Bellarmine · De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus · On the Power of the Supreme Pontiff in Temporal Matters, against William Barclay
Chapter 17: The Second Reason for the Power of the Supreme Pontiff in Temporal Matters Is Defended
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. XII, De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaium, a treatise of 1610. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
In the seventeenth chapter Barclay, his digressions dispatched, returns to examining and refuting Bellarmine's reasons; and since enough has been said of the first reason in chapter 14, he now attacks the second, which he has faithfully transcribed in these words. The second reason, he says, is: The ecclesiastical commonwealth ought to be perfect and sufficient to itself in order to its end; for such are all well-founded commonwealths; therefore it ought to have every power necessary for attaining its end; but the power of using and disposing of temporal things is necessary for the spiritual end, because otherwise bad princes could with impunity favour heretics and overthrow religion; therefore it has this power too. Likewise, any commonwealth, because it ought to be perfect and sufficient to itself, can command another commonwealth not subject to it, and compel it to change its administration, nay even depose its prince and set up another, when it cannot otherwise defend itself from its injuries; therefore much more will the spiritual commonwealth be able to command the temporal commonwealth subject to it, and compel it to change its administration, and depose princes and set up others, when it cannot otherwise protect its spiritual good.
This reason, faithfully enough brought forward, Barclay censures under two heads. For first he denies that there are two commonwealths in the Church, one of churchmen, the other of laymen; or one spiritual, the other temporal; one sacred, the other political; and he proves it from my first reason, in which I said that the political and spiritual power are parts of the same Christian commonwealth, and that clerics and laymen do not make two commonwealths in the Church, but one. Then he denies that the power of disposing of temporal things is necessary for the spiritual end, which he proves from this, that the Apostle Peter indicates in Acts 5 that he did not have the power of disposing of the temporal goods of Ananias, to whom he said: Whilst it remained, did it not remain to thee? and after it was sold, was it not in thy power?
To the first head the answer is very easy. For the spiritual or ecclesiastical commonwealth and the temporal or political commonwealth are both two and one: two partial, one total; as spirit and flesh joined together make one man, nay, are one man, as Saint Athanasius speaks in the Creed; and it is gathered from chapter 2 of Genesis, where we read: God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul; and yet they are so distinct in powers and laws and motions that the Apostle in Romans 7 says: I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind; and in Galatians 5: The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; and, what is more to be wondered at, in 2 Corinthians 4 the spirit is called the inner man, and the flesh the outer man, when it is said: Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day; and Romans 7: I am delighted with the law of God, according to the inward man. So spirit and flesh are one man and two men; nor does the Holy Spirit, who says both, contradict himself; wherefore neither does Bellarmine fight against himself when he considers the ecclesiastical and political commonwealth in the Church now as parts of one Christian commonwealth, now as two commonwealths distinct from each other; for that the ecclesiastical commonwealth is most like the spirit, and the political the flesh, not Bellarmine alone or first taught, but before him Thomas Netter of Walden, and before Walden Saint Thomas, and before Saint Thomas Alexander of Hales, and before Hales Hugh of Saint Victor, and before Hugh Saint Gregory Nazianzen, as we have warned more than once above.
To the second head I answer: the words of Saint Peter to Ananias do not signify that there was not in the Prince of the Apostles the power of disposing of the temporal things of Ananias, if they had been necessary for the spiritual end; but indicate only that Saint Peter did not use that power, nor wished to use it, since there was no necessity. And certainly, if Barclay's argument were worth anything, it would also bring it about that no king can dispose of the temporal goods of his subjects, in a case where they were necessary for preserving the commonwealth. For every king can say to his subjects: Did not your field remain to you, and after it was sold, was it not in your power? who compelled you to give it to the commonwealth? and if you profess to have given it whole, why, keeping back a part, do you lie that you gave it whole? So as the right which kings have of disposing of the temporal things of citizens is not that they may at their pleasure strip citizens of the ownership of their things, but that they may compel citizens to lay out their goods for preserving the common good; so also the power of the Apostle Peter over the temporal goods of Christians was not (as Barclay pretends we say) that the Apostle could without any cause deprive all Christians of the ownership of their things, and leave them nothing of their own; but only that he could provide that Christians should not abuse temporal goods against the law of God, and on the other hand should use them rightly for attaining eternal life. And that the Apostles had some power of disposing of temporal things in order to spiritual is established from this alone, that they decreed that the Christian peoples should support the preachers of the Gospel from their means, and that according to the ordinance of the Lord, as is plain from the Apostle in the first epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 9.
“But,” says Barclay, “in the first three hundred years there was not in the Church a power of disposing of the temporal things of Christians against the will of the owners; therefore either the Christian commonwealth was then imperfect, or that power is not necessary for attaining the spiritual end.” And here Barclay pours out many words in vain to show that it belonged to the providence of God that that first Church should be furnished with all those things which were necessary for its preservation. I answer: that first Church was furnished with all the power and all the safeguards which were necessary for constituting a perfect commonwealth; but in the first three hundred years there were not many political princes in the Church; there were nevertheless some, such as the emperor Philip, and King Lucius, and King Donald. But let us suppose there were none; not on that account was the Church lacking the power of disposing of the temporal goods of princes, and of directing their political power, whenever they should wish to become members or sons of the Church. Besides, as I said a little before, in the very beginning of the Church, although there were no Christian princes, the Apostles themselves ruling the Church, there were nevertheless many rich men, of whose riches the Apostles disposed, decreeing that from them the ministers of the Gospel should be supported.
Barclay afterwards brings forward the words of Saint Bernard, from book 4 on Consideration, chapter 3: “This is Peter, who is not known ever to have gone forth adorned with gems or silks, not covered with gold, not carried on a white horse, not surrounded by soldiers, not hedged about by noisy attendants; yet without these he believed the saving command could be fulfilled well enough: If thou lovest me, feed my sheep. In these things you have succeeded not Peter, but Constantine.” So Bernard; to which Barclay adds: “Although, therefore, the temporal power of which we speak may have seemed to men necessary to the Church, yet to God it seemed neither necessary nor useful.” I answer: in this place it could be said to Barclay what God himself says in the book of Job, chapter 38: Who is this that wrappeth up sentences in unskilful words? Saint Bernard writes that the Apostle Peter was poor in the riches of this world, and could fulfil the saving command of feeding the sheep without gold and silver of his own, without a white horse, and without attendants; yet Saint Bernard does not say that there was not in the Apostle Peter the power of disposing of the temporal goods of Christians, and of kingdoms and empires themselves, if spiritual necessity required it; nay, he says the contrary, when he applies to the Pontiff, as Pontiff and Vicar of Christ and successor of Peter, those words of Jeremiah 1: Lo, I have set thee over the nations and over kingdoms, to root up and to pull down, and to waste and to build and to plant; for personal poverty does not fight with the power of disposing of riches and of judging the kings and princes of the earth. So the prelates of religious orders, though they are themselves bound by the vow of poverty, have the power of disposing of the most ample wealth of their order. And among the ancient Romans many poor citizens, such as Fabricius, Curius, Cincinnatus and others, made consuls or dictators, disposed of kingdoms and the wealth of kings, while they themselves remained in their former want. Barclay ought not, then, to have confused riches with power, as if the same man could not be both poor in money and rich in power. Then Saint Bernard says that the Pontiff in riches and temporal principality succeeded not Peter but Constantine; what does Barclay gather from this? That the Pontiff could discharge the Apostolic office without a temporal principality. What then? For our question is not about the temporal principality of the Supreme Pontiff, but about the spiritual and Apostolic power, which we say extends to disposing of temporal things, and of kingdoms and empires themselves, in order to the spiritual end. But Barclay, to refute this, transfers the disputation to the temporal principality, which the Apostle in fact lacked, so that by confusing and mixing everything he may seem to have said something. Lastly Barclay, as if caught up to the third heaven he had been in the counsel of God, absolutely pronounces that to God the temporal power of which we speak seemed neither necessary nor useful to the Church. But I ask Barclay: of what temporal power do you speak? For if you speak of that power which, being in itself spiritual, extends to temporal things, you not obscurely impute a falsehood to God. For God judged that power necessary to the ecclesiastical Prince, and therefore gave it to him when he said: Whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, it shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven. For that these words ought to be so understood the general councils have taught which we cited above, and which could most truly say: It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us. But if you speak of the power of temporal principality, which the Church now possesses, and possessed eight hundred years ago, you affirm altogether rashly that this power seemed to God neither necessary nor useful to the Church. For (to pass over other things now) if it had seemed to God that this principality was not useful to the Church, certainly the Supreme Pontiffs Zachary, Hadrian, Nicholas I and II, Leo III, IV and IX, and others, who by the common opinion of all writers were most excellent, most holy and most pleasing to God, would not have kept that principality, and much less fought to preserve it. And whether on the divine judgment so many holy Pontiffs are more to be believed than the one Barclay certainly cannot be called into doubt.
But Barclay presses again, and turns the argument back on us in these words: “I pass over that if their reason were good, it would follow on the contrary that the temporal commonwealth has the power of disposing of spiritual things, and of deposing the supreme prince of the ecclesiastical commonwealth, because it ought to be perfect and sufficient to itself in order to its end, and to have every power necessary for attaining its end. But the power of disposing of spiritual things and deposing the ecclesiastical prince is necessary for the temporal end, because otherwise bad ecclesiastical princes could disturb the state and quiet of the temporal commonwealth, and hinder the end of civil government, as in fact some Supreme Pontiffs have sometimes disturbed it; therefore the temporal commonwealth has this power. The consequent is plainly false and absurd (for the temporal prince, as such, has no spiritual power); therefore that also is false of which this is the consequent.” I answer: there is as much difference between the argument which we made and that which Barclay now makes by turning it back, as truth is distant from falsehood, and good from evil. For that proposition of ours, the power of disposing of temporal things is necessary for the spiritual end, is most true, since temporal things are ordered to spiritual, and the consequence is good: therefore the spiritual commonwealth can dispose of temporal things in order to spiritual, since he who can attain the end can also order the means to that end. But Barclay's proposition, the power of disposing of spiritual things is necessary for the temporal end, is false, since spiritual things are not ordered to temporal, and the power of ordering spiritual things to temporal is not a true power, but an abuse of power and a perversion of order; and it cannot be that an abuse of power or a perversion of order is necessary to any commonwealth; and since the power of disposing of spiritual things is not necessary for attaining the temporal end, the consequence cannot be good: therefore the temporal commonwealth can dispose of spiritual things in order to temporal. All this can easily be understood from the comparison already often repeated, of spirit and flesh in man; for the spirit can dispose of the senses and members of the body in order to eternal life, imposing on them continence, abstinence, scourges, fasts, vigils, labours; and, what is greatest, ordering the flesh to suffer death for the confession of the faith; yet the flesh cannot dispose of the understanding and will, nor forbid the acts of praying and praising God, and much less can it order the spirit to suffer spiritual and eternal death for any temporal good whatever. And if perhaps the spirit by indiscreet labours of the mind, as by praying or meditating too much, should harm the health of the body, the spirit will indeed sin, but the flesh will not on that account be able to take command over the spirit; but by groaning and fainting it will bring the spirit to remit something of its excessive fervour. So too, if perhaps the spiritual prince should abuse his power by unjustly excommunicating a temporal prince, or absolving his subjects from obedience to him without just cause, and in that way disturb the state of the temporal commonwealth, the spiritual prince will sin; but the temporal prince will nevertheless not be able to take on himself the judgment of spiritual things, or to judge the spiritual prince, and much less to depose him from his spiritual See.
Barclay notices the weakness of his argument; therefore he returns to the former solution, saying: “But, as is usually said, to give an absurdity is not to solve an argument. I answer, then, otherwise to the first part of this second reason, that there are not here two commonwealths, as he thinks, but only one, in which there are two powers or two magistracies, the ecclesiastical and the political, each of which has those things which it necessarily needs for attaining its end, the one namely spiritual, the other temporal jurisdiction; and neither is this jurisdiction necessary to that power, nor that to this; otherwise it would have to be confessed that both powers were destitute of necessary means at the time when they were separated, as they once were.” I answer: this is not another solution, but the former repeated; which solution I refuted a little before, when I showed that the ecclesiastical and political commonwealth can be called two and one; since they are distinct, and can be found separated; yet when they come together into the one body of the Church, the one is so subordinated to the other that there are two partial and one total. Nor does it follow that at the time when they were separated, at the beginning of the newborn Church, they were destitute of necessary means; for the political commonwealth could fear no harm from the spiritual power, since it was not capable of ecclesiastical censures, which have force only over Christians; and the spiritual commonwealth had the power of disposing in act of the temporal things of those who were about to come to it. Lastly, it is not true that the spiritual and political power are like two magistracies, neither of which needs the jurisdiction of the other. For two magistracies depend on the king, whose power stands above both magistracies, and he can take care that neither hinders the other; but the spiritual and political power do not have one third power in the Church to which they are subordinated, and which keeps both in their duty. Wherefore it is necessary that one be subordinated to the other, namely the lower to the higher, the temporal to the spiritual. And by this answer everything remains solved which Barclay disputes to the end of the chapter about the office of the Chancellor and the Constable, most ample magistracies, whom the king alone commands. But what Barclay adds, that the spiritual and the political prince are under God alone, as the Chancellor and the Constable are under the king, cannot be admitted with the Catholic faith safe. For the Church, which is the kingdom of Christ, not only acknowledges Christ as her Lord and King, but also knows from the holy Scriptures, and Apostolic tradition, and the declaration of general councils, and the common consent of the Fathers and doctors, that there is one general Vicar of Christ on earth, who is the visible head of the visible Church. And that this Vicar of Christ is the Roman Pontiff Barclay admits in his whole book; therefore (if he wishes to be called a Catholic) he ought also to admit that the Pontiff and the king are not two magistrates immediately under Christ, but that the king ought to be subject to Christ and to the Pontiff, the Pontiff to Christ alone.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XVII. Defenditur secunda ratio pro potestate Summi Pontificis in temporalibus. In capite septimo decimo Barclaius digres¬ sionibus expeditis, redit ad examinandas, et refellendas Bellarmini rationes: et quoniam de prima ratione satis multa dicta sunt de cap. 14. aggreditur nunc secundam, quam fideliter transcripsit in haec verba. Secunda ratio, inquit, est : Respublica Ecclesiastica debet esse perfecta, et sibi suf¬ ficiens in ordine ad finem suum : tales enim sunt omnes Respublicae bene institutae : ergo debet habere omnem potestatem neces¬ sariam ad finem suum consequendum : sed necessaria est ad finem spiritualem potestas utendi, et disponendi de temporalibus re¬ bus; quia alioquin possent mali principes impune fovere haereticos, evertere Religio¬ nem; igitur, et hanc potestatem habet. Item potest quaelibet respub. quia perfecta, et sibi sufficiens esse debet, imperare alteri reipub. non sibi subjectae, et eam cogere ad mutandam administrationem , imo etiam deponere ejus principem, et alium institue¬ re, quando non potest aliter se defendere ab ejus injuriis : ergo multo magis poterit spi¬ ritualis respub. imperare temporali reipub. sibi subjectae, et cogere ad mutandam ad¬ ministrationem, et deponere principes, atque alios instituere, quando aliter non potest bo¬ num suum spirituale tueri. Ilanc rationem satis fideliter allatam ex duplici capile Barclaius reprehendit. Primum enim negat duas esse respublicas in Eccle¬ sia, unam ecclesiasticorum, alteram laico- rum, sive, unam spiritualem, alteram tem¬ poralem; unam sacram, alteram politicam: et probat ex prima mea ratione; in qua di¬ xi, potestatem politicam, et spiritualem esse partes ejusdem reipub. Christiana?, et cleri¬ cos, et laicos non facere in Ecclesia duas respub. sed unam. Deinde negat, potestatem disponendi de rebus temporalibus necessariam esse ad fi¬ nem spiritualem, quod ex eo probat, quod Apostolus Petrus indicat Act. iv. se non ha¬ buisse potestatem disponendi de bonis tem¬ poralibus Ananise, cui dixit, Nonne manens IN REBUS TEMPORALIBUS 61 tibi manebat , et venumdatum erat in tua po¬ testate ? » Ad primum caput facillima responsio est. Respublica enim spiritualis, sive ecclesia¬ stica, et respublica temporalis, sive politica, et duse sunt, et una : duae partiales, una to¬ talis : quemadmodum spiritus, et caro simul juncta unum hominem faciunt, imo unus homo sunt, ut sanctus Athanasius in Sym¬ bolo fidei loquitur : et colligitur ex 7. cap. Geneseos, ubi legimus, Formavit Deus homi¬ nem de limo terrae , et inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitae , et factus est homo in animam viventem; et tamen ita distinctae sunt potentiis, et legibus, et motibus, ut Apostolus ad Rom. vn. dicat, Video alium legem in membris meis repugnantem legi men¬ tis meae : et ad Gal. xvn ,Caro concupiscit ad¬ versus spiritum; spiritus autem adversus car¬ nem; et quod magis est admirandum, IS Corinth. iv. vocatur spiritus, homo interior, et caro homo exterior, cum dicitur, Licet is , qui foris est noster homo corrumpitur , tamen is , qui intus est , renovatur de die in diem , et Rom. xvi, Condelector legi Dei secundum in¬ teriorem hominem (2). Itaque spiritus, et caro sunt unus homo, et duo homines : neque Spiritus sanctus, qui utrumque dicit, sibi ipse contradicit : quare nec Bellarminus se- cum pugnat, cum rempublicam ecclesiasti¬ cam, et politicam in Ecclesia nunc conside¬ rat; ut partes unius reipublicae Christianae, nunc ut duas respublicas inter se distinctas, nam simillimam esse rempublicam ecclesia¬ sticam spiritui, et politicam carni, non Bel¬ larminus solus, aut primus docuit; sed ante cum Thomas Valdonsis, et ante Valdensem S. Thomas, et ante S. Thomam, Alexander Alensis, et ante Alensem, Hugo de S. Victo¬ re, et ante Hugonem, S. Gregorius Nazian- zenus, ut supra non semel admonuimus. Ad secundum caput respondeo : Verba S. Petri ad Ananiam, non significare, non fuisse in Apostolorum Principe potestatem disponendi de rebus temporalibus Ananiae, si ea necessaria fuissent ad finem spiritua¬ lem : sed indicare solum, non usum fuisse S. Petrum ea potestate, neque uti voluisse, cum necessitas nulla esset : et certe si argu¬ mentum Barclaii aliquid valeret, efficeret etiam, nullum regem posse disponere de bonis temporalibus subditorum suorum, in casu quo necessaria essent ad rempublicam conservandam. Omnis enim rex dicere po¬ test subditis suis : Ager tuus nonne tibi ma¬ nebat, etvenumdatus in tua erat potestate? quis te illum Reipub. donare coegit? et si donasse integrum profiteris, cur parte re¬ tenta integrum te donasse mentiris? Itaque quemadmodum jus, quod habent reges dis¬ ponendi de rebus temporalibus civium, non est, ut pro arbitrio spolient cives domino rerum suarum; sed ut possint cives cogere ad bona sua exponenda pro communi bono conservando : sic etiam potestas Apostoli Petri in bona temporalia Christianorum, non erat (ut Barclaius dicere nos fingit) ut posset Apostolus sine ulla causa privare dominio rerum suarum omnes Christianos, neque eis aliquid proprium relinquere : sed tantum ut posset providere, ne Christiani bonis tem¬ poralibus abuterentur contra legem Dei ; et contra, ut eis recte uterentur ad vitam ae¬ ternam consequendam. Habuisse auteifi Apostolos potestatem aliquam disponendi de temporalibus in ordine ad spiritualia, vel ex eo constat, quod statuerunt, ut populi Chri¬ stiani praedicatores Evangelii ex facultatibus suis alerent, idque juxta ordinationem Do¬ mini, ut patet ex Apostolo in priore ad Co¬ rinth. cap. ix. « At. inquit Barclaius, primis trecentis annis non fuit in Ecclesia potestas disponen¬ di de rebus temporalibus Christianorum, in¬ vitis Dominis; ergo vel respublica Christiana tunc fuit imperfecta, vel non est necessaria ista potestas ad finem spiritualem conse¬ quendum. » Atque hic multa verba Bar¬ claius frustra profundit, ut ostendat, ad pro¬ videntiam Dei pertinuisse, ut Ecclesia illa prima instructa esset omnibus iis rebus, quse ad ejus conservationem necessaria essent. Responde : Ecclesia illa prima instructa fuit omni potestate, atque omnibus praesi¬ diis. quae ad perfectam remp. constituendam necessaria erant : primis autem trecentis annis non fuerunt in ecclesia multi principes politici : fuerunt tamen aliqui, ut Philippus imperator, et rex Lucius, ac rex Donaldus. Sed fingamus, nullos fuisse : non ideo defuit Ecclesiae potestas disponendi de bonis tem¬ poralibus principum, et dirigendi potestatem eorum politicam, quando illi Ecclesiae mem¬ bra, vel filii effici vellent. Praeterea, ut paulo ante dixi, in ipso principio Ecclesiae, quam¬ quam nulli fuerint principes Christiani, Apo- (I) Act. V, 4. - (2) Gen. II, 7 ; Rom. VII, 13 ; Gal. V, 17; II Cor. IV, 16 ; Rom. VII, 22. G2 DE POTESTATE PAP.E stolis ipsis Ecclesiam roge. itibus ; fuerunt tamen multi homines divites, de quorum di¬ vitiis Apostoli disposuerunt, statuentes ut ex iis ministros Evangelii sustentarent. Adducit postea Barclaius verba S. Ber- nardi, ex lib. iv. de Consider. cap. 7>. « Pe¬ trus hic est, qui nescitur processisse ali¬ quando vel gemmis ornatus, vel sericis, non tectus auro, non vectus equo albo, nec sti¬ patus milite, nec circumstrepentibus septus ministris : absque his tamen credidit satis posse impleri salutare mandatum, si amas me, pasce oves meas : in his successisti non Petro, sed Constantino. » Haec Bernardus : quibus subjungit Barclaius : «Quamvis ita¬ que potestas temporalis de qua nobis sermo hominibus videri potuit Ecclesim necessaria; Deo tamen neque necesaria, neque utilis visa est. » Respondeo : Posset hoc loco Barclaio dici qsod in libro Job cap. 38. Deus ipse dicit : Quis est iste involveris sententias sermonibus imperitis ? S. Bernardus scribit, Apostolum Petrum pauperem fuisse divitiarum hujus mundi, et potuisse sine auro, et argento pro¬ prio, sine equo albo, et sine satellitibus im¬ plere salutare mandatum pascendi oves : non tamen S. Bernardus dicit, non fuisse in Apo¬ stolo Petro potestatem disponendi de tem¬ poralibus bonis Christianorum, et de ipsis regnis, et imperiis, si necessitas spiritualis id requireret; imo contrarium dicit, cum Pontifici, qua Pontifex est, et Christi Vica¬ rius, ac Petri successor, applicat illa verba Hierem. i. Ecce constituite super gentes , et su¬ per regna, ut evellas , et disperdas , et dissipes, et aedifices , et plantes (i) : non enim pugnat paupertas propria cum potestate disponendi de divitiis, et judicandi reges, et principes terree. Sic enim Pradati ordinum religioso¬ rum, cum sint ipsi voto paupertatis obstricti, potestatem habent de opibus amplissimis sui ordinis disponendi. Et apud veteres Roma¬ nos multi cives inopes, ut Fabricius, Curius, Cincinnatus, et alii consules, vel Dictatores eftecti , disponebant de regnis, et regum opibus, cum ipsi tamen in pristina sua ege¬ state remanerent. Ergo non debuit Barclaius divitias cum potestate confundere ; quasi non possit idem homo et pauper esse pecu¬ niis, et dives potestate. Deinde S. Bernardus dicit, Pontificem in divitiis, et temporali principatu non successisse Petro, sed Con¬ stantino : quid inde colligit Barclaius? po¬ tuisse Pontificem sine temporali piincipatu fungi munere Apost lico. Quid tum? non enim quaestio nostra est de principatu tem¬ porali Summi Pontificis, sed de potestate spirituali, et Apostolica, quam nos dicimus extendi ad disponendum de rebus tempora¬ libus, et de ipsis regnis, et imperiis in ordine ad finem spiritualem. Barclaius autem ut hoc refellat, disputationem transfert ad principatum temporalem , quo Apostolus actu caruit, ut omnia confundendo, et per¬ miscendo aliquid dixisse videatur. Denique Barclaius, quasi raptus ad tertium coelum in consilio Dei fuerit, absolute pronunciat, Deo neque necessariam, neque utilem Ec¬ clesiae visam esse potestatem temporalem, de qua nobis sermo. Ego vero a Barclaio quaero, de qua potestate temporali loqueris? Nam si de potestate illa loqueris, quae in se spiritualis cum sit, extenditur ad tempora¬ lia, non obscure Deo falsum imponis. Illam enim potestatem Deus ecclesiastico Principi necessariam esse duxit, ideoque eam illi tribuit, cum ait : Quodcumque ligaveris super terram, erit ligatum et in coelis, et quodcum¬ que solveris super terram, erit solutum et in coelis. Sic enim ista verba intelligi debere docuerunt Concilia generalia, quae supra ci¬ tavimus; quaeque verissime dicere poterant, Visum est Spiritui sancto, et nobis. Sin au¬ tem loqueris de potestate temporalis princi¬ patus, quem Ecclesia nunc possidet, et ante annos octingentos possedit : omnino temere affirmas hanc potestatem Ecclesiae, neque necessariam, neque utilem Deo esse visam. Nam (ut alia nunc omittam) si Deo visum esset, non esse utilem Ecclesiae hunc Prin¬ cipatum, certe Summi Pontifices Zacharias, Adrianus , Nicolaus primus, et secundus, Leo tertius, et quartus, et nonus, et alii, qui communi omnium scriptorum sententia optimi, et sanctissimi, et Deo gratissimi fue¬ runt, eum principatum non retinuissent, et multo minus pro eo conservando decertas- sent. Utrum autem de judicio divino magis credendum sit tot sanctis Pontificibus, quam uni Barclaio, in dubium certe revocari non polest. At rursus instat Barclaius, et argumentum in nos retorquet his verbis : omitto quod sj ratio illorum bona esset, sequeretur econ- trario, rempub. temporalem habere potesta- (1) liierem. 1, 10. IN REBUS TEMPORALIBUS 63 tem disponendi de rebus spiritualibus , et deponendi supremum rei publicas ecclesiasti¬ cae principem, quia debet esse perfecta, et sibi sufficiens in ordine ad finem suum, et habere omnem potestatem necessariam ad fi¬ nem consequendum. Sed necessaria est ad finem temporalem potestas disponendi de rebus spiritualibus, et deponendi principem Ecclesiasticum, quia alioqui possent mali principes Ecclesiastici turbare statum , et quietem reip. temporalis, et impedire finem civilis gubernationis, ut de facto aliquando nonnulli Summi Pontifices perturbarunt : igitur hanc potestatem habet respublica tem¬ poralis. Consequens plane falsum est, et ab¬ surdum (nam princeps temporalis quatenus talis est, nullam habet potestatem spiritua¬ lem) proinde, et illud quoque falsum est, cui hoc est consequens. , Respondeo : Tantum interest inter argu¬ mentum quod nos fecimus, et illud quod nunc Barclaius retorquendo facit, quantum distat verum a falso, et bonum a malo : illa enim propositio nostra : Necessaria est ad finem spiritualem potestas disponendi de re¬ bus temporalibus , verissima est, quoniam temporalia ordinantur ad spiritualia, et bona est consecutio , ergo respub. spiritualis po¬ test disponere de temporalibus in ordine ad spiritualia, quoniam qui potest consequi fi¬ nem, potest etiam ordinare media ad illum finem. At propositio Barclaii : Necessaria est ad finem temporalem potestas disponendi de spiritualibus, falsa est, quoniam spiritualia non ordinantur ad temporalia, et potestas ordinandi spiritualia ad temporalia non est vera potestas, sed abusio potestatis, et per¬ versio ordinis : fieri autem non potest, ut alicui reipub. sit necessaria abusio potestatis, vel ordinis perversio : et cum necessaria non sit ad finem temporalem consequendum po¬ testas disponendi de rebus spiritualibus , non potest bona esse consecutio, ergo respub. temporalis potest disponere de spiritualibus in ordine ad temporalia. Hoc totum facile potest intelligi ex similitudine jam saepius re¬ petita, spiritus, et carnis in homine : potest enim spiritus disponere de sensibus, et mem¬ bris corporis in ordine ad vitam aeternam, indicendo illis continentiam, abstinentiam, flagella, jejunia, vigilias, ltbores; et quod maximum est, jubendo car ii, ut mortem pa¬ tiatur pro concessione fidei : non tamen po¬ test caro disponere de intclligentia, it vo- untate, neque prohibere actiones orandi, et laudandi Deum, et multo minus potest spiri¬ tui jubere, ut mortem spiritualem , atque aeternam patiatur, pro quocumque temporali bono : quod si forte spiritus indiscretis labo¬ ribus mentis, ut nimis orando, vel meditan¬ do laedat corporis sanitatem, peccabit quidem spiritus, sed non ideo poterit caro in spiri¬ tum .mperium sumere; sed gemendo, et fa¬ tiscendo, faciet, ut spiritus remittat aliquid de nimio fervore suo. Sic etiam si forte Prin¬ ceps spiritualis abutatur potestate sua injuste excommunicando temporalem principem , vel ejus subditos sine justa causa ab obe- dientia ejus absolvendo, et eo modo pertur¬ bet statum reipub. temporalis peccabit prin¬ ceps spiritualis; sed non poterit tamen prin¬ ceps temporalis judicium sibi sumere de spi¬ ritualibus rebus , aut spiritualem principem judicare, et multo minus de Sede sua spiri¬ tuali deponere. Animadvertit Barclaius infir¬ mitatem argumenti sui ; propterea revertitur ad priorem solutionem, dicens : « Sed, ut dici solet, dare absurdum non est solvere argumentum. Respondeo igitur aliter ad priorem partem hujus secundae ra¬ tionis, non esse scilicet hic duasresp. ut ille retur, sed unam tantum, in qua sunt duae potestates, sive duo magistratus Ecclesiasti¬ cus, et politicus, quorum uterque habet ea, quibus necessario indiget ad suum finem obtinendum, alter nempe spiritualem, alter temporalem jurisdictionem : et neque hunc jurisdictionem illi potestati, neque illam huic esse necessariam, alioqui fatendum esset, utramque potestatem mediis necessariis fuisse destitutam tunc, cum separatae, ut olim fue¬ runt. » Respondeo : Haec non est alia solutio, sed prior repetita ; quam solutionem refutavi paulo ante, cum ostendi, rempub. ecclesia¬ sticam, et politicam, posse dici duas, et unam ; quoniam distinctae sunt, et separatae inveniri possunt; tamen cum in unum corpus Eccle¬ siae conveniunt, ita una subordinatur alteri, ut sint duae partiales, et una totalis. Neque sequitur, ut quo tempore separatae erant initio nascentis Ecclesiae, mediis necessariis fuerint destitutae : nam resp. politica non po¬ terat aliquid detrimenti timere a potestate spiritual u.n non esset capax censurarum ecclesiasticarum, quae in solos Christianos viin habent : et resp. spiritualis habebat po¬ testatem disponendi actu de rebus tempora¬ libus eorum, qui accessuri erant. Denique nou est verum, potestatem spiritualem, et 64 DE POTESTATE PAPdE politicam esse similes duobus magistratibus, quorum neuter indiget jurisdictione alterius. Nam duo magistratus pendent a rege, cujus potestas supereminet utrique magistratui, et potest operam dare, ut neuter alterum impediat : at spiritualis, et politica potestas, non habent unam tertiam potestatem in Ec¬ clesia, cui subordinentur, et quae utramque in officio contineat. Quare necesse est, ut una subordinetur alteri , inferior videlicet superiori, temporalis spirituali. Atque ex hac responsione soluta manent omnia , quae us¬ que ad finem capitis Barclaius disputat de officio Cancellarii et Comestabuli amplissi¬ morum magistratuum, quibus rex solus im¬ perat. Quod autem Barclaius addit, Princi¬ pem spiritualem, et politicum uni Deo sub- esse , quemadmodum Cancellarius , et Comestabulus subsunt regi, salva fide Ca¬ tholica admitti non potest. Ecclesia siquidem, quae regnum Christi est, non solum Christum pro domino, et rege suo agnoscit, sed etiam exScripturis sanctis, et traditione A postolica, et declaratione generalium Conciliorum, et communi Patrum , et Doctorum consensu novit, unicum esse in terris Christi Vicarium generalem, qui caput sit visibile visibilis Ecclesias. Hunc autem Christi Vicarium, R,o- manum esse Pontificem in toto suo libro Barclaius admittit; proinde (si Catholicus dici velit) admittere etiam debet , Pontifi¬ cem, et regem, non esse duos magistratus immediate sub Christo : sed regem Christo et Pontifici , Pontificem soli Christo subje¬ ctum esse debere.