Bellarmine · De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus · On the Power of the Supreme Pontiff in Temporal Matters, against William Barclay
Chapter 22: The Second Confirmation of the Third Principal Reason Is Defended
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. XII, De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaium, a treatise of 1610. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
In the twenty-second chapter Barclay attacks the second confirmation of the third principal reason, which I set down in my book to prove the power of the Supreme Pontiff in temporal matters. This was the confirmation: To tolerate a heretical or unbelieving king trying to draw men to his sect is to expose religion to the most evident danger. But Christians are not bound, nay, they ought not, to tolerate an unbelieving king with evident danger to religion; for when divine and human law conflict, the divine law ought to be kept and the human left aside; and it is of divine law to keep the true faith and religion, which is one only, not many; but it is of human law that we have this or that king.
To this confirmation Barclay answers first that the argument is not in the form of a syllogism; but this is cavilling; for I neither wished nor thought to reduce the argument to the form of a syllogism, which can be understood from this alone, that I did not expressly set down the conclusion, and inserted many things from sacred Scripture, from profane authors, and from old and new experience, which Barclay left out. Then, leaving aside the cavil about the form of the syllogism, he tries to blunt the force of the argument itself, saying: “Let us grant that he has framed his reasoning in the best form, and let us answer the force of the argument. I say, then, that his proposition is false; I say, I repeat, that it is not true that to tolerate a heretical or unbelieving king trying to draw men to his sect is to expose religion to the most evident danger; but it is only to suffer religion to be in a danger into which it has fallen by the fault of the heretical or unbelieving king, and to which it is already exposed without fault of the people, since no just and lawful remedy for freeing it, besides constancy and endurance, remains to the people.” I answer: when the Church's strength does not suffice for shaking off the yoke of unbelieving tyrants, as truly in the times of Nero, Diocletian, Constantius, Julian and Valens it did not suffice, then it is true that to tolerate a heretical or unbelieving king trying to draw the people to his sect is not to expose religion to danger, but to suffer it to be in danger; but when strength suffices, and the Church can, if she will, by the authority of the Vicar of Christ deprive a heretical or unbelieving king of the dominion which he has over the faithful, then, if she does not do it, she truly and properly exposes religion to the most evident danger, since she refuses to apply the remedy which she has at hand, unless perhaps reason persuades her to defer this remedy for a time, and to try other gentler ones meanwhile. And what Barclay adds here, that it would have been very easy for Christians once to depose Julian, Constantius and Valens, has already been copiously refuted above in chapters 6, 7 and 8, and it does not please me to imitate Barclay in repeating the same things again and again.
Barclay goes on and says: “Now as to what he deduces from the conflict of divine and human law, I answer briefly that he is greatly mistaken in thinking there is a concurrence and conflict there of divine and human law; for to keep the true faith and religion, and to tolerate a heretical or unbelieving king, are not things in conflict; nor is the one of divine law, the other of human, as he thinks; but they are two precepts of divine law, to worship God with true religion, and to serve and obey the king, which can be kept and fulfilled at the same time, as the Jesuits themselves teach.” I answer: I was not ignorant that to serve and obey the king is of divine law; and therefore I did not deny this in my book; but I said that it is of human law that we have this or that king, but of divine law to keep the true faith and religion; for although by divine law we are bound to obey the king while he is king, yet it is not provided by divine law that the kingdom can for no causes be taken from a king; otherwise all who from the beginning of the world have been stripped of their kingdoms would have been stripped by injury; nor would there be any commonwealth, or almost none, lawfully founded; for commonwealths are for the most part set up when kings have been driven out. This, then, is what we say: that in order that the divine law about preserving the true religion be kept, it is lawful sometimes for the human law to be changed, and the kingdom transferred from an unbeliever to a believer, when the true religion either cannot, or scarcely can, be preserved in any other way.
But Barclay objects again: “That indeed,” he says, “is wholly true, that it is by human law that this man or that is king. But beware, reader, lest you be caught. Bellarmine has left out what is chief; for he ought to have added: But when we once have this or that king, it is of divine law that we obey him in civil causes with all honour and reverence. By this addition, which no Catholic can deny, that argument of his is wholly struck down.” I answer: I have already taught before that when we once have this or that king, he is by divine law to be obeyed while he presides on the throne. But it is not of divine law that he should always, while he lives, preside on the royal throne; for it can happen that either he himself abdicates his power, or, overcome by another king, falls from the kingdom, or is deposed for heresy; and in whatever way he ceases to be king, obedience too ceases to be owed to him.
But, says Barclay: “By Bellarmine's opinion, book 2 on the Pontiff, chapter 29, it is not lawful for a council to judge, punish or depose a Pope striving to disturb and destroy the Church of God, but only to resist him by not doing what he orders, and by hindering him from carrying out his will. Why should we not likewise, and with even better reason, judge the same of kings? since they too are superior to the peoples (on the witness of the same author, book 1 on the Pontiff, chapter 9, and book 3, chapter 19) and have no judge on earth; and since besides it has seemed to some theologians of great name that an ecumenical council is endowed with greater authority over the Pope than the people has over the prince.” I answer: if the Supreme Pontiff should become a heretic, and strive to destroy the Church by leading her away from the Catholic faith, without doubt he could be deposed, or certainly declared deposed, by a council, as is gathered from the canon Si Papa, distinction 40; and this neither Bellarmine nor any Catholic denies; wherefore from this very thing Barclay could have understood that it is no wonder if kings can be deposed on account of heresy, although they have no superiors in temporal matters, since the Pope can be deposed for a like cause, who has no superior on earth either in temporal or in spiritual matters. But what I wrote in book 2, chapter 29, that the Pontiff cannot be judged or deposed by a council, is understood outside the case of heresy, if by life and morals only he should seem to wish to disturb and destroy the Church. And there is a difference between the Pontiff and a king; that the Pontiff has no superior at all on earth, since he is that chief servant whom the Lord set over his whole household, Luke 12; of whom the same Lord says in the same place that if that servant behaves badly, and begins to strike the menservants and maidservants, and to eat and drink with drunkards, the Lord will come on a day when he does not expect, and will punish him most severely; therefore the Lord does not wish him to be punished by the household, or by anyone of the household, but the Lord himself reserves to himself the judgment of that servant. But a king, who did not receive his kingdom immediately from God, but the people transferred its power to him; and besides, if he is or was a Christian, is subject to the Pontiff as a sheep to the shepherd; and although he has no temporal superior in temporal matters, he has nevertheless a spiritual superior, whose power extends also to temporal things; therefore he can be deposed by the Supreme Pontiff as the Vicar of Christ. And if some learned men have held that a council is above the Pope more than the kingdom is above the king, we do not trouble ourselves much about their opinion, since from the Scriptures, and even from the decrees of general councils, the contrary is gathered; of which matter we have written enough in the second book on Councils.
But perhaps someone will ask: if the Pope has no superior at all on earth, by what right can he be deposed by a council or the Church on account of heresy? The answer is at hand: because, whereas for other crimes men are cast out of the Church by excommunication, heretics go out and withdraw of themselves, and in a certain way excommunicate themselves; as Saint Jerome noted, explaining those words of the Apostle to Titus, chapter 3, that a heretic is condemned by his own judgment. So if the Pontiff, which I think cannot happen, should become a heretic, or an unbeliever, or an apostate, he would not so much be deposed as declared deposed by a council.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXII, Defenditur altera confirmatio rationis tertiae principalis. In capite vigesimo secundo Barclaius op¬ pugnat confirmationem secundam rationis tertiae principalis, quam in meo libro posui ad probandam Summi Pontificis potestatem in temporalibus. Hsec autem erat confirma¬ tio : Tolerare regem haereticum, vel infidelem conantem pertrahere homines ad suam se¬ ctam, est exponere Religionem evidentissimo periculo. At non tenentur Christiani, immo nec debent cum evidenti periculo Religionis regem infidelem tolerare : nam quando jus divinum et humanum pugnant, debet servari jus divinum omisso humano : de jure au¬ tem divino est servare veram fidem, et Re¬ ligionem, quae una tantum est, non multae : de jure autem humano est, quod hunc, aut illum habeamus regem. Ad hanc confirmationem respondet primo Barclaius. argumentum non esse in forma syllogismi, sed hoc cavillari est: nam neque ego volui, nec cogitavi redigere argumentum ad formam syllogismi, quod vel ex eo potest intelligi, quod non expresse posui conclusio¬ nem, et multa inserui ex Scriptura sacra, ex profanis auctoribus, et ex experimentis veteribus et novis, quae Barclaius omisit. Deinde omissa cavillatione de forma syllo¬ gismi, vim ipsam argumenti retundere co¬ natur, dicens : « Demus eum optima forma ratiocinatio¬ nem confecisse, et ad vim argumenti respon¬ deamus. Dico igitur propositionem ejus falsam esse, dico, inquam, non verum esse, quod tolerare regem haereticum vel infidelem co¬ nantem pertrahere homines ad sectam suam, est exponere Religionem evidentissimo peri¬ culo, sed est tantum pati Religionem versari in periculo, in quod incidit vitio regis haere¬ tici, aut infidehs, et cui jam sine culpa po¬ puli exposita est : cum nullum ejus liberandae justum, et legitimum remedium, praeter con¬ stantiam, et tolerantiam, populo supersit. » Respondeo : Quando non suppetunt vires Ecclesiae excutiendi jugum infidelium tyran¬ norum, ut vere temporibus Neronis, Diocle¬ tiani, Constantii, Juliani, et Valentis non suppetebant : tum verum est, tolerare regem haereticum, vel infidelem, conantem pertra¬ here populum ad sectam suam, non esse Religionem exponere periculo, sed pati eam in periculo versari : sed quando vires sup¬ petunt, et potest Ecclesia, si velit, per aucto¬ ritatem Vicarii Christi privare regem haere¬ ticum, vel infidelem dominio, quod habet su¬ per fideles : tum si non faciat, vere, proprie- que exponit Religionem evidentissimo pe¬ riculo, cum nolit adhibere remedium, quod in promptu habet, nisi forte ratio suadeat, hoc remedium ad tempus differre, et alia leniora inteiim experiri. Quod autem hic subjungit Barclaius, fa¬ cillimum fuisse Christianis olim deponere Julianum, Constantium, et Valentem; jam supra copiose refutatum est cap. 6. 7. et 8. neque libet Barclaium imitari in iisdem re¬ bus saepius repetentiis. Pergit Barclaius, et ait : « Jam vero ad illud, quod deducit ex pugna juris divini, et humani, respondeo breviter, illum valde falli in eo, quod putet esse ibi concursum, et conflictum divini juris, et humani : non sunt enim pugnantia, servare veram fidem, et Religionem , et tolerare regem haereticum, vel infidelem ; neque alterum de jure divino est, alterum de jure humano, ut ille putat ; sed sunt duo praecepta juris divini, colere Deum vera Religione, et servire, atque obe- dire regi, quae simul servari, et expleri pos¬ sunt, ut ipsimet Jesuitae docent. » Respondeo : Non ignorabam, servire, et obedire regi esse juris divini ; et ideo non hoc negavi in meo libro : sed dixi, juris hu¬ mani esse, -ut hunc, aut illum habeamus regem, juris autem divini servare veram fidem, ac Religionem : quamvis enim jure divino teneamur regi patere, dum rex est; non tamen jure divino cavetur ut regi nullis de causis regnum abrogari possit : alio qui quotquot ab exordio mundi regnis exuti sunt, omnes per injuriam exuti fuissent : ne¬ que ulla esset respublica, aut pene nulla jure instituta: Respublicse siquidemmt plurimum exactis regibus constituuntur. Hoc est igitur quod dicimus, ut jus divinum servetur de conservanda vera Religione, fas esse ali¬ quando mutari jus humanum, et transferri regnum ab infideli ad fidelem, quando vel non possit, aut vix possit alia ratione vera conservari Religio. At rursum excipit Barclaius. « Id quidem, IN REBUS TEMPORALIBUS 75 inquit, totum verum est, jure videlicet hu¬ mano fieri, ut hic aut ille sit rex. Sed cave, lector, ne capiaris. Omisit Bellarminus, quod est praecipuum; addere enim debuit: Atubi hunc aut illum regem semel habemus, de jure divino est, ut illi in civilibus causis cum omni honore, et reverentia pareamus. Hac adjectione, quam nemo Catholicus negare potest, illud ejus argumentum prorsus elidi¬ tur. » Respondeo : Jam ante docui, Ubi hunc, vel illum regem semel habemus, jure divino illi parendum esse, dum in solio praesidet. Sed non esse de jure divino, utsemper, dum vivit, in solio regali praesideat : nam fieri potest, ut vel ipse se abdicet potestate, vel ab alio rege superatus cadat a regno, vel hoeresis causa deponatur , et quocumque modo rex esse desinat, obedicntia quoque ei deberi desinit. At, inquit Barclaius : « Ex Bellarmini sententia lib. n. de Pontif. cap. 29. non licet Concilio judicare, punire, vel deponere Pa¬ pam nitentem turbare, et destruere Eccle¬ siam Dei ; sed tantum ei resistere non fa¬ ciendo, quod jubet, et impediendo ne exe- quatur voluntatem suam. Cur non similiter, et potiore etiam ratione idem de regibus etiam censeamus? cum et ipsi sint populis (teste eodem auctore lib. i. de Pontif. c. 9. et lib. m. c. 19.) nuperiores et Judicem in terris nullum habeant? cumque praeterea nonnullis magni nominis theologis visum sit, Concilium OEcumenicum majore supra Papam auctoritate praeditum esse, quam habeat populus in Principem? » Respondeo : Si Pontifex Maximus haereti¬ cus fleret, et Ecclesiam destruere, abducen¬ do eam a fide Catholica, niteretur; sine du¬ bio deponi, aut certe depositus declarari a Concilio posset, ut colligitur ex can. Si Pa¬ pa, dist. 40. et hoc neque Bellarminus, ne¬ que ullus Catholicus negat, quare ex hoc ipso potuisset Barclaius intelligere, non esse mirum, si reges propter haeresim deponi possint, quamvis non habeant in temporali¬ bus superiores, cum Papa propter similem causam deponi possit, qui neque in tempo¬ ralibus, neque in spiritualibus superiorem habet in terris. Quod autem scripsi in lib. n. cap. 29. Pontificem non posse judicari, aut deponi a Concilio, intelligitur extra causam haeresis, si vita solum, et moribus Ecclesiam perturbare, atque destruere velle videretur. Est autem discrimen inter Pontificem et re¬ gem ; quod Pontifex nullum omnino in ter¬ ris superiorem habet, cum sit ille servus principalis, quem posuit Dominus super om¬ nem familiam suam, Luc. xn. de quo idem Dominus eodem loco dicit, quod si servus ille male se gesserit, et coeperit percutere servos, et ancillas, manducare et bibere cum ebriosis; veniet Dominus in die, qua non sperat, eumque severissime puniet : proinde non vult Dominus, ut a familia, vel aliquo de familia puniatur ; sed ipse Domi¬ nus judicium de servo illo sibi reservat. Rex antem, qui non immediate a Deo regnum accepit; sed populus in eum potestatem suam transtulit : et praeterea si Christianus est, aut fuit, Pontifici, ut ovis Pastori, sub¬ jectus est, et quamvis non habeat in tempo¬ ralibus superiorem aliquem temporalem; habet tamen superiorem spiritualem, cujus potestas ad temporalia etiam se extendit : ideo deponi a summo Pontifice, ut Christi Vicario potest. Quod si aliqui viri docti sen¬ serunt, concilium esse supra Papam, magis quam regnum supra regem : non multum de eorum sententia laboramus, cum ex scri¬ pturis, et conciliorum etiam generalium de¬ cretis contrarium colligatur : de qua re satis multa scripsimus in secundo libro de Conci¬ liis. Sed forte quaeret aliquis: si Papa nullum omnino superiorem habet in terris, quo jure deponi potest a concilio, vel Ecclesia propter hseresim? Responsio est in promptu, quo¬ niam cum propter alia crimina ejiciantur homines per excommunicationem ab Eccle¬ sia, haeretici per se exeunt, et recedunt, et ipsi se quodam modo excommunicant ; ut sanctus Hieronymus notavit explicans illa verba Apostoli ad Titum cap. m. Hxreticum esse proprio judicio condemnatum (1). Itaque si Pontifex, quod fieri non posse arbitror, haereticus, vel infidelis, vel Apostata fieret, non tam deponendus, quam declarandus depositus a concilio esset. (I) Tit. III, 10. 76 DE POTESTATE PAP^E