Faith & the Word

Bellarmine · De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus · On the Power of the Supreme Pontiff in Temporal Matters, against William Barclay

Chapter 26: The First Part of the Fifth Reason for the Power of the Supreme Pontiff in Temporal Matters Is Defended

Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. XII, De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaium, a treatise of 1610. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).

In the twenty-sixth chapter Barclay sets about refuting the first part of my fifth reason. The reasoning was this: To a shepherd a power concerning wolves is necessary, that he may keep them from the fold by every means he can; but the wolves who lay waste the Church are heretics; therefore if some prince from a sheep or a ram becomes a wolf, that is, from a Christian becomes a heretic, the shepherd of the Church will be able to keep him off by excommunication, and at the same time to order the people not to follow him, and therefore to deprive him of the dominion which he has over his subjects. To this reasoning Barclay, answering, admits everything except that last part of the conclusion, in which we said the shepherd can order the people no longer to follow their king; for he distinguishes this part, and says that the shepherd can indeed order the faithful not to follow a heretical king in his heresies, but cannot order them not to follow him in political matters. He adds that a heretical king can indeed be deprived of the communion of the faithful in sacred things, but that not even this is to be done if there is danger of schism and scandal and graver evils, from Augustine, book 3, chapter 2, against the epistle of Parmenian; of which matter we spoke in chapter 9, where Barclay treated these same things more fully; for I have already warned that Barclay chose to spend a great part of his book in repeating the same things.

These things being left aside, the whole reason for which Barclay denies that the faithful can be forbidden by the supreme Shepherd to render obedience to a heretical king even in political matters is this, that by divine law obedience is owed to kings; and no man, not even the Supreme Pontiff himself, can dispense in divine law; and to prove this he brings forward the rescript of Innocent III, who in the chapter Cum ad monasterium, on the state of monks, says that “a monk cannot be dispensed to marry, or to have property of his own”; and in this place he disputes much about divine and human law, and about the marriage of Constance, daughter of King Roger, who, though a nun, is said to have married the emperor Henry VI by dispensation of Pope Clement III. But we have shown above that Barclay's reason is of no strength; because it is of divine law that an inferior obey a superior as long as he is superior; but if he has ceased to be superior, the precept of showing him obedience will cease too. Which we showed from many like cases; for it is of divine law not only that the people obey the king, but also that children obey their father, servants their master, wives their husbands; and yet if a son is emancipated, and a servant given his liberty, and a wife separated from her husband by divorce or repudiation, they are no longer held by that divine law; as also a sworn promise is by divine law to be kept, and yet if he to whom the promise was made releases it, he who promised will not be bound to fulfil it. Restitution is sanctioned by divine law, and yet if the creditor remits the debt, no obligation of restitution remains; and very many like examples could be brought. So then, by divine law the people is bound to serve the king as long as he is king; but if he ceases to be king, which can happen in many ways, no obligation of service or obedience remains; but it is not of divine law that a king cannot for just causes be deposed; and much less is it of divine law that the Supreme Pontiff cannot declare that a heretical king is not a lawful king, and that no obedience is owed him by the faithful people.

As to the chapter Cum ad monasterium, on the state of monks, the matter is easy; for Innocent teaches only this, that marriage and ownership of things cannot stand with the state of monks, since continence and poverty belong to the essence of the monastic life. So the Supreme Pontiff cannot bring it about that the same man be a monk and married, the same a monk and rich in wealth of his own. But it is another thing whether the Supreme Pontiff can dispense a monk to pass from the monastic life to the secular life, and, having become secular, to be able to enter marriage and keep wealth as his own; for on this the doctors think variously. And as to Constance, daughter of King Roger, we think it a fable that, being a nun and an old woman, she married Henry VI by dispensation of Clement III. For Godfrey of Viterbo, who instructed Henry VI in letters and morals, writes that the marriage of Henry with Constance was celebrated at Milan in the year of salvation 1186, Urban III sitting in the Apostolic See, and Constance herself in her thirtieth year; from which it follows that it is false that Clement III dispensed her from monastic vows, or, as others say, Celestine III, or, as others, Alexander III; for this last had already died, and the others had not yet begun to sit; it is false too that she married when she was an old woman above fifty years; it is false, lastly, that she was a nun before, since none of those who lived at that time writes it. See Cardinal Baronius, volume 12 of the Annals, at the year 1186.

Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT  XXVI. 
Detenditur  prima  pars  rationis  quintae  pro  po¬ 
testate  summi  Pontificis  in  temporalibus. 
In  cap.  26.  aggreditur  Barclaius  refutare 
primam  partem  rationis  me®  quint®  :  erat 
autem  h®c  ratiocinatio.  Pastori  necessaria 
est  potestas  circa  lupos,  ut  eos  arceat  omni 
ratione  qua  poterit  ab  ovili  :  lupi  autem, 
qui  Ecclesiam  vastant,  sunt  haeretici  :  ergo 
si  princeps  aliquis  ex  ove,  aut  ariete  lupus 
fiat,  id  est,  ex  Christiano  fiat  h®reticus,  po¬ 
terit  pastor  Ecclesi®  eum  arcere  per  excom¬ 
municationem.  et  simul  jubere  populo  ne 
eum  sequatur,  ac  proinde  privare  dominio, 
quod  habet  in  subditos. 
Ad  hanc  ratiocinationem  Barclaius  re¬ 
spondens  admittit  omnia,  excepta  illa  ex¬ 
trema  parte  conclusionis,  qua  diximus,  posse 
Pastorem  jubere  populo,  ut  non  sequatur 
amplius  regem  suum  .  distinguit  enim  hanc 
partem,  ac  dicit :  Posse  quidem  pastorem 
jubere  fidelibus  ,  ut  non  sequantur  regem 
h®retieum  in  h®resibus,  sed  non  posse  ju¬ 
bere,  ut  non  sequantur  eum  in  rebus  politi¬ 
cis. 
Addit  autem  posse  quidem  regem  h®reti- 
cum  privari  communione  fidelium  in  rebus 
sacris,  sed  neque  hoc  esse  faciendum,  si 
periculum  sit  schismatis,  et  scandali,  et  gra¬ 
viorum  malorum ,  ex  Augustino  lib.  iii. 
cap.  2.  contra  Epist.  Parmeniani  :  de  qua 
re  diximus,  cap.  9.  Ubi  h®c  eadem  Barclaius 
fusius  tractavit  :  jam  enim  admonui,  Bar- 
claium  in  repetitione  rerum  earumdem  ma¬ 
gnam  partem  libri  sui  consumere  voluisse. 
His  igitur  omissis,  tota  ratio ,  ob  quam 
negat  Barclaius  posse  a  summo  Pastore  pro¬ 
hiberi  fidelibus,  ut  regi  hmretico  obedien- 
tiam  etiam  in  rebus  politicis  praestent,  ea 
est,  quoniam  jure  divino  debetur  regibus 
obedien  ia  :  et  non  potest  ullus  humo,  ac  ne 
ipse  quidem  summus  Po  itifex  dispensare  in 
jure  divino  ;  et  ad  hoc  probandum  adducit 
rescriptum  Innoccntii  111.  qui  cap  Cum  ad 
monasterium,  de  statu  Monach.,  dicit  :  «Non 
posse  dispensari  cum  monacho,  ut  uxorem 
ducat,  vel  rerum  proprietatem  habeat  »  : 
et  hoc  loco  multa  disputat  de  jure  divino, 
et  humano,  et  de  matrimonio  Constanti® 
Hogerii  regis  fili®,  qu®  cum  esset  sanctimo¬ 
nialis,  ex  dispensatione  Clementis  III.  Ponti¬ 
ficis,  nupsisse  dicitur  Henrico  VI  imperatori. 
At  nos  supra,  rationem  Barclaii  nullius 
roboris  esse  demonstravimus  :  quoniam  de 
jure  divino  est,  ut  inferior  obediat  supeiiori, 
quamdiu  superior  est  ;  sed  si  desierit  esse 
superior,  desinet  etiam  pr®ceptum  de  obe- 
dientia  il  i  exhibenda.  Id  quod  octcndimus 
ex  multis  similibus  :  siquidem  juris  divini 
est,  non  solum  ,  ut  populus  obediat  -regi ; 
sed  etiam  ut  filii  obediant  patri,  servi  domi¬ 
no,  uxores  maritis  :  et  tamen  si  filius  eman¬ 
cipetur,  et  servus  libertate  donetur,  et  uxor 
per  divortium,  aut  repudium  a  marito  sepa¬ 
retur,  non  amplius  tenentur  lege  illa  divina  : 
quemadmodum  etiam  promissio  jurata  jure 
divino  servanda  est  et  tamen  si  is,  cui  pro¬ 
missio  facta  est,  eam  relaxet,  non  tenebitur 
eam  implere  qui  promisit.  Restitutio  jure 
divino  sancita  est,  et  tamen  si  creditor  de¬ 
bitum  remittat,  restitutionis  obligatio  nulla 
restat  :  atque  exempla  similia  plurima' 
possent  adduci.  Sic  igitur,  jure  divino  te¬ 
netur  populus  regi  servire,  dum  rex  est  : 
sed  si  rex  desinat  esse,  quod  multis  modis 
fieri  potest,  nulla  remanet  obligatio  servi¬ 
tutis,  aut  obedienti® ;  non  est  autem  de 
jure  divino,  ut  rex  justis  de  causis  deponi 
non  possit  :  multoque  minus  juris  divini  est, 
ut  summus  Pontifex  declarare  non  possit, 
regem  b®reticum  non  esse  legitimum  re¬ 
gem,  nullamque  ei  deberi  a  fideli  populo 
obedientiam. 
Quod  autem  attinet  ad  cap.  Cum  ad  mo¬ 
nasterium,  de  statu  monachorum,  res  facilis 
est  :  id  enim  solum  innocentius  docet,  non 
posse  consistere  matrimonium,  et  proprie¬ 
tatem  rerum  cum  statu  monachorum  ;  cum 
ad  essentiam  vitae  monasticae  pertineant 
continentia,  et  paupertas.  Itaque  non  pote¬ 
rit  summus  Pontifex  facere,  ut  idem  mona¬ 
chus  sit,  et  conjugatus  :  idem  monachus, 
et  dives  oprun  in  particulari.  Aliud  autem 
est,  utrum  possit  summus  Pontifex  dispen- 
IN  REBUS  TEMPORALIBUS 
83 
sare  cum  monacho,  ut  transeat  a  vita  mo¬ 
nastica  ad  vitam  sa3c  darem,  et  saecularis 
effectus  matrimonium  inire  possit,  ct  opes 
propriis  retinere,  de  hoc  enim  varie  sen¬ 
tiunt  doctoics.  De  Constantia  vero  Rogerii 
regis  fili;e  fabulam  esse  existimamus,  quod 
sanctimonialis,  et  vetula  eum  esset,  dispen¬ 
satione  Clementis  III.  nupserit  Henrico  VI. 
Nam  Gotefridus  Viterbiensis,  qui  Henricum 
VI.  in  litteris,  ct  moribus  instituebat,  scri¬ 
bit,  nuptias  Hcnrici  cum  Constantia  celebra¬ 
tas  Mediolani  anno  salutis  1186.  sedente  in 
Apostoliea  Sede  Urbano  III.  et  ipsa  Con¬ 
stantia  annum  trigesimum  agente,  ex  quo 
sequitur,  ut  falsum  sit  dispensasse  cum  ea 
in  votis  monasticis  Clementem  III.  vel,  ut 
alii  dicunt,  Coelestinum  III,  ut  a!  i  i,  Alexan¬ 
drum  III;  nam  hic  jam  obierat,  illi  nondum 
sedere  coeperant  :  falsum  quoque  sit,  eam 
nupsisse  cum  esset  vetula  annorum  supra 
quinquaginta  :  falsum  denique  fuisse  antea 
sanctimonialem,  cum  id  nullus  scribat  ex  iis, 
qui  eo  tempore  vixerunt.  Vide  Card.  Ba- 
ronium  toni.  xn.  Annalium  ad  annum  1186. 
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