Bellarmine · De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus · On the Power of the Supreme Pontiff in Temporal Matters, against William Barclay
Chapter 27: Whether a Vow or an Oath Binds More
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. XII, De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaium, a treatise of 1610. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
In the twenty-seventh chapter Barclay, to gather helps for his cause from every side, compares the vow of monks with that oath by which peoples promise fidelity and obedience to kings. And he says that the Pontiff, by the opinion of some doctors, can dispense in the vows of monks; but that even if this be granted, it is not to be admitted that he can dispense in the oath by which peoples bind themselves to obedience to the king. Barclay seems, then, to think that the bond of an oath is greater than that of a vow; of which nevertheless Saint Thomas expressly teaches the contrary in 2-2, question 89, article 8, and almost the whole school of theologians on the Sentences, distinction 39. For a vow is a promise made to God; an oath is the confirmation of a promise made to a man; but a man is more bound to fulfil a promise made to God than to a man. Then, he who violates a vow is unfaithful to God; he who breaks an oath commits the crime of irreverence toward God; but the crime of unfaithfulness is graver than that of irreverence, since all unfaithfulness toward a superior has irreverence joined with it, but not all irreverence unfaithfulness. Therefore the breaker of a vow sins more gravely than the violator of an oath; therefore a vow binds more than an oath. Lastly, a vow is a thing absolutely good; an oath is good under compelling necessity; otherwise the Lord says in Matthew 5: But I say to you not to swear at all; and James in his epistle, chapter 5: Above all things, my brethren, swear not; but nowhere do we read, vow not; but on the contrary the king and prophet David exhorts, saying in Psalm 75: Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God. Therefore a vow is nobler than an oath, and thereby he sins more gravely who breaks a vow than he who violates an oath; therefore a vow binds more than an oath; wherefore if the Supreme Pontiff can dispense in vows, much more will he be able in an oath.
But Barclay resists with this reasoning: “The whole monastic order, and others in the Church, as some will have it, proceeded from human constitutions and positive law, over which therefore the Pontiff has full and every kind of power, as we said a little above; but the submission and obedience owed to kings and princes, and to all overseers and superiors whatever, is of natural and divine law, confirmed in both Testaments. For although it is of human law that we use this or that form of commonwealth, or have this or that prince, yet that we revere him whom we have once received, and submissively obey him in all things which are not repugnant to the commandments of God, is not of human ordinance only, but of natural and divine.” I answer: this argument totters on every side; for it has nothing solid, nothing firm. For that the whole monastic order proceeded from human constitutions and positive law is not only false but even heretical, since the evangelical counsels, on which the monastic order is founded, proceeded not from human constitution but from the very mouth of our Lord and God Jesus Christ; of which matter I have treated at length in the book on Monks, nor does any Catholic deny it. Then, that the monastic vows themselves, in which the essence of the monastic life consists, are of divine law, not only all Catholics teach, but Barclay himself confessed a little before. Whence, then, does he now say that the whole monastic order proceeded from human constitutions and positive law? Besides, if, as he himself assumes in this argument of his, the submission owed to kings and princes, and to all overseers and superiors, is of natural and divine law confirmed in both Testaments, then the submission owed by monks to their overseers and superiors is of natural and divine law, confirmed in both Testaments. Whence, then, does Barclay gather that the Pontiff can dispense in the obedience and submission of monks toward their overseers and superiors, and cannot in the obedience and submission of peoples toward kings and princes, since both are of natural and divine law confirmed in both Testaments? Nay, since the obedience of monks has a vow, and that a solemn one, joined to it, and the obedience of peoples is confirmed by a simple oath, it seems altogether that the Supreme Pontiff can more easily dispense in the obedience of peoples than of monks, since the bond of a vow is greater than that of an oath, as the theologians teach. Lastly, as, on Barclay's witness, it is of human law what form of commonwealth we use, and that we have this or that prince, but after we have received someone as prince, that we obey him is of divine law; so also it is of human law what rite and form of living monks use, and that they have this or that overseer; and yet that they submissively obey him whom they have once received as overseer is of divine law. Therefore all things are equal, nor is there any reason why the Supreme Pontiff can dispense in the one and not in the other, that is, why he can absolve monks from the bond of obedience promised to their overseer, and cannot absolve a subject from the bond of obedience promised to his king.
Barclay goes on, and weaves an argument from the nature of a vow and an oath; which argument, because it does not bear much on the matter, and yet is most wordily proposed by him, I shall contract into a few words, that it may appear how great the force of the argument is. He reasons, then, thus: A vow is a promise made to God and the Church, therefore the principal creditor is God; but the Pontiff, who is the Vicar of God and head of the Church in Christ's place, can declare that it does not displease God and the Church that that promise, for some just cause more pleasing to God than the fulfilment of that promise would be, be remitted and forgiven to him who had vowed. But an oath by which some pact or engagement is sealed does not make God properly the creditor, but the man with whom the pact was entered, and to whom the sworn promise was made; which is clear from this, that the man who is creditor can even without any cause free the debtor and release him from the oath, if he wishes freely to remit to him the promise made to himself; nor has the interpretation or declaration of the Supreme Pontiff any place here, since the man who is creditor speaks for himself. Therefore the Supreme Pontiff cannot release men from an oath, since he would deprive the creditor against his will of an obligation acquired to him by the best right, and lawful by every divine and human law. I answer: when the Supreme Pontiff releases men from an oath, he does not take away a right acquired from a just and lawful obligation; but either he declares that the obligation and promise was, or has become, unlawful, as when he absolves peoples from the oath of fidelity rendered to a heretical prince, or one who afterwards fell into heresy; or he takes away the bond of the oath, leaving the promise in its force, only to this end, that he who had promised may without danger of sacrilege pursue his right before lawful judges.
But these things were not unknown to Barclay, as one who professed jurisprudence above all; therefore he adds: “But suppose he can take it away for cause, and free the promise from the bond of the oath (that I may not contend further here with the canonists on this matter); let him take it away, then; what does it seem to follow from that deed in this business of ours? The people will be free, you will say, from the rule and subjection of the prince as soon as it is loosed from the bond of the oath. Is it so indeed? Do you not perceive that this oath is nothing but an accessory confirming that obligation by which faith and obedience were promised to the prince? Are you ignorant that accessories can be taken away and released without the destruction of the principal obligation? There remains, then, still the obligation to which the oath had been added; which, since it is of natural and divine law, holds the minds and consciences of men before God no less than if it were supported by an oath.” I answer: the bond of an oath can indeed, as I said above, be taken away, even if the obligation of the promise is not taken away. But when the Supreme Pontiff, on account of heresy or another just cause, looses peoples from the oath of fidelity, he is wont at the same time also to loose them from the bond of the promise, and to order that the peoples no longer obey him to whom they had made the promise of obedience; and that the Pontiff, as the Vicar of Christ, can do this we have shown above from the doctors and councils, and even from the divine letters themselves, and many years ago we showed this same thing by five theological reasons; nor has Barclay with all his arguments and cavils been able to refute those reasons. For what he here again repeats and presses, that the obligation of obeying kings is of natural and divine law, has been explained by us more than once, that it is to be understood of the obligation of obeying kings as long as they are kings; but that it is not of natural and divine law that a king cannot be deprived of his kingdom if he becomes a heretic, manifest reason and frequent use have most plainly shown.
“But,” says Barclay, “on this axiom Bellarmine chiefly relies when he wishes to show that the Pope cannot subject himself to the coercive sentence of councils, because (he says, book 2 on Councils, chapter 18) the Pope's power over all is of divine law; but the Pope cannot dispense in divine law.” I answer: if the Pope should subject himself to the coercive sentence of councils, or of any princes whatever, he would truly subject a superior to inferiors, and thereby would fight against divine and natural law; for by divine law the Pope is the Shepherd and Father and Overseer of all Christians, and thereby superior to all who are his sheep and sons and subjects; and by divine law too a superior cannot be judged by an inferior, at least by a coercive judgment. But when the Pope judges a king, or even deposes him, he does nothing against divine law, since a superior judges an inferior, a shepherd a sheep, a father a son, an overseer a subject, which is most agreeable to divine law and natural reason. For although kings in temporal matters do not acknowledge a temporal superior, or even acknowledge none directly but God, yet they ought to acknowledge a spiritual superior, whose power extends to temporal things so far as they are subordinated to spiritual, as has been said more than once above.
At the end Barclay speaks thus: “Lest we err in anything, it must be held that the fullness of the Apostolic power embraces only that power which the Lord Jesus, the Son of God, when he lived in this world, wished to have as a man among men; and that so far the Pope represents Christ to us and is his Vicar; but not that power which, as the Son of God, God himself equal to the Father, he had from eternity and reserved to his divinity by omnipotence, of which he says: All power is given to me in heaven and in earth.” I answer: I not only admit what Barclay here asks, that the fullness of the Apostolic power is not equal to the omnipotence of the divinity of Christ; but I add also that it is not altogether equal to that power which Christ wished to have and had on earth as a man. For Christ, even while mortal he lived with mortals, had the power which the theologians call the power of excellence, through which he could institute sacraments, and remit sins without sacraments, and other things of that kind, to which the fullness of the pontifical power does not reach. So I am not of the number of those of whom John of Torquemada says, writing on the canon Conjunctiones, cause 35, question 2: It is a wonder that the Supreme Pontiffs speak moderately of the power given them, and certain petty doctors without any true foundation wish by flattery to make them as it were equal to God. Nevertheless I securely affirm that our Lord Jesus Christ could, in the time of his mortality, dispose of all temporal things, and deprive kings and princes of their kingdoms and dominions, and that he without doubt granted this power to his Vicar, to use it when he shall judge it necessary for the salvation of souls, which ought to be his chief care.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXVII, Utrum votum , an juramentum magis obliget. In cap. 27. Barclaius, ut causae suae undi¬ que adjumenta conquirat, confert votum monachorum cum juramento illo, quo po¬ puli regibus fidelitatem , et obedientiam pollicentur. Ac dicit, Pontificem ex aliquo¬ rum Doctorum sententia dispensare posse in votis monachorum, sed etiam si hoc detur, non esse admittendum, ut dispensare possit in juramento, quo populi ad regis obedien¬ tiam se adstringunt. Videtur igitur sentire Barclaius majus vinculum juramenti esse, quam voti, cujus tamen contrarium diserte sanctus Thomas in 2. 'i. qu. 89. ai t. 8 et omnis fere schola theologorum in Sent. dist. 39. Votum enim est promissio facta Deo : jura¬ mentum est confirmatio promissionis homini factee : magis autem tenetur homo implere promissionem factam Deo, quam homini. Deinde qui votum violat, infidelis est Deo : qui juramentum frangit, crimen irreveren¬ tiae in Deum committit : gravius autein crimen infidelitatis est, quam irreverentiae : cum infidelitas omnis erga superiorem irre¬ verentiam conjunctam habeat, non omnis irreverentia infidelitatem. Igitur gravius peccat voti fragiis, quam juramenti violator : pro i n d e m agi s o b ! i gat vo t um , q u a i n j u ra men¬ tum. Denique votum res est absolute bona; juramentum bonum est necessitate cogente : alioqui Dominus Matth. v. dicit: Ego autem dico cobii non jurare omnino Et Jacobus in epistola sua cap. 6. Ante omnia. , inquit, fra¬ tres mei nolite jur >re : nusquam autem legi¬ mus, nolite vovere ; sed contra, rex et pro¬ pheta David hortatur, dicens in Psal. lxxv. Vovete , et reddite Domino Deo vestro (1). Igitur votum nobilius juramento est, ac per hoc gravius peccat q i votum frangit, quam qui juramentum violat ; proinde magis obligat votum, quam juramentum : quare si summus Pontifex dispensare potest in votis, multo magis poterit in juramento. Sed Barclaius resistit hac ratione : « To¬ tus ordo monachalis, aliique in Ecclesia, ut quidam volunt, ab humanis constitutionibus, et jure positivo profecti sunt, in quos idcirco plena, et omnimoda potestas Pontifici est, uti superius paulo diximus : at submissio et obediemia regibus , ac principibus, atque omnibus omnino prapositis, et superioribus debita, est juris naturalis, et divini utroque testamento confirmata. Nam licet de huma¬ no jure sit, ut hac, aut illa reip. forma uta¬ mur, vel hunc, aut illum Principem habea¬ mus ; tamen ut eum, quem semel accepi¬ mus, revereamur, eique in omnibus, quae Dei mandatis non repugnant, submisse pa¬ reamus, non humanae solum, sed naturalis, et divinae est ordinationis. » Respondeo : Hoc argumentum ab omni parte nutat : nihil enim solidi, nihil firmi habet. Nam quod totus ordo monachalis ab humanis constitutionibus , et jure positivo profectus sit, non modo falsum, sed etiam haereticum est, siquidem consilia Evangeli- ca, in quibus ordo monasticus fundatur, non ex humana constitutione, sed ex ipso ore Domini, ac Dei nostri Jesu Christi pro¬ fecta sunt : de qua re fuse tractavi in lib. de monachis, neque id ullus Catholicus ne¬ gat. Deinde vota ipsa monastica, in quibus essentia Monasticae vitae consistit, juris esse divini, non modo Catholici omnes docent, sed et ipse Barclaius paulo ante confessus est. Unde ergo nunc totum ordinem mona-» (1) Matth. V, 34 ; V, 12 ; Psalm. LXXY, U. 84 DE POTESTATE PAPjE sticura ab humanis constitutionibus, et jure positivo profectum esse dicit ? Prseterea, si, ut ipse in hoc suo argumento assumit, sub¬ missio regibus, ac principibus, atque omni¬ bus prepositis , et superioribus debita, est juris naturalis, et divini in utroque testa¬ mento confirmata ; ergo submissio mona¬ chorum suis prepositis, et superioribus de¬ bita, est jut is naturalis, et divini, in utroque testamento confit mata. Unde igitur Barclaius colligit, posse Pontificem dispensare in obe- dienlia, et submissione monachorum erga suos prepositos, et superiores ; et non posse in obedientia, et submissione populo¬ rum erga reges, et principes, cum utraque sit juris naturalis, et divini in utroque te¬ stamento confirmata ? quin etiam cum obe¬ dientia monachorum habeat votum, idque soletnne adjunctum ; et obedientia populo¬ rum simplici juramento confirmata sit : vi¬ detur omnino facilius posse dispensari per Summum Pontificem, in obedientia popu¬ lorum, quam monachorum, cum voti vin¬ culum majus sit, quam juramenti, ut theo¬ logi docent. Denique quemadmodum Bar- claio teste juris humani est, qua forma reip. utamur, et hunc aut illum principem habea¬ mus ; sed posteaquam aliquem accepimus in principem ut ei parcamus, juris divini est : sic etiam juris humani est quo ritu, et forma vivendi monachi utantur, et hunc aut illum praepositum habeant ; et tamen ut ei, quem in praepositum semel susceperunt, submisre pareant, juris divini est. Ergo om¬ nia paria sunt, neque ulla est ratio cur pos¬ sit summus Pontifex in uno dispensare, et non in altero, id est, cur possit monachos a vinculo obed entiee praeposito suo promissae absolvere, et non possit absolvere subditum a vinculo obedientiae regi suo promissae. Pergit Barclaius, et argumentum texit ex natura voti, et juramenti : quod argumen¬ tum, quia non multum ad rem facit, et ta¬ men verbosissime ab ipso proponitur, ego in pauca contraham , ut vis argumenti quanta sit appareat : sic igitur ille ratioci¬ natur: Votum e4 promissio facta Deo, et Ec¬ clesia?, proinde creditur principalis estDeus : potest autem Pontifex, qui Vicarius Dei est, et caput Ecclesiae loco Christi, declarare non displicere Deo, et Ecclesiae, ut promissio illa ob justam aliquam causam, et magis Deo gratam, quam sit promissionis illius adim¬ pletio, remittatur, et condonetur ei, qui vo¬ verat. At juramentum quo pactum aliquod, vel sponsio obsignatur, non facit Deum pro¬ prie creditorem, sed hominem, cum quo pacto initum, et cui promissio jurata facta est, quod ex eo perspicuum est, quod homo creditor potest etiam sine ulla causa liberare debitorem, et juramento solvere ; si illi pro¬ missionem sibi factam libere remittere ve¬ lit : neque hic habet locum interpretatio, aut declaratio summi Pontificis, cum homo ipse creditor per se loquatur. Ergo non po¬ test summus Pontifex homines a juramento solvere, quoniam privaret creditorem invi¬ tum obligatione sibi optimo jure quaesita, et omni jure divino, et humano licita. Respondeo : Quando summus Pontifex solvit homines juramento, non tollit jus qua?situm ex justa, et licita obligatione : sed vel declarat obligationem , et promis¬ sionem fuisse, vel factam esse illicitam, ut cum absolvit populos a juramento fidelitatis pra?stito principi hseretico, vel qui postea in hseresirn lapsus est : aut tollit vinculum ju¬ ramenti, relicta promissione in suo vigore, ad eum finem tantum, ut possit, qui promi¬ serat, sine periculo sacrilegii prosequi jus suum coram legitimis judicibus. Sed ha?c Barclaio non erant incognita, ut qui juris prudentiam praecipue profiteretur : ideo subjungit : « Sed esto auferre ex causa possit, et promissionem jurisjurandi vinculo liberare (ne de hac re amplius cum canoni- stis hic contendam) auferat igitur ; quid ei deinde facto consequens in nostro hoc ne¬ gotio videtur ? liberum fore populum, dices, ab imperio, et subjectione principis, statim atque jurisjurandi nexu solutus est. Ita ne vero ? an non perspicis, jusjurandum hoc non esse nisi accessionem tantum confirma¬ tricem illius obligationis, qua fides, et obe¬ dientia principi promissa est, an ignoras accessiones tolli, et liberari posse sine inte¬ ritu principalis obligationis ? Manet ergo adhuc obligatio, cui jusjurandum accesse¬ rat : quse quoniam juris naturalis, et divini est, non minus tenet hominum mentes, et conscientias apud Deum, quam si esset ju¬ ramento sustentata » . Respondeo : Potest quidem, ut supra dixi, tolli vinculum juramenti, etiamsi non tolla¬ tur promissionis obligatio. Sed quando summus pontifex propter haeresim, aut aliam justam causam, solvit populos a juramento fidelitatis, simul etiam solvere solet a vin¬ culo promissionis, ac jubere, ut populi non amplius obediant ei, cui promissionem obe- IN REBUS TEMPORALIBUS 85 dientiae fecerant : posse autem id Pontifi¬ cem, ut Christi Vicarium, praestare, nos su¬ pra ex doctoribus, et conciliis, et ex ipsis etiam divinis litteris ostendimus, et ante multos annos idipsum quinque rationibus theologicis ostendimus : neque Barclaius omnibus suis argumentis, et cavillationibus eas rationes refellere potuit. Nam quod hoc loco iterum repetit, et inculcat, obligatio¬ nem parendi regibus esse juris naturalis, et divini, non semel a nobis explicatum est, id esse intelligendum de obligatione parendi regibus, dum reges sunt : non esse autem juris naturalis, et divini, ut rex non possit regno privari, si haereticus efficiatur, et ra¬ tio manifesta, et usus frequens apertissime demonstravit. « At, inquit Barclaius, hoc axiomate Bel- larminus praecipue nititur, dum vult osten¬ dere, Papam non posse subjicere se ipsum sententiae coactivae conciliorum quoniam (in¬ quit lib.n. de Conciliis, cap. 18.) Papae pote¬ stas super omnes est de jure divino : non autem potest Papa dispensare in jure divino. » Respondeo : Si Papa se ipse subjiceret sententiae coactivae conciliorum, aut princi- pum quorumcumque, vere subjiceret supe¬ riorem inferioribus, ac per hoc cum divino, et naturali jure pugnaret : nam jure divino Papa est Pastor, et Pater , et Praepositus omnium Christianorum, ac per hoc superior omnibus, qui oves, et filii, et subditi ipsius sunt : et jure etiam divino superior ab infe¬ riore judicari non potest judicio saltem coactivo. At vero cum Papa judicat regem, vel etiam deponit, nihil agit contra jus divi¬ num, quoniam superior inferiorem judicat, pastor ovem, pater filium, praepositus sub¬ ditum, quod est juri divino, et naturali ra¬ tioni maxime consentaneum Quamvis enim reges in temporalibus non agnoscant supe¬ riorem temporalem, vel etiam nullum agno¬ scant directe nisi Deum : tamen agnoscere debent superiorem spiritualem, cujus po¬ testas ad temporalia se extendit, quatenus ea spiritualibus subordinantur , ut supra non semel dictum est. Ad extremum sic loquitur Barclaius : « Ne qua erremus, tenendum est, Apostolica3 po¬ testatis plenitudinem eam tantum potesta¬ tem complecti, quam Dominus Jesus Dei filius, cum in hoc mundo versaretur, ut homo inter homines habere voluit : et eate- nus Papam nobis Christum referre, et ejus esse Vicarium ; non autem potestatem illam, quam ut Dei filius, Deus ipse Patri sequalis ab seterno habuit, et divinitati sute omnipo¬ tentia reservavit, de qua ait : Dcua est mihi omnis potestas in coelo , et >n terra » . Respondeo : Non admitto solum, quod Barclaius hic postulat, plenitudinem Aposto- licse potestatis, non esse parem omnipotentiae divinitatis Christi : sed addo etiam, non esse omnino aequalem illi potestati, ruam in terris habere voluit, et habuit Christus, ut homo. Christus enim etiam dum mortalis cum mor¬ talibus versaretur, habuit potestatem, quam Theologi vocant excellentiae, per quam sa¬ cramenta instituere poterat, et sine sacra¬ mentis peccata remittere, et alia id genus, ad quae plenitudo potestatis Pontificiae non pertingit. Itaque non sum de numero eoium de quibus ait Joan. de .Turrecremata scri¬ psisse, in can. Conjunctiones 35 qusest. 2. Mirum est, quod sumini Pontifices loquantur moderate de potestate eis data, et quidam doctorculi sine aliquo vero fundamento vo¬ lunt adulando eos quasi sequi parare Deo. Ni¬ hilominus tamen securus affirmo, potuisse Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum tempore mortalitatis suae, disponere ale temporalibus omnibus, et reges, principes regnis dominis¬ que privare, et hanc potestatem Vicario suo sine dubio concessisse, ut ea utatur, quando necessarium judicaverit ad animarum salu¬ tem, quse illi prajcipue curse esse debet.