Bellarmine · De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus · On the Power of the Supreme Pontiff in Temporal Matters, against William Barclay
Chapter 23: The Third Confirmation of the Third Principal Reason Is Defended
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. XII, De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaium, a treatise of 1610. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
In the twenty-third chapter Barclay strives to refute the third confirmation of my third principal reason. This is the confirmation: Lastly, why cannot a faithful people be freed from the yoke of an unbelieving king who draws them to unbelief, if a believing spouse is free from the obligation of remaining with an unbelieving spouse when that one refuses to remain with the Christian spouse without injury to the faith, as Innocent III openly deduces from Paul, 1 Corinthians 7, in the chapter Gaudemus, on divorces? Is not the greater also true?
To this confirmation Barclay so answers that he seems on purpose to have refused to understand in what the force of the reason consists; and he does this for the reason that he may have occasion, by writing much, either to show off his learning or to enrich his book. But the prudent reader will easily notice that he wanders off the point. For at the beginning he pretends that I speak of a marriage contracted between believers, of whom one afterwards falls into heresy; which marriage is wholly indissoluble, and cannot rightly be compared with the bond which is between king and people. But it never came into my mind to speak of a marriage of that kind. I spoke, then, of a marriage contracted between unbelievers, of whom one, when converted to the faith, is free from cohabitation and from the yoke of the unbelieving spouse. And that I spoke of this marriage is plain from the Apostle and from Innocent, whom I cited; for neither the Apostle nor Innocent pronounces free from the marriage one who contracted after baptism with a believer, but one who had contracted before baptism with an unbeliever, and afterwards was converted to the faith while the spouse remained in unbelief. “But,” says Barclay, “you did not say that the believing spouse is free from the yoke or bond, but from the obligation of remaining with the unbelieving spouse.” I answer that I said what the Apostle said, and understood what the Apostle understood. The Apostle's words are these: If any brother hath a wife that believeth not, and she consent to dwell with him, let him not put her away; and if any woman hath a husband that believeth not, and he consent to dwell with her, let her not put away her husband; but if the unbeliever depart, let him depart; for a brother or sister is not under servitude in such cases. Where he speaks of the obligation of cohabiting, as I too spoke; but the Apostle did not understand by freedom from the obligation of cohabiting only freedom from the obligation of cohabiting, the bond and yoke of the marriage remaining, but full freedom, with power of entering another marriage, the bond and yoke of the former marriage being dissolved; and in this same way I wished my words to be understood, in the way in which all theologians understand the words of the Apostle. So Barclay could have left out more than half of this chapter 23.
He then comes nearer to the matter, but, to solve the argument, entangles himself in a most grave error; for he speaks thus: “But if he understands the argument of the latter spouses, the answer is at hand from the same decretal epistle of Innocent: namely that between such spouses the marriage is not ratified, as far as the indissoluble bond of union is concerned; and therefore such spouses have full liberty of dissolving the marriage, so that they part either by mutual consent and good grace, or with anger of mind and offence; and the one, against the will of the other, when it pleases him, dissolves that bond of marriage by repudiation and divorce.” And below: “No wonder, then, if a spouse brought to the faith is free from the company and power of a spouse remaining in unbelief; since even if both had remained in unbelief, it would have been equally free for either of them to withdraw from the other and dissolve the marriage by repudiation, because no ratified and firm bond of obligation came between them at the beginning.” And below: “Since therefore there exists no ratified marriage between these, and political subjection and royal dominion is ratified and approved among all nations and in every law, both divine and human, what more absurd or more inept can be said than to set these things together, and to draw some argument from the partnership and yoke of unbelieving spouses, which can be shaken off at pleasure, for driving off the yoke of royal rule, and to judge the same of both, as if of things plainly alike?”
I answer: it is a wonder why so great a jurist, from one word of Innocent badly understood, has thrown himself headlong into so great an error; for what Innocent says in the chapter Quanto, on divorces, that the marriage of unbelievers is not ratified, does not signify that it is dissoluble at pleasure, but that it is not wholly indissoluble, as the marriage of believers is; for it is dissoluble only in the case of the Apostle, the Apostle himself declaring the will of God in that matter. And that the marriage of unbelievers lawfully contracted is firm and indissoluble, except in that case, is clear first from Innocent himself in the chapter Quanto, already cited, where he says that the marriage of unbelievers is true; but a true marriage is defined: the union of man and woman, keeping an undivided way of life, chapter Illud, on presumptions; where the canonists commonly approve that definition, as also the theologians on the Master in the fourth book of the Sentences, distinction 27. Second, the same Innocent, in the chapter Gaudemus, on divorces, expressly teaches that repudiation is not lawful even among unbelievers; which same thing is found in the canon Si quis judaicae, cause 28, question 1, where it is said that among unbelievers repudiation is valid by the law of the court, not by the law of heaven. Third, the Council of Trent, session 24, at the beginning: “The perpetual and indissoluble bond of marriage,” it says, “the first parent of the human race pronounced by the instinct of the divine Spirit, when he said: This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh; wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh.” And certainly Adam spoke not of the marriage of Christians only, but of marriage in general; therefore every true marriage has a perpetual and indissoluble bond. Fourth, there is added the common opinion of the doctors; for the Master of the Sentences, book 4, distinction 33, and with him Saint Bonaventure, Richard, Dominic Soto and very many others, teach that repudiation was permitted to the Jews by God through Moses as a lesser evil, but was never lawful either among the Jews or among the Gentiles. But others not few, such as Saint Thomas, Scotus, Durandus, Paludanus, teach indeed that a dispensation was so given to the Jews concerning repudiation, but that that dispensation was taken away by Christ, so that afterwards it was no longer lawful either to Jews or to Gentiles; for the words of Christ are plain enough, Matthew 5: He that shall marry her that is put away committeth adultery; and Mark 10: Whosoever shall put away his wife and marry another committeth adultery against her; and if the wife shall put away her husband, and be married to another, she committeth adultery. So Barclay cannot be excused, who, following the error of the Turks, would have it lawful for unbelievers to separate marriages at pleasure. For although the Turks do this, yet they do it with manifest error. From which our argument, which Barclay tried in vain to solve, is shown wholly insoluble. For if it is lawful for a believing spouse, on account of faith and religion, to break the bond, otherwise indissoluble, by which he was bound to an unbelieving spouse before his conversion to the faith, how much more will it be lawful for a faithful people to break, on account of faith and religion, the bond by which it was bound to an unbelieving prince, especially if he is busy perverting the faithful people? For it is clear that the bond by which a people is bound to its prince is weaker than that by which a wife is bound to her husband, since the bond of a people to its prince could be, and still can be, dissolved for many causes; but the bond of a wife to her husband among Christians can be dissolved in no case, if it is ratified and consummated; and among unbelievers cannot by right be dissolved, except by the conversion of one of them to the faith, the other persevering in unbelief.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXIII . Defenditur tertia confirmatio tertiae rationis principalis. In capite vigesimortertio Barclaius refellere nititur confirmationem tertiam rationis mem tertiae principalis : haec autem est confirma¬ tio : Denique cur non potest liberari populus fidelis a jugo Regis infidelis, et pertrahentis ad infidelitatem ; si conjux fidelis liber est ab obligatione manendi cum conjuge infideli quando ille non vult manere cum conjuge Christiana, sine injuria fidei, uta perte dedu¬ cit ex Paulo, Corinth. vn, Innocentius III. in cap. Gaudemus, extra, de divortiis ? non etiam major. Ad hanc confirmationem Barclaius ita re¬ spondet, ut videatur de industria intelligere noluisse, in quo vis rationis consistat : idque ea de causa facit, ut occasionem habeat, multa scribendo, vel doctrinam suam osten¬ tandi, vel librum suum locupletandi. Sed prudens lector facile animadvertet eum ex¬ tra rem vagari. Initio enim fingit me loqui de conjugio inter fideles contracto, quorum alter postea in beeresim labitur : quod ma¬ trimonium omnino insolubile est, et non recte comparari potest cum vinculo, quod matrimonium omnino insolubile est, et non recte comparari potest cum vinculo, quod est inter regem, et populum. Sed mihi numquam venit in mentem de matrimonio ejusmodi loqui. Igitur locutus sum de matrimonio contracto inter infideles, quorum alter cum ad fidem convertitur, li- bei est a cohabitatione, et a jugo conjugis infidelis. Quod autem de hoc matrimonio lo¬ cutus sim, planum est ex Apostolo, et Inno- centio, quos citavi ; non enim Apostolus, aut Innocentius liberum pronunciant a conjugio eum, qui contraxit post baptismum cum fi¬ deli, sed eum qui contraxerat ante Bapti¬ smum cum infideli, et postea conversus est ad fidem conjuge in infidelitate perma¬ nente. « At, inquit Barclaius, tu non dixisti, conjugem fidelem liberum esse a jugo, aut vinculo, sed ab obligatione manendi cum conjuge infideli ». Respondeo : Me dixisse, quod Apostolus dixit, et intellexisse, quod Apostolus intel¬ lexit. Apostoli verba htec sunt : Si quis fra¬ ter habet uxorem infidelem , et haec consentit habitare cum illo, non dimittat illam : et si qua mulier habet virum infidelem, et hic con¬ sentit habitare cum illa , non dimittat virum : quod si infidelis discedit , discedat : non enim servituti subjectus est frater , aut soror in hu¬ jusmodi. Ubi loqirtur de obligatione cohabi¬ tandi, quemadmodum et ego loquutussum; sed non intellexit Apostolus per libertatem ab obligafione cohabitandi, solam libertatem ab obligatione cohabitandi, manente vin¬ culo, et jugo conjugii; sed plenam liberta¬ tem cum potestate ineundi aliud conjugium, soluto vinculo, et jugo conjugii prioris : et hoc eodem modo verba mea intelligi volui, quo modo verba Apostoli intelligunt omnes Theologi. Itaque poterat Barclaius omittere plus quam partem dimidiam hujus capitis 23. Accedit deinde propius ad rem, sed, ut argumentum solvat, implicat se gravissimo errori ; sic enim loquitur : « Quod si posterioribus conjugibus argu¬ mentum intelligat, in promptu responsio est ex eadem Innocentii Epistola decretali : ni¬ mirum inter tales conjuges, non esse ratum matrimonium, quantum ad indissolubile con¬ junctionis vinculum attinet : et ideo ejusmodi conjuges plenam dissolvendi matrimonii li¬ bertatem habent, ut vel mutuo consensu, et bona gratia, vel cum ira sui animi, et offensa discedant : et alter invito altero, ubi ei libi¬ tum sit, nexum illum conjugii per repudium, et divortium dissolvat. » Et infra : « Non mi¬ rum ergo si conjux ad fidem perductus a conjugis in infidelitate permanentis consor¬ tio. et potestate liber sit : cum etiamsi ambo in infidelitate mansissent, seque liberum al¬ terutri eorum fuisset ab altero recedere, et matrimonium repudio dissolvere; quia nul¬ lum initio inter eos ratum, et firmum obli¬ gationis vinculum intercessit. » Et infra : a Cum itaque nullum inter istos ratum con¬ jugium existat : et subjectio politica, et re¬ galis dominatio inter omnes gentes, et in omni lege, tam jure divino, quam humano rata, et probata sit : quid absurdius, aut ineptius dici potest, quam illa inter se com¬ ponere, et argumentum aliquod ab infidelium conjugum societate, et jugo, quod excuti pro arbitrio potest, ad regalis imperii jugum repellendum deducere, et idem de utroque, quasi de plane similibus judicare ? » Respondeo : Mirum est, cur tantus jure- IN REBUS TEMPORALIBUS 77 consultus ex uno verbo Innocenti i male in¬ tellecto in tantum errorem se praecipitaverit, nam quod ait Innocentius in cap. Quanto, de divort., matrimonium infidelium non esse ratum, non significat, esse solubile ad libi¬ tum , sed non esse insolubile omnino, ut ma¬ trimonium fidelium : solum enim solubile est in casu Apostoli, ipso Apostolo declarante in ea re voluntatem Dei. Quod autem matrimo¬ nium infidelium legitime contractum sit fir¬ mum, et insolubile, excepto illo casu, perspi¬ cuum est, primo ex ipso Innocentio in cap. Quanto, jam citato, ubi dicit, matrimonium infidelium esse verum : matrimonium autem verum definitur : Conjunctio viri, et foeminoe individuam vitae consuetudinem retinens, cap. Illud, de praesumptionibus. Ubi cano- nistae communiter eam definitionem appro¬ bant, ut etiam Theologi apud Magistrum in 4. sent. distinet. 27. Secundo idem Innocen¬ tius, in cap. Gaudemus, de divort. expresse docet, repudium etiam apud infideles non esse licitum : quod idem habetur in Canon. Si quis judaicae 28. quaest. 1 . ubi dicitur apud infideles valere repudium lege fori, non lege poli. Tertio Concilium Tridentinum sess. 24. in principio : « Matrimonii », inquit, « per¬ petuum, insolubilemque nexum primus hu¬ mani generis parens divini Spiritus instinctu pronunciavit, cum dixit : Hoc nunc os ex os¬ sibus meis , et caro de carne mea , quamobrem relinquet homo patrem , et matrem , et adhae¬ rebit uxori suae, et erunt duo in carne una. Et certe Adarn non de matrimonio tantum Chri¬ stianorum, sed de matrimonio in genere lo¬ cutus est : proinde omne verum matrimo¬ nium perpetuum insolubilemque nexum ha¬ bet. Accedit quarto, communis Doctorum sententia : siquidem Magister sententiarum lib. iv. distinet. 33. Et cum eo sanctus Bo- * naventura, Richardus, Dominicus a Soto, et alii plurimi docent, repudium permissum fuisse Judaeis a Deo per Mosem, ut minus malum, sed numquam fuisse licitum neque apud Judaeos, neque apud Gentiles. Alii vero non pauci, ut sanctus Thomas, Scotus, Du¬ randus, Paludanus, docent quidem cum Ju¬ daeis ita dispensatum fuisse circa repudium : sed tamen a Christo sublatam fuisse eam dispensationem, ut postea non fuerit amplius neque Judaeis, neque gentibus licitum : sunt enim Christi verba satis aperta, Marci v. Qui dimissam duxerit mxchatur, et cap. x Quicumque dimiserit uxorem suam , et aliam, duxerit , adulterium commisit super eam : et si uxor dimiserit virum , et alii nupserit, moecha¬ tur (I). Itaque excusari non potest Barclaius, qui turearum errorem sequutus, voluit lici¬ tum esse infidelibus pro arbitrio matrimonia separare. Tametsi enim Turea? id faciunt, tamen cum errore manifesto faciunt. Ex quibus argumentum nostrum, quod frustra Barclaius solvere lentavit, omnino insolubile demonstratur. Nam, si licet conjugi fideli propter fidem, et religionem disrumpere vin¬ culum, alioqui insolubile, quo alligatus erat conjugi infideli ante conversionem suam ad fidem ; quanto magis licebit populo fideli disrumpere vinculum propter fidem, et reli¬ gionem, quo alligatus erat Principi infideli, praesertim si is populum fidelefn pervertere satagat ? Debilius enim esse vinculum quo adstringitur populus Principi suo, quam sit illud, quo adstringitur uxor viro suo perspi¬ cuum est, cum vinculum populi ad principem multis de causis solvi potuerit, et adhuc pos¬ sit : vinculum autem uxoris ad virum, apud Christianos in nullo casu solvi possit, si ra¬ tum, et consummatum fuerit : apud infideles autem jure solvi non possit, nisi per conver- sionem alterius eorum ad fidem, altero per¬ severante in infidelitate.