Bellarmine · De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus · On the Power of the Supreme Pontiff in Temporal Matters, against William Barclay
Chapter 37: The First Example Brought Forward for the Power of the Supreme Pontiff in Temporal Matters Is Defended
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. XII, De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaium, a treatise of 1610. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
In chapters 35 and 36 Barclay reports and refutes certain arguments of Nicholas Sander, which whole disputation I have judged should be passed over in this place, since I have not undertaken the burden of proving that all the arguments which are proposed by Catholic writers are insoluble demonstrations. I know that many probable things are sometimes mixed with more solid arguments, which, although by themselves and alone they have no force to persuade, yet, added to firmer arguments, help not a little to confirm the matter in hand. So I have taken upon myself to defend Sander's conclusion, which is common among all Catholic writers, against Barclay, whose hands are against all, as the Scripture speaks of Ishmael; and at the same time I have judged that I must answer what Barclay has properly objected against my own writings. In chapter 38, then, he reports my first argument drawn from an example and figure of the Old Testament; this is the sum of the argument. King Uzziah, in 2 Chronicles, chapter 26, when he usurped the office of the priests, and, driven back by the priests, would not yield, was at once struck by God with leprosy, and by the judgment of the priests, separated from the assembly of the people, dwelt apart in a solitary house until his death; from which it came about that he was deprived of the administration of the kingdom, and his son judged the people in the city. From this an argument of this kind is made: If on account of bodily leprosy the priest could once judge a king and deprive him of his kingdom, why can he not do it now on account of spiritual leprosy, that is, heresy, which was figured by leprosy, as Saint Augustine teaches, book 2 of Questions on the Gospels, question 40, especially since in 1 Corinthians 10 Paul says that all things happened to the Jews in figure?
To this argument Barclay answers that King Uzziah was by the judgment of the priests separated from the rest of the people on account of leprosy, and that in the same way a king can now by the judgment of the Supreme Pontiff be separated on account of heresy, by excommunication, from the assembly of the faithful; but he denies that King Uzziah was deprived of his kingdom, and therefore also denies that a king can be deprived of his kingdom by the Pontiff on account of heresy. And that Uzziah was not deprived of his kingdom he proves from this, that the Scripture witnesses that he began to reign in the sixteenth year of his age, and reigned fifty-two years, 4 Kings 15 and 2 Chronicles 26; therefore he reigned from his sixteenth year until his death. He proves the same also from this, that the same Scripture says: Jotham the king's son governed the palace, and ruled the king's house, and judged the people of the land; for from this it is gathered that the king's son administered the kingdom not by his own authority, but in the name of his sick father. So Barclay. I answer: Uzziah, struck with leprosy, kept indeed the royal name, but a bare one; but his son, without the royal name, administered the kingdom with full power; this Josephus witnesses in express words, book 9 of the Antiquities, chapter 11, where he says that “Uzziah lived as a private man in a solitary house, and his son administered the commonwealth”; which same thing the Scripture indicates plainly enough when it says: The king's son judged the people of the land; nor does it add that he did this by his father's order, or in his father's name; nor that during the whole time in which the king, struck with leprosy, remained in the solitary house, any part of the government belonged to him in any way. And this I understood when I said in the argument that Uzziah was forced to resign the kingdom to his son; for by kingdom I signified not the word king, but the authority; which authority the father did not keep, but lived as a private man, as Josephus speaks. In this, then, the force of the argument drawn from the example is placed, that as King Uzziah, struck with leprosy, was by the judgment of the priests forced to dwell in a solitary house, and, the administration of the kingdom laid down, to live as a private man; so also a heretical king can by the judgment of the Supreme Priest be separated by excommunication from the assembly of the godly, not only as to communication in the sacraments and prayers, as Barclay admits, but also as to forensic judgment and the administration of the kingdom, which Barclay denies. But the royal name was left to Uzziah. That is true indeed; but the royal name ought not on that account to be left to a man excommunicated and deposed on account of heresy; for spiritual leprosy is worse than bodily leprosy, and the Christian priest is more excellent than the Levitical priest, and the thing figured is more perfect than the figure itself; for so the paschal lamb was not equal to Christ crucified, and manna is inferior to the Eucharist, and circumcision does not equal baptism.
But what Barclay disputes about the difference between the authority of reigning and the administration of the kingdom is not to the point; both because Uzziah must be said to have been deprived not of the administration only, but also of the authority, since Josephus says that he lived as a private man in great grief after receiving the stroke of leprosy; and also because Barclay does not grant that a heretical king can be deprived of the administration of the kingdom; for he speaks thus on page 312: “But what I said, that the Pope can separate a heretical king from the communion of the faithful by excommunication, is to be understood of a spiritual separation of minds, not of bodies; for subjects ought not to deny service to an excommunicated king.” So he, who without doubt, as he also taught above, does not allow that the administration of the kingdom can be forbidden to a heretical king by the Pontiff, and a guardian given him, as he himself confesses that his son was given to King Uzziah as guardian. Wherefore he afterwards says falsely that “the figure of Uzziah, leprosy and separation agrees most beautifully with king, heresy and excommunication; and that from this figure the temporal power of the Pontiff is shown to be wholly fictitious, usurped and foreign to divine law.” For how does the figure agree with the thing figured, if in the figure is set a king forced to dwell in a solitary house and to handle no business of the kingdom, and in the thing figured is set a king freely residing in the royal city and pronouncing law as he did before? And if the truth of the figure requires that nothing less, but rather something more, be found in the thing figured than in the figure itself, and therefore it is necessary that a heretical king be deprived by the sentence of the Pontiff of the administration of the kingdom and of the authority itself too, how from this figure is the temporal power of the Pope shown to be fictitious, and usurped, and foreign to divine law? Let our argument stand, then, as aptly drawn from the example, and as one that Barclay could not shake.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXXVII. Defenditur primum exemplum allatum pro po¬ testate summi Pontificis in temporalibus. In cap. 35. et 36. refert, et refellit Bar¬ claius argumenta quaedam Nicolai Sanderi, quam totam disputationem omittendam hoc loco esse censui, quoniam non suscepi onus probandi omnia argumenta, quae a Catholi¬ cis scriptoribus proponuntur, esse insolubi¬ les demonstrationes. Scio multa interdum probabilia admisceri argumentis solidiori¬ bus, quae quamvis per se, ac sola, vim per¬ suadendi non habeant, tamen addita firmi¬ oribus argumentis, non parum juvant ad rem, de qua agitur, confirmandam. Itaque conclusionem Sanderi, quae communis est inter omnes Catholicos scriptores, adversus Barclaium, cujus manus sunt contra omnes, ut scriptura de Ismaele loquitur, defenden¬ dam mihi desumpsi, et simul ad ea, quae proprie adversus mea scripta Barclaius ob¬ jecit, respondendum mihi esse judicavi. Igi¬ tur in cap. 38. refert argumentum meum primum ab exfemplo, et figura veteris testa¬ menti ductum, haec autem est argumenti summa. Ozias rex in lib. II Paralip. cap. xxvi. cum sacerdotum officium usurparet, et a sacerdotibus repulsus non acquiesceret, continuo lepra divinitus percussus fuit, atque judicio Sacerdotum separatus e coetu populi, seorsim in domo solitaria habitavit usque ad obitum : ex quo factum est, ut regni admi- nistratione privatus fuerit, et filius ipsius it: civitate populum judicaverit. Hinc argumen¬ tum ejusmodi conficitur : Si ob lepram cor¬ poralem poterat sacerdos olim regem judi¬ care, et regno privare : quare id non poterit nunc propter lepram spiritualem, id est, propter hseresim, quse per lepram figuraba- 106 DE POTESTATE PAPiE tur, ut S. Augustinus docet lib. n. qusest. Evang. qusest. 40. prsesertim cum I. Co- rinth. x. Paulus dicat, contigisse Judseis omnia in figuram ? Ad hoc argumentum respondet Barclaius, judicio Sacerdotum fuisse regem Oziam propter lepram separatum a reliquo populo; et eodem modo posse nunc regem judicio summi Pontificis propter hseresim separari per excommunicationem a coetu fidelium : negat autem fuisse regem Oziam regno pri¬ vatum, et propterea etiam negat, posse re¬ gem a Pontifice propter hseresim regno privari. Quod autem non fuerit Ozias regno privatus, probat ex eo quod Scriptura testa¬ tur, anno aetatis sexto decimo regnare coepisse , et quinquaginta duobus annis regnasse. IV Reg. xv. et II. Paralip. xxvi. proinde regnas¬ se ab anno sexto decimo usque ad mortem. Idem etiam probat ex eo quod eadem Scri¬ ptura dicit, Joatham, filius regis , gubernabat palatium , et rexit domum regis et judicabat populum terrae (1) : hinc enim colligitur, filium regis non auctoritate propria, sed nomine Patris sui aegrotantis regnum admi¬ nistrasse : hsec Barclaius. Respondeo : Ozias lepra percussus retinuit quidem nomen regium, sed mane : filius vero ejus sine regio nomine regnum cum plena potestate administravit, id verbis disertis testatur Josephus lib. ix. Antiquita¬ tum, cap. 11. ubi dicit, « Oziam privatum vixisse in domo solitaria, et filium ejus rem- publicam administrasse, » quod idem satis aperte indicat Scriptura, cum ait : Filius regis judicabat populum terree : neque addit, id eum fecisse jussu patris, aut patris nomi¬ ne; neque toto eo tempore quo rex percussus lepra mansit in domo solitaria, ullam partem regiminis ad eum ullo modo pertinuisse. At¬ que hoc intellexi, cum in argumento dixi, coactum fuisse Oziam filio regnum renun- ciare : per regnum enim non vocabulum regis, sed auctoritatem significavi : quam auctoritatem pater non retinuit, sed priva¬ tus vixit, ut Josephus loquitur. In hoc igi¬ tur vis argumenti ab exemplo ducti posita est, quod quemadmodum rex Ozias lepra percussus judicio sacerdotum coactus est habitare in domo solitaria, et regni admi- nistratione dimissa privatus vivere : sic etiam rex hsereticus, judicio summi Sacer¬ dotis per excommunicationem separari pos¬ sit a coetu piorum, non solum quoad Sacra¬ mentorum, et precum communicationem, ut Barclaius admittit, sed etiam quoad fo¬ rense judicium, et regni administrationem, quod Barclaius negat. At Oziee relictum est nomen regium. Verum id quidem, sed non ideo nomen regium relinqui debet ho¬ mini propter hseresim excommunicato, atque deposito : nam lepra spiritualis dete¬ rior est lepra corporali : et sacerdos Chri¬ stianus prsestantior est Sacerdote Levitico, et res figurata perfectior est, quam sit ipsa figura, sic enim agnus paschalis par non erat Christo crucifixo, et manna inferius est Eucharistia, et circumcisio Baptismum non sequat. Quod autem Barclaius disputat de diffe¬ rentia auctoritatis regnandi, et administra- tionis regni, non faciat ad rem, tum quia Ozias non sola administratione, sed etiam auctoritate privatus fuisse dicendus est, cum Josephus dicat, eum privatum in magno moerore vixisse post acceptam plagam leprse : tum etiam quia Barclaius non concedit, regem haereticum posse privari administra¬ tione regni, sic enim ipse loquitur pag. 312, « Quod autem dixi, Papam posse separare regem haereticum a communione fidelium per excommunicationem, de separatione spirituali animorum, non corporum, intelli- gendum est, subditi enim regi excommuni¬ cato obsequium denegare non debent » : haec ille, qui sine dubio, ut etiam supra docuit, non permittit, posse per Pontificem interdici regi haeretico administrationem regni, et curatorem illi dari, ut ipse fatetur, datum esse regi Oziae filium curatorem. Quare falso postea dicit, « figuram Oziae, leprae, separationis, bellissime convenire cum rege, haeresi, et excommunicatione : et ex hac figura temporalem Pontificis potesta¬ tem omnino fictitiam, usurpatam, atque a jure divino alienam ostendi. » Quo modo enim figura cum re figurata concordat, si in figura ponitur rex coactus habitare in domo solitaria, et negotia regni nulla tra¬ ctare : in re figurata ponitur rex libere in Urbe regia residere, et jus dicere, ut antea faciebat ? Et si veritas figurae requirit, ut nihil minus, sed potius aliquid amplius in re figurata reperiatur, quam in ipsa figura : et ideo necesse est, ut rex hsereticus per sententiam Pontificis administratione regni, (1) IV Reg. XV et II; Paralip. XXVI, 3. IN REBUS TEMPORALIBUS 107 et ipsa quoque auctoritate privetur, quo modo ex hoc figura temporalis potestas Papae fictitia, et usurpata, et a jure divino aliena monstratur ? Maneat ergo argumen¬ tum nostrum ab exemplo apposite ductum esse : neque a Barclaio potuisse convelli.