Christian kings and princes, not properly temporal, but one which extends itself to temporal things, has been attributed to the Supreme Pontiff, the Vicar of Christ. For from the same source from which Barclay himself deduces that a most ample spiritual power belongs by divine law to the Roman Pontiff over all kings and princes, we gather that by the same divine law there belongs to the Roman Pontiff a power which reaches to temporal things; because the order of the superior power to the inferior, of the spiritual to the temporal, requires it. But, says the adversary, no passage is found either in the divine or in the human laws which confers such a power on him. I answer: nay, a passage is found in the divine law which confers that power on him, and a passage is found in the human law which expounds the passage of the divine law; for what is written in Matthew 16, I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and so on, and John 21, Feed my sheep, we find explained in many councils, and especially in the Roman under Gregory VII, in the Lateran under Innocent III, and in that of Lyons under Innocent IV, in this sense, that the power of binding and loosing, and also of feeding and ruling the universal Church, reaches not to spiritual things alone, but also to temporal things by reason of spiritual; which the common opinion of Catholic doctors, and practice itself and experience, confirm.
“But,” he says, “the dominion and authority of kings is openly commended and approved by many testimonies of the sacred letters, as when it is said: By me kings reign. Power is given to you by the Lord. The kings of the Gentiles lord it over them. The heart of the king is in the hand of God. I will give them a king in my wrath. My son, fear the Lord and the king. Honour the king; and everywhere things of this kind.” I answer: the first passage does not show a power given by God to kings, but that wisdom is necessary to kings that they may reign as they ought. For those are the words of Wisdom, which exhorts kings to the study of Wisdom herself, if they wish truly to reign, and in making laws to decree just things. The second passage says indeed that the royal power is from the Lord; but it says this that kings may not be proud, but may understand that they have above them a Lord, by whom they will be gravely punished if they abuse their power. The third passage does not attribute power, but reproves the abuse of power; for the kings of the Gentiles, who lack the true knowledge of God, not content with royal administration, commonly aim at lording it over peoples as over slaves, and change political rule into despotic, and from kings become tyrants; which abuse the Greek word katakyrieuein, which signifies violent domination, shows more plainly. The fourth passage shows the power of God over kings, not a power given by God to kings; for such is the omnipotence of God that he has in his power not only the bodies of kings but also their hearts, and turns and converts them as he pleases. The fifth passage does not commend the royal power, but threatens that he will permit the people for their sins to fall under an unjust and cruel king, by whom they are not so much ruled as devoured. The sixth and seventh passages teach the fear of the people toward the king, not the power of the king toward the people. But whatever may be of these passages, as we do not deny that the royal power is from God, so also it ought not to be denied that the Apostolic power is from God; indeed that all power is from God, according to that of the Apostle, Romans 13: There is no power but from God. But that the royal power is not subject to the Apostolic power, or that it is subject in spiritual things only, and not also in temporal, is found in these passages neither openly nor obscurely; and this is what is in question.
Lastly Barclay brings forward an argument which he has also brought forward more than once above: “Lastly,” he says, “since that temporal power and jurisdiction of the Pope, of which we speak, is found neither comprised in the express word of God in the Scriptures, nor received as it were by hand from the tradition of the Apostles, nor observed by use and custom in the Church for a whole thousand years and more, or taken up by any Pontiff, nor praised and approved by the ancient Fathers of the Church, nay, not even mentioned; what necessity of believing, I beseech you, forces us to admit it? or by what authority do they persuade us of it?” I answer: there are many things which we believe from the word of God explained by the Church, although they are not expressly found in the word of God. That the Son is consubstantial with the Father we do not read expressly in the Scriptures; yet we believe it, because the Church teaches that the words of the Lord in John 10, I and the Father are one, are so to be understood. That the Spirit proceeds from the Son we do not read expressly in the Scriptures; yet we believe it, because the Church teaches that the words of the Lord in John 16 are so to be understood: He shall glorify me, because he shall receive of mine and shall show it to you; all things whatsoever the Father hath are mine, therefore I said that he shall receive of mine. The baptism of infants we do not read expressly in the Scriptures; yet we believe it, because the Church teaches that those words are so to be understood, John 3, Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, and so on, and Matthew 19, Suffer the little children to come unto me. So then, that the power of the Supreme Pontiff extends itself to temporal things, and especially to kingdoms and empires, we do not read expressly in the Scriptures; yet we believe it, because the Church in general councils teaches that those words of the Lord, Matthew 16, I will give to thee the keys, and so on, are so to be understood. But it is false that this power was not in use in the Church for a whole thousand years and more. For we have already taught above that it was in use after the year seven hundred, in the time of the Pontiffs Gregory II and Zachary; likewise after the year eight hundred, in the time of Leo III and Gregory IV. It is also false that it was not praised or mentioned by the ancient Fathers, since it was mentioned by Gregory Nazianzen somewhat more obscurely, but by Gregory of Rome openly; and then in later centuries most plainly commended and celebrated by all the writers, some of whom have been enrolled in the roll of the saints. What Barclay says at the end of the chapter, that our reasons are not demonstrations but dialectical syllogisms, and therefore do not produce certain faith, of what kind that is, and how much weight and moment it has, we shall explain in the following chapter.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XII. Diluuntur argumenta adversus Theologorum sententiam 'de Potestate Pontificis Maximi in temporalibus. In cap. 12. conatur Barclaius ex proposito affirmare, ac demonstrare, nullam habere Pontificem Maximum potestatem in tempo¬ ralibus super reges, aliosque principes Chri¬ stianos. Primum argumentum ejus est, quia tota antiquitas Christiana semper censuit, reges solo Deo minores esse. Quod argumentum jam ante proposuerat in cap. 8. ubi et nos illi copiose respondimus. Id enim habet ve- luti proprium hic auctor, ut eadem argu¬ menta stepius repetat, et inculcet, nescio an ut librum grandiorem faciat, an ut importu¬ nitate obtineat assensum, quem vi rat.onum extorquere non potest. Hoc igitur primo ar¬ gumento praetermisso, secundum audiamus. 2. « Quid, inquit, quod ipsi Pontifices fa¬ tentur, reges non habere superiores in tem¬ poralibus ? cap. Per Yenerab. Qui filii sint legitimi. Habent, et non habent, simul vera esse nequeunt. Falsum est ergo reges non habere superiorem in temporalibus, si alius possit jure iis temporalia auferre, alterique conferre. » Respondeo : Sententia Pontificis in eo ca¬ pite est, reges supremos esse principes tem¬ porales, et ideo nullum habere supra se 48 DE POTESTATE PAP^E principem temporalem, quemadmodum du¬ ces aliique principes inferiores in eodem regno superiorem in temporalibus regem habent : sic enim loquitur Ecclesiastes cap. v. Excelso excelsior est alius et super hos quoque eminentiores sunt alii , et insuper uni¬ versae terrae rex imperat servienti , et S. Pe¬ trus in priore epist. cap. ii : Subjecti estote omni humanae creaturae propter Deum , sive reg i quasi praecellenti, sive ducibus, tamquam ab eo missis (1). Idem igitur est, regem non habere supra se alium regem sive principem alium temporalem, alioqui non esset rex supremus in ordine principatus temporalis, sive politici. Et ea forte ratio est, cur idem Innocentius in eodem cap. Per venerabilem, paulo ante dixerit, « nonnullos principes nullum inter homines , excepto Romano Pontifice, superiorem agnoscere : Addidit enim illam exceptionem, ut cum postea dixit : « Regem Francorum nullum in temporalibus superiorem agnoscere, » intelligamus, ser¬ monem fuisse de superioribus temporalibus : non enim rex agnoscit ullum supra se prin¬ cipem temporalem, sed agnoscit Romanum Pontificem, Principem spiritualem, qui de temporalibus quoque in ordine ad spiritualia judicare potest. « At, inquit Barclaius, ha¬ bent, et non habent simul vera esse ne¬ queunt. » Respondeo : Habent, et non ha¬ bent de re eadem, simul vera esse nequeunt : de re diversa, nihil impedit quominus vera esse possint. Habet coccineum pallium, et non habet coccineum pallium, simul vera esse nequeunt : sed habet coccineum pallium, et non habet nigrum pallium, vera simul esse queunt ; sic igitur, habet rex in temporali¬ bus superiorem temporalem, et non habet in temporalibus superiorem temporalem , vera esse nequeunt : sed, habet rex in tem¬ poralibus superiorem spiritalem, et non ha¬ bet in temporalibus superiorem temporalem, verissima simul esse queunt, et sunt. 3. Sed instat Barclaius : « Quod, inquit, in verbis directe, et indirecte discrimen sta¬ tuunt, id non ad facultatem judicandi, et effectum judicii, sed solum ad modum, et rationem acquirendi tantam potestatem per¬ tinet, Canonistee enim dicunt Papam directe dominium temporale totius orbis a Christo accepisse. Hi vero negant eum accepisse tale dominium directe, quasi dicas per se, sim¬ pliciter et sine alterius rei consideratione, sed tantum indirecte, hoc est, per con¬ sequentiam, ratione illius potestatis spiritua¬ lis, quam directe a Domino accepit. Haec igitur ex verbis istis differentia ad initium, et modum acquirendi temporalem potesta¬ tem, non autem ad ejus vim et effectum referri debet. » Haec ille, qui vult, Pontifi¬ cem ex sententia Theologorum habere pote¬ statem temporalem super reges indirecte acquisitam esseque eorum judicem in tem¬ poralibus : quod repugnare videtur Innocen- tio, in capite citato, ubi dicit Innocentius, reges non habere superiorem in temporali¬ bus. Respondeo : Distinctione opus est , ut plane intelligatur verene, an falso Barclaius colligat, Pontificem habere potestatem tem¬ poralem super reges, esseque eorum Judi¬ cem. Potestas disponendi de temporalibus, sive ipsa potestas in se sit spiritualis, sive temporalis, vere colligit, Pontificem habere potestatem temporalem in reges : si vero per temporalem potestatem intelligatur po¬ testas quae sit in se temporalis, ut est pote¬ stas regum, et aliorum principum politico¬ rum, falso colligit, Pontificem habere pote¬ statem temporalem in reges ex theologorum sententia. Theologi enim tribuunt Summo Pontifici temporalem, et spiritualem potesta¬ tem in Ecclesiastica ditione tantum, quam potestatem plenam in patrimonio S. Petri appellat Innocentius, in cap. Per venerabi¬ lem : in reliquas Provincias Christianas , et principes Christianos, tribuunt Pontifici potestatem solum spiritualem, quae per se, et proprie respicit spiritualia ; tempora vero respicit, ut subordinantur spiritualibus. Et ideo quando proprie loquimur, dicimus Pon¬ tificem habere potestatem in temporalibus, non autem habere potestatem temporalem, qua Pontifex est. Ex quo sequitur, ut discri¬ men vocum, directe et indirecte, non refe¬ ratur proprie loquendo, ad modum acqui¬ rendi potestatem, ut Barclaius falso dicit ; sed ad explicandum objectum secundarium, et consectaneum supremae spiritualis pote¬ statis, quae ut supra diximus, primario, et directe respicit spiritualia, secundario et indirecte, id est, in ordine ad spiritualia, respicit temporalia : quae sententia Theolo¬ gorum nullo modo repugnat verbis Innocen- tii in cap. Per venerabilem, ut ex dictis perspicuum est. (1) Eccl. V, 7 ; 1 Petr. II, 13. JN REBUS TEMPORALIBUS 49 4. Addit praeterea Barclaius hoc argumen¬ tum : « Quod si adversariorum sententiae lo¬ cus sit, reges , principes Christiani , non erunt solum vassalli, et clientes Papae in temporalibus ; sed (quod vilius est) quasi precario regna, et principatus ab eo possi¬ debunt. Id facile ex ipsis adversariorum principiis, sic ostendo : Summus Pontifex potest alicui regnum auferre, et alteri con¬ ferre, si id necessarium sit ad animarum salutem : atqui judicare, et decernere, an sit necessarium, pertinet ad eumdem Ponti¬ ficem, de cujus judicio, aequum ne sit, an iniquum nemo potest judicare : ergo ubi libiftim ei erit, poterit quemlibet regno pri¬ vare, et illud alteri conferre. » Respondeo : Reges Christiani , alii que principes, iis exceptis, qui feudatarii sunt Ecclesiae, neque clientes Pontificis Maximi dici debent, quamvis ita eos ad conflandam Ecclesiae invidiam, Barclaio appellare libue¬ rit : multo minus precario regna, et princi¬ patus ab eo possident ; sed sunt veri reges, verique principes, tantoque ethnicis regi¬ bus, et principibus nobiliores, et feliciores , quanto non solum in terris ad tempus reg¬ nant , sed etiam post hanc vitam, si juste pieque regnaverint, ad regnum caeleste, et sempiternum transferuntur. Argumentum vero Barclaii ab omni parte vitiosum est : illa enim propositio, Summus Pontifex potest ali¬ cui regnum auferre, et alteri conferre, si id necessarium sit ad animarum salutem : expli¬ catione indiget; nam et bene, et secus intelli- gi,et vera, et falsa esse potest. Potestquidem Pontifex, si necessarium ad salutem animarum sit, alicui regnum auferre ; sed sianteaadmo- nuerit, si spatium resipiscendi dederit, si per¬ niciosum, et incorrigibilem esse perspexerit. Potest quoque alteri regnum conferre, non pro arbitrio tamen cui libuerit ; sic enim vere precario reges regnarent ; sed cui jure debetur, sive successio, sive electio locum habeat. Et si forte nemini debeatur ; cui ratio dictaverit, esse tribuendum. Sic enim Innocentius quartus in concilio Lugdunensi cum Fridericum imperatorem deposuisset, electionem successoris Electoribus, quibus jure competit, liberam reliquit : sic etiam Gregorius VII. post depositionem Henrici Rudolphum a principibus electum confirma¬ vit. Sic etiam Zacharias regnum Francorum Pipino adjudicavit , quoniam ille re ipsa regnum administrabat, et proceres eumdem expetebant. Leo quoque tertius imperium Tom. XII Occidentale a Graecis ad Francos transtulit, quoniam ipsi in Occidente potentissimi erant, et soli poterant eam dignitatem sustinere, et eosdem Romanus populus maxime cupie¬ bat. Sic etiam in testamento veteri Joiada Pontifex posteaquam Athaliam reginam, quse regnum invaserat, interfici jussit, regnum contulit regis demortui filio, cui jure haere- ditario debebatur, IV Reg. xi. et Azarias Pontifex rege Ozia ob lepram divinitus im¬ missam ab hominum commercio segregato, regni administrationem non cui voluit; sed cui debebatur, id est, regis filio dereliquit. II Paralip. xxvi. Ula igitur propositio Bar¬ claii, aut male intellecta falsa est, aut recte explicata non efficit, ut reges precario reg¬ nent. Jam vero assumptio illa, Atqui judi¬ care, et dicernere an sit necessarium, perti¬ net ad eumdem Pontificem, de cujus judicio sequumne sit, an iniquum, nemo potest judi¬ care, similis est propositioni : nam perperam intellecta, falsa est ; recte explicata, vera quidem est ; sed non inde concluditur, pre¬ cario regna a Summo Pontifice data possi¬ deri, quse est Barclaii conclusio. Pertinet quidem ad Pontificem judicare an sit neces¬ sarium ad salutem animarum, regem ali¬ quem regno privare ; sed non pertinet ad eumdem necessitates pro libito fingere, vel sub colore necessitatis cupiditati servire. Et quoniam res haec gravissima est, et necessi¬ tas manifesta, et explorata esse debet, idcir¬ co Pontifices ordinarie in Synodis Episcopo¬ rum, vel Consistoriis S. R. E. Cardinalium, expositis rationibus, et consentientibus Pa¬ tribus, ista gesserunt, ut supra ostendimus. 5. Pergit Barclaius, et posteaquam ratio¬ nem superiorem multis verbis more suo amplificavit, et repetivit, subjungit haec verba ; « Sed et omnis potestas, omneque dominium, et jurisdictio, aut jure divino acquiritur, aut jure humano ; et qui aliquid possidet, seu tenet, si neutro horum possi¬ deat, injuste possidet, ut praeclare in Dona- tistas ratiocinatur Augustinus tract. 6. ad cap. i. Joannis, canon. Quo jure, dist. 8. Fieri igitur non potest, ut Papa imperium aliquod temporale in reges, et principes saeculares juste exerceat, nisi constet id ei jure divino, vel humano esse tributum. » Respondeo : Jure divino potestas in reges, et principes Christianos, non proprie tempo¬ ralis, sed quae se ad temporalia extendat, Summo Pontifici Christi Vicario attributa est. Unde enim Barclaius ipse deducit, potesta-. 4 d:; potestate pap.e 50 tem spiritualem amplissimam jure Divino Ro¬ mano Pontifici in omnes reges, principesque competere : inde nos colligimus, eodem di¬ vino jure Pontifici Romano competere pote¬ statem, quae ad temporalia pertingat; quo¬ niam id requirit ordo potestatis superioris ad inferiorem, spiritualis ad temporalem. At, inquit adversarius, nullus neque in divinis, neque in humanis legibus locus reperitur, qui talem illi potestatem conferat. Respon¬ deo : Irnmo locus invenitur in divina lege, qui potestatem illi conferat, et locus inveni¬ tur in humana lege, qui locum divinae legis exponat, quod enim scriptum estMatth. xvi. Tibi dabo claves Regni coelorum, etc. et Joan. xxi. Pasce oves meas; explicatum inveni¬ mus in multis conciliis, ac potissimum in Ro¬ mano sub Gregorio VII, in Lateranensi sub Jn- nocentio III. et in Lugdunensi sui > Innocentio IV, in eum sensum, ut potestas ligandi, at¬ que solvendi, nec non pascendi, atque re¬ gendi Ecclesiam universam, non ad sola spi¬ ritualia ; sed etiam ad temporalia ratione spiritualium porrigatur: quod idem commu¬ nis doctorum Catholicorum sententia, et ipsa praxis, atque experientia confirmat. 6. « At, inquit, regum dominatio, et au¬ ctoritas multis sacrarum litterarum testimo¬ niis aperte commendatur, et probatur, ut cum dicitur : Per me reges regnant. Data est a Domino potestas vobis, reges gentium do¬ minantur eorum. Cor regis in manu Dei. Dabo illis regem in furore meo. Time Domi¬ num, fili mi, et regem. Regem honorificate, et passimid genus similia. » Respondeo : Primus locus non demonstrat potestatem datam a Deo regibus ; sed sapien¬ tiam regibus esse necessariam, ut regnent, sicut oportet. Verba enim illa sapientisesunt, qnse reges hortatur ad ipsius Sapientiae stu¬ dium, si volunt vere regnare, et leges feren¬ do justa decernere. Secundus locus dicit quidem, potestatem regiam esse a Domino : sed hoc dicit, ut reges non superbiant ; sed intelligant habere supra se Dominum, a quo graviter punientur, si potestate abutantur. Tertius locus non potestatem tribuit ; sed abusum potestatis reprehendit, r,eges enim gentium, qui vera Dei cognitione carent, non contenti administratione regia, plerumque dominari populis, quasi mancipiis, affectant, et polit cum imperium in despoticum trans¬ mutant, ac de regibus tyranni fiunt : quem abusum Grseca vox xat7x'jpi£oeuv, quae vio¬ lentam dominationem significat, magis aperte demonstrat. Quartus locus potestatem Dei in reges, non potestatem datam a Deo regi¬ bus ostendit : ea enim est omnipotentia Dei, ut non solum corpora regum; sed etiam corda in potestate habeat, eaque vertat, et conver¬ tat, ut sibi libuerit. Quintos locus non pote¬ statem regiam commendat ; sed minatur se permissurum, ut populus ob sua peccata in regem iniquum, et crudelem incidat, a quo non tam regatur, quam devoretur. Sextus et septimus locus, timorem populi erga re¬ gem, non potestatem regis erga populum docet; sed quicquid de his locis sit, ut non negamus regiam potestatem esse a Deo , sic etiam negari non debet, Apostolicam potesta¬ tem esse a Deo ; immo omnem potestatem esse a Deo, juxta illud Apostoli Roman. xm. Non est potestas nisi a Deo. Quod autem potestas regia subjecta non sit Apostolicse potestati, vel quod subjecta sit in spirituali¬ bus tantum, non etiam in temporalibus; in his locis, neque aperte, neque obscure habe¬ tur, atque hoc est non quaeritur. ' Postremo adducit Barclaius argumentum, quod etiam supra non semel adduxit : « Po¬ stremo, inquit, quandoquidem potestas, et jurisdictio ista temporalia Papae, de qua nobis, sermo, neque expresso Dei verbo in Scripturis comprehensa, neque ex traditione Apostolo¬ rum, quasi per manus recepta, neque usu, et consuetudine in Ecclesia per totos mille annos, et amplius observata, aut ab ullo Pontifice occupata, neque ab antiquis Eccle¬ siae Patribus laudata, et probata immo ne memorata quidem invenitur: quae nos ob¬ secro credendi necessitas cogit eam admit¬ tere? aut qua nobis eam auctoritate persuade¬ ant? » Respondeo : Multa sunt quae ex verbo Dei per Ecclesiam explicata credimus, quamvis in verbo Dei expresse non habeantur. Filium esse Patri consubstantialem, expresse in Scripturis non legimus; credimus tamen, quia sic docet Ecclesia intelligenda esse ver¬ ba Domini Joan. x. Ego et Pater unum su¬ mus. Spiritum a Filio procedere expresse in Scripturis non legimus; credimus tamen, quia sic docet Ecclesia intelligenda esse verba Domini Joan. xvi. Ille me clarificabit , quia de meo accipiet , et annunaabit vobis : omnia quae habet. Paler mta sunt, ileo di¬ xi vobis , qu>a de meo accipiet. Baptismum parvulorum expresse in Scripturis non legi¬ mus ; credimus tamen, quia sic docet Eccle¬ sia intelligenda esse verba illa Joan m. Nisi IN REBUS TEMPORALIBUS 51 quis renatus fuerit ex aqua , et Spiri¬ tu sancto , etc. Mattii, xix, ''inite parvulos venire ad me. Sic ergo potestatem summi Pontificis extendere se ad temporalia ac pmescrt m ad regna, et imperia expresse in Scripturis non legimus; credimus tamen, quia Ecclesia in conciliis generalibus, sic docet intellligenda esse illa verba Domini Matth.xvi. Tibi dabo claves , etc. (1). Falsum vero est, potestatem istam non fuisse in usu apud Ecclesiam per totos mille annos, et amplius. Jam enim supra docuimus, in usu fuisse post annum septingentesimum tempo¬ re Gregorii secundi, et Zachariee Pontificum. Item post annum octingentesimum tempore Leonis tertii, et Gregorii quarti. Falsum quoque est ab antiquis Patribus non fuisse laudatam vel commemoratam; cum a Gre- gorio Nazianzeno paulo obscurius ; sed a Gregorio Romano aperte commemorata ; ac deinde posterioribus saeculis ab omnibus scriptoribus, quorum nonnulli in album san¬ ctum relati sunt, apertissime commendata, et celebrata fuerit. Quod in extremo capite Barclaius dicit, rationes nostras non esse demonstrationes, sed dialecticos syllogismos, proinde eas non certam fidem facere ; id quale sit, et quantum ponderis, et momenti habeat, in sequenti capite explicabimus.