Bellarmine · De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus · On the Power of the Supreme Pontiff in Temporal Matters, against William Barclay
Chapter 35: Barclay's Great Word, by Which the Exemption of Clerics Is Wholly Taken Away, Is Refuted
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. XII, De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaium, a treatise of 1610. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
In the thirty-third chapter Barclay, all fear and shame laid aside, pronounces thus: “I shall say more, and I shall say the truth, although it will perhaps breed me hatred from those to whom everything is hateful which is even in the least contrary to their zeal and desire. I shall say, then, and shall utter a great word, which perhaps either no one has yet mentioned, or, if anyone has mentioned it, at least he did not, as he ought, warn those whose concern it was to know it: namely that clerics throughout the whole world, of whatever order or rank they are, are not yet in any way exempted and freed from the temporal power of the secular princes in whose kingdoms and regions they live, but, just like other citizens, are subject to them in all things which pertain to the political and temporal administration and jurisdiction, and that the right of life and death over them, as over other subjects, belongs to such princes.” This great word of Barclay is nothing else than the great rashness and intolerable error of one man, who, to flatter kings, does not fear to set himself against the truth, and against all the writers, theologians and canonists, of whom we cited two a little before, namely Soto and Covarruvias; to whom we could have added innumerable other writers, and, what is greater, the four general councils cited a little before, namely the two Lateran councils, that of Constance and that of Trent, in which it is affirmed in general that laymen have no power over clerics; nor are emperors or kings excepted. Nor need we labour in showing the novelty of this doctrine, for he himself confesses that he is about to utter a great word which perhaps no one has yet mentioned.
But let us see by what arguments Barclay strives to persuade the world of so great and hitherto unheard-of a word; and I shall contract into a brief summary his whole reasoning, that what force it has may be more easily perceived. He, then, argues thus: “Christians, both clerics and laymen, were subject to unbelieving princes, and could be judged by them; because the law of Christ deprives no one of his right and dominion. Again, believing princes did indeed exempt clerics by their privileges from the power of inferior magistrates; but did not exempt them from their own power; for nowhere has it been recorded by any writer that the princes who granted clerics these privileges so released them from themselves that they were no longer under them. Nay, princes neither could nor yet can grant clerics settled in their kingdoms such liberty that they be not under their temporal power, or that when they offend they cannot be judged and punished by them, unless by the same act they abdicate the principality. For it is proper to a prince to be able to punish the citizens and members of his commonwealth; but clerics, as far as temporal things are concerned, are citizens and members of the political commonwealth, whose head and ruler is the prince. Wherefore the emperor Charles V ordered Hermann, archbishop of Cologne, to be summoned before him at law, to clear himself of the crimes objected to him by the clergy and the university, as Surius witnesses in the Commentary of the year 1545. And many princes have reserved to themselves certain offences of clerics to be specially punished, and commit them to be judged by their magistrates; such are those crimes which in France are called privileged, as of majesty, of carrying arms, of counterfeit coin, and the like.” So he. From all of which it follows that clerics are not exempt from the power and jurisdiction of temporal princes.
I shall now answer in order to the single propositions. To the first, on the subjection of clerics to unbelieving princes, there are two opinions, as we said above; and neither favours Barclay. The true opinion is that clerics were by right exempt even from the power of unbelieving princes, although in fact they were subject; and he exempted them, as his own ministers, who in Apocalypse 1 is truly called the Prince of the kings of the earth. So according to this opinion Barclay's first proposition is to be denied, which he neither proved anywhere nor proves in this place, but assumes as granted; which nevertheless the graver writers do not grant, namely all those who teach that this exemption is of divine law. But even if it were granted, Barclay would gather nothing from it, since that consequence would be denied: Therefore clerics are subject to the judgment and power of believing princes; for this proposition, which is the second in Barclay, all Catholic writers, both theologians and canonists, deny; and that consequence is denied because the Supreme Pontiff has absolutely exempted clerics from the power of believing princes, who acknowledge his power; but from the power of unbelieving princes, who do not acknowledge his power, he has not so absolutely exempted them, since he cannot restrain them by ecclesiastical censures; Christian princes themselves also exempted clerics, understanding how great is the dignity of clerics, which unbelieving princes did not do, since that spiritual dignity was not known to them. To the third proposition, the law of Christ deprives no one of his right and dominion, I have already answered above in the preceding chapter, where I showed that by the exemption of clerics princes are not deprived of the right which they had over the same before they were clerics of itself and properly, but consequently and as it were by accident; as when a son of a family is raised to the episcopal height, he is taken out of the paternal power; nor yet is injury done to the father, since the father is not deprived of his right of itself, but consequently; for the Church does not intend to deprive the father of the right of paternal power, but to raise that person to the rank of which he is worthy, although from that follows that deprivation of paternal power. See many other examples in the preceding chapter.
To the fourth proposition, which was that it has been recorded by no writer that princes exempted clerics from their own power, but only that they exempted them from the power of inferior magistrates, I answer: he who says this seems either to have read nothing, or to have wished to deceive readers. For Rufinus writes, book 10 of the history, chapter 2, that the emperor Constantine pronounced in express words that it was not lawful for him to judge priests, but rather that he was to be judged by them. Where he plainly enough declared that priests are exempt not only from the power of inferior judges, but also from the rule of the supreme prince himself. With which declaration agrees the seventh law of the same Constantine in the Theodosian Code, on bishops and clerics: “Let the readers of the divine writings,” he says, “and subdeacons, and the other clerics, who through the injury of heretics have been summoned to the curia, be released; and for the future, after the likeness of the East, let them in no way be summoned to the curias, but enjoy the fullest immunity.” So he, who, since he absolutely forbids clerics to be summoned to the curias, and wills them to enjoy the fullest immunity, and excepts nothing at all, manifestly wishes that they be not summoned even to the curia of the prince himself; for it would not be the fullest immunity if they were liable to the princely power. Like is the law of Theodosius and Valentinian, Theodosian Code, last law on bishops and clerics, where we read thus: “The clerics, whom an ill-omened presumer had proclaimed ought to be brought without distinction before secular judges, we reserve to the episcopal audience. For it is not right that the ministers of the divine office be subjected to the will of temporal powers.” In which law, while nothing is excepted, all things seem to be included, unless perhaps the power of the prince ought not to be called temporal. Justinian himself too, in the eighty-third Novel, which is often cited by the adversaries, as if in it clerics in criminal matters seemed not exempt from the secular court, has these words: “Let him first be stripped by the bishop beloved of God of the priestly dignity, and so come under the hand of the laws.” Where we see that clerics, while they remain clerics, are not under the power of the laws, but only after they have been deprived of the clerical honour by the bishops; and thereby that they are exempt, while they are clerics, not only from the power of inferior judges, but from the very laws of princes, as far as coercion is concerned; and this is what the council of Constance, session 31, said: “Laymen have no jurisdiction or power over clerics.” And certainly under the name of laymen it includes even supreme princes, since they too are laymen. Lastly, to pass over many other things, the emperor Frederick II, in his first constitution, speaks in general when he says: “Likewise we decree that no one presume to drag an ecclesiastical person in a criminal or civil question to a secular judgment, against the imperial constitutions and the canonical sanctions”; so it stands there. But by secular judgment are understood not only the judgments of inferior judges, but also of supreme, since all are equally secular. And in fact we see it so observed wherever reverence for the sacred canons flourishes.
To the fifth proposition, which was that supreme princes could not exempt clerics from their royal power, we answer that this is manifestly false. For although the supreme prince cannot exempt all who live in his kingdom from all his power, unless he abdicates the principality, yet he can exempt some part of his people from some part of his power, or even from the whole, and at the same time be truly called and be prince. For it is proper to the supreme prince to exact tribute from the people subject to him, as the Apostle teaches in Romans 13: For therefore also you pay tribute; for they are the ministers of God, serving unto this purpose; and yet the king can make whom he will in his kingdom immune from tributes. For it is said in 1 Kings, chapter 17: The man that shall slay the Philistine, the king will enrich with great riches, and will make his father's house free from tribute in Israel. So also if some great king in the midst of his kingdom either makes one city free, or gives it absolutely to someone, he will not on that account be unable to be called king of his whole kingdom, especially if he protects and defends that city, and those citizens keep the laws of the kingdom of their own accord. So then kings could exempt clerics living in their kingdom from their royal power, and yet be called and be kings not only of laymen but also of clerics, who freely keep his political laws, and bring the causes which they have with laymen, when they are plaintiffs, to his tribunal, and acquiesce in his judgment and sentence in such causes. And because the king labours and watches for the defence not only of laymen but also of clerics, therefore not only laymen but also clerics pay him the honour which is owed to kings, according to the precept of the Apostle Peter: Fear God, honour the king, 1 Peter 2. Lastly, they pray to God for the king, as the Apostle warns in 1 Timothy 2, saying: I desire therefore, first of all, that supplications, prayers, intercessions and thanksgivings be made for all men, for kings, and for all that are in high station; and not only do they pour out prayers to God for kings in general, but in particular they say, for our king N., or for our emperor N.
“But,” says Barclay, “all members ought to be under the head, and all citizens under the ruler of the city, so that the head and ruler can punish all members and citizens; but clerics are members of the political body, and citizens of the earthly city, as to temporal things.” I answer: in the natural body it is necessary that all members be under the head, since in such a body exemption has no place. But in the political body, in which exemption has place, it is not necessary that all members, that is, all citizens, be properly under the power of the head, that is, the ruler; and thereby it is not necessary that princes be able to punish all citizens, just as it is not necessary that all citizens pay tributes, or that all help the temporal commonwealth with arms. “But the commonwealth will be disturbed if clerics transgress the laws of princes with impunity.” I answer: they will not transgress with impunity, since they will be restrained by their bishop or by the Supreme Pontiff. But “Charles V summoned Hermann, archbishop of Cologne, to his tribunal.” It is true; but he summoned him as a prince of the empire; for Pope Paul III summoned the same man to his tribunal as archbishop, the same Surius being witness in the same place, which Surius afterwards writes that in the year 1547, by order of the Supreme Pontiff and the emperor, Hermann was removed from his place. But the sentence of deposition was pronounced by the Pontiff; and how diligent an observer of ecclesiastical immunity Charles V was can be understood from this, that in the year of salvation 1520, an atrocious conspiracy against the same Charles having been discovered, in which some churchmen were mixed, Charles punished the laymen, and sent the churchmen back to their ecclesiastical superiors to be punished, as Molina witnesses, book 4, chapter 21, on the Spanish primogeniture. Barclay added that there are certain grave offences, which are called privileged in France, reserved to the supreme princes. But this argument can be turned back on its author; for they are not called privileged because the prince himself reserved them when he granted the privilege of exemption to clerics, as Barclay thinks; but they are called privileged because by privilege of the Apostolic See it has been granted to the kings of the Franks that they may take cognizance of those offences; which Clarus explains, question 36, final paragraph, at the words further I ask, and on the Clementine Ut clericorum, on the office of the ordinary judge, limitation 13.
To the last proposition, which Barclay gathers from the foregoing, namely that the exemption of clerics from the power of princes is null, I answer that that proposition is wrongly gathered from what has been said; both because it has been shown that supreme princes could and did wish to exempt clerics from their power; and because, even if they had not wished or had not been able, the Supreme Pontiff could and did wish to exempt them, or to declare them exempt by divine law; nor can princes, even supreme, hinder this exemption. And this is the common opinion of the learned theologians and canonists, which hitherto none but heretics have resisted. And indeed that those hold this who would have the exemption to be of divine law not even Barclay doubts, and Navarrus expressly teaches it on the chapter Novit, on judgments, notable 6, number 30. But that those also confess and teach the same who think the exemption is not of divine law is clear from Francis Vitoria, relection on the power of the Church, question 6, proposition 5; from Dominic Soto on the fourth, distinction 25, question 2, article 2; from Martin Ledesma on the fourth, part 2, question 20, article 4; from Dominic Bañez on 2-2, question 67, article 1; and from Diego Covarruvias, Practical Questions, chapter 31, conclusions 3 and 4, whose words, as also Soto's, we brought forward in the preceding chapter. Hence is solved the question which Barclay left unsolved at the end of the chapter, whether it is lawful for a prince to revoke the privilege of exemption of clerics. For the doctors alleged answer that it is in no way lawful.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXX Y. Refutatur grande verbum Barclaii , quo exemptio clericorum funditus tollitur. In cap. 33. Barclaius omni timore, vel pudore deposito, ita pronunciat : « Amplius dicam, et veritatem dicam, licet odium for¬ tassis mihi parituram ab iis, quibus omnia sunt invidiosa, quae suo studio, et desiderio vel minimum adversantur. Dicam ergo, et grande verbum proloquar, cujus forte, aut nondum meminit quisquam, aut si meminit, saltem eos quorum intererat id scire, non ut debuit commonefecit, clericos scilicet per totum orbem, quocumque ordine, vel gradu sint, non esse adhuc ullo modo exemptos, et liberatos a potestate temporali principum saecularium, in quorum regnis, et regioni¬ bus vitam degunt, sed perinde, ac caeteri cives, iis subjectos esse in omnibus, quae ad politicam, et temporalem administrationem, et jurisdictionem pertinent, inque eos jus vitae, ac necis, sicut in caeteros subditos ad ejusmodi Principes pertinere. » Hoc grande verbum Barclaii, nihil est aliud, nisi grandis temeritas, et intolerabilis error hominis unius, qui ut regibus adule¬ tur, non veretur opponere se veritati, et scriptoribus omnibus theologis, et canoni- stis, quorum duos paulo ante citavimus, So- tum videlicet, et Govarruviam : quibus ad¬ dere potuissemus scriptores alios innumera¬ biles, et quod majus est concilia quatuor generalia paulo ante citata, Lateranensia videlicet duo, Constantiense, et Tridenti- nuiu, iu quibus generatim affirmatur, non habere laicos ullam in clericos potestatem ; neque excipiuntur imperatores vel reges. Neque est quod laboremus in demonstranda hujus doctrinae novitate, nam ipse fatetur, se verbum grande prolocuturum, cujus forte nondum meminit quisquam. Sed videamus, quibus argumentis, tam grande, et adhuc inauditum verbum Barcla¬ ius persuadere orbi terrarum nitatur, con¬ traham autem in breve compendium totam ejus ratiocinationem, ut quam vim habeat , facilius percipiatur. Sic igitur ille : « Chri¬ stiani tum clerici, tum laici subjecti erant principibus infidelibus, atque ab eis judica¬ ri possunt : quia Christi lex neminem privat jure dominioque suo. Rursus Principes fide¬ les exemerunt quidem privilegiis suis cleri¬ cos a potestate Magistratuum inferiorum ; sed non exemerunt a potestate sua : nus¬ quam enim memoriae proditum est ab ullo scriptore , principes, qui istis clericos privile¬ giis donarunt, ita eos a se liberos dimisisse, . ut sibi amplius non 'subessent. Imo nec po¬ tuerunt principes, nec adhuc possunt cleri¬ cos in suis regnis constitutos ea libertate do¬ nare, ne ipsis potestate temporali subsint ; neve delinquentes ab iis judicari, et puniri possint, nisi eadem opera sese principatu abdicent. Nam proprium est principis posse animadvertere in cives, et membra suae rei- publicse ; sunt autem clerici, quod ad tem¬ poralia attinet, cives, et membra reipubli- cae politica}, cujus caput, et rector est prin¬ ceps. Quare Carolus Y. imperator Herma- num archiepiscopum Coloniensem in jus ad se vocari jussit, ut de criminibus a clero, et universitate ei objectis se purgaret, teste Surio in Comment. anni 1345. Et multi principes sibi quaedam clericorum delicta specialiter vindicanda reservarunt , eaque suis magistratibus judicanda committunt : ut sunt illa crimina, qua} in Gallia privilegia- ta vocantur, veluti Majestatis , gestationis armorum, adulterinae monetae, et similia ». Haec ille. Ex quibus omnibus sequitur, cleri¬ cos non esse exemptos a potestate, et juris¬ dictione principum temporalium. Respondebo nunc ordine ad singulas pro¬ positiones. Ad primam illam de subjectione clericorum principibus infidelibus duae sen¬ tentiae sunt, ut supra diximus : et neutra favet Barclaio. Vera sententia est, clericos jure fuisse exemptos etiam a potestate prin¬ cipum infidelium, quamvis de facto subjecti essent : exemit autem eos, tamquam pro¬ prios suos ministros ille, qui Apoc. i. vere dicitur Princeps regum terrae. Itaque juxta hanc sententiam neganda est propositio pri- IN REBUS TEMPORALIBUS 101 ma Barclaii, quam neque ille usquam pro¬ bavit, neque hoc loco probat, sed assumit, ut concessam ; quam tamen graviores scri¬ ptores non concedunt, videlicet omnes illi, qui exemptionem istam de jure divino esse docent. Sed etiamsi concederetur, nihil inde Barclaius colligeret, quoniam negaretur illa consecutio, Ergo subjecti sunt clerici judicio, et potestati principum fidelium : hanc enim propositionem, quae est secunda apud Bar- claium, negant omnes catholici scriptores, tam theologi, quam canonistae : negatur au¬ tem illa consecutio, quoniam summus Ponti¬ fex clericos absolute exemit a potestate prin¬ cipum fidelium, qui ejus potestatem agno¬ scunt : a potestate autem principum infide¬ lium, qui ejus potestatem non agnoscunt, non ita absolute exemit : cum eos censuris ecclesiasticis coercere non possit : ipsi etiam Christiani principes clericos exemerunt, in- telligentes, quanta sit dignitas clericorum, quod principes infideles non fecerunt, cum eis spiritualis illa dignitas nota non esset, Ad illam tertiam propositionem, lex Christi neminem privat jure, dominioque suo : jam supra respondi capite superiore, ubi osten¬ di, per exemptionem clericorum non privari pincipes jure, quod habebant in eosdem, antequam clerici essent, per se, et proprie, sed consequenter, et quasi per accidens : quemadmodum cum filius familias evehitur ad Episcopale fastigium, eximitur a patria potestate; nec tamen fit injuria patri, quo¬ niam mon privatur pater jure suo per se, sed consequenter : non enim intendit Eccle¬ sia privare patrem jure patriae potestatis, sed evehere personam illam ad gradum, quo dignus est, quamvis inde sequatur illa privatio patriae potestatis. Yide multa alia exempla capite superiore. Ad quartam propositionem, quae erat, a nullo scriptore memoriae proditum esse, quod principes exemerint clericos a pote¬ state sua, sed solum quod exemerint a pote¬ state magistratuum inferiorum, Respondeo : Videtur qui hoc dicit, aut nihil legisse, aut lectores fallere voluisse. Scribit enim Ruffinus lib. x. hist. cap. 2. Constantinum imperatorem disertis verbis pronuntiasse, sibi non esse licitum judicare Sacerdotes, sed ab aliis potius se esse judi¬ candum. Ubi satis aperte declaravit^ sacer¬ dotes exemptos esse non solum a potestate judicum inferiorum, sed etiam ab ipsius supremi Principis imperio. Cui declarationi consentanea est lex ejusdem Constantini septima in Codice Theodosiano, de Episc. et clericis. « Lectores, inquit, divinorum apicum, et hypodiaconi, et caeteri clerici, qui per injuriam haereticorum ad curiam devocati sunt, absolvantur ; et de caetero ad similitudinem Orientis minime ad curias de¬ vocentur, sed immunitate plenissima po¬ tiantur ». Haec ille, qui cum absolute pro¬ hibeat Clericos ad curias devocari, et velit plenissima immunitate potiri, et nihil om¬ nino excipiat, manifestum est, eum velle, ut neque ad ipsius principis curiam devocen¬ tur : non enim esset plenissima immunitas, si principali potestati essent obnoxii. Similis est lex Theodosii, et Valentiniani Cod. Theod. 1. ultima de Episc. et Clericis, ubi sic legimus : « Clericos, quos indiscretirn ad saeculares Judices debere deduci infaustus praesumptor edixerat, Episcopali audientiae reservamus. Fas .enim non est , ut divini muneris Ministri temporalium potestatum subdantur arbitrio ». In qua lege dum nihil excipitur, omnia comprehendi videntur, nisi forte principis potestas, temporalis dici non debeat. Ipse quoque Justinianus novella octogesima tertia, quae saepe ab adversariis citatur, quasi in ea Clerici in criminalibus exempti non videantur a foro saeculari, ha¬ bet haec verba : « Prius hunc spoliari a Deo amabili Episcopo sacerdotali dignitate, et ita sub legum fieri manu » . Ubi videmus, clericos, dum clerici permanent, non esse sub potestate legum, sed solum posteaquam clericali honore per Episcopos privati sunt : ac per hoc non solum exemptos esse, dum clerici sunt, a potestate judicum inferiorum, sed ab ipsis principum legibus, quod ad coactionem attinet : atque hoc est quod con¬ cilium Constantiense sess. MI. dixit, « Laicos nullam in Clericos jurisdictionem, vel pote¬ statem habere ». Et certe nomine laicorum principes etiam supremos comprehendit, cum, et ipsi laici sint. Denique, ut alia multa preeteream, imperator Fridericus Secundus, in prima sua Constitutione generaliter lo¬ quitur, dum ait : « Item statuimus, ut nullus Ecclesiasticam personam in criminali quse- stione, vel civili trahere ad judicium saecu- lare praesumat, contra constitutiones impe¬ riales, et canonicas sanctiones », haec ibi. Per saeculare autem judicium non intelli- guntur judicia solum judicum inferiorum, sed etiam supremorum , cum omnia sint aeque saecularia. Atque re ipsa sic observari d 02 DE POTESTATE PAPiE videmus, ubi sacrorum Canonum reverentia viget. Ad quintam propositionem, quae erat, non potuisse principes supremos eximere cleri¬ cos a sua regia potestate : respondemus, id manifeste falsum esse. Nam etiamsi non possit summus princeps, omnes qui in regno suo degunt ab omni potestate sua eximere, nisi principatu se abdicet, tamen potest ali¬ quam partem populi sui ab aliqua parte potestatis suae, vel etiam a tota eximere, et simul vere princeps dici, et esse. Proprium enim summi principis est, tributum a po¬ pulo sibi subjecto exigere, ut Apostolus do¬ cet ad Rom. xiii. Ideo enim , inquit, et tribu¬ ta praestatis : ministri enim Dei sunt, in hoc ipsum servientes : et potest tamen rex, quos vult in suo regno immunes a tributis facere. Dicitur enim lib. I Reg. cap. xvii. Qui per¬ cusserit Pkilistaeum, ditabit eum rex divitiis magnis , et domum patris ejus faciet absque tributo in Israel (1). Sic etiamsi magnus ali¬ quis rex in medio regno suo civitatem unam, vel liberam faciat, vel alicui absolute donet, non ideo rex dici non poterit totius regni sui, praesertim si civitatem illam pro¬ tegat, et defendat; et cives illi leges regni sponte servent : sic igitur potuerunt reges, clericos in suo regno degentes eximere a potestate sua regia, et reges tamen dici, et esse non solum laicorum, sed etiam clerico¬ rum, qui leges ejus politicas libere servant; et causas, quas cum laicis habent, cum acto¬ res sunt ad tribunal ipsius deferunt : et ju¬ dicio, ac sententia ejus in ejusmodi causis acquiescunt. Et quoniam rex pro defensione non solum laicorum, sed etiam clericorum laborat, et vigilat, ideo non solum laici, sed etiam clerici honorem ei deferunt, qui regi¬ bus debetur, juxta praeceptum apostoli Petri, Deum timete , regem honorificate. I Pet. ii. Denique pro rege Deum orant, ut Apostolus monet I Timoth. n. dicens : Obsecro igitur primum omnium feri obsecrationes , orationes , postulationes , gratiarum actiones pro omnibus hominibus , pro regibus , et pro omnibus , qui in sublimitate sunt (2) : nec solum pro regi¬ bus generatim preces ad Deum fundunt, sed in specie dicunt, pro rege nostro N. vel pro imperatore nostro N. « At, inquit Rarclaius, omnia membra debent subesse capiti, et omnes cives rectori civitatis, ita ut caput, et rector in omnia membra , et cives animadvertere possit : sunt autem clerici membra corporis poli¬ tici, et cives terrenae civitatis, quoad tempo¬ ralia ». Respondeo : In corpore naturali necesse est, ut omnia membra capiti subsint ; quo¬ niam in ejusmodi corpore locum non habet exemptio. Sed in corpore politico, in quo locum habet exemptio, non est necesse, ut omnia membra, id est, omnes cives proprie subsint potestati capitis, id est, rectoris, ac per hoc non est necesse, ut principes in omnes cives animadvertere possint, sicut non est necesse, ut omnes cives solvant tri¬ buta, neque ut omnes armis Rempublicam temporalem juvent. « At perturbabitur res¬ publica, si clerici leges principum impune transgrediantur ». Respondeo : Non impune transgredientur, quoniam ab Episcopo suo, vel Pontifice Summo coercebuntur. At « Carolus Y. vocavit ad tribunal suum Her- mannum Archiepiscopum Coloniensem ». Verum est, sed vocavit, ut principem impe¬ rii, eumdem enim ad suum tribunal vocavit Paulus III. Pontifex, ut archiepiscopum, eo¬ dem teste Surio, in eodem loco, qui Surius postea scribit, anno 1547. jussu summi Pontificis, et imperatoris Hermannum loco motum fuisse. Sententia vero depositionis a Pontifice lata est; quam autem fuerit Caro¬ lus Y. diligens observator Ecelesiasticse im¬ munitatis, ex eo potest intelligi, quod anno salutis 1520. detecta atroci conspiratione adversus eumdem Carolum, in qua Eccle¬ siastici nonnulli intermisti erant, Carolus in laicos animadvertit, ecclesiasticos superio¬ ribus ecclesiasticis puniendos remisit, testis Molin. lib. iv. cap. 21. de Hisp. primog. Addebat Barclaius, esse quaedam delicta gravia, quae privilegiata dicuntur in Gallia, summis Principibus reservata. Sed hoc ar¬ gumentum in ipsum auctorem retorqueri potest : illa enim non dicuntur privilegiata, quia princeps ipse sibi reservaverit, quando privilegium exemptionis clericis concessit, ut Barclaius existimat : sed dicuntur privi¬ legiata, quia privilegio Sedis Apostolicae in¬ dultum est regibus Francorum, ut ea delicta cognoscere possint : id quod explicat Clarus q. 36. paragr. fin. versic. ulterius, quaero, et in Clementina , Ut Clericorum , de offic. Judic. ordin. limit. 13. Ad ultimam propositionem, quam colligit (1) Rom. XIII, 6; I Reg. XVII, 26. - (2) I Pet. II, 17 ; 1 Timoth. II, 1. IN REBUS TEMPORALIBUS 103 Barclaius ex supradictis, quod videlicet, exemptio Clericorum a potestate principum nulla sit, Respondeo : Eam propositionem ex dictis perperam colligi ; tum quia demonstratum est, summos principes potuisse, et voluisse clericos a sua potestate eximere : tum quia licet ipsi non voluissent, aut non potuissent, " potuit, et voluit Summus Pontifex illos exi¬ mere, aut jure divino exemptos declarare : neque possunt principes etiam supremi hanc exemptionem impedire. Atque hsec est com¬ munis Doctorum Theologorum, et Canoni- starum sententia, cui hactenus nonnisi hae¬ retici restiterunt. Et quidem quod hoc sen¬ tiant illi, qui exemptionem volunt esse de jure divino, ne Barclaius quidem dubitat, et expresse docet Navarrus in cap. Novit, de Judiciis, notab. 6. num, 30. Quod autem idem etiam fateantur, et doceant illi, qui exemptionem arbitrantur non esse de jure divino, perspicuum est ex Francisco Victo¬ ria, Relect. de potestate Eccles. q. 6. pro- posit. 5. ex Dominico a Soto, in 4. dist. 25. q. 2. art. 2. ex Martino Ledesmio in quar¬ tum, part. 2. q. 20. art. 4. ex Dominico Bannes in 22. q. 67. art. J. et ex Didaco Covarruvia pract. queest. cap. 31. conci. 3. et 4. cujus verba, ut etiam Soti, capite su¬ periore adduximus. Hinc solvitur quaestio, quam Barclaius in extremo capite insolutam reliquit, liceat ne principi privilegium ex¬ emptionis clericorum revocare. Respon¬ dent enim Doctores allegati, nullo modo licere.