Bellarmine · De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus · On the Power of the Supreme Pontiff in Temporal Matters, against William Barclay
Chapter 20: Bellarmine's Third Reason Is Defended
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. XII, De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaium, a treatise of 1610. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
In the twentieth chapter Barclay sets about examining and refuting Bellarmine's third principal reason for confirming the power of the Supreme Pontiff in temporal matters. The reason was this: It is not lawful for Christians to tolerate an unbelieving or heretical king, if he tries to draw his subjects to his heresy or unbelief; but to judge whether the king draws them to heresy or not belongs to the Pontiff, to whom the care of religion is committed; therefore it is the Pontiff's part to judge whether the king is to be deposed or not deposed. The proposition of this reason I confirmed by three arguments; but Barclay refutes it in these words: “That it is not lawful for Christians to tolerate a heretical or unbelieving king is as false as what is most false; otherwise the whole of antiquity is to be condemned, which submissively bore with heretical and unbelieving kings trying to destroy the Church of God, not only for wrath but also for conscience' sake, that is, not because they lacked strength to drive out ungodly princes, but because they judged that this was not lawful to them by the law of God.”
I answer: where truth is sought among sensible and serious disputants, he does not win who affirms his opinion with greater exaggeration, but who confirms it with stronger arguments. Barclay says indeed that the proposition of my argument is as false as what is most false; but what he says he proves only from this, that the whole of antiquity bore with heretical or unbelieving kings trying to destroy the Church, not only for wrath but also for conscience' sake. But this very thing he ought to have proved, namely that heretical or unbelieving kings trying to destroy the Church were tolerated by antiquity not only for wrath but also for conscience' sake. For we say on the contrary that they were tolerated because the Church's strength was not enough to cast them down; but that the Church could, if strength had been present, nay, even ought to have taken from those kings their rule over the faithful, unless there were some cause why this taking away seemed to be deferred to a more convenient time, we prove by this argument, which is the first confirmation of my proposition. The Jews were forbidden to set over themselves a king not a Jew, Deuteronomy 17; and because that law is moral, by the same right Christians are forbidden to set over themselves a king not a Christian, lest they be drawn by him to unbelief; and it is of the same danger and harm to tolerate over themselves a heretical or unbelieving king trying to turn the people from the faith; therefore, if strength is at hand, they are bound not to tolerate him, but to depose him.
To this argument Barclay answers in such a way that, admitting the proposition and the assumption, which he could not deny, he denies only the consequence; for he says it is not rightly gathered from the equality of danger and harm that the people has the right to cast down a king in the same way as it had the right not to admit him. And that this is not rightly gathered he proves by three arguments drawn from the like: “For he who receives blows, or is stripped of his fortunes, receives the same danger and harm, whether he suffers it from a robber by force or from a judge by an unjust sentence; and yet he can resist the robber with arms, the judge he cannot. Again, it is of the same danger and harm to board a ship of which you know the keel to be shattered, and to enter one which you think to be sound, when in truth it is leaky and falling apart; and yet it is not the same sin to commit oneself to the danger of shipwreck on purpose and through ignorance. Lastly, it is of the same danger and harm to marry a very peevish and quarrelsome wife, whether it is done deliberately for her fortune or her beauty, or from error and imprudence; and yet neither is it an equal sin to be entangled in such a marriage on purpose or ignorantly, nor is it lawful to repudiate the wife, even if it was lawful at the beginning not to marry her.”
To these arguments I answer that they are drawn not from the like but from the unlike, and thereby do not hinder the consequence of my reason from being excellent. The first argument is not drawn from the like; because the people to whom it belongs to choose a king not only can but ought to choose a king from among their brethren, as the law commands, that is, a Christian and a Catholic, and sins most gravely if it does otherwise; but he who falls among robbers can, if he will, repel force by force; but he can also bear that injury with an even mind, and deserves more with God if he prefers to be unjustly killed by the robber than by justly defending himself to kill the robber. The second example, of one boarding a leaky ship with danger of making shipwreck, has no likeness to the matter we are dealing with; for we are not ignorant that it is not the same sin if someone exposes himself to the same danger on purpose or through imprudence; but what we say is that it is the same sin deliberately to choose a heretical king, and deliberately to tolerate a heretical king, if he tries to call the people away from the truth of the faith, and strength is not lacking to remove him; for as it is never lawful to go into danger of losing eternal salvation, so it is never lawful to persevere in a like danger, provided it can be avoided; for he that loveth danger shall perish in it, Ecclesiasticus 3. The third example, of the quarrelsome wife, is also not much to the point, both because, as we just said, we are disputing of one who on purpose goes into danger and on purpose perseveres in danger, whereas the adversary sets the example of one who through ignorance or imprudence marries a quarrelsome wife, and of another who does it knowingly and wittingly. Then, he who marries a wife in the Christian manner, whether he does it prudently or imprudently, cannot after the marriage is consummated be loosed from that bond by any means; for what God hath joined together, man cannot put asunder; but the people which chooses a king can by the pontifical authority be freed from obedience to him and from the oath of fidelity. So if Barclay wishes to draw from marriage an example apt and like in all things, let him take the marriage of a believer with an unbeliever; for as it is not lawful for a believer to marry an unbelieving wife, since there is danger lest she turn him from the faith, so also it is not lawful to persevere with an unbelieving wife, not only because that marriage is not lawful, but because it is the same danger to marry an unbelieving wife and to persevere with an unbeliever. For even if the marriage were lawful, as is the marriage of an unbeliever with an unbeliever, yet if one of the spouses is converted to the faith, and the other refuses to dwell with the husband without injury to the Creator, a marriage rightly contracted can be rightly dissolved, according to the Apostle in the first epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 7; and the usage of the Church now holds that, on account of the huge danger to the faith, not only is it lawful for such a marriage to be dissolved, but it is also not lawful for a husband converted to the faith to dwell with an unbelieving spouse.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XX. Defenditur tertia ratio Bellarmini. In capite vigesimo aggreditur Barclaius tertiam rationem principalem Bellarmini, pro confirmanda potestate summi Pontificis in temporalibus, excutere, atque refellere. Ratio haec erat : Non licet Christianis tole¬ rare regem infidelem, aut haereticum, si ille conetur pertrahere subditos ad suam haere- sim, vel infidelitatem : at judicare, an rex pertrahat ad haeresim, necne, pertinet ad Pontificem, cui est commissa cura Religio¬ nis : ergo Pontificis est judicare, regem esse deponendum, vel non deponendum. Hujus rationis propositionem tribus argumentis confirmavi; sed Barclaius eamdem refellit his verbis : « Quod non liceat Christianis tolerare regem haereticum, vel infidelem, id adeo falsum est, quam quod falsissimum; alioqui damnanda tota antiquitas, qua} reges haere¬ ticos, et infideles Ecclesiam Dei destruere conantes submisse pertulit, non solum pro¬ pter iram, sed etiam propter conscientiam, hoc est, non quod deficerentur viribus ad impios principes exigendos; sed quod id sibi per Dei legem non licere judicarent. » Respondeo : Ubi veritas quaeritur inter cordatos, et serios disputatores, non vincit ille, qui majore exaggeratione sententiam suam affirmat; sed qui fortioribus argumen¬ tis eam confirmat. Barclaius dicit quidem : Propositionem argumenti mei, tam esse fal¬ sam, quam id quodfalsissimum est; sed quod dicit non probat nisi ex eo, quod antiquitas 68 DE POTESTATE PAP/E tota reges haereticos, vel infideles, Ecclesiam destruere conantes pertulit, non solum pro¬ pter iram, sed etiam propter conscientiam. At hoc ipsum probare debuisset, videlicet reges haereticos, vel infideles Ecclesiam de¬ struere conantes non solum propter iram, sed etiam propter conscientiam toleratos ab antiquitate fubsc. Nos enim contra dicimus, eos fuisse toleratus propterea, quod ad eos dejiciendos vires- Ecclesiae non suppetebant: potuisse autem Ecclesiam, si vires adfuissent, immo etiam debuisse regibus illis imperium super fideles abrogare, nisi causa aliqua es¬ set, cur h<rc abrogatio in tempus commodius differenda videretur, probamus hoc argu¬ mento, quod est prima confirmatio proposi¬ tionis meae. Prohibiti sunt Judaei constituere super se regem non Judaeum Deuteron. xvu, et quia lex illa moralis est, eodem jure pro¬ hibentur Christiani constituere super se re¬ gem non Christianum, ne ab iilo pertrahan¬ tur ad infidelitatem : ad ejusdem periculi, et damni est tolerare super se regem haere¬ ticum, vel infidelem conantem avertere po¬ pulum a fide : ergo, si vires adsint, tenentur eum non tolerare, sed deponere. Ad hoc argumentum ita respondet Bar- claius, ut admissa propositione, et assump¬ tione, quas negare non potuit, solam neget consecutionem : dicit enim non recte colligi ex paritate periculi, et damni ita jus esse populo regem dejicere, quemadmodum jus illi fuit eum non amittere. Id autem non recte colligi probat tribus argumentis ductis a simili : Nam qui plagas accipit, aut fortu¬ nis spoliatur, idem periculum, et damnum accipit, sive id a latrone per vim, sive a Judice per iniquam sententiam patiatur : et tamen latroni armis resistere potest, judici non potest. Rursus, ejusdem periculi, et damni est in navim cogitam conscendere, cujus carinam scis esse quassatam, et illud intrare, quod putas esse bonum, cum revera rimosum, ac dissolutum sit : et tamen non est ejusdem peccati ex industria, et ex igno¬ ratione pericu o naufragii se committere. Denique ejusdem periculi, et damni est, uxorem ducere valde morosam, et rixosam, sive id consulto propter fortunas, aut for¬ mam ; sive ex errore, et imprudentia fiat : *et t .men neque par peccatum est, ejusmodi matrimonio studiose vel ignoranter impli¬ cari : neque licitum est uxorem repudiare, etiam si licitum fuit eam initio non ducere. » Ad hrec argumenta respondeo, ea non a simili, sed a dissimili duci, ac per hoc non impedire, quo minus consecutio rationis meae optima sit. Primum argumentum non ducitur a simili ; quoniam populus ad quem pertinet regem eligere, non solum potest, sed debet regem eligere de fratibus suis, ut lex jubet, id est, Christianum, atque Catho¬ licum, et gravissime peccat, si secus fece¬ rit : qui autem incidit in latrones, potest, si velit, vim vi repejlere; sed potest etiam in¬ juriam illam sequo animo tolerare, et magis apud Deum meretur, si malit injuste alatrone occidi, quam juste se defendendo latronem occidere. Alterum exemplum de ascendente navim rimosam, cum periculo naufragii faciendi, nullam habet cum re, de qua nos agimus, similitudinem : non enim ignoramus non ' esse idem peccatum, si quis ex industria, vel ex imprudentia eidem periculo se expo¬ nat : sed quod dicimus est, idem esse pec¬ catum consulto eligere regem hsereticum, et consulto tolerare regem hsereticum, si is conetur populum a veritate fidei avocare, et ad eum removendum vires non desint : nam sicut uumquam licet adire periculum salutis seternse amittendse,itanumquam licet perseverare in simili periculo, modo possit illud vitari : qui enim amat periculum , in illo peribit, Eccles. m. Tertium exemplum de uxore rixosa, non est etiam multum ad rem, tum quia ut modo diximus, disputamus de eo, qui studiose adit periculum, et stu¬ diose in periculo perseverat : adversarius autem ponit exemplum de eo, qui per igno- rantiam, aut imprudentiam ducit uxorem rixosam, et de altero, qui sciens, et prudens id facit. Deinde qui ducit uxorem more Chri¬ stiano, sive prudens, sive imprudens id fa¬ ciat, non potest post matrimonium consum¬ matum ulla ratione ab eo vinculo solvi : quod enim Deus conjunxit, non potest homo separare : populus autem, qui regem eligit, potest per Pontificiam auctoritatem ab ejus obedientia, et juramento fidelitatis liberari. Itaque si exemplum aptum, et simile per omnia Barclaius a matrimonio ducere velit, accipiat matrimonium fidelis cum infideli : quemadmodum enim non licet fideli uxo¬ rem ducere infidelem, quoniam periculum est, ne illum a fide avertat : sic etiam non licet cum uxore infideli perseverare, non solum quia matrimonium illud non est legi¬ timum, sed quia idem est periculum uxorem infidelem ducere, et cum infideli perseverare. IN REBUS TEMPORALIBUS 69 Nam etiam si matrimonium legitimum esset, ut est matrimonium infidelis cum infideli, tamen si alter conjugum convertatur ad fidem, et altera nolit sine injuria Creatoris viro cohabitare, potest matrimonium rite contractum rite dissolvi, ex Apostolo in priore ad Cor., c. vii, et usus Ecclesiae nunc habet, ut propter ingens periculum fidei, non solum liceat ejusmodi conjugium solvi, sed etiam non liceat viro ad fidem converso cum infideli conjuge cohabitare.