Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Sacraments in General · Book I: On the Nature and Causes of the Sacrament
Chapter 11: What is the definition of a Sacrament
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. III, De Sacramentis in Genere, Book I: On the Nature and Causes of the Sacrament. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The second difficulty is: in what words the definition of a Sacrament ought to be conceived. For there are several definitions among the Theologians, which are to be briefly proposed and explained. One is: The sign of a sacred thing. Another, a little more explicit: The visible form of invisible grace.
These definitions are gathered from Augustine, who thus writes book 10 of the City of God chapter 5: “The visible sacrifice is the Sacrament” — that is, the sacred sign — “of the invisible sacrifice”; and they are common among Catholics, as is plain from Hugh, book 1 part 9 chapter 2, Bernard in the sermon On the Lord's supper, St. Thomas part 3 question 60 articles 1 and 2, and from Thomas Waldensis, tome 2 chapter 20. And these definitions indeed, if they be taken as the words absolutely sound, are imperfect. For there are many more signs of sacred things, or of invisible grace, than there are Sacraments; yet if they be taken as they sound according to the sense and intention of the Church and the Doctors, they are good and legitimate. Since by “sign” they understand a sensible, instituted, practical sign, bearing the likeness of the thing signified; by “sacred thing” they understand justifying grace. Although (as Hugh rightly notes in the place cited) he who first said that a Sacrament is the sign of a sacred thing seems to have wished not so much to define the thing itself accurately as to explain the interpretation of the name. Wherefore they do not act rightly who wrangle too much in defending this definition; especially since St. Augustine in the place cited speaks of the Sacrament in so ample a signification that it comprehends even sacrifice.
The third definition is Hugh's, in the place noted, who defines thus: “A Sacrament is a corporeal or material element, set forth sensibly without, representing from likeness, and signifying from institution, and containing from sanctification some invisible and spiritual grace.” Where two things are to be noted. First, that by “element” is not to be taken an element in the way it is taken when we say that there are four elements of the world, but any thing whatsoever, as it is distinguished from the word, according to that of Augustine: “The word comes to the element, and it becomes a Sacrament.” Now Hugh, and certain others, call the matter of all the Sacraments an “element,” because in the first Sacrament, that is, in Baptism, the true element of water is the matter; for from the matter of the first Sacrament they wished to name the matter of all the Sacraments. Or also because an element most aptly signifies matter, since it is an imperfect body, and by its nature ordered to composing a mixed thing; whence Aristotle too called prime matter an element. Second, it is to be noted that Hugh, when he says that a Sacrament has from sanctification the power of conferring grace, does not understand by “sanctification” (as Kemnitz wrongly understood, page 94) some preceding blessing or consecration, such as that by which water is blessed — for even without that blessing the Sacrament of Baptism can be conferred — but the word of God, which is, as it were, the form perfecting the Sacrament; for by those words the element is said to be sanctified, because through them the Sacrament is effected. Now this definition, although it could perhaps have been comprehended in fewer words, yet embraces integrally enough the whole nature of a Sacrament.
The fourth definition is that of the Master of the Sentences, book 4 distinction 1, where he thus says: “A Sacrament is the visible form of invisible grace, bearing the image of that grace, and being its cause.” Which definition, as to the sense, differs nothing from the former. For only in this definition does there seem to be lacking the explanation of the sign, whether it be natural or from institution; but this is manifestly gathered from that particle, “being its cause.” For no sensible sign can be the cause of grace, nor infallibly signify it, except from the institution of God, as is well known.
The fifth definition is that of the Catechism of the Council of Trent: “A Sacrament is a thing subject to the senses, which from the institution of God has the power both of signifying and of effecting holiness and justice.” Which definition is most beautiful, since it is both most brief, and yet comprehends all those eight heads which we said pertain to the nature of a Sacrament. For first, that a Sacrament is a sign is plain from that particle, “signifying.” Second, that it is sensible, from that, “subject to the senses.” Third, that it is voluntary, from that, “from the institution of God.” Fourth, that it is of a sacred thing, from that, “of holiness and justice.” Fifth and sixth, that it is of a holiness which is then effected by the power of the Sacrament itself, from that, “has the power.” Seventh, that it is a solemn ceremony, is gathered from this, that it is said to be a thing subject to the senses, instituted for sanctifying. Eighth, that it bears the likeness of the thing signified is not had expressly in this definition, yet can be gathered from that particle, “signifying,” and from that, “from the institution of God.” For God, who disposes all things sweetly, would never have instituted one thing to signify another, unless it had some analogy with it.
There exists another definition in Gratian, cause 1 question 1, canon Multi saecularium: “A Sacrament is that through which, under the covering of visible things, the divine power more secretly works salvation.” This definition is attributed by Gratian to Gregory; by St. Thomas in book 4 distinction 1 question 1 it is attributed to Augustine. But it is neither this one's nor that one's, but Isidore's; for it is had in the same words in Isidore, book 6 of the Etymologies chapter 18 — unless perhaps Isidore took it from some book of Augustine or Gregory unknown to us. But whosever it be, there is no reason for us to labor much, since it is agreed enough that it was brought forward by Isidore to explain the signification of the name, not to define the thing itself accurately.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XI. Qucb sit definitio Sacramenti. Secunda difficultas est : quibus verbis concipi debeat definitio Sacramenti. Sunt enim plures definitiones .apud Theologos, quae breviter proponendae, et explicandae sunt. Una est: Signa rei sacrce. Altera, paulo explicatior : Invisibilis gratice visibilis forma. Hae definitiones colliguntur ex Augus¬ tino, ita scribente lib. X. de civitate Dei cap. 5 : « Sacrificium visibile invisibilis sa¬ crificii Sacramentum, » id est, sacrum si¬ gnum est; et communes sunt apud Catholi¬ cos, ut patet ex Hugone lib. I. par. 9. cap. 2. Bernardo in sermone de ceena Domini, S. Thoma III. par. quaest. LX. artic. 1. et 2. et ex Thoma Waldensi tom. II. cap. 20. Atque hae quidem definitiones si accipian¬ tur, ut verba absolute sonant, imperfectae sunt. Multo enim plura sunt signa rerum sacrarum, aut invisibilis gratiae, quam sint Sacramenta : tamen si accipiantur, ut sonant secundum sensum, et intentionem Ecclesia), et Doctorum bona) sunt, et legitimae. Siqui¬ dem per signum, intelligunt signum sensi¬ bile, institutum, practicum, rei signata) similitudinem gerens : per rem sacram in¬ telligunt justificantem. Quamquam (si recte monet Ilugo loco notato) qui primus dixit Sacramentum esse rei sacra) signum, non tam rem ipsam accurate definire, quam no¬ minis interpretationem explicare voluisse videtur. Quocirca non recte faeiunt, qui pro hac definitione defendenda nimium alter¬ cantur : praesertim cum S. Augustinus loco 356 LIBER I. citato de Sacramento loquatur, tam ampla significatione, ut etiam sacrificium compre¬ hendat. Tertia definitio est Hugonis loco notato , qui sic definit : « Sacramentum est corpo¬ ree vel materiale elementum, foris sensi¬ biliter propositum, ex similitudine reprae¬ sentans, et ex institutione significans, et ex sanctificatione continens aliquam invisibi¬ lem, et spiritualem gratiam. » Ubi duo no¬ tanda sunt. Primo, per elementum non debere accipi elementum, quomodo acci¬ pitur cum dicimus, quatuor esse mundi elementa, sed rem quamlibet, ut a verbo distinguitur, juxta illud Augustini : « Ac¬ cedit verbum ad elementum, et fit Sacra¬ mentum. » Yocat autem Hugo, et quidam alii, elementum, materias omnium Sacra¬ mentorum, quia in primo Sacramento, id est, in Baptismo, verum elementum aquae, materia est, a materia enim primi Sacra¬ menti, materias omnium Sacramentorum nominare voluerunt. Yel etiam quia elemen¬ tum materiam aptissime significat, cum sit corpus imperfectum ; et natura sua ordi¬ natum ad componendum mixtum : unde etiam Aristoteles materiam primam elemen¬ tum vocavit. Secundo notandum est, Hugonem, cum ait, Sacramentum ex sanctificatione vim habere conferendi gratiam, non intelligere per sanctificationem, ut perperam intellexit Kemnitius, pag.94. aliquam benedictionem, vel consecrationem prsecedentem, ut est illa, qua benedicitur aqua (nam etiam sine ista benedictione Sacramentum Baptismi conferri potest) sed verbum Dei quod est veluti forma perficiens Sacramentum : illis enim verbis dicitur elementum sanctificari, quia per illam efficitur Sacramentum. Porro haec definitio, etsi potuisset fortasse paucio¬ ribus verbis comprehendi, tamen satis in- - . tegre complectitur totam naturam Sacra¬ menti. Quarta definitio est Magistri Sententiarum lib. IY. d i st . 1, ubi sic ait : « Sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma, ejusdem gratiae imaginem gerens, et causa existens. » Quae definitio, quod ad sensum attinet, nil differt a priore. Solum enim in hac defini¬ tione desiderari videtur explicatio signi, na¬ turale ne, an ex institutione sit : sed hoc manifeste colligitur ex illa ^irticula, « causa existens. » Nullum enim signum sensibile potest esse causa gratiae, nec illam infalli- biliter significare, nisi ex Dei institutione, ut notum est. Quinta definitio est Catechismi Concilii Ti identini : « Sacramentum est res sensibus subjecta, quae ex Dei institutione sanctitatis, et justitiae tum significandae, tum efficiendae vim habet. » Quae definitio pulcherrima est, cum et brevissima sit, et tamen comprehen¬ dat omnia illa octo capita , quae ad naturam Sacramenti pertinere diximus. Nam primo, quod Sacramentum sit signum, patet ex illa particula, significandos . Secundo , quod sen¬ sibile, ex illa, sensibus subjecta. Tertio, quod voluntarium, ex illa , ex Dei institutione. Quarto, quod rei sacrae, ex illa, sanctitatis et justitiae. Quinto et sexto , quod sanctitatis, quae tunc fiat vi ipsius Sacramenti , ex illa, vim habet. Septimo, quod sit caeremonia so- lemnis, ex eo colligitur, quod dicitur esse res sensibus subjecta, instituta ad sanctifi¬ candum. Octavo, quod similitudinem gerat rei significata}, non habetur expresse in hac* definitione, tamen colligi potest ex illa parti¬ cula, significandae , ex illa, ex Dei institutione. Deus enim qui suaviter omnia disponit, numquam instituisset rem unam ad aliam significandam, nisi cum ea analogiam ali¬ quam haberet. Exstat alia definitio apud Gratianum, I. quaest. 1. Cau. Multi saecularium : « Sacra¬ mentum est, per quod sub tegumento rerum visibilium, divina virtus secretius salutem operatur. » Ilaec definitio a Gratiano tribui¬ tur Gregorio ; a S. Thoma in IV. dist. I. qua;st. I. tribuitur Augustino. Sed nec hu¬ jus, nec illius est, sed Isidori : habetur enim iisdem verbis apud Isidorum lib. VI. ety¬ mologiarum, cap. 18. nisi forte Isidorus illam acceperit ex libro aliquo nobis incognito Au¬ gustini, aut Gregorii. Sed cujuscumque sit, non est cur multum laboremus , cum satis constet ab Isidoro allatam , ad explicandam nominis significationem , non ad rem ipsam accurate definiendam.