Bellarmine · De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus · On the Power of the Supreme Pontiff in Temporal Matters, against William Barclay
Chapter 34: Barclay's Error on the Exemption of Clerics Is Refuted
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. XII, De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaium, a treatise of 1610. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Barclay then passes to the exemption of clerics, taking occasion from what he had said, that temporal goods cannot be given or taken away except by the temporal prince, and that no one can decline the judgment of the prince in temporal matters. And because someone could object that clerics are exempt from the power of princes, and thereby can decline their judgment even in temporal matters, he answers that clerics are exempt by the privilege of princes, whereas otherwise by common law they would be subjects like the rest. He digresses, then, in this chapter and the following to the exemption of clerics, and says many things which are foreign not only to the truth but also to the common opinion of the writers.
First he says that before clerics were exempted by the favour of princes, they were by common law subject to the judgment of temporal magistrates. He proves this by a twofold reason: first from this, that clerics are not only clerics but also citizens of the political commonwealth; and he cites my book on Clerics, chapter 28. Then from this, that once, under the best and most godly princes, the causes of clerics, both civil and criminal, except ecclesiastical causes, were handled before political and temporal judges; and he cites the fifteenth chapter of this book, where he thinks he showed this. To this I answer: clerics were exempted not by the privilege of princes alone, but also by the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs, and, what is greater, by divine law, and thereby were exempt before they were exempted by the privilege of princes. And that clerics are citizens and a certain part of the political commonwealth proves that they are bound to observe the civil laws by force of reason, not by force of law; and to prove this I brought forward that reason which Barclay now abuses to prove that clerics were by common law subject to the civil magistrate; which nevertheless is not rightly proved from it. And as to the fact that under godly princes before the times of Justinian the civil and criminal causes of clerics were sometimes handled before political magistrates, I say that there are indeed found laws of princes in the Code, title on bishops and clerics, which provide for the causes of clerics being ended before secular judges; but there are also found canons of councils of the same age, such as the third of Carthage, canon 9, that of Milevis, canon 19, that of Chalcedon, canon 9, and others, by which clerics are forbidden access to secular courts. So to the godly princes the exemption which clerics had by divine law was not yet well enough known and explained, and the holy Fathers were striving little by little to explain and introduce it.
Second, Barclay says he wonders that Bellarmine asserts that the Pope could simply, by his own authority, through canon law, exempt clerics from subjection to temporal princes. “For that,” he says, “by the leave of so great a man I shall say it, is falser than false; because the law of Christ deprives no one of his right and dominion; but it would deprive, if through it the temporal right and dominion which princes had over clerics before they became Christians were taken from them against their will.” So he. But that Barclay may wonder the more, not Bellarmine alone, nor only those who among theologians and jurists seem most to favour the exemption of clerics, but even those who have been thought to favour it little, say exactly the same; for these are the words of Dominic Soto on the fourth book of the Sentences, distinction 25, question 2, article 2, conclusion 6: “The Pope could, even without consulting princes, and ought to, except clerics from their exactions and their court; which exemption indeed princes cannot contravene.” And this same thing Diego Covarruvias, a noble jurist, following Soto, teaches in the Practical Questions, question 31, conclusion 3, in these words: “The Supreme Pontiff could exempt clerics and their goods from secular jurisdiction; and that was and is fitting for the Christian commonwealth, not only in spiritual things, which was already instituted by divine law, but also in temporal”; and conclusion 4: “Although the exemption of clerics from the jurisdiction of seculars has been introduced by human law only, yet the secular prince, however supreme he be, cannot derogate from this immunity or exemption by his own laws or his own authority.” Let Barclay cease, then, to wonder if Bellarmine says what almost all say, and let him not, as if he alone were wise, deny what almost no one denies.
But, he says, the law of Christ deprives no one of his right and dominion. It is true of itself and properly, as if it intended this very thing, unless someone by his own fault deserves to be deprived. But nevertheless, while it raises laymen to a higher order, that is, of clerics, it is no wonder if consequently it deprives princes of the right which they had over them while they were in the lower rank; nor are examples lacking in other matters, both profane and sacred. A king raises a private man, who was subject to a count, to a principality; consequently he deprives the count of the right which he had over him, and perhaps subjects the same count to that man now made prince, over whom the same count before presided. The Pope raises a simple priest, otherwise subject to a bishop, to be a metropolitan, and thereby without injury to anyone brings it about that he who before was subject to the bishop begins as metropolitan to preside over the bishop to whom a little before he was subject. An unbelieving husband had a right over his unbelieving wife; the woman is converted to the faith, and consequently is freed from subjection to the unbelieving husband, and without any injury the law of Christ deprives the unbelieving husband of the right which he had over his wife. By the same reasoning, through a marriage contracted by words of the present, a Christian husband acquires a right over his Christian wife; and yet if within the time prescribed by law she wishes to ascend to the profession of a higher life and become a nun, the law of Christ deprives the husband of the right which he had acquired, not of itself, but consequently; for the law of Christ does not intend to deprive that husband of his right, but to honour the woman raised to a higher rank. Lastly, a son of a family is raised to be a bishop; his father is deprived of the paternal power, not that he may be treated with injury, but because it is not fitting that a spiritual father be subjected to the power of a carnal parent.
But Barclay objects again, saying: “Then, since the Pope himself obtained his own exemption by no other right than the bounty and favour of princes (for, as the adversaries confess, he was subject by right and in fact to heathen princes, like other citizens), it is absurd to say that he could free others from that subjection; otherwise that would fit him: He saved others, himself he could not save.” I answer: Barclay's argument labours under a twofold fault; for it has both a false antecedent and a faulty consequence. It is false in the first place that the Pontiff obtained his exemption by no other right than the bounty and favour of princes; for he who appointed him his Vicar on earth by that very fact exempted him from all power of the princes of the earth; but even if he had been subject by right to heathen kings or emperors, still it would not follow that he ought also to be subject to Christian kings or emperors, unless he were exempted by their bounty and favour. For since he is himself set over the whole household, and kings and emperors are fitted by him into the same household, to be ruled and directed by him, certainly no reason allows that he be subjected to those over whom he presides by divine law. But it is well that Barclay thought the Vicar of Christ was to be mocked in the way that the faithless Jews mocked Christ; who nevertheless even unwillingly confessed that many had been saved by Christ from death itself, and sacrilegiously lied when they said he could not save himself from destruction.
Third, Barclay says it is not true what many say, that clerics were exempted by the ancient councils from the power and jurisdiction of civil magistrates; and he adds that the Fathers who were present in the councils forbade indeed that clerics go to the tribunals of secular judges, but did not forbid that they answer when summoned; nor did they in any way forbid temporal judges to hear the causes of clerics, nor could they have forbidden it by any means. And first he tries to show this from the third council of Carthage, canon 9, where it is thus read: “Likewise it was resolved that whoever of bishops, priests, deacons or clerics, when a crime has been charged against him in the Church, or a civil cause has been raised, if, leaving the ecclesiastical judgment, he wishes to be cleared by the public courts, even if the sentence has been given in his favour, shall lose his place, and this in a criminal judgment; but in a civil one let him lose what he won, if he wishes to keep his place. For he to whom authority lies open on every side for choosing judges judges himself unworthy of brotherly fellowship, who, thinking ill of the universal Church, asks help of the secular judgment; whereas the Apostle commands that the causes of private Christians be brought to the Church and there determined.” So far the words of the council, in which Barclay could see nothing for the exemption of clerics, but says only that the Fathers acted to restrain the levity and impudence of those clerics who, after a cause has begun to be handled in the Church, despising and leaving the ecclesiastical judges, commit themselves to lay arbitration and judgment. But we see many things in the words of this council for the exemption of clerics. For first the Fathers openly condemn recourse to the courts of secular magistrates; which they certainly would not do if secular magistrates were in every respect the lawful judges of churchmen; for what fault was it to appeal from the judgment of the bishop to the judgment of the governor of the province, or of the prince himself, if the governor or prince was the lawful judge not only of a cleric but even of a bishop? Then, the council rescinds the sentence of the secular judge given against a cleric, when it judges that in a criminal judgment a cleric absolved by a secular judge loses his place, and in a civil judgment loses what he won, that is, the sentence pronounced in his favour by the secular judge profits neither; and although these things are decreed by way of punishment, yet the punishment would have been unjust if it were not a crime for a cleric to acknowledge a secular judgment. Lastly, because Barclay says the council censures only those clerics who, after a cause has been begun in the ecclesiastical court, transfer it to the judgment of secular powers, which can seem injurious to the ecclesiastical judges, let him hear the council of Milevis, of the same age, and celebrated in the same Africa; for it speaks thus, canon 19: “It was resolved that whoever asks of the emperor the cognizance of public courts be deprived of his own honour; but if he asks of the emperor an episcopal judgment, let it not harm him.” Where we see that it is not a matter of a judgment begun, but that clerics are absolutely, and under a most grave penalty, forbidden to flee to the emperor to obtain a secular judgment; but that it is allowed if an episcopal judgment is asked of the emperor, namely to avoid a secular judgment.
Barclay then passes to the council of Chalcedon, in which it is thus decreed, canon 9: “If any cleric has a matter against a cleric, let him not leave his own bishop and run to secular courts; but let the action first be examined before his own bishop, or certainly, with the counsel of the same bishop, they shall obtain judgment before those whom both parties wish; if anyone acts otherwise, he shall be subject to canonical corrections.” From this canon Barclay says nothing is gathered except that in the first instance the cause be examined before the bishop; then, if need be, be brought to the examination of a secular judge. But that gloss destroys the text; for nowhere in the whole canon, either openly or obscurely, is mention made of a secular judgment; and it is expressly said in this canon that clerics are not to have recourse to secular courts. Besides, in the same place the council adds: “But if a cleric has a cause against his own bishop, or against another, let it be judged before the synod of the province. But if a bishop or cleric has a complaint against the metropolitan of the same province, let him apply either to the primate of the diocese, or to the see of the royal city of Constantinople, and let it be judged before it.” Where, though there was an excellent occasion for naming the governor of the province, or the emperor himself, yet no mention was made of them. What then (asks Barclay) does that mean, But let the action first be examined before the bishop? for first is referred to afterwards; and since it is not explained in the council what is to be done afterwards, reason demands that we understand that afterwards recourse is to be had to the secular judgment, as Justinian afterwards established in Novel 83. I answer: first the cause of a cleric is to be examined before his own bishop; and if it is not ended there, recourse is to be had to the mediate superiors, namely the metropolitan, the patriarch and the Pope; but the council did not express this, because it was known, both from the usage of other tribunals, where appeal is always made from a lesser judge to a greater, and from the general council of Sardica, canons 4 and 7, where the last appeal of churchmen is declared to be to the Roman bishop; looking to which canons Pope Gelasius I writes in the epistle to Faustus: “These are the canons which willed the appeals of the whole Church to be brought to the examination of this See; but from it they ordained that there should never be any appeal at all”; and in the epistle to the bishops of Dardania: “But to it,” he says, “the canons willed appeal to be made from any part of the world; but from it no one is permitted to appeal.” Nor is it fitting to expound the canons of the Church by the Novels of Justinian, when we can explain them by other canons, or by the usage of the Church.
Barclay afterwards brings forward against himself the council of Agde, where in canon 32 it is decreed: “Let no cleric presume to sue anyone before a secular judge without the bishop's permission”; and he complains that this canon was corrupted by Gratian, who in his collection, cause 11, question 1, canon Clericum, set it thus: “Let no one presume to sue a cleric before a secular judge without the bishop's permission”; he wonders also why Bellarmine preferred in citing this canon to follow Gratian's corruption rather than the council's truth. I answer: it is in no way credible that Gratian, an upright man and zealous for Christian perfection, wished to corrupt the text of the council; but rather it is to be believed that Gratian had another reading of that canon than we have. But however the matter stands, both readings show the exemption of clerics plainly enough. For in the council itself, even if those first words, let no cleric presume to sue anyone before a secular judge, seem not to make much for exemption, yet the following words, “But if he is sued, let him not answer,” make very much altogether for exemption; for the cleric is commanded, when summoned to judgment before a secular judge, not to appear, than which nothing could be said more openly; and to the same sense comes what is in Gratian, let no one presume to sue a cleric before a secular judge. For if it is not lawful for a cleric to answer in a secular judgment, neither will it be lawful for a cleric or a layman to summon a cleric to a secular judgment. And what Barclay notes in the second part of the canon, that a layman is punished with a most grave penalty who tries by calumny to harass a cleric or the Church, does not signify that it was lawful for laymen to drag a cleric or a cause of the Church to the secular court, provided it were done without calumny; but signifies that the crime is far graver, and to be punished with a most grave penalty, if calumny is added, than if it is done without calumny. But neither is it certain that the council speaks of the secular court; for it can happen that a layman accuses a cleric indeed in his own court, that is, the ecclesiastical, and yet harasses him unjustly by calumny.
Barclay then adds the eighth canon of the first council of Mâcon, where it is thus read: “That no cleric presume to accuse any other brother among the clerics before a secular judge, or to drag him to plead a cause in any place whatever; but let every matter of clerics be ended in the presence either of his bishop, or of a priest, or of an archdeacon.” He adds lastly the thirteenth canon of the third council of Toledo, in these words: “Long lack of discipline, and the presumption of inveterate licence, has opened the way to unlawful darings so far that clerics drag their fellow clerics, leaving their own Pontiff, to public courts; therefore we decree that this be not presumed hereafter; if anyone presumes to do this, let him both lose his cause and be made a stranger to communion.” These testimonies of councils brought forward, Barclay adds: “These are those solemn, and almost the only, decrees of the sacred canons on which they found their error who falsely think that councils could exempt, and in fact did exempt, clerics from the power of laymen; whom nevertheless the canons themselves so clearly refute that there is no need to fetch anything else from elsewhere to overthrow that opinion.” I answer: first, these are not the only councils which declare the exemption of clerics, but many others, of which I have thought these should be briefly recalled. In the Lateran council under Innocent III, chapter 43, it is thus read: “Certain laymen try to usurp too much from divine law, when they compel ecclesiastical men, holding nothing temporal from them, to render them oaths of fidelity.” In the council of Constance, session 31, these words are found: “Laymen have no jurisdiction or power over clerics.” In the Lateran council under Leo X, session 9: “Since by law both divine and human no power over ecclesiastical persons has been attributed to laymen, we renew all and singular the constitutions,” and so on. In the Council of Trent, session 25, chapter 20, on reformation: “The immunity of the Church and of ecclesiastical persons has been instituted by the ordinance of God and by canonical sanctions.” To these and the like, which speak too openly, Barclay answered nothing, but passed them over as if he had never read them. Then, we do not say that clerics were properly exempted by councils, but that their exemption was declared, and confirmed by penalties added. Lastly, it is a wonder why Barclay dares to say that from the canons alleged the opinion of exemption is refuted and overthrown, when it is confirmed and strengthened by them in many ways. For if lay magistrates were the lawful judges of clerics, by what right would the council of Mâcon cited above decree that all matters of clerics be ended in the presence of the bishop, or a priest, or an archdeacon? And why would the council of Toledo, also cited, with such harshness of words call recourse to a secular judgment presumption and unlawful daring? And how, lastly, would the same council dare to annul the sentence of a secular judge, and to excommunicate a cleric having recourse to the court of a secular judge? for this is what those words signify: “Let him lose his cause, and be made a stranger to communion.”
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXXIV. Refutatur error Barclaii de exemptione clericorum. Transit deinde Barclaius ad exemptionem clericorum, sumpta occasione ex eo quod dixerat, bona temporalia non posse dari, nec auferri, nisi a principe temporali , et neminem posse judicium principis in tem¬ poralibus declinare. Et quia poterat aliquis objicere clericos exemptos esse a potestate principum, ac per hoc etiam in temporali¬ bus posse eorum judicium declinare ; re¬ spondet : clericos privilegio principum exemptos esse, cum alioqui jure communi subditi essent, sicut ceeteri. Digreditur igi¬ tur in hoc capite, et sequenti ad exemptio¬ nem clericorum, et multa dicit, quae non solum a veritate, sed etiam a communi scri¬ ptorum sententia abhorrent. Primum dicit, antequam clerici beneficio principum eximerentur, jure communi sub¬ jectos fuisse judicio Magistratuum tempora- , lium. Id probat duplici ratione : primum ex eo, quod clerici, non solum clerici sunt, sed etiam cives Beipublicae politica} ; et citat librum meum de clericis cap. 28. Deinde ex eo quod olim sub optimis, et piissimis prin¬ cipibus causae clericorum tam civiles, quam criminales , exceptis causis Ecclesiasticis, apud politicos, et temporales judices agita¬ bantur, et citat caput quintum decimum hu¬ jus libri, ubi hoc demonstrasse putat. Ad hoc respondeo : Clericos non solo pri¬ vilegio Principum, sed etiam decretis Sum¬ morum Pontificum, et quod majus est, divino jure exemptos fuisse, ac per hoc exemptos fuisse, antequam Principum privilegio exi¬ merentur. Quod autem Clerici sint cives, et pars quaedam reip. politicae, probat, eos teneri ad observandas leges civiles vi ratio¬ nis, non vi legis, atque ad hoc probandum ego rationem illam adduxi, qua nunc abuti¬ tur Barclaius ad probandum jure communi subjectos fuisse clericos civili Magistratui : quod tamen inde non recte probatur. Quod vero sub piis principibus ante Justiniani tempora causae civiles, et criminales cleri¬ corum apud Magistratus politicos aliquando agitarentur : dico , inveniri quidem leges principum in Codice, tit. de Episcopis, et Clericis, quae disponunt de causis clericorum apud saeculares judices terminandis : sed in¬ veniri etiam Canones Conciliorum ejusdem aetatis, ut Carthaginiensis tertii can. 9. Mile- vitani can. 19. Chalcedonensis can. 9. et alio¬ rum quibus prohibetur clericis accessus ad judicia saecularia. Itaque piis principibus nondum satis nota, et explicata erat exem¬ ptio, quam jure divino clerici habebant,; et sancti Patres paulatim eam explicare, atque introducere nitebantur. Secundo, Barclaius dicit, mirari se, Bel- larminum asserere, Papam potuisse eximere simpliciter clericos propria auctoritate per legem canonicam, a subjectione temporalium Principum. « ld enim, inquit., pace tanti viri dicam, est falso falsius : quia lex Christi neminem privat jure, dominioque suo : pri¬ varet autem, si per eam jus, et dominium temporale, quod principes antequam fierent Christiani in clericis habebant, ipsis invitis auferret. » Haec ille. Sed ut magis Barclaius miretur, non solus Ballarminus, neque soli illi, qui inter Theo¬ logos, et Jureconsultos maxime favere vi¬ dentur exemptioni clericorum ; sed illi etiam, qui parum favere existimati sunt, idem pror¬ sus dicunt : haec enim sunt verba Domini a Soto in 4. Sentent. dist. 25. q. 2. art. 2. conclus. 6. « Papa potuit etiam inconsultis principibus, et debuit clericos ab eorum exactionibus, et foro excipere : cui quidem exemptioni principes contravenire ne¬ queunt. » Atque hoc idem docet Didacus Covarruvias Jureconsultus nobilis Sotum sequutusin practicis quaest. q. 31. conci. 3. his verbis : « Potuit Summus Pontifex cleri¬ cos, et eorum res a jurisdictione saeculari eximere : idque conveniens fuit, et est Chri¬ stianae reip. non tantum in spiritualibus, quod jure divino jam erat institutum, sed etiam intemporalibus», et conci. 4. «Quam¬ vis exemptio Clericorum a jurisdictione sae¬ cularium jure tantum humano sit introducta, IN REBUS TEMPORALIBUS 97 princeps tamen saecularis, utcumque sum¬ mus sit, non poterit huic immunitati, aut exemptioni propriis legibus, propriave au¬ ctoritate derogare. » Desinat ergo jam Bar- claius mirari si Bellarminus dicit, quod fere omnes dicunt, et nolit ipse, quasi solus sa¬ piat, id negare, quod fere nullus negat. At, inquit : lex Christi neminem privat jure, dominioque suo. Yerum est per se, ac proprie ; quasi hoc ipsum intendat, nisi ali¬ quis culpa sua privari mereatur. Sed tamen dum evehit laicos ad ordinem altiorem, id est, clericorum, non est mirum si conse¬ quenter privet principes jure, quod in eos habebant, dum essent in gradu inferiore : neque desunt exempla in aliis rebus tam prophanis, quam sacris. Evehit rex priva¬ tum hominem, qui subjectus erat comiti, ad Principatum ; consequenter privat comitem jure quod in illo habebat, et fortasse comi¬ tem eumdem subjicit illi Principi jam effecto, cui idem comes antea jam praeerat. Evehit Papa simplicem Presbyterum, subjectum alias Episcopo in Metropolitanum, ac per hoc sine ullius injuria facit, ut qui antea subje¬ ctus erat Episcopo, incipiat tamquam Metro¬ politanus Episcopo praeesse, cui paulo ante subjectus erat. Jus habebat maritus infidelis in conjugem infidelem : convertitur mulier ad fidem, et consequenter liberatur a subje¬ ctione viri infidelis, et sine injuria ulla lex Christi privat virum infidelem jure, quod in uxorem suam habebat : pari ratione per ma¬ trimonium per verba de praesenti contra¬ ctum, acquirit vir Christianus jus in uxorem Christianam, et tamen si intra tempus a jure praescriptum, velit illa ad professionem vitae altioris ascendere, et sanctimonialis fieri, lex Christi privat virum jure, quod acqui¬ sierat, non per se , sed consequenter : non enim intendit lex Christi virum illum jure suo privare, sed feminam ad altiorem gra- / dum evectam honorare. Denique evehitur filius familias in Episcopum, privatur pater ipsius potestate patria, non ut ipse afficiatur injuria, sed quia non decet patrem spiritua¬ lem subjici potestati parentis carnalis. At rursus objicit Barelaius dicens : «Dein¬ de cum ipsemet Papa exemptionem suam, non alio jure, quam Principum largitate, et beneficio nactus sit, (nam ut adversarii fa¬ tentur subjectus erat de jure, et de facto Ethnicis principibus, sicut alii cives) absur¬ dum est dicere, eum potuisse liberare alios ab illa subjectione : alioqui id in eum con- Tom. Xfl veniret, Alios salvos fecit, seipsum non po¬ tuit salvum facere. » Respondeo : Argumentum Barclaii duplici vitio laborat : nam et antecedens habet fal¬ sum, et consecutionem vitiosam. Falsum in primis est. Pontificem non alio jure, quam principum largitate, et beneficio, exemptio¬ nem suam nactum esse : qui enim Vicarium suum in terris eum constituit, is hoc ipso exemit eum ab omni potestate principum terree : sed etiam si subjectus jure fuisset regibus , vel imperatoribus ethnicis : non tamen sequeretur, eum subjectum quoque esse debere regibus, vel imperatoribus Chri¬ stianis, nisi ipsorum largitate et beneficio eximeretur. Nam cum sit ipse super omnem familiam constitutus, et reges, atque impe¬ ratores ab eo in eamdem familiam coapten¬ tur, ut ab ipso regantur, et dirigantur, cer¬ te nulla ratio patitur, ut ipse illis subjiciatur, quibus jure divino prsesidet. Sed bene habet, quod Barelaius ita irridendum putavit Vica¬ rium Christi, quo modo perfidi Judaei Chri¬ stum irridebant : qui tamen vel inviti confi¬ tebantur, multos a Christo ab. ipsa morte salvos factos fuisse, et sacrilege mentieban¬ tur, cum non potuisse seipsum ab interitu salvum facere. Tertio, Barelaius dicit, non esse verum quod multi dicunt, a veteribus Conciliis fuisse Clericos a potestate, et jurisdictione Magistratuum civilium exemptos ; qui etiam addit, Patres, qui in Conciliis interfuerunt, vetuisse quidem, ne clerici adirent tribuna¬ lia judicum ssecularium : sed non vetuisse, ne vocati responderent : neque ullo modo prohibuisse temporalibus judicibus, ne cau¬ sas clericorum audirent : sed nec prohibere ulla ratione potuisse. Ac primum id osten¬ dere conatur ex concilio III. Carthaginiensi, can. 9. ubi sic legitur : « Item placuit, ut quisquis Episcoporum, presbyterorum, diat; conorum, sive clericorum, cum in Ecclesia ei crimen fuerit intentatum, vel civilis causa fuerit commota, si relicto Ecclesiastico judi¬ cio, publicis judiciis purgari voluerit, etiamsi pro ipso fuerit prolata sententia, locum suum amittat, et hoc in criminali judicio : in civili vero perdat, quod evicit, si locum suum obtinere voluit. Cui enim ad eligendos judices undique patet auctoritas, ipse se in¬ dignum fraterno consortio judicat, qui de universa Ecclesia male sentiendo, de judicio saeculari poscit auxilium : cum privatorum Christianorum causas (Apostolus ad Eccle- 7 98 DE POTESTATE PA1UE siam deferri, 'atque ibi determinari praeci¬ piat. » Hactenus verba concilii, in quibus nihil videre potuit Barclaius, pro clericorum exemptione : sed tantum id ait egisse Pa¬ tres, ut eorum clericorum levitatem, et pro¬ cacitatem coercerent, qui post causam in Ecclesia tractari coeptam, spretis, et relictis judicibus Ecclesiasticis, laico se arbitrio ju¬ dicioque committunt. At nos multa videmus in hujus concilii verbis pro exemptione clericorum. Primum enim aperte damnant Patres recursum ad judicia saecularium Magistratuum : quod certe non facerent, si saeculares Magistratus omni ex parte legitimi judices Ecclesiastico¬ rum fuissent, quae enim culpa erat appellare a judicio Episcopi ad judicium praesidis pro¬ vinciae, vel ipsius principis, si praeses, vel princeps legitimus judex erat, non solum clerici, sed etiam Episcopi ? Deinde conci¬ lium rescindit sententiam judicis saecularis contra clericum latam, dum judicat, ut in criminali judicio clericus a saeculari judice absolutus amittat locum suum ; et in judicio civili, perdat quod evicit, id est, neutri pro¬ sit sententia in favorem ejus a judice saecu¬ lari pronunciata : quamvis autem haec loco poenae decernantur ; tamen injusta fuisset poena, si crimen non fuisset clerico saecula¬ re judicium agnoscere. Denique quia Bar¬ claius dicit, concilium reprehendere solum eos clericos, qui post inchoatam causam in judicio ecclesiastico, eam transferunt ad ju¬ dicium saecularium potestatum, quod inju¬ riosum videri potest ecclesiasticis judicibus : audiat Milevitanum concilium ejusdem aeta¬ tis, et in eadem Africa celebratum : sic enim loquitur, can. 19. « Placuit, ut quicumqne ab imperatore cognitionem judiciorum pu¬ blicorum petierit, honore proprio privetur ; si autem episcopale judicium ab imperatore postulaverit, nihil ei obsit. » Ubi videmus non agi de judicio inchoato, sed absolute, et sub poena gravissima prohiberi clericis ne confugiant ad Imperatorem pro saeculari judicio obtinendo : concedi autem si Epi¬ scopale judicium ab Imperatore petatur, ad evitandum videlicet saeculare judicium. Transit deinde Barclaius ad concilium Chalcedonense, in quo sic statuitur, can. 9 : « Si quis clericus adversus clericum habeat negotium, non derelinquat proprium episco¬ pum, et ad saecularia percurratjudicia : sed prius actio ventiletur apud proprium episco¬ pum, vel certe consilio ejusdem episcopi apud quos utraeque partes voluerint, judi¬ cium obtinebunt: si quis praeter haec fecerit, canonicis correptionibus subjacebit.» Ex hoc canone dicit Barclaius nihil colligi, nisi ut in prima instantia apud episcopum causa ven¬ tiletur : deinde, si opus fuerit, ad saecularis judicis examen deferatur. Sed ista glossa destruit textum : nusquam enim in toto ca¬ none, vel aperte, vel obscure mentio fit judi¬ cii saecularis; et expresse in hoc canone di¬ citur, ut clerici ad saecularia judicia non re¬ currant. Praeterea in eodem loco concilium addit : « Quod si clericus causam habeat ad¬ versus Episcopum proprium, vel adversus alterum, apud synodum provinciae judice¬ tur. Quod si adversus ejusdem provinciae Metropolitanum episcopus, vel clericus ha¬ bet querelam, petat aut Primatem dioece- seos, autem sedem Urbis regiae Constantino- politanae, et apud ipsam judicetur. » Ubi cum optima esset occasio nominandi Praesi- dem provinciae, aut ipsum imperatorem : nulla tamen eorum mentio facta est. Quid igitur (quaerit Barclaius) sibi vult illud, Sed prius actio ventiletur apud Episcopum ? prius enim refertur ad posterius : et cum non sit in concilio explicatum, quid posterius faciendum sit, ratio postulat, utintelligamus, posterius recurrendum esse ad judicium sae¬ culare, ut constituit postea Justinianus, No¬ vella constitutione 83. Respondeo : Prius causa clerici ventilanda est apud Episcopum proprium : quod si ibi terminata non fuerit, recurrendum est ad superiores mediatos, Metropolitanum vide¬ licet, Patriarcham, et Papam : sed id non expressit concilium; quia notum erat, tum ex usu aliorum tribunalium, ubi semper a minore judice appellatur ad majorem ; tum ex Concilio Sardicensi generali can. 4. et 7. ubi ultima provocatio Ecclesiasticorum, de¬ claratur esse ad Episcopum Romanum, ad quos canones respiciens Gelasius Papa pri¬ mus in Epistola ad Faustum scribit : « Ipsi sunt canones, qui appellationes totius Ec- clesise ad hujus Sedis examen voluere defer¬ ri : ab ipsa vero nusquam prorsus appellari debere sanxerunt; » et in Epistola ad Episco¬ pos Dardaniae : « At illam, inquit, de quali¬ bet mundi parte canones appellari volue¬ runt : ab illa autem nemo est appellare per¬ missus. » Neque oportet canones Ecclesiae per Novellas Justiniani exponere, cum pos¬ sumus per alios canones, aut per usum Ec¬ clesiae illos explicare. IN REBUS TEMPORALIBUS 99 Adducit postea contra se Barclaius conci¬ lium Agathense, ubi can. 3. statuitur : « Ne clericus quemquam praesumat apud saecula¬ rem judicem, Episcopo non permittente pul¬ sare )> : et queritur corruptum esse hunc ca- nonem a Gratiano, qui in sua collectione 1 1 . q. \ can Clericum, ita posuit, a Clericum nullus praesumat apud saecularem judicem Episcopo, non permittente pulsare » : mira¬ tur etiam cur Bellarminus maluerit in hujus canonis citatione sequi potius Gratiani cor¬ ruptionem, quam concilii veritatem. Respondeo : Non est ullo modo credibile, Gratianum, virum probum, et Christianae perfectionis studiosum voluisse textum con¬ cilii depravare : sed potius credendum est, habuisse Gratianum aliamx lectionem illius canonis, quam nos habeamus. Sed ut ut res se habeat, utraque lectio exemptionem cle¬ ricorum satis aperte demonstrat. Nam in ip¬ so concilio etiamsi verba illa prima, clericus nec quemquam praesumat apud saecularem judicem pulsare, non multum pro exem¬ ptione facere videantur : tamen sequentia verba : « Sed si pulsatus fuerit, non respon¬ deat d : multum omnino faciunt pro exem¬ ptione : mandatur enim clerico, ut in judi¬ cium coram saeculari judice vocatus, non compareat, quo nihil apertius dici potuit : et in eumdem sensum recidit quod est apud Gratianum, clericum nullus praesumat apud saecularem judicem pulsare. Nam si non li¬ cet clerico respondere in judicio saeculari : neque licebit clerico, vel laico clericum ad judicium saeculare vocare. Quod autem notat Barclaius in secunda parte canonis, puniri laicum gravissima poe¬ na, qui per calumniam clericum, vel Eccle¬ siam fatigare tentaverit : non significat, li¬ citum fuisse laicis trahere clericum vel cau¬ sam Ecclesiae ad forum saeculare, modo id sine calumnia fieret : sed significat crimen longe gravius esse, et poena gravissima pu¬ niendum, si addatur calumnia, quam si abs¬ que calumnia id fiat. Sed neque certum est, concilium loqui de foro saeculari : potest enim fieri, ut laicus clericum accuset quidem ad suum forum, id est, ecclesiasticum, et tamen eum per calumniam injuste fatiget. Addit deinde Barclaius canonem octavum concilii primi Matisconensis, ubi sic legitur : « Ut nullus clericus ad judicem saecularem quemcumque alium fratrem de clericis accu¬ sare, aut ad causam dicendam trahere quo¬ cumque loco praesumat: sed omne negotium clericorum, aut in episcopi sui, aut presby¬ teri, aut archi diaconi praesentia finiatur. » Addit denique, canonem tertium decimum concilii tertii Toletani, in haec verba : a Diu¬ turna indisciplinatio, et licentiae inolitae praesumptio usque adeo illicitis ausibus adi¬ tum patefecit, ut clerici conclericos suos re¬ licto Pontifice suo, aci judicia publica per¬ trahant : proinde statuimus hoc de caetero non praesumi : si quis hoc praesumpseris fa¬ cere, et causam perdat, et a communione ef¬ ficiatur extraneus. His testimoniis conciliorum allatis, subjun¬ git Barclaius : « Haec illa sunt solemnia, et fere sola sacrorum canonum decreta, in quibus errorem suum fundant, qui falso pu¬ tant, concilia potuisse eximere, et de facto exemisse clericos de potestate laicorum, quos tamen ipsimet canones adeo perspicue redarguunt, ut nihil necesse sit alia ad eam opinionem convellendam aliunde accerse- re. » Respondeo : Primum non sunt haec sola coucilia, quae exemptionem clericorum de¬ clarant, sed multa alia, ex quibus haec bre¬ viter commemoranda censui. In concilio Lateranensi sub Innocentio III. cap. 43. sic legitur : « Nimis de jure divino quidam laici usurpare conantur, cum viros ecclesiasticos, nihil temporale obtinentes ab eis, ad prae¬ standa sibi fidelitatis juramenta compel¬ lunt. » In concilio Constantiensi, sess, 31 i habentur haec ^erba : « Laici nullam in cle- ricos jurisdictionem, aut potestatem habent.» In concilio Lateranensi ;sub Leone X. sess. 9. : « Cum a jure tam divino, quam humano laicis potestas nulla in Ecclesiasticas perso¬ nas attributa sit, innovamus omnes, et sin¬ gulas constitutiones, etc. » In concilio Tri- dentino sess. 25. cap. 20. de reformatione : « Ecclesiae, et personarum Ecclesiasticarum immunitas, Dei ordinatione, et canonicis sanctionibus instituta est. » Ad haec, et similia, quae nimis aperte lo¬ quuntur, nihil Barclaius respondit, sed ea} quasi numquam legisset, omisit. Deinde nos non dicimus a conciliis proprie clericos fuisse exemptos, sed eorum exem¬ ptionem declaratam, et poenis additis con¬ firmatam. Denique mirum est, cur Barclaius dicere audeat, ex canonibus allegatis redargui, et convelli opinionem exemptionis, cum ea multis modis confirmetur, et roboretur. Nam si laici Magistratus legitimi judices clerico- 100 DE POTESTATE VAVJE rum essent; quo jure Matisconense conci¬ lium supra citatum, omnia negotia clerico¬ rum in episcopi, aut presbyteri, aut archi dia¬ coni praesentia finienda esse decerneret? Et cur concilium Toletanum etiam citatum, tanta verborum asperitate vocaret praesumptio¬ nem, et illicitos ausus, recursum ad saecula¬ re judicium ? Et quo modo denique idem concilium auderet sententiam judicis saecu¬ laris irritare, et recurrentem clericum ad forum saecularis judicis excommunicare ? id enim significant illa verba : « Causam, per¬ dat, et a communione efficiatur extraneus. »