Bellarmine · De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus · On the Power of the Supreme Pontiff in Temporal Matters, against William Barclay
Chapter 13: Bellarmine's First Reason for the Power of the Pontiff in Temporal Matters Is Defended
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. XII, De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaium, a treatise of 1610. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
In the thirteenth chapter Barclay sets about refuting those reasons which I brought forward in book 5 on the Pontiff, chapter 7, to prove the power of the Supreme Pontiff in temporal matters. And since he prefaces that no one has collected the reasons for this power more diligently than Bellarmine, or proposed them more acutely, or concluded them more briefly and subtly, namely to persuade readers that, Bellarmine overcome, the whole matter is finished; I too must preface that I do not admit what Barclay says of my diligence, acuteness and subtlety. For I know there are many far more learned than I, and more diligent and subtle, who have dealt with the same argument before me, and whose diligence and study I have tried to emulate according to the slenderness of my wit; therefore the sum of victory does not stand in overcoming me, as Barclay strives to persuade readers. I have thought too that the reader should be warned that in proving this matter I brought forward only reasons and examples, not Scriptures, councils and Fathers; because I had pursued these most copiously in the earlier books in confirming the spiritual primacy of the Supreme Pontiff; which being confirmed and firmly established, I judged it very easy to draw from it, as from a spring, the streams of reasons for proving the power in temporal matters.
My first reason, then, which Barclay reports word for word, was this: The civil power is subject to the spiritual power when each is a part of the same Christian commonwealth; therefore the spiritual prince can command temporal princes, and dispose of temporal things in order to the spiritual good; for every superior can command his inferior. And that the political power, not only as Christian but also as political, is subject to the ecclesiastical, as such, is shown first from the ends of each. For the temporal end is subordinated to the spiritual end, as is plain, because temporal happiness is not absolutely the last end, and therefore ought to be referred to eternal happiness. And it is established from Aristotle, book 1 of the Ethics, chapter 1, that faculties are subordinated as their ends are subordinated. Second, kings and pontiffs, clerics and laymen, do not make two commonwealths but one, that is, one Church. For we are all one body, Romans 12 and 1 Corinthians 12. But in every body the members are connected and dependent one on another; and it is not rightly asserted that spiritual things depend on temporal; therefore temporal things depend on spiritual, and are subjected to them. Third, if the temporal administration hinders the spiritual good, in the judgment of all the temporal prince is bound to change that manner of administering, even with harm to the temporal good; therefore it is a sign that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual. This is my first reason, faithfully enough reported by Barclay.
To this reason he himself answers that it is false what I assumed, that the civil power is subject to the spiritual when each is a part of the same Christian commonwealth. And he tries to prove this false in these words: “For these two powers are so parts of the Christian commonwealth that neither has command over the other, since, being free and their own masters, they came together in mutual love. Each therefore acknowledges and reveres the other in its own order and office, and each exercises its own function at its own discretion; there is only between them a conspiring consent and partnership for preserving the Christian commonwealth.” I answer: in these words I see it affirmed, not proved, that the political and ecclesiastical powers in the same Christian Church are joined by a bond of goodwill, not by the subjection of one to the other. But this would be rightly said if the political and ecclesiastical power were of the same order, and made as it were two separate commonwealths, as are the cantons of the Swiss. But from the divine Scriptures, pontiffs and kings, clerics and laymen, regenerated in Christ, make one commonwealth, nay one city, nay one house, nay one body. Nor do the spiritual and temporal power come together in the Church as two commonwealths into one confederation, but as spirit and flesh into one man, as Gregory Nazianzen excellently taught in the oration to the people struck with fear; and it is certain that the spirit ought to have command over the flesh, not the reverse; nor are pontiffs and kings in the Church of Christ like the chief rams in a fold, but like shepherds and sheep; nor can it be called into doubt whether shepherds preside with command over sheep, or sheep over shepherds.
Barclay adds: “By both powers, or, to use Genebrard's words, by both magistracies the Church is held together, fortified and flourishes; for protecting which and keeping it whole and sound each one's cause asks the help of the other, and conspires in friendship, so that as long as they keep their partnership the Christian commonwealth flourishes with innumerable benefits of concord and peace. But when they dissolve the union, the spiritual power indeed, though excelling in divine virtue, yet weaker in the eyes of men and destitute of bodily helps, is commonly despised; and the temporal, however powerful and strong, hastens to its own ruin through every crime and madness, being namely destitute of the heavenly grace which it enjoyed through union with the spiritual power.” I answer: all these things fight against their author, not against Bellarmine. For Bellarmine confesses that it is best that those two powers be in concord, and very pernicious if they fight one another; but it does not follow from this that one is not by right subject to the other. For in man too it is best that spirit and flesh be in concord, and pernicious if they disagree, as they often do, the flesh resisting the command of the spirit, and the spirit trying to bring the flesh into servitude; and yet no wise man will gather from this discord that the spirit ought not to have command over its flesh, since the contrary is most plainly gathered from it. In the same way, then, from the fact that from the discord of the two powers, spiritual and political, in the same Christian commonwealth so many troubles follow, and concord is very necessary to both, it ought to be gathered that it belonged to the wisdom of Christ, the Founder of the Christian commonwealth, to subject one power to the other, that they might the more easily keep and cultivate peace and concord between them.
Barclay adds the testimony of Hosius of Cordoba and of Saint Bernard; but since we have answered the testimony of Hosius more than once above, let us hear the words of Saint Bernard, book 1 on Consideration, chapter 5: “These lowest and earthly things,” he says, “have their own judges, the kings and princes of the earth; why do you invade others' borders? why do you stretch your sickle into another's harvest?” I answer: Saint Bernard explains himself when in the same place he adds: “Not because you are unworthy, but because it is unworthy of you to dwell on such things, being occupied with better ones; lastly, where necessity demands, hear what is judged, not by me, but by the Apostle: For if the world shall be judged by you, are you unworthy to judge the smallest matters? But it is one thing to run into these incidentally, when a cause indeed presses; another to lean upon them, as if they were great, and worthy of such a man and of such attention.” Where he shows that the Supreme Pontiffs ought for the most part to be occupied with greater matters, and to leave these lowest and earthly things to lesser judges, namely the kings and princes of the earth. As the Apostle said in 1 Corinthians 6: If you have judgments of things pertaining to this world, set them to judge who are the most despised in the Church. So Saint Bernard in that place called earthly judgments others' borders and another's harvest, not because the Pontiff cannot, but because for the most part he ought not, leaving graver matters, to be entangled in these earthly and base things. And Barclay not prudently enough, not to say fraudulently, cites words which bring their explanation with them if the whole passage is brought forward.
With like cunning he alleges John Driedo from book 2 on Christian liberty, chapter 2, whose words are these: “Christ separated the offices of both powers, so that the one should preside over divine and spiritual things and persons, the other over profane and worldly”; and soon after: “See, you plainly see that Christ separated the offices of both powers; the distinction, therefore, of the ecclesiastical papal power from the secular and imperial power is made by divine law.” I answer: John Driedo writes that those two powers are distinct; but that one is subject to the other, namely the temporal to the spiritual, he does not deny in this place, and a little below in the same chapter he affirms it in express words, saying: “Whence the Pope and the emperor are in the Church not as two supreme rulers divided from each other, of whom neither acknowledges and reveres the other as superior; because a kingdom so divided against itself will be made desolate.” So he; nor does Barclay's gloss hold, that the emperor in spiritual things ought to acknowledge and revere the Pope, and the Pope in temporal things the emperor, as superior. For John Driedo explained his opinion in book 1 of the same work, chapter 9, where he taught that in order to the supernatural end the temporal power is subject to the spiritual power; and in chapter 14 he taught that the Pope has fullness of power over all Christian kings and princes, and can deprive them of their kingdoms, and in temporal matters wholly exempt the Christian people from obedience and subjection to them; and nowhere did he teach that the spiritual power is subject to the temporal, or that the Pontiff can be deprived by kings of the papacy, or the peoples freed from obedience and subjection to him. Barclay alleges an ancient gloss on the canon Hadrianus, distinction 63, saying thus: “As the one is father to the other in spiritual things, so the other is father to the one in temporal things.” But I could find that gloss neither in the new nor in the old editions. Perhaps, like a doting old woman, it has been retired, or from too great age has long since departed from the living.
Lastly Barclay adds the testimony of Bellarmine, that he may set Bellarmine against Bellarmine, and lay him low wounded by his own sword. “Note,” says Bellarmine, book 5 on the Pontiff, chapter 3, “that as the sun and the moon are not the same star, and as the sun did not institute the moon, but God; so also the pontificate and the empire are not the same, nor does one absolutely depend on the other.” These words recited, Barclay adds: “The sun and the moon are indeed the two great lights, which Pope Innocent, in the chapter Solitae, on majority and obedience, interprets by allegory as the two dignities, which are the pontifical authority and the royal power, and compares the former to the sun, the latter to the moon. Whence I dispute thus. As the moon is no less the moon, nor stands less by itself, when it withdraws from the sun and, wandering, loses the light borrowed from it, than when it is illumined by its rays in full orb and aspect, and in neither case does the one depend on the other; but both, keeping the order and manner of their institution, serve God and the world; so also the royal or political power, resting on its own strength, always stands by itself; and although it receives indeed a great light for living well and blessedly from the pontifical and spiritual power, yet by neither its approach nor its withdrawal is it in any part changed, lessened or increased in its nature or essence, much less subjected to the one that approaches.” I answer: comparisons do not hold in all things, but only in that matter for explaining which they are used. Therefore an application in all things is sought in vain. Christ is called the Lamb of God for meekness, and a lion for strength, and a rock for firmness, and a vine for fruitfulness; yet it is not lawful to attribute to Christ the dullness of a sheep, or the savagery of a lion, or the hardness of a stone, or the frailty of a vine. Rightly, then, did Innocent III compare the pontifical power to the sun and the royal power to the moon, because the former presides over spiritual things, the latter over temporal, the former is greater, the latter less. Nor did I note badly that the pontificate and the empire are, like the sun and moon, distinct, and from God; and that the empire does not absolutely depend on the pontificate; because namely the Roman empire was before the Christian pontificate, and thereby was not instituted by the Pontiff; nor did the Pontiff ever take away the empire, but only transferred it from one man to another, or from one nation to another. But we grant to Barclay that the pontifical and royal powers, like the sun and moon, do not depend on each other as to essence. But we do not grant what Barclay added at the end, that the moon is not subjected to the sun. For the moon is subjected to the sun, since it receives its light from it; and the sun is not subjected to the moon, since it receives nothing from the moon. And not only the moon, but all the stars too are subjected to the sun, since they receive light from it; and rightly Marcus Tullius in the Dream of Scipio says of the sun: It is the leader and prince and governor of the other lights. So as the moon is subjected to the sun, and the sun is not subjected to the moon, so too the king is subjected to the Pontiff, and the Pontiff is not subjected to the king.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XIII. Defenditur prima ratio Bellarmini pro pote¬ state Pontificis in temporalibus. In cap. 13. aggreditur1 Barclaius refutare eas rationes, quas egoinlib.v. dePontif. cap. 7. adduxi ad probandam Pontificis Maximi potestatem in temporalibus. Et quoniam ille praefatur, neminem Bellarmino diligen¬ tius rationes pro hac potestate collegisse, vel argutius proposuisse, vel brevius, etsub- tilius conclusisse; ut videlicet lectoribus per¬ suadeat Bellarmino superato, rem totam esse confectam : ego quoque praefari debeo, me non admittere, quae Barclaius do mea diligentia, argutia, et subtilitate dicit. Sc.o enim multos esse me longe doctiores, et di- Ugentiores, ac subtiliores, qui in eodem ar¬ gumento ante me versati sunt, et quorum ego diligentiam, et studium pro ingenii me tenuitate annulari studui : proinde non in me superando stat summa victoriae, ut Barclaius persuadere lectoribus nititur. Admonendum quoque lectorem esse duxi, me in hac re comprobanda rationes tantum, et exempla, non Seri p! uras, concilia, et Patres adduxisse: quoniam ista in libris superioribus copiosis¬ sime persecutus fueram in confirmando pri¬ matu spirituali Summi Pontificis ; quo con¬ firmato, et firmiter stabilito facillimum esse censui, ex eo tamquam ex fonte deducere rivulos rationum ad potestatem in tempora¬ libus comprobandam. Prima igitur ratio mea, quam Barclaius ad verb mi refert,haec fuit: Potestas civilis subjecta est potestati spi¬ rituali, quando utiaque pars est ejusdem reipub. Christianae : ergo potest princeps spi¬ ritualis imperare principibus temporalibus, et disponere de temporalibus rebus in ordi¬ ne ad bonum spirituale : omnis enim supe¬ rior imperare potest inferiori suo. Quod abtem potestas politica, non solum ut Christiana, sed etiam ut politico, sit sub¬ jecta Ecclesiasticae, ut talis est : primo de¬ monstratur ex finibus utriusque. Nam finis temporalis subordinatur fini spirituali, ut patet, quia felicitas temporalis, non est ab¬ solute ultimus finis ; et ideo referri debet in felicitatem aeternam. Constat autem ex Aristotele lib. i. Ethic. c. i. ita subordinari facultates, ut subordinantur fines. Secundo reges, et pontifices, clerici, et laici non faciunt duas respublicas, sed unam, id est, unam Ecclesiam. Sumus enim omnes unum corpus Rom. xii. et I Corinth. xir. At in omni corpore membra sunt connexa, et dependentia unum ab alio : non autem recte asseritur, spiritualia pendere a temporali¬ bus : ergo temporalia a spiritualibus pen¬ dent, iliisque subjiciuntur. Tertio, si temporalis administratio impedit spirituale bonum, omnium judicio tenetur princeps temporalis mutaie illum modum administrandi, etiam cum detrimento tem¬ poralis boni : ergo signum est, subjectam esse temporalem potestatem spirituali. Hmc est mea ratio prima satis fideliter aBarclaio relata. Huic rat oni respondet ipse, falsum esse, quod ego assumpsi, civilem pote: tutem sub¬ jectam esse spirituali, quaudo utraque pars (1) Joan. X, 30 ; Joan. XY1, 14; Joan. 111, 3 ; Matth. XIX, 14; Malth. XVI, 10. 52 UE POTESTATE PAP/E est ejnsdom rcipub. Christiana?. Id autem falsum esse probare conatur his verbis: « Siquidem hee duce potestates ita sunt partes rcipublicee Christianae, ut neutri in alteram imperium sit, utpote cum libeie, et sui juris essent, mutuo amore coierunt. TJtraque ergo alteram in suo ordine, et mu¬ nere recognoscit, et veneratur, et suam utraque functionem arbitratu suo exercet 5 tantum inter eas conspirans quidem consen¬ sus, et societas est, ad Christianam rempub. conservandam. » Respondeo : In his verbis affirmari video, non probari, politicam, et Ecclesiasticam potestates in eadem Ecclesia Christiana con¬ junctas esse vinculo benevolenti se, non autem subjectione uni is ad alteram. Sed hoc recte diceretur, si politica, et Ecclesiastica pote¬ stas ejusdem ordinis essent, et quasi duas separatas respublicas facerent, ut sunt pagi Helvetiorum. At ex Script ris divinis Ponti¬ fices, et reges, clerici, et laici in Christo re¬ generati unam remp. imo unam civitatem, imo unam domum, imo unum corpus effici¬ unt. Neque potestas spiritualis, et tempora¬ lis in Ecclesia conveniunt, ut dua? resp. in unam confoederationem, sed ut spiritus, et caro in unum hominem, ut Gregorius Nazi- anzcnus praeclare docuit in oratione ad po¬ pulum timore perculsum certum autem est, spiritum in carnem imperium habere debere, non contra: neque sunt in Ecclesia Christi Pontifices, it reges, ut principales arietes in ovili, sed ut pastores, et oves : neque in du¬ bium revocari potest, an pastores ovibus, vel oves pastoribus cum imperio praesint. Subjungit Barclaius: «Utraque potestate, sive ut Genebrardi verbis utar, utroque magistratu Ecclesia continetur, munitur, et viget : ad quam protegendam, et sartam re¬ ctam conservandam alterius sic 1 Altera poscit opem res, et conjurat amice, ut quamdiu societatem retinent, respublica Christiana innumeris concordiae, et pacis commodis efflorescat. At ubi coitam dissol¬ vunt, spiritualis quidem potestas, licet divi¬ na virtute praestans, imbecillior tamen in oculis hominum, et corporalibus auxiliis de¬ stituta plerumque contemnitur : temporalis vero, quantumvis potens, atque fortis in su¬ am ipsius perniciem per omne scelus, et (1)1 Corinth. VI, 4. insaniam properat, nimirum coelesti gratia destituta, qua per spiritualis potestatis coitio¬ nem fruebatur. » Respondeo : Haec omnia contra suum au¬ ctorem, non contra Bellarminum pugnant. Fatetur enim Bellarminus, optimum esse, ut duae istae potestates concordes sint, et val¬ de perniciosum si inter se pugnent : sed non inde sequitur unam alteri non essejure sub¬ jectam. Nam et in homine optimum est, ut spiritus et caro concordes sint, et pernicio¬ sum si dissideant, ut saepe carne reluctante imperio spiritus, et spiritu carnem in servi¬ tutem redigere conante, discordant: nec ta¬ men ullus sapiens ex hac discordia colliget, non debere esse spiritui in carnem suam im¬ perium ; cum contrarium apertissime inde colligatur. Igitur eodem modo ex eo quod ex discordia duarum potestatum, spiritualis, et politicae in eadem Christiana republica tam multa incommoda sequuntur, et utrique val¬ de necessaria concordia est: colligi debet, pertinuisse ad sapientiam Christi Christianae reipublicee Conditoris, ut unam potestatem alteri subjiceret, quo facilius pacem, et con¬ cordiam inter se retinerent, et colerent. Addit Barclaius testimonium Hosii Cordu¬ bensis, et S. Bernardi : sed quoniam ad te¬ stimonium Hosii non semel supra respondi¬ mus, audiamus verba S. Bernardi lib. 1. de Consideratione cap. 5. « Habent, inquit, haec infima, et terrena judices suos, reges, et principes terrae, quid fines alienos inaudi¬ tis? quid falcem vestram in alienam messem extenditis? » Respondeo : Sanctus Bernardus ipse se declarat, cum in eodem loco subjungit: « Non quia indigni vos, sed quia indignum vobis talibus insistere, quippe potioribus oc¬ cupatis : denique ubi necessitas exigit, audi quid censeat, non ego, sed Apostolus. Si enim in vobis judicabitur hic mundus indig¬ ni estis, qui de minimis judicetis? Sed aliud est incidenter incurrere in ista, causa quidem urgente, aliud vero incumbere istis, tamquam magnis, dignisque tali, et talium intentione rebus. » Ubi demonstrat Pontifices maximos, ut plurimum debere in rebus majoribus oc¬ cupari, et infima ista, ac terrena relinquere Judicibus minoribus, regibus videlicet, et principibus terree. Quemadmodum Aposto¬ lus I Corinth. vi. dixit : Judicia saccularia si habueritis , contemptibiles qui sunt in Eccle¬ sia , hos constituite ad judicandum (I). Itaque /■ IN REBUS TEMPORALIBUS 53 S. Bernardus eo loco fines alienos, et mes- sem alienam, judicia terrena vocavit, non quod non possit Pontifex, sed quod ut pluri¬ mum non debeat, dimissis rebus gravioribus, istis terrenis, et vilibus implicari. Et Barcla- ius non satis prudenter, ne dicam fraudu¬ lenter, verba citat, qute secum adferunt ex¬ plicationem, si locus integer adferatur. Pari astutia Joan. Driedonem allegat ex lib. ii. de libert. Christiana cap. 2. cujus heec supt verba : « Christus utriusque pote¬ statis officia discrevit, ut una divinis, et spi¬ ritualibus rebus, atque personis, altera pro¬ fanis, atque mundanis prassideret» ; et mox: « En plane vides Christum discrevisse utri¬ usque potestatis officia, distinctio igitur Ec¬ clesiasticae potestatis Papalis e potestate sae¬ culari, ac imperiali est de jure divino facta. » Respondeo : Scribit Joannes Driedo, po¬ testates illas duas distinctas esse; sed unam alteri subjectam esse, temporalem videlicet spirituali hoc loco non negat, et paulo infra in eodem capite disertis verbis affirmat, di¬ cens : « Unde Papa, et imperator sunt in Ec¬ clesia, non tamquam duo rectores summi inter se divisi, quorum neuter alterum cognoscit, et veneratur, tamquam supe¬ riorem : quia regnum sic contra se desola¬ bitur. » Haec ille : nec valet glossa Barclaii, quod imperator in spiritualibus Papam, Pa¬ pa in temporalibus imperatorem cognoscere debeat, et venerari tamquam superiorem. Nam Joan. Driedo explicuit sententiam suam lib.i. ejusdem operis, cap. 9. ubi docuit, in ordine ad finem supernaturalem, subjectam esse potestatem temporalem potestati spiri¬ tuali, et cap. 14. docuit, papam habere ple¬ nitudinem potestatis super omnes reges, et principes Christianos, et posse eos regnis privare, et in temporalibus prorsus eximere plebem Christianam ab eorum obedientia, et subjectione : et nusquam docuit, potestatem spiritualem subjectam esse temporali, aut posse a regibus privari Pontificem Papatu, autab ejus obedientia, et subjectione popu¬ los liberari. Allegat Barclaius antiquam glos¬ sam in can. Hadrianus, dist. 63. sic dicen¬ tem : « Quemadmodum ille huic in spiritua¬ libus : ita hic illi in temporalibus pater est » . Sed ego istam glossam neque in novis, ne¬ que in antiquis editionibus invenire potui. Fortasse tamquam delira anus antiquata est, aut prse nimio senio jam dudum excessit e vivis. Postremo addit Barclaius testimonium Bellarmini, ut Bellarminum cumBcllarmino commitat, eumque proprio gladio vulnera¬ tum prosternat. « Nota, inquit Bellarminus lib. v, de Pontifice cap. 3. quemadmodum non est idem sidus sol, et luna, et sicut lu¬ nam non instituit sol, sed Deus ; ita quoque non esse idem Pontificatum et imperium, neque unum ab alio absolute pendere. » His verbis recitatis, subjungit Barclaius : « Sunt quidem sol, et luna duo luminaria magna, quse Pontifex Innocentius, cap. Solitae, de majorit, et obed.,por allegoriam interpreta¬ tur duas dignitates, qum sunt Pontificalis auctoritas, et regalis potestas, et illam soli, hanc lunae comparat. Unde hoc modo dis¬ puto. Quemadmodum luna non minus luna est, nec minus per se consistit, tunc cum a sole recedit, et mutuatum ab eo lumen errans amittit, quam cum ejus radiis pleno orbe, atque aspectu illustratur, et neutro casu haec ab illo, aut ille ab hac dependet; sed ambo institutionis suae ordinem, et modum tenentes Deo, mundoque dcser\iunt . sic etiam potestas regalis, sive politica propriis subnixa viribus per se semper consistit . et licet magnum quidem lumen ad bene, bea- teque vivendum a Pontificali, spiritualique potestate accipiat , tamen ejus, neque ac¬ cessu, neque recessu ulla ex parte in sua outrta, sive essentia mutatur, minuitur, vel augetur, multoque minus advenienti subji¬ citur. » Respondeo : Similitudines non in omnibus locum habent, sed in ea tantum re, ad quam explicandam adhibentur. Ideo frustra quee- ritur accommodatio in omnibus. Christus agnus Dei dictus est propter mansuetudi¬ nem, et leo propter fortitudinem, et petra propter firmitatem, et vitis propter tocun- ditatem : nec tamen licet Christo tribuere stoliditatem ovis, aut sieviliam leonis, aut duritiem lapidis, aut fragilitatem vitis. Recte igitur comparavit InnocentiusIH, potestatem Pontificiam soli, et potestatem regiam lunae, quod illa praesit spiritualibus, ista temporali¬ bus, illa sit major, ista minor. Nec male ego notavi, Pontificatum, et imperium instar solis, et lunae esse distincta, et a Deo ; et im¬ perium absolute non pendere a Pontificatu : quia videlicet imperium Romanum fuit ante Pontificatum Christianum, ac per hoc insti¬ tutum non fuit a Pontifice : neque Pontifex imperium sustulit unquam, sed solum trans¬ tulit ab uno homine a i alium, vel ab una gente ad aliam. Concedimus autem Barclaio 54 DE POTE-TATE PAPAS potestates Pontifi eiam, et regiam insta r sn'is, et lunae non pendere ah invicem quoad essen¬ tiam. Sed non concedimus, quod Barclaius in fine addidit, lunam soli non subjici. Subji¬ citur enim luna soli, cum abeo lumen i eci - piat, et non subjicitur luna) sol, qui nihil re¬ cipit a luna. Nec solum luna, sed omnes etiam stella) subjiciuntur soli, quoniam ab illo lumen recipiunt : et recte Marcus Tul¬ lius in Somnio Scipionis de sole dicit: Dux est et princeps, et moderator luminum reli¬ quorum. Itaque quemadmodum soli subjici¬ tur luna, et luna) non subjicitur sol : ita quoque Pontifici subjicitur rex, et regi non subjicitur Pontifex.