Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Sacraments in General · Book I: On the Nature and Causes of the Sacrament
Chapter 10: Whether a Sacrament can be properly defined
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. III, De Sacramentis in Genere, Book I: On the Nature and Causes of the Sacrament. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
These things being thus settled, we must treat of the formal and technical definition of a Sacrament; and three things are to be briefly handled. First, whether a Sacrament can be properly defined. Second, what is the proper definition of a Sacrament. Third, whether it agrees only with our Sacraments, or with every Sacrament in general.
The first question, then, is whether a Sacrament can truly and properly be defined, or only described in a certain gross manner. The reason of the difficulty is that a Sacrament is either a certain aggregate by accident, since it consists of things and words; or is a being of reason, if it be considered formally, as a sign signifying by arbitrary institution. But only real beings, and those which are one per se, can be properly defined.
There are three opinions of the Doctors. Some think that a Sacrament cannot be properly defined, for the causes already said. So Ockham, Major, Richard, in book 4 distinction 1. Others will have a Sacrament to be indeed a being of reason, yet one per se; and accordingly able to be defined, at least imperfectly. So Scotus, distinction 1 question 2, and Soto, distinction 1 question 1 article 2. For although there are many things in the Sacraments which signify, yet the signification is one, arising out of those various things; just as the figure of a house is one, although there are many things which concur to make the house. Others, finally, will have a Sacrament able to be properly defined. So Martin Ledesma, in the treatise On the Sacraments in general, question 1 article 2.
But to say briefly what I think: the Sacraments can be considered in two ways. In one way, physically. In another way, morally; just as a man too is considered otherwise by the natural philosopher, otherwise by the political philosopher. And indeed, according to the physical consideration — which is not proper to this place, nor much pertains to the Theologian — I judge the first opinion to be by far the most probable. First, because to the notion and essence of a Sacrament pertains not the signification alone, but also the sensible thing itself, which is a certain substance, and with the adjoined signification constitutes a being by accident. For if the essence of a Sacrament consisted in the signification alone, the sensible thing itself would be nothing but the subject of the Sacrament. But the Church teaches us far otherwise, when in the Council of Florence, and in the writings of all the Doctors, she affirms that the Sacraments consist of things and words, and that those are the matter, these the form. For how do the things which are, and are called, the matter and form of a Sacrament not pertain to the essence of the Sacrament? Second, a Sacrament, as a Sacrament, not only signifies, but also sanctifies, as all Catholics teach concerning the Sacraments of the new law. But to signify and to sanctify are things of diverse predicaments, namely of Relation and of Action; therefore they cannot make one thing per se. Add that those who place in the Sacraments a certain real and physical quality are necessarily compelled to compose the Sacraments out of a real being and a being of reason. For the signification of a Sacrament, since it depends on arbitrary institution, cannot but be a being of reason. But how can that be one per se, to whose essence a real being and a being of reason pertain?
But if we consider a Sacrament morally, as it truly ought to be considered by the Theologian, it is a real being, and in its own manner one, and in that manner can be defined. For as among the moral Philosophers a kingdom, and a city, and a family are defined, and of all these properties are demonstrated, although they are all beings by aggregation if they be considered physically; so also the Theologians define the Church, a Council, a Sacrament, and other things of that kind, although physically these cannot be defined. Now a Sacrament is morally one, because it is one means, or instrument, for justifying men. For although water, and words, and to act, and to signify, are things in themselves most diverse, yet as they make one instrument of justification they are one; and this one thing is said to be composed of genus and difference, as again of matter and form, on account of the likeness which it has to the Metaphysical and Physical composite. For as in the Metaphysical composite there are two predicates, one more universal and more imperfect, the other less common and more perfect; so also a Sacrament has two predicates, one more common and less perfect, namely, to be a sign — for every Sacrament is a sign, but not every sign is a Sacrament — the other less common and more perfect, namely, sanctifying instrumentally and by way of a ceremony; for this agrees with the Sacraments alone. And so “sign” is, as it were, the genus; “sanctifying,” as it were, the difference. In like manner, as in the Physical composite there are two parts, of which neither is predicated of the whole, and one is indeterminate, the other determining — that is called matter, this form — so also in the Sacraments there are the things, as it were the matter, and the words, as it were the form; because the thing itself, as for example water, indifferent of itself to signify or even to effect many things, is determined by the words to signify and effect one thing. Whence is that of Augustine, tract 80 on John: “The word comes to the element, and it becomes a Sacrament.” And so it is not needful to discuss too anxiously whether the whole notion and all the properties of genus and difference, and of matter and form, agree with the parts of a Sacrament; because (as we have said) the Sacraments are to be considered by the Theologian not physically, but morally.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT X. Possitne Sacramentum proprie definiri. His ita constitutis agendum est de ipsa formali, et artificiosa definitione Sacra¬ menti : ac tria breviter tractanda sunt. Pri¬ mo ; An Sacramentum proprie definiri pos* sit. Secundo ; Quae sit propria definitio Sacramenti. Tertio ; An ea conveniat tan¬ tum Sacramentis nostris, an omni Sacra¬ mento in genere. Igitur prima quaistio 6st; An Saeramen- tum vere, et proprie definiri, an solum crasso quodam modo describi possit. Ratio difficultatis est, quia Sacramentum vel est aggregatum quoddam per accidens, eum constet ex rebus et verbis; vel est ens ra¬ tionis, si consideretur formaliter ; ut signum ex arbitraria institutione significans. Non possunt autem proprie definiri, nisi entia realia, et quai sunt unum per se. Tres sunt Doctorum sententias. Quidam existimant, Sacramentum proprie definiri non posse ob causas jam dictas. Ita Okam, Major, Richardus in IY. dist. 1. Alii volunt, Sacramentum esse quidem ens rationis, ta¬ men unum per se : proinde definiri posse saltem imperfecte. Ita Scotusdist. 1. quaist. 2. et Sotus dist. 1. quoest. i. art. 2. Tametsi enim multa sint in Sacramentis, quce signi¬ ficant, tamen significatio una est ex variis illis rebus consurgens, quemadmodum una est figura domus, licet multa sint quse ad domum faciendam concurrunt. Alii denique volunt, Sacramentum proprie definiri posse. Ita Martinus Ledesmius in tractatu de Sa¬ cramentis in genere, quaist. 1. art. 2: Ut autem breviter dicam quod sentio, bi¬ fariam oonsiderari possunt Sacramenta. Uno modo, Physice, Alio modo, moraliter: quemadmodum etiam homo aliter conside¬ ratur a Physico, aliter a Politico. Et quidem secundum Physicam conside¬ rationem, quae non est propria hujus loci, nec multum ad Theologum pertinet, longe probabilissimam esse arbitror sententiam primam. Primo, quia ad rationem, et es¬ sentiam Sacramenti non pertinet sola signi¬ ficatio, sed etiam res ipsa sensibilis, quce substantiae quadam est, et cum adjuncta significatione ens per accidens constituit. Nam si in sola significatione constiteret es¬ sentia Sacramenti, res ipsa sensibilis nihil esset nisi subjectum Sacramenti. At longe aliud nos docet Ecclesia, cum in Concilio Florentino, et in scriptis omnium Doctorum affirmat. Sacramenta constare ex rebus, et verbis, et illas esse materiam, ista esse for¬ mam. Quomodo enim ad essentiam Sacra- (1) I. Cor. XI, 26. — (2) Luc. VII, 48. CAPUT X. 355 menti non pertinent ea, quae materia, et forma Sacramenti dicuntur, et sunt? Secundo, Sacramentum, ut Sacramen¬ tum, non solum significat ; sed etiam sanc¬ tificat; ut Catholici omnes docent, de Sa¬ cramentis novae legis. At significare, et sanctificare, res sunt diversorum prajdica- mentorum, nimirum Relationis, et Actionis : non ergo unum per se facere possunt. Adde, quod qui ponunt in Sacramentis realem quamdam, et Physicam qualitatem, necessario coguntur Sacramenta componere ex ente reali, et rationis. Significatio enim Sacramenti, cum ex institutione arbitraria pendeat, non potest non esse ens rationis. Quomodo autem esse potest unum per se id, ad cujus essentiam pertinet ens reale, et ens rationis? At vero si Sacramentum consideremus moraliter, ut vere a Theologo considerari debet, est ens reale, et suo modo unum, at- •que eo modo definiri potest. Ut enim apud morales Philosophos definitur regnum, et civitas, et familia, et de his omnibus passio¬ nes demonstrantur, licet illa omnia sint en¬ tia per aggregationem, si Physice conside¬ rentur : ita etiam Theologi definiunt Eccle¬ siam, Concilium, Sacramentum, et alia id genus, licet Physice ista definiri nequeant. Porro Sacramentum moraliter ideo est unum, quia est unum medium, sive instru¬ mentum ad justificandos homines. Etsi enim aqua, et verba, agere, et significare, sint res in se diversissimae, tamen ut faciunt unum instrumentum justificationis, unum sunt : atque hoc unum ex genere, et diffe¬ rentia componi dicitur, ut rursum ex materia et forma, ob similitudinem compositi Meta- physici, et Physici, quam habet. Ut enim in composito Metaphysico sunt duo praedi¬ cata, unum universalius, et imperfectius, aliud minus commune, et magis perfectum : sic etiam Sacramentum duo praedicata ha¬ bet, unum magis commune, et minus per¬ fectum, nimirum, esse signum. Omne enim Sacramentum signum est, sed non omne si¬ gnum est Sacramentum : alterum minus commune, et magis perfectum, nimirum, sanctificans instrumentaliter, et per modum caeremoniae ; id enim solis Sacramentis con¬ venit. Proinde signum, est veluti genus; sanctificans, veluti differentia. Pari ratione ut in composito Physico sunt xlu* partes, quarum neutra praedicatur de toto, et una est indeterminata , altera determinans; illa materia, haec forma dicitur : sic etiam in Sacramentis sunt res, veluti materia; et verba, veluti forma; quia res ipsa, ut causa exempli, aqua, indifferens ex se ad multa significanda, vel etiam efficienda, per verba determinatur ad unum significandum, «et efficiendum. Unde est illud Augustini tract. 80. in Joannem : « Accedit verbum ad ele¬ mentum, et fit Sacramentum. » Itaque non oportet nimis anxie discutere, an tota ratio, et omnes proprietates generis, et differentiae, materiaeque ac formae conve¬ niant partibus Sacramenti : quia (ut dixi¬ mus) non Physico, sed moraliter Sacramen¬ ta a Theologo consideranda sunt.