Bellarmine · De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus · On the Power of the Supreme Pontiff in Temporal Matters, against William Barclay
Chapter 21: The Confirmation of the Third Principal Reason Is Defended
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. XII, De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaium, a treatise of 1610. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
In the twenty-first chapter Barclay, with great zeal and no less force of speech, tries to refute the other confirmation of my third principal reason. The confirmation was this: That if Christians once did not depose Nero and Diocletian and Julian the Apostate and Valens the Arian and the like, it was because temporal strength was lacking to Christians; for that otherwise they could have done it by right is plain from the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 6, where he commands new judges of temporal causes to be appointed for Christians, lest Christians be forced to plead their cause before a judge who was a persecutor of Christ. For as new judges could be appointed, so also new princes and kings, for the same cause, if strength had been at hand.
Barclay says this confirmation can be censured in many ways; and first he censures that I said the lack of strength was the reason why Christians once did not depose Nero, Diocletian, Julian and Valens, and refers the reader to what he wrote above on this matter in chapters 6, 7 and 8. We too refer the reader to what we wrote in chapters 6, 7 and 8. This only I note in this place, that what I said here had been said before by Saint Thomas in 2-2, question 12, article 2, to the first. So Barclay censures not me only, but Saint Thomas too; but whoever is willing to read the places just noted will easily judge on which side the truth stands.
Then he strives to refute what I said, that the Apostle ordered Christians to appoint for themselves Christian judges of civil controversies; from which I deduced that he could in the same way have ordered the Christian peoples to choose for themselves Christian princes, unbelievers and persecutors being removed, if strength had been ready for accomplishing it. But Barclay says that those judges of whom the Apostle speaks were mere arbiters, or voluntary judges without command, by whose appointment nothing of jurisdiction was taken from the heathen princes under whom Christians then lived. And to confirm this sense he alleges Saint Thomas and Nicholas of Lyra in the commentary on this passage of the Apostle. I confess indeed that those Christian judges appointed by the Apostle's order did not have coercive force in the outer forum, and that if Christians had been summoned, whether by heathen or by Christians, to the tribunals of heathen judges, they ought altogether to have obeyed; and this is all that Saint Thomas and Lyra teach. Yet I deny that they were mere arbiters, or voluntary judges. For arbiters are chosen by the litigating parties, and have no other power of judging than that which the litigants attribute to them by a pact entered into between themselves. But these were appointed by the public authority of the multitude; and those who had civil causes were obliged to go to them, and were forbidden to go to the tribunals of the Gentiles. This can easily be proved from the Apostle's words: Dare any of you, he says, having a matter against another, go to be judged before the unjust, and not before the saints? Where he shows that it is not good to go to the tribunals of Gentile judges, whom he calls unjust; and as he speaks of true judgment, not of mere arbitration, when he forbids being judged before the unjust, so he speaks of true judgment when he orders being judged before the saints, that is, Christians. The Apostle adds: Know you not that the saints shall judge this world? and if the world shall be judged by you, are you unworthy to judge the smallest matters? Know you not that we shall judge angels? how much more things of this world? Where he shows the authority of the Church, which by its own right can judge of secular things, since it is to judge with Christ the whole world, and the apostate angels themselves, on the day of the last judgment; and certainly Christ and the Church will not judge the world as arbiters, without command and jurisdiction. It follows: If therefore you have judgments of things pertaining to this world, set them to judge who are the most despised in the Church. Where he concludes from what has been said that, since it is evil to be judged before the unjust Gentiles, and the Church has authority to judge, they should by common consent appoint some from the Church to be judges of such secular controversies; and he does not say, let each one choose arbiters for himself, but, you, gathered together, appoint judges. He warns (says Cardinal Cajetan on this passage) that some wise man be appointed judge of the multitude of the brethren. He adds: I speak to your shame. Is it so that there is not among you any one wise man, that is able to judge between his brethren? but brother goeth to law with brother, and that before unbelievers. Where he declares that what he had said, set them to judge who are the most despised in the Church, he had not said in the sense that they should in fact, leaving the wise aside, appoint the unwise to judge; but to confound those who so went to the tribunals of unbelievers as if there were no wise man in the Church who could be appointed judge; whereas on the contrary the most despised, that is, the lowest Christians, ought to be fitter to judge than the highest and wisest unbelievers. Now from this principle, namely that on the Apostle's witness the Church has the right and authority of appointing judges for herself, the theologians, and above all Saint Thomas in 2-2, question 10, article 10, rightly gather that the same Church has authority to take from unbelieving princes their rule over the faithful. Nor does it stand in the way that Saint John Chrysostom, expounding this passage, makes mention of an arbiter. For neither he nor any other interpreter, that I know, says that the Apostle here speaks of arbiters chosen by the parties; but Chrysostom says only that great wisdom is not necessary for an arbiter of a controversy between brethren. Where he calls the judge an arbiter of the controversy, although he had a public power of judging. As Justin at the beginning of his history writes: the arbitrations of princes were in place of laws; for although princes were true judges, yet their judgments were called arbitrations, because they did not judge by the prescription of laws, but by their natural judgment; so also the judges appointed by the Church in the civil causes of Christians were true judges, but were not bound to follow the fine points of the civil laws, and therefore were called arbiters by Chrysostom.
But Barclay contradicts, and says: “The Apostle orders nothing in that place which takes away, or lessens, or in any way prejudices the jurisdiction and command of unbelieving judges over Christians. Nay, he could justly order nothing against such subjection, since it is of natural law confirmed by the authority of God, as, on the witness of Saint Ambrose, the Apostle himself teaches in Romans 13.” I answer: the Apostle does not prejudice, by that appointment of Christian judges, the jurisdiction and command of unbelieving princes; because he does not order Christians not to appear before an unbelieving judge if they are summoned; but only commands that they not go of their own accord. But that the Apostle could not have exempted Christians from subjection to unbelieving princes, if he had judged it useful or necessary, and had had strength to accomplish it, I think cannot be said without grave error; and the reason which Barclay offers for his opinion is wholly weak. For it is of natural law confirmed by God and declared by the Apostle that every soul be subject to higher powers; but it is not of natural law confirmed by God and declared by the Apostle that a higher power cannot be taken out of the way by another higher, and thereby it come about that subjection and obedience are no longer owed to it. For the power of inferior magistrates too is to be obeyed by divine law, not only for wrath but also for conscience' sake; and yet an inferior magistrate can be removed or changed by the prince, and then to that person from whom the magistracy has been taken no one any longer owes subjection or obedience. So also, when a king is deposed from the throne, either by the supreme spiritual power in a case of heresy, or by another king in a case of victory, what the Apostle says no longer applies to him: Let every soul be subject to higher powers. The same can be said of the paternal and the master's power; for it is of natural law confirmed by God and declared by the Apostle in Ephesians 6 that children obey parents, and servants masters; and yet children can be emancipated, and servants given their liberty, and thereby it can come about that neither the former are bound to obey their parents, nor the latter their masters. So unless Barclay shows it to be of natural law, confirmed by God and declared by the Apostle, that secular princes, whether believing or unbelieving, cannot in certain cases be deposed by ecclesiastical authority, he has said nothing yet that bears on the matter, however much, with many words often and more often repeated, he has tried in this chapter to persuade us of his opinion.
Barclay afterwards adds another solution, no more solid than the former: “Besides,” he says, “if anyone runs through that passage of the Apostle with no squinting eye, he will notice that he sets himself this business, to train Christian minds to evangelical perfection, which is rather of counsel than of precept, and to exhort them rather to bear injury and suffer fraud than to have lawsuits among themselves,” and so on. I answer: when the Apostle exhorts Christians not to have lawsuits among themselves, but by meekness and patience to forestall the occasion of lawsuits, he teaches a counsel of perfection, not a precept of justice; but when he orders that, if they have lawsuits among themselves, they bring their causes to Christian judges, not to unbelievers, then indeed he clearly shows that he gives not a counsel but a precept, when he says: “Dare any of you, having a matter against another, go to be judged before the unjust, and not before the saints?” and: “Set them to judge who are the most despised in the Church.”
Barclay goes on, and leaving Bellarmine attacks Saint Thomas, saying: “But since we are pursuing each point, we must note that Saint Thomas in 2-2, question 10, article 10, is of that opinion, that he thinks the right of dominion and prelacy of heathen princes can justly be taken from them by the sentence or ordinance of the Church having the authority of God, as he says. Saint Thomas has great authority with me, but not so great that I hold all his disputations for canonical Scriptures, or that he overcomes reason or law. I revere and look up to his shade, then; but there is no reason why anyone should be moved by that opinion of his: both because he offers for his opinion neither a fit and effective reason nor an authority; and because in the explanation of the epistle of Paul to the Corinthians he plainly thinks the contrary; and lastly because he has none of the ancient Fathers agreeing with him, and many reasons and authorities are at hand to the contrary. But the reason which he brings is that unbelievers by the desert of their unbelief deserve to lose power over the faithful, who are transferred into sons of God. A bad reason, and unworthy of so great a man; as if, when someone deserves to be deprived of an office, benefice, dignity, authority or other right which he possesses, he could therefore at once be stripped of it by another than him from whom he received and holds it, or by another having an express command and power from him.”
I answer: the importunity of this Aristarchus is to be wondered at, who so freely censures the Prince of Theologians as to say: A bad reason, and unworthy of so great a man; when he himself professes to be a jurist, and has not greeted the inner shrine of sacred theology even from the threshold. But that I do not wonder at, that he says he reveres the shade of Saint Thomas; for his book is most full of improper words; for the spirit of this most holy doctor does not enjoy everlasting life with the gods of the dead below, but with the angels above. But what Barclay says, that the opinion of Saint Thomas is fortified by no effective reason, is false; although it is true that the force of Saint Thomas's reason could in no way be penetrated by Barclay's wit. And what he adds, that the same Saint Thomas wrote contraries in the Commentary on the epistle to the Corinthians, convicts Barclay of manifest ignorance. For in that Commentary Saint Thomas writes indeed that it is against divine law to forbid that the judgment of an unbelieving prince be stood by, and that subjection is owed to princes even unbelieving; which things are most true; but from them it does not follow that there is not in the Church authority to deprive unbelieving princes of the dominion which they have over the faithful; therefore these are not contraries: subjection is owed to an unbelieving prince while he is prince; and, an unbelieving prince can be deprived of the dominion which he has over the faithful by the authority of the Church. And Barclay, because he judges these to be contraries, either has not learned dialectic, or has handed its rules over to oblivion; as also a little below, when the same Barclay says: “And indeed Saint Thomas, in the exposition of the epistle of Paul related above in this chapter, indicates plainly enough that the Church does not have that authority by which it could depose the heathen; for he says it is against divine law to forbid that the judgment of unbelieving princes be stood by by their subjects.” He manifestly wanders and is deceived; for although it is against divine law that obedience be denied to a prince while he is prince, yet it is not against divine law that the Church have the power of deposing a prince; for it is also against divine law to forbid children to obey their parents while they are under the paternal power; and yet it is not against divine law that children be sometimes taken out of the paternal power, as in fact a son of a family is taken out of it when he is raised to the episcopal height. Further, that reason of Saint Thomas: “Unbelievers deserve by reason of their unbelief to lose power over the faithful, who are transferred into sons of God; therefore the Church can deprive unbelieving princes of the dominion which they have over the faithful,” is not so weak a reason as Barclay says; but truly weak is the argument with which Barclay attacks Saint Thomas's reason; for this is Barclay's argument: “Unbelievers deserve to lose power over the faithful, but no one can deprive them of power except he who gave that power, or he who has an express command from him; but princes have their power from God, and are less than God alone; therefore they can be deprived of power by God alone, and not by the Church, which neither gave power to unbelievers, nor has an express command of God by which it ought or can take it away.” This argument, I say, has no strength; for it is false that political princes have their power from God alone; for they have it from God so far as God has sown in the minds of men a natural instinct to wish to be governed by someone. But that men be governed by kings or by consuls, by one or by many, by a perpetual or a temporary magistrate, depends on the will of men; as also that this man is king rather than that, not a special command of God but the will of men has brought about; wherefore the same Saint Thomas, in the place cited, 2-2, question 10, article 10, and question 12, article 2, sets down as a thing certain and settled that political dominions and principalities are not of divine law but of human law; which no learned man contradicts, nor would Barclay contradict it if he took reason, not passion, into his counsel. Besides, even if we granted that a king is immediately appointed by God, and has his power from him alone, which nevertheless we do not grant, still Barclay's argument would effect nothing against Saint Thomas's reason; for Saint Thomas would answer that the Church has authority from God, through her ruler and shepherd, to take away power in certain cases, those in which God has given it. For the Supreme Pontiff is the Vicar of God, and thereby has power from God of dispensing and changing in many things, according to the will of God, whose interpreter he is; for in this way the Pontiff dispenses in vows and oaths, which God himself commanded to be paid, and whose payment is of divine law; but he dispenses not because he is himself above divine law, but because he interprets that it pleases God that in such or such a case an oath or vow be relaxed; as the Apostle also says in the second epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 2: For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ. Where he says that in the person of Christ he had remitted to the incestuous Corinthian the punishment which by divine law he ought to have paid, either in this life or in purgatory; and this is what Saint Thomas says in the place noted, that the Church has the authority of God, by which she can deprive unbelieving princes of the dominion which they have over the faithful.
Then Barclay, to leave nothing untouched, carps also at this, that Saint Thomas in the same article 10 of question 10 in 2-2 says that the Church does not always use her right in deposing unbelieving princes, to avoid scandal; as the Lord paid the didrachma, to which he was not bound, lest he should scandalize those who collected that tax; and the Apostle admonishes servants to obey their carnal masters, lest the doctrine of the Lord be blasphemed. “Not only on account of scandal,” says Barclay, “did she abstain, as Thomas thinks in that place, but on account of a lack of power, because she was not the judge of unbelievers, according to that of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 5: What have I to do to judge them that are without? and because princes appointed by God have God alone as judge above them, by whom alone they can be deposed. Nor is it to the point that Paul, when he orders Christian servants to show all honour to their unbelieving masters, adds only this, lest the name of the Lord and his doctrine be blasphemed.” I answer: intolerable is this peevish censor's lust for carping and nibbling; for Saint Thomas, when he says that the Church does not use her right on account of scandal, does not add the particle only; wherefore, if there are also other causes, the holy doctor ought not on that account to be censured, who touched on one cause, and that a most true one, and the very one which in a like cause Christ himself and his Apostle touched on; for neither did the Lord say that the didrachma was paid by him on account of scandal only, nor did the Apostle order masters to be honoured by servants for that cause only, lest the name of the Lord and his doctrine be blasphemed. And what Barclay adds, that the Church had no power over unbelieving princes, because the Apostle writes, what have I to do to judge them that are without? is not against Saint Thomas, who in 2-2, question 12, article 2, declares that this passage of the Apostle is understood of unbelievers who never received the faith, so far as they are unbelievers, not so far as they rule over the faithful; for on account of unbelief alone the Church cannot judge unbelievers, because they do not belong to her government; but when they rule over the faithful, and especially when they try to turn their faithful subjects from the faith, then the Church has the right of depriving them of the dominion which they have over the faithful. But she does not always use her right, either because strength is not at hand, or to avoid scandal. And what he says, that princes are appointed by God and have no judge above them but God, is Barclay's old song, repeated to nausea, and refuted in this very chapter and in the earlier ones.
At the end of the chapter Barclay, dismissing Saint Thomas, returns to Bellarmine, whom he says he can convict from his own writings; and he produces certain words from book 2, chapter 29, on the Supreme Pontiff, where with Albert Pighius he admits that the Apostles were subject by right and in fact to unbelieving princes in all civil causes, and that unbelieving princes were not subject to the Apostles, either by right or in fact. From which passage Barclay deduces that Bellarmine held that in those times the Church had no right to depose unbelieving princes. I answer: I have already warned in the Recognition of my writings that the opinion of Pighius, which I too had once followed, is improbable, and that one must think with the better doctors that the Apostles were by right exempt from all subjection to earthly princes. But even if the opinion of Pighius were true, still it would not follow that the Church did not then have the right of depriving unbelieving princes of the dominion which they had over the faithful. For Pighius would say that the Church and the Apostles themselves were subject to unbelieving princes as long as they were princes; but if they had been deprived by the Church having the authority of God, then at last they would no longer have been subject by right. For the people too is subject to a king as long as he reigns; but if, conquered in battle by another king, he ceases to reign, it will no longer be subject to him.
Lastly Barclay brings forward another saying of Bellarmine in the same book 2 on the Pontiff, chapter 29, namely that to judge, punish and depose belongs only to a superior. Which saying is indeed most true; but nevertheless from it Barclay, according to his dialectic, weaves this syllogism: “Subjects cannot by right judge, punish or depose a superior; but all Christians were subject to Nero, Diocletian and the other heathen emperors and kings; therefore they could not depose such emperors and kings. The proposition is granted, and likewise the subsumption, and they rest on most certain truth; but the conclusion depends by consequence on the antecedents, and is diametrically opposed to what Bellarmine said, that Christians once could by right have deposed Nero, Diocletian and so on, but because they lacked temporal strength abstained from that counsel. That, therefore, is false and worthy of censure; for affirmations and negations cannot be true at the same time. Hence also appears the falsity of the opinion of Saint Thomas, which we refuted above in this chapter.” I answer: Barclay is altogether a great master in the art of dialectic, who by a single syllogism has laid low not only Bellarmine, but Saint Thomas too, who is deservedly celebrated by the surname of the Angelic Doctor for the singular splendour of his wisdom. To his syllogism I answer in form thus: That proposition, subjects cannot by right depose superiors, is true, but it ought to be universal for the syllogism to be lawful; and besides, it ought to be understood formally, that is, a subject, as subject, or as long as he is subject, cannot depose a superior, as superior, or as long as he is superior. But that assumption, all Christians were subject to Nero, Diocletian, and so on, is false, since the Apostles and their successors, who were spiritual princes, were not by right subject to earthly kings. Then, the Christian people, even if otherwise subject to unbelieving kings and emperors, yet in a case of danger of losing the divine faith could by the right of just defence shake off the yoke of an unbelieving prince, especially if the Church through the Supreme Pontiffs had judged that it should be so done. From these things it follows that Barclay's conclusion is manifestly false, and the doctrine of Saint Thomas, and of Bellarmine, who followed Saint Thomas, most true.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXL Defenditur confirmatio rationis tertiae principalis . ✓ In capite vigesimo primo Barclaius magno studio, nec minore dicendi vi refutare cona¬ tur alteram confirmationem rationis meae tertiae principalis. Confirmatio haec erat : Quod si Christiani olirn non deposuerunt Neronem, et Diocletianum, et Julianum apostatam, ac Valentem arianum , et simi¬ les, id fuit, quia deerant vires temporales Christianis, nam quod alioqui jure potuissent id facere, patet ex Apostolo I Corinlh vi, ubi jubet constitui novos judices Christianis temporalium causarum, ne cogerentur Chri¬ stiani causam dicere coram judice Christi persecutore. Sicut enim novi judices con¬ stitui potuerunt, ita, et novos principes et reges, propter eamdem causam, si vires ad¬ fuissent. Hanc confirmationem multis modis repre¬ hendi posse Barclaius dicit : ac primum re¬ prehendit, quod dixerim defectionem virium in causa fuisse, cur Christiani olim non de¬ posuerint Neronem, Diocletianum, Julianum, et Valentem, ac lectorem remittit ad ea, quae supra scripsit de hac re cap. 6. 7. et 8. Nos quoque lectorem remittimus ad ea, quae scripsimus cap. 6. 7, et 8. Id solum hoc loco admoneo, quod ego hoc loco dixi, dictum antea fuisse a S. Tboma in 2. 2. qusest. 12. art. 2. ad primum. Itaque non me solum, sed S. quoque Tliomam Barclaius reprehendit : sed qui legere voluerit loca paulo ante notata, facile judicabit a qua parte stet veritas. Deinde refellere nititur quod dixit, Apo¬ stolum jussisse, ut Christiani constituerent sibi judices Christianos civilium controver¬ siarum ; ex quo deduxi, potuisse eodem mo¬ do jubere, ut principes Christianos sibi Chri¬ stiani populi eligerent, infidelibus et perse¬ cutoribus abrogatis, si vires ad id efficiendum praesto fuissent. Dicit autem Barclaius, judi¬ ces illos de quibus Apostolus loquitur, fuisse/ meros arbitros, sive judices voluntarios, sine imperio; ex quorum constitutione nihil ju¬ risdictionis detrahebatur principibus ethni¬ cis, sub quibus tunc Christiani vivebant. Atque ad hunc sensum confirmandum alle¬ gat S. Thomam et Nicolaum Liranum in commentario ad hunc locum Apostoli. Ego vero fateor quidem, non habuisse ju¬ dices illos Christianos jussu Apostoli consti¬ tutos vim coactivam in foro exteriore, et si Christiani vocati fuissent, sive ab ethnicis, sive a Christianis ad tribunalia judicum eth¬ nicorum, debuisse omnino parere : et hoc est solum quod S. Thomas, et Liranus docent : tamen nego, eos fuisse meros arbitros, sive judices voluntarios : Arbitri enim eliguntur a personis litigantibus, neque aliam habent judicandi potestatem, nisi eam, quam liti¬ gantes ex pacto inter se inito illis attribuunt. Isti vero constituebantur auctoritate publica multitudinis; et obligabantur, qui causas ci¬ viles habebant, ad istos adire, et prohibe¬ bantur ad tribunalia Gentilium accedere. Id ex verbis Apostoli facile probari potest : Au¬ det, inquit, aliquis vestrum negotium habens adversus alterum judicari apud iniquos , et non apud Sanctos? Ubi ostendit, non esse bonum adire tribunalia judicum Gentilium, quos iniquos vocat : et sicut loquitur de vero ju¬ dicio, non de solo arbitrio, cum prohibet judicari apud iniquos; ita loquitur de vero judicio, cum jubet judicari apud sanctos, id est, Christianos. Addit Apostolus : An nescitis quia sancti de hoc mundo judicabunt? et si in vobis judicabitur mundus, indigni estis, qui de minim s judicetis? nescitis quoniam Angelos judiCn binius? quanto magis saecularia? Ubi de¬ monstrat auctoritatem Ecclesie, qua? jure suo potest de saicularibus rebus judicare, cum sit judicatura cum Christo totum mundum, et ipsos Angelos apostatas in die ultimi judicii et certe Christus, et Ecclesia non judicabunt ut arbitri, sine imperio, et jurisdictione mundum. Sequitur : Saecularia igitur judi¬ cia si habueritis, contemptibiles qui sunt in Ecclesia, illos constituite ad judicandum. Ubi concludit ex dictis, ut quoniam malum est judicari apud iniquos Gentiles, et Eccle¬ sia auctoritatem habet judicandi, communi 70 DE POTESTATE PAPiE consensu constituant aliquos de Ecclesia, qui sint judices ejusmodi saecularium con¬ troversiarum, et non dicit, unusquisque eli¬ gat sibi arbitros : sed vos congregati in unum constituite judices. Monet (inquit Card. Ga- jetamus in hunc locum) ut sapiens aliquis constituatur judex multitudinis fratrum, ad¬ jungit, Ad verecundiam vestram dico, sic non est inter vos sapiens quisquam, qui possit ju* dicare inter fratrem suum, sed frater cum fratre judicio contendit, et hoc apud infide¬ les. Ubi declarat, quod dixerat, contemptibi¬ les, qui sunt in Ecclesia, illos constituite ad judicandum; se non dixisse, ut re vera sa¬ pientibus relictis, insipientes constituerent adjudicandum : sed ut eos confunderet, qui sic adibant tribunalia infidelium, quasi nul¬ lus esset in Ecclesia vir sapiens, qui Judex constitui posset ; cum contra deberent con¬ temptibiles, id est, infimi Christiani aptiores esse ad judicandum, quam supremi et sa- pientissimi infideles. Jam vero ex hoc prin¬ cipio, quod videlicet Apostolo teste, habeat Ecclesia jus, et auctoritatem constituendi sibi judices ; recte colligunt Theologi, atque in primis S. Thomas in 2. 2. qu. 10. art. 10. ha¬ bere eamdem Ecclesiam auctoritatem abro¬ gandi Principibus infidelibus imperium su¬ per fideles. Neque obstat, quod S. Joannes Chrysostomus hunc locum exponens, mentio¬ nem faciat arbitri. Nam neque ipse, neque alius interpres, quod sciam, dicit Apostolum hic loqui de arbitris electis a partibus : sed solum Chrysostomus dicit, non esse necessa¬ riam magnam sapientiam arbitro controver¬ siae, inter fratres. Ubi vocat judicem, arbi¬ trum controversiae quamvis publicam habe¬ ret judicandi potestatem. Quomodo Justinus initio historiae scribit, arbitria principum pro legibus erant : quamvis enim principes veri judices essent, tamen eorum judicia vocata sunt arbitria, quia non judicabant ex praescri¬ pto legum, sed ex naturali suo judicio : sic e' tiam judices ab Ecclesia constituti in causis civilibus Christianorum, veri judices erant, sed non tenebantur legum civilium apices sequi , ideo a Chrysostomo arbitri dicti sunt. Sed contradicit Barelaius , atque ait : «Nihil jubet Apostolus eo loco, quod judi¬ cum infidelium jurisdictionem, et imperium in Christianos aut tollat, aut minuat, aut et aliquo modo praejudicet. Immo vero nihil contra ejusmodi subjectionem juste jubere potuit, cum sit juris naturalis Dei auctori¬ tate confirmati, ut teste S. Ambrosio, ipse- met Apostolus docet ad Rom. xm. » Respondeo : Non praejudicat Apostolus per illam judicum Christianorum constitu¬ tionem jurisdictioni, et imperio Principum infidelium ; quoniam non jubet Christianis, ut non compareant coram judice infideli, si vocentur : sed tantum pnecipit, ut sponte non accedant. Sed quod non potuerit Apo¬ stolus eximere Christianos a subjectione principum infidelium , si id utile, vel neces¬ sarium censuisset, et vires ad perficiendum habuisset : id sine gravi errore dici non posse arbitror : et ratio, quam pro sua sen¬ tentia Barelaius profert, omnino infirma est. Nam juris naturalis a Deo confirmati, et ab Apostolo declarati est, ut omnis anima po¬ testatibus sublimioribus subdita sit : sed non est juris naturalis a Deo confirmati, et ab Apostolo declarati, ut non possit sublimior potestas per aliam sublimiorem tolli de medio, et per hoc fieri, ut ei subjectio, et obedieutia non amplius debeatur. Si¬ quidem magistratuum quoque inferiorum potestati jure divino parendum est non so¬ lum propter iram, sed etiam propter con¬ scientiam : et tamen potest magistratus infe¬ rior per principem tolli, aut mutari, et tunc personae illi, cui magistratus abrogatus est, nemo jam subjectionem, aut obedientiam debet. Sic etiam cum rex, vel spirituali su¬ prema potestate in casu heeresis, vel ab alio rege in casu victoriae, de solio deponitur, non amplius ad illum pertinet quod Aposto¬ lus ait : Omnis anima potestatibus sublimio¬ ribus subdita sit. Idem dici potest de patria, et despotioa potestate : nam juris naturalis a Deo confirmati, et ab Apostolo declarati ad Ephes. vi. est, ut filii obediant parenti¬ bus, et servi dominis, et tamen filii emanci¬ pari, et servi libertate donari possunt, et per hoc fieri potest, ut nec illi parentibus, nec isti dominis suis obedire teneantur. Itaque nisi Barelaius naturalis juris, a Deo confir¬ mati, et ab Apostolo declarati, esse demon¬ stret, ut principes saeculares, sive fideles, sive infideles in certis casibus, per Ecclesia¬ sticam auctoritatem deponi non possint ; ni¬ hil quod ad rem faciat, adhuc dixit, quan* tumvis multis verbis seepe, ac saepius repe¬ titis sententiam suam in hoc capite persua¬ dere conatus sit. Addit postea Barelaius aliam solutionem nihilo priore solidiorem : « Praeterea, inquit, si quis locum illum Apostoli npn limis per- IN REBUS TEMPORALIBUS 71 currerit, animadvertet eum id sibi negotii dare, ut ad Evangelicam perfectionem, quse consilii magis, quam praecepti est, Christia¬ nos animos erudiat, tum eos hortetur, ut potius injuriam ferant, et fraudem patiantur, quam ut judicia inter se habeant etc. » Respondeo : Cum Apostolus hortatur ut Christiani judicia inter se non habeant, sed mansuetudine, et patientia occasione judi¬ ciorum praeveniant, consilium perfectionis, non praeceptum judiciae docet : sed cum ju¬ bet, ut si judicia inter se habuerint, ad ju¬ dices Christianos, non ad infideles causas suas deferant : tum vero non consilium, sed praeceptum dare se luculenter ostendit, cum ait : « Audet aliquis vestrum negotium ha¬ bens adversus alterum, judicari apud ini¬ quos, et non apud sanctos? » et : « Contem¬ ptibiles, qui sunt in Ecclesia, hos constituite ad judicandum. » Per.qit Barclaius, et omisso Bellarmino S. Thomam aggreditur, dicens : « Quoniam autem singula persequimur, admonere opor¬ tet D. Thomam in “2. 2. qua3st. 10. art. 10. in ea opinione esse, ut existimet jus dominii, et praelationis ethnicorum principum juste illis auferri posse per sententiam, vel ordinatio¬ nem Ecclesiae auctoritatem Dei habentis, ut ille ait. D. Thomae magna apud me auctori¬ tas est, sed non tanta ut omnes ejus dispu¬ tationes pro canonicis scripturis habeam, vel ut rationem vincat, aut legem. Ejus ergo manes veneror, et suspicio : sed non est ta¬ men, cur illa ejus opinione aliquis moveatur : tum quia nullam suae sententiae , vel ratio¬ nem idoneam et efficacem, vel auctoritatem profert : tum etiam quja in explicatione Epi¬ stolae Pauli ad Corinth. contrarium plane sentit : tum denique quia neminem secum antiquorum Patrum consentientem habet, et rationes multae, auctoritatesque in contra¬ rium suppetunt. Ratio autem quam adfert, est, quia infideles merito suae infidelitatis merentur potestatem amittere super fideles, qui transferuntur in filios Dei. Mala ratio, et tanto viro indigna : quasi vero si quis me¬ retur privari officio, beneficio, dignitate, auctoritate, aliove jure, quod possidet, id¬ circo statim spoliari possit ab alio, quam ab eo a quo id accepit, retinetque, vel ab alio expressum mandatum, et potestatem ad ipso habente. » Respondeo : Admiranda est hujus Aristar¬ chi importunitas, qui tam libere Principem Theologorum reprehendit, ut dicat: Mala ratio, et tanto viro indigna ; cum ipse jure¬ consultum se profiteatur, et sacrse theologiae adyta, ne a limine quidem salutaverit. Illud autem non miror, quod manes S. Thomae se venerari dicat : nam liber ejus vocabulis impropriis plenissimus est : neque enim spi¬ ritus hujus sanctissimi doctoris cum diis manibus apud inferos, sed cum Angelis apud superos aevo sempiterno fruitur. Quod vero Barclaius dicit S. Thomae sententiam nulla efficaci ratione esse munitam, falsum est ; quamvis sit verum, vim rationis S. Thomae ab ingenio Barclaii penetrari minime po¬ tuisse. Quod autem addit, eumdem S. Tho¬ mam in Commentario Epistol. ad Corinth. contraria scripsisse : manifestae ignorantiae Barclaium arguit. Siquidem in eo Commen¬ tario scribit quidem S. Thomas, esse contra jus divinum prohibere, quod judicio princi¬ pis infidelis non stetur, et, subjectionem de¬ beri principibus etiam infidelibus : quae ve¬ rissima sunt ; sed ex iis non sequitur, non esse in Eccle ia auctoritatem privandi prin¬ cipes infideles dominio, quod habent super fideles : proinde ista non sunt contraria, debetur subjectio principi infideli , dum princeps est: et, potest princeps infidelis pri¬ vari dominio, quod, habet super fideles per auctoritatem Ecclesiae : Et Barclaius, quia ea contraria esse judicat, vel dialecticam non didicit, vel ejus regulas oblivioni tradi¬ dit : quemadmodum etiam paulo infra cum idem Barclaius dicit : « Et vero sanctus Thomas in expositione Epistolae Pauli superius hoc capite relata, satis aperte indicat, Ecclesiam non habere eam auctoritatem, qua possit ethnicos de¬ ponere : ait enim esse contra jus divinum prohibere ne principum infidelium judicio stetur a subditis. » Manifeste hallucinatur, et fallitur : tametsi enim contra jus divinum est, negari principi obedientiam, dum prin¬ ceps est, non tamen est contra jus divinum, quod Ecclesia potestatem habeat principem deponendi : nam est etiam contra jus divi¬ num prohibere filios ne parentibus obediant, * dum sub patria potestate sunt ; nec tamen est contra jus divinum, quod aliquando filii eximantur a patria potestate, ut re ipsa exi¬ mitur filius familias cum ad episcopale fasti¬ gium evehitur. Porro illa sancti Thomse ra¬ tio : « Infideles merentur ratione suee infi¬ delitatis potestatem amittere super fideles, qui transferuntur in filios Dei : ergo potest Ecclesia privare principes infideles domi- DE POTESTATE PAP M 72 nio, quod habent super fideles » : non est adeo debilis ratio, utBarclaius dicit : sed vere debile argumentum est, quo sancti Thomae rationem Barclaius oppugnat : hoc est enim argumentum Barclaii : « Merentur infideles amittere potestatem super fideles, sed non potest eos potestate privare, nisi qui dedit eam potestatem, aut qui mandatum expres¬ sum ab illo habeat; at principes a Deo pote¬ statem habent, et solo Deo sunt minores : ergo a solo Deo privari potestate possunt : non autem ab Ecclesia, quae neque dedit potestatem infidelibus, neque habet expres¬ sum mandatum Dei, quo illam auferre de¬ beat, aut possit. » Hoc, inquam, argumentum nullas vires habet : nam falsum est, principes politicos a solo Deo potestatem habere : habent enim illam a Deo, quatenus Deus instinctum na¬ turalem in animis hominum insevit, ut ab aliquo gubernari velint. Ut autem guber¬ nentur homines a regibus, vel a consulibus; ab uno, vel a multis ; a magistratu perpetuo, vel temporario, ab hominum voluntate de¬ pendet : quemadmodum etiam quod iste sit rex potius, quam ille, non Dei specialis jus¬ sio, sed hominum voluntas fecit: quare idem S. Thomas loco citato, 2. 2. qu. 10. art. 10. et qu. 12. art. 2. tamquam rem certam, et exploratam ponit, dominia , et principatus politicos, non esse de jure divino ; sed de jure humano : cui nemo doctus contradicit, neque Barclaius contradiceret, si rationem, non passionem in consilium adhiberet. Praeterea etiamsi concederemus, regem esse immediate constitutum a Deo, et ab illo solo potestatem habere, quod tamen non concedimus, adhuc argumentum Barclaii nihil efficeret adversus rationem sancti Thomee : responderet enim sanctus Thomas, Ecclesiam habere auctoritatem a Deo per suum rectorem, et pastorem auferendi po¬ testatem, in certis casibus , illis , quibus Deus eam dedit. Summus enim Pontifex Vicarius Dei est, ac per hoc potestatem ha¬ bet a Deo dispensandi, et mutandi in multis, secundum voluntatem Dei, cujus ipse inter¬ pres est: hoc enim modo dispensat Pontifex in votis, et juramentis, qua} Deus ipse jussit reddi, et quorum solutio de jure divino est : dispensat autem non quod sit ipse super jus divinum: sed quia interpretatur Deo placere, ut in tali, vel tali casu, juramentum, aut vo¬ tum relaxetur: quemadmodum et Apostolus ait in posteriore ad Corinth. cap. ii. Nam et ego quod donavi , si quid donavi propter vos in persona Christi (1). Ubi dicit se in persona Christi condonasse Corinthio incestuoso poe¬ nam, quam divino jure, vel in hac vita, vel in purgatorio luere debuisset; atque hoc est, quod sanctus Thomas in loco notato dicit, Ecclesiam habere auctoritatem Dei , qua principes infideles privare possit dominio , quod habent super fideles. Deinde Barclaius, ut nihil intactum relin¬ quat, carpit etiam illud, quod S. Thomas in eodem artic. 10. qusest. 10. in 2. 2 dicit, Ecclesiam non semper uti jure suo in depo¬ nendis principibus infidelibus, ad vitandum scandalum : quemadmodum Dominus solvit didrachma, ad quod non tenebatur, ne scan¬ dalizaret eos, qui censum illum colligebant ; et Apostolus admonet servos obedire domi¬ nis carnalibus, ne doctrina Domini blasphe¬ metur. « Non solum, inquit Barclaius, propter scandalum abstinuit, ut putat Thomas eo loco, sed propter defectum potestatis, quia non erat judex infidelium, secundum illud Apostoli. I Corith. v. Quid mihi de iis , qui foris sunt judicare ? et quia Principes a Deo constituti solum Deum supra se judicem ha¬ bent, a quo solo deponi possunt. Nec ad rem pertinet, quod Paulus dum jubet servos Christianos dominis suis infidelibus omnem honorem exhibere, illud solum addit, ne no¬ men Domini, et doctrina blasphemetur. ;> Respondeo : Intolerabilis est hujus morosi censoris carpendi, et vellicandi libido : S. enim Thomas cum ait Ecclesiam non uti suo jure propter scandalum, non addit particu¬ lam, solum : quare, si sint etiam aliae causae, non ideo reprehendi debet sanctus Doctor, qui unam causam, eamque verissimam atti¬ git, et illam ipsam, quam in simili causa Christus ipse, et ejus Apostolus attigerunt : nam neque Dominus dixit propter solum scandalum a se solutum fuisse didrachma, neque Apostolus jussit honorandos esse do¬ minos servis, ea solum de causa, ne nomen Domini, et doctrina blasphemetur. Quod autem addit Barclaius, Ecclesiam non ha¬ buisse potestatem ullam in Principes infide¬ les, quia scribit Apostolus, quid ad me de his, qui foris sunt judicare? non est contra S. Thomam, qui in 2. 2. qusest. 12. art 2. (1) Corinth. II. 10. IN REBUS TEMPORALIBUS 73 declarat hunc locum Apostoli intelligi de in¬ fidelibus, qui numquam fidem receperunt, quatenus infideles sunt, non quatenus domi¬ nantur fidelibus : ob solam enim infidelitatem Ecclesia non potest infideles judicare ; quia ad ejus regimen non pertinent: Sed quando dominantur fidelibus, et praesertim quando subditos fideles avertere conantur a fide : tunc Ecclesia jus habet illos privandi domi¬ nio, quod habent super fideles. Sed non semper utitur jure suo, vel quia vires non adsunt, vel ob scandalum evitandum. Quod vero dicit, Principes a Deo esse constitutos, et nullum praeter Deum super se judicem habere, antiqua est cantilena Barclaii usque ad nauseum repetita, et in ipso capite, atque in superioribus refutata. In extremo capite Barclaius S. Thoma di¬ misso revertitur ad Bellarminum, quem ex propriis scriptis convincere se posse dicit ; producit autem verba quaedam ex lib. n, cap. 29 de summo Pontifice, ubi cum Al- berto Pighio admittit, Apostolos subjectos fuisse de jure, et de facto principibus infide¬ libus in civilibus omnibus causis : et princi¬ pes infideles non fuisse Apostolis subjectos, neque de jure, neque de facto. Ex quo loco deducit Barclaius , Bellarminum sensisse, non habuisse illis temporibus Ecclesiam jus ullum ad deponendos principes infideles. Respondeo : Jam in Recognitione scripto¬ rum meorum admonui, improbabilem esse sententiam Pighii, quam ego quoque olimse- quutus fueram, et cum melioribus Doctori- bus sentiendum esse, Apostolos jure exem¬ ptos fuisse ab omni subjectione Principum terrenorum. Sed quamvis etiam vera esset sententia Pighii, non tamen sequeretur, non habuisse tunc Ecclesiam jus privandi Principes infideles dominio quod habebant super fideles. DicerCt enim Pighius Eccle¬ siam, et ipsos Apostolos subjectos fuisse Prin¬ cipibus infidelibus, quamdiu Principes erant : sed si ab Ecclesia auctoritatem Dei habente, privati fuissent, tunc demum non fuisse am¬ plius de jure subjectos. Nam et populus sub¬ jectus est regi, quamdiu regnat, sed si ab alio rege victus in praelio, regnare desierit, non amplius illi subjectus erit. Adducit, postremo Barclaius aliud Bellar- mini dictum in eodem lib. n. de Pontif. cap. 29. Quod videlicet, judicare, punire, depo¬ nere ad superiorem tantum pertinet. Quod quidem dictum verissimum est ; sed tamen ex eo Barclaius secundum dialecticam suam hunc syllogismum texit. « Subjecti non possunt jure judicare, pu¬ nire, deponere superiorem : atqui omnes Christiani erant subjecti Neroni, Diocletiano, et caeteris imperatoribus, et regibus Ethnicis : ergo non poterant ejusmodi imperatores et reges deponere. Propositio concessa est , itemque subsumptio, et certissima veritate nituntur : conclusio autem ex antecedentibus consecutione pendet, atque ex diametro op¬ ponitur ei, quod dixit Bellarminus, Christia¬ nos olim jure potuisse deponere Neronem, Diocletianum etc.,sed quia viribus tempora¬ libus deficiebantur, eo consilio abstinuisse. Falsum igitur illud est, et reprehensione dignum : siquidem aientia, et negantia simul vera esse nequeunt. Hinc etiam patet falsitas opinionis D. Thomae, quam supra hoc capite refutavimus. » Respondeo : Magnus omnino magister in arte Dialectica Barclaius est, qui unico syl¬ logismo, non solum Bellarminum prostravit, sedS. Thomam etiam, qui Doctoris Angelici cognomento ob eximium sapientiae splendo¬ rem merito celebratur. Ad syllogismum ejus in forma sic respondeo : Propositio illa, Sub¬ jecti non possunt jure deponere superiores, vera est, sed deberet esse universalis, ut syllogismus legitimus esset : et praeterea in¬ telligi debet formaliter, id est, subjectus, ut subjectus, sive quamdiu subjectus est, non potest deponere superiorem, ut superiorem, sive quamdiu supeiior est. Assumptio autem illa, omnes Christiani erant subjecti Neroni, Diocletiano, etc., falsa est, quoniam Apo¬ stoli, eorumque successores, qui principes erant spirituales, non erant jure subjecti regibus terrenis. Deinde populus Christianus, etiam si alioqui subjectus esset regibus, et imperatoribus infidelibus, tamen in casu pe¬ riculi amittendae Fidei divinae, poterat jure justae defensionis excutere jugum principis infidelis : praesertim si Ecclesia per Summos Pontifices, ita faciendum esse censuisset. Ex his sequitur conclusionem Barclaii esse ma¬ nifeste falsam, et doctrinam S. Thomae, ac Bellarmini, qui S Thomam sequutus est, esse verissimam. 74 DE POTESTATE PAPjE