Bellarmine · De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus · On the Power of the Supreme Pontiff in Temporal Matters, against William Barclay
Chapter 16: Another Digression of Barclay Is Refuted
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. XII, De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaium, a treatise of 1610. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
In the sixteenth chapter Barclay, breaking off his answer to my reasons for the power of the Pontiff in temporal matters, again digresses to the power of kings over Pontiffs. And because I had said in book 2 on the Pontiff, chapter 29, that a distinction must be acknowledged between heathen and Christian kings, in that the former had not subjected themselves through baptism to the Supreme Pontiff as the Vicar of Christ, but the latter had; and therefore it could probably be said that the Supreme Pontiffs were once subject to heathen emperors as to temporal matters, but were never by right subject to Christian emperors; he sets about attacking this distinction, and promises that he will show that the Supreme Pontiffs are no less subject by right to Christian kings than to heathen ones, as far as temporal matters are concerned. He excepts, however, those Pontiffs who, after obtaining temporal dominion in certain provinces, began to be supreme political princes, as kings and other absolute princes are. And he uses this reasoning: Temporal princes through baptism subjected themselves to the spiritual power of the Supreme Pontiff as the Vicar of Christ; but from this subjection it does not follow that the Supreme Pontiff is not subject to the temporal power of Christian princes; therefore Bellarmine argues faultily.
I answer: what I had said in the place cited about the temporal subjection of the Supreme Pontiffs to heathen emperors I changed in the Recognition of my works, published two years ago; for I had followed the authority of Albert Pighius; but I perceived afterwards that the reason for that opinion was not firm enough. But this is nothing to Barclay; for whether the Pontiffs were subject to the temporal power of heathen emperors, or were not, Barclay's reasoning is faulty, and Bellarmine's argument is without fault. For by the fact that kings through baptism subjected themselves to the spiritual power of the Pontiff, they are judged to have subjected also their kingdoms and their political power to the same spiritual power; namely so that they would be directed and corrected by the Pontiff, if in any way concerning temporal matters they should turn aside from the way of salvation. And empty is all that Barclay adds about the emperor Constantine, and Clovis and other kings, who through baptism did not lose their empire and kingdoms. For we do not say that kings lose their kingdoms through baptism, or lose anything of their right; but on the contrary we rather affirm that kings after baptism reign more happily and more truly. For the Vicar of Christ does not covet the kingdoms of his spiritual sons, nor desire to lessen or disturb their temporal jurisdiction, as Innocent III openly wrote in the chapter often cited, Per venerabilem, which children are legitimate; but he strives to bring it about that they so reign on earth that they do not lose the heavenly kingdom, and that earthly kingdoms serve the heavenly kingdom, as Saint Gregory excellently writes in book 2, epistle 61.
Barclay afterwards adds a comparison by which he thinks his opinion is most aptly explained and most effectively confirmed. This is the comparison: “If some son of a family, his father still living, holds a public magistracy, he will have to obey his father in those things which pertain to domestic affairs, and can, if he behaves badly toward his father, be punished by his father by disinheritance and the other punishments to which the paternal power extends; yet he will not be bound to obey in those things which pertain to the public administration, nor can he be deprived of his magistracy by his father, or restrained by other punishments which are usually inflicted by a public magistrate. On the contrary, the father will be bound to rise before his son holding the magistracy, and to obey him in public and political matters, but not in domestic; and the son can punish his father, and proceed against him by law as against other private men, if he should perhaps offend in something against the public laws. So then the Pontiff, who is the father of all Christians, even of kings and princes, can command kings in those things which pertain to domestic, that is, ecclesiastical affairs, and punish them with the gravest punishment of disinheritance, that is, of excommunication; but he cannot order them anything concerning the political government, nor deprive them of their kingdoms; on the contrary, kings can command the Pontiff in those things which regard the political government, but not in ecclesiastical and spiritual matters.”
I answer: I have already warned above that Barclay enlarges his book by repeating the same things again and again, so that from a small pamphlet a book of proper size may be made. For he had already proposed this comparison before in chapter 3, except that in that place he had compared the Pontiff to an adoptive father, in this place he compares him to a father simply; but as far as the present matter is concerned, the comparison is the same. And as we warned in chapter 3, that comparison is so inept and childish that it is a wonder Barclay himself did not notice the faults of the comparison brought forward by him. For the power of a public magistrate is greater than the paternal power of private citizens, and can direct and correct it, and if justice demands, can deprive a father of the paternal power; on the contrary, the father, since he is a private citizen, cannot direct or correct a public magistrate, much less deprive him of his power. But the power of the Supreme Pontiff is indeed a paternal power, but not at all like the paternal power of private citizens, but like the power of God, whose place the Pontiff holds on earth; therefore it is a supernatural, spiritual, public power, far higher than every political and human power. So there are two faults of Barclay in this comparison: one, that he makes the political power of the magistrate and the power of private citizens equal, when nevertheless the former is superior, and the latter is subjected to it as inferior; the other, that he made the pontifical power like a human and private paternal power, when it is a public and divine power, than which neither a greater nor an equal can be found on earth. See what we said of this matter in chapter 3.
Lastly Barclay adds the testimony of Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, who in book 3 of the Catholic Concord, chapter 3, writes that there was in a certain ancient gloss on the canon Hadrianus, distinction 63, that “the Pope is father of the Patrician in spiritual things, and the Patrician is father of the Pope in temporal things”; and in chapter 4 writes that “it is not in the hand of the Roman Pontiff to give a king or emperor to any province whatever in the world, without its consent.” To the first testimony I have already answered above, that that ancient gloss was deservedly retired and exploded. To the second I answer that the Roman Pontiff can, especially in a case of heresy, excommunicate and depose emperors and kings, and free their subjects from obedience; but who ought to succeed in their place he leaves free to those to whom it belongs by right. So he does not thrust emperors or kings at his pleasure upon unwilling peoples, nor take away the rights of hereditary succession or of election; and this is all that that Cardinal requires.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XVI. Refellitur alia digressio Barclaii. Incnpifesexto decimo Barclaiusintermissa responsione ad r tiones meas, pro potestate Pontificiis in temporalibus, iterum digreditur ad potestatem regum in Pontifices. Et quo¬ niam ego in lib. ii de Pontif. cap. 29 dixe¬ ram, discrimen esse agnoscendum inter* re¬ ges Ethnicos et Christianos, quod illi non subjecissent se per Baptismum Summo Pon¬ tifici, ut Christi Vicario, isti autem subjecis¬ sent: et ideo probabiliter dici potuisse, Sum¬ mos Pontifices olim subjectos fuisse impe¬ ratoribus Ethnicis quoad temporalia ; impe¬ ratoribus autem Christianis, numquam fuisse de jure subjectos: aggreditur hoc discrimen impugnare, seque demonstraturum pollice¬ tur, Pontifices Summos non minus subjectos esse de jure regibus Christianis, quam Eth¬ nicis quod attinet ad temporalia. Excipit ta¬ men eos Pontifices, qui post adeptam tem¬ poralem ditionem in certis provinciis coepe¬ runt esse supremi principes politici, ut sunt reges aliique principes absoluti. Utitur autem hac ratiocinatione : Principes temporales per baptismum subjecerunt se potestati spiri¬ tuali Summi Ponticis, ut Christi Vicarii: ex hacautem subjectione non sequiturSummum Pontificem, non esse subjectum potestati temporali principum Christianorum ; ergo Bellarminus vitiose argumentatur. Respondeo : Quod dixeram in loco citato de subjectione temporali Summorum Ponti¬ ficum ad Ethnicos imperatores, in Recogni¬ tione operum meorum ante duos annos edita mutavi : secutus enim fueram auctoritatem Alberti Pighii : sed animadverti postea, ra¬ tionem ejus sententiae, non esse satis firmam. Sed nihil ad Barclaium : sive enim Pontifices subjecti fuerint temporali potestati impera¬ torum Ethnicorum, sive non fuerint, Barclaii ratiocinatio vitiosa est, et Bellarmini argu¬ mentum vitio caret. Per hoc enim quod re¬ ges per Baptismum potestati spirituali Pon¬ tificis se subjecerunt, censentur etiam eidem potestati spirituali regna sua subjecisse, et politicam potestatem; ut videlicet a Pontifice dirigi, et corrigi vellent, si quo modo circa temporalia a via salutis deflecterent. Vana sunt autem omnia quae Barclaius subjungit de Constantino imperatore, Clodoveo, et T rrnYo regii us, qui per baptismum impe- 'rio et regnis non exciderunt. Nam neque nos dicimus, reges per baptismum regnis excidere, aut quicquam sui juris amittere; sed contra potius affirmamus, reges post baptismum felicius, veriusque regnare. Ne¬ que enim Christi Vicarius regna filiorum suo- r mi spiritualia n allectat, aut jurisdictionem illorum temporalem imminuere, aut pertur¬ bare cupit, ut aperte scripsit Innocentius III in capite smpe citato, Per venerabilem, Qui filii sint legitimi; sed procedere nititur utitareg* nent in terris, ut regnum coeleste non amittant, et ut regna terrena regno coelesti famulentur, ut praeclare scribit S. Gregorius in lib. ii epist. 61. Subjungit postea Barclaius similitudinem, qua explicari aptissime, et confirmari effi¬ cacissime sententiam suam censet, haec est autem, similitudo. « Si quis filius familias patre suo adhuc superstite magistratum pu¬ blicum gerat : debebit patri parere in iis, quae ad res domesticas pertinent, et poterit si male se gesserit erga patrem, a patre pu¬ niri per exhaeredationem, aliasque poenas ad quae patria potestas se extendit : non tamen parere tenebitur in iis, quae ad publicam ad- ministrationem pertinent, neque poterit a patre privari magistratu, aliisve poenis coer¬ ceri, quae a publico magistratu infligi so¬ lent. Contra vero pater tenebitur filio ma¬ gistratum gerenti assurgere, eique parere in rebus publicis, et politicis; non autem in domesticis : et poterit in patrem animadver¬ tere, atque in eum lege agere, ut in alios homines privatos, si contra publicas leges aliquid forte peccaverit. Sic igitur Pontifex, qui pater est omnium Christianorum, etiam regum, et principum, poterit regibus impe¬ rare in iis, quae ad res domesticas, id est, Ecclesiasticas pertinent, eosque punire poe¬ na gravissima exhseredationis, id est, excom¬ municationis : sed non poterit aliquid eis jubere circa regimen politicum, neque eos regnis privare : contra, reges poterunt Pontifici imperare in iis, quae spectant ad regimen politicum, non autem in rebus Ec¬ clesiasticis et spiritualibus. » Respondeo : Jam supra admonui, Bar¬ claium eadem saipius repetendo librum suum augere, ut ex parvo libello, liber justae staturae efficiatur. Hanc enim similitudinem jam antea proposuerat cap. m. eo excepto, quod eo loco Patri adoptivo Pontificem com¬ paraverat, hoc loco Patri simpliciter com- 60 DE POTESTATE PAP.E parat : sed quod attinet ad rem praesentem, eadem similitudo est. Atque ut cap. m. ad¬ monuimus, similitudo illa tam est inepta, et puerilis, ut mirum sit, Barclaius ipsum non animadvertisse vitia similitudinis a se alla¬ tae. Nam potestas publici magistratus major est potestate patria civium privatorum, et potest eam dirigere, et corrigere, et si ju¬ stitia postulet, potest patrem patria potestate privare : contra vero, pater, cum civis pri¬ vatus sit, non potest magistratum publicam dirigere, vel corrigere, multo minus illum potestate privare. Potestas autem Summi Pontificis, patria quidem potestas est; sed haud similis potestati patriae civium priva¬ torum ; sed potestati Dei, cujus Pontifex vi¬ ces gerit in terris; proinde potestas est supernaturalis, spiritualis, publica, et omni potestate politica, atque humana longe su¬ blimior. Itaque duosu.it in hac similitudine peccata Barclaii : unum quod potestatem politicam magistratus, et potestatem civium privatorum pares facit; cum tamen prior, ut superior, posterior ut inferiori subjiciatur : alterum, quod potestatem Pontificiam simi¬ lem fecerit potestate patrice humana;, et privata; ; cum sit potestas publica, et divina, qua neque major, neque par in terris inve¬ niri potest. \ide quse diximus de hac re cap. 3. Addit postremo Barclaius testimonium Nicolai Cardinalis de Cusa, qui in lib. m. de Concordia Catholica cap. 3, scribit, fuisse in antiqua quadam glossaad Canonem Hadria¬ nus, dist. 63. «Papam esse Patrem Patricii in spiritualibus, et Patricium esse patrem Papee in temporalibus, » et cap. 4. scribit, « non esse in manu Romani Pontificis dare cuicumque provinciae per mundum regem, vel imperatorem, ipsa non consentiente. » Ad primum testimonium jam supra re¬ spondi, glossam illam antiquam merito fuis¬ se antiquatam, et explosam. Ad secundum, respondeo, Pontificem Romanum posse, praesertim in casu hseresis, imperatores, ac reges excommunicare, atque deponere, eo- rumque subditos ab obedientia liberare : quis autem in locum ipsorum succedere de¬ beat, liberum relinquere illis ad quos de jure pertinet. Itaque non obtrudit imperato¬ res, aut reges pro arbitiio populis invitis, neque jura haereditariae successionis, aut electionis tollit ; atque hoc est solum, quod Cardinalis ille requirit.