Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Sacraments in General · Book I: On the Nature and Causes of the Sacrament
Chapter 13: The arguments of Kemnitz are answered
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. III, De Sacramentis in Genere, Book I: On the Nature and Causes of the Sacrament. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
From what we have said, answer can easily be made to the calumnies of Kemnitz. For he, in the second part of the Examen, in the chapter On the number of the Sacraments, reprehends all the definitions which we have brought forward, except that of the Tridentine Catechism, of which he makes no mention; and besides he adds two definitions, one of Scotus, the other of William of Ockham, which he also reprehends.
First, then, on page 38, he argues against the definition of Isidore: “How,” he says, “according to this definition will Matrimony be a Sacrament?” I answer that this definition agrees most aptly with Matrimony; for under the covering of visible things — that is, of the conjunction of bridegroom and bride — is signified the invisible grace by which God is joined with the soul, and justifies it, whether by infusing justice or by increasing justice already infused. Nor does it conflict with these things that the Apostle says Matrimony is a sign of the conjunction of Christ with the Church; since the same Sacrament can be a sign of several things.
Second, he argues against the definitions of Hugh, that a Sacrament is not rightly called a corporeal element, seeing that the Sacrament of the Eucharist, according to Catholics, is not any substance, but the accidents alone of bread and wine. I answer: Neither is the very substance of bread and wine an element properly so called, that is, a simple body, but a mixed one. But, as we showed above, Hugh called an “element” any sensible thing whatsoever which is applied for perfecting the Sacraments.
Third, he argues against the definition of the Master of the Sentences, that it is not right to hold that a Sacrament is a visible form. For in Matrimony the Catholics will have the matter to be the words expressing consent; but words are neither visible, nor can be called an element, according to Hugh, if an element is distinguished against the word, according to that: “The word comes to the element, and it becomes a Sacrament.” I answer: There are not lacking many Catholics who will have the matter in the Sacrament of Matrimony to be the very persons contracting, and the words to be only the form; and accordingly they assign a visible matter, and one that can be called an element. See Peter Paludanus in book 4 distinction 1 question 4. But even if the words alone were in the Sacrament of Matrimony, still Kemnitz's argument would effect nothing. For words too can be called elements, inasmuch as they hold the place of matter; for we call that an “element,” when we treat of the Sacraments, which of itself is indeterminate, and is determined by certain words, as by a form. Nor less do we assert that words can be called visible, since “visible” is usually transferred to all sensible things, and the sense of seeing itself to every sense. For, as Augustine teaches book 10 of the Confessions chapter 35, we rightly say: See how it shines, how it smells, how it tastes, how hard it is, how well it sounds; yet we do not on the contrary say: Hear how it shines, taste how it glitters, smell how it gleams, touch how it flashes.
Fourth, he argues against the same two definitions, that they do not rightly hold a Sacrament to be a sign of invisible grace, if by grace be understood sanctifying grace. For although Richard disputes that in Matrimony and Ordination, as in the other Sacraments, grace of this kind is given, “yet the rest,” says Kemnitz, “acknowledge that this cannot stand.” But this is an impudent falsehood, as we said above in chapter 2.
Fifth, he argues against the definition of Scotus and Ockham; but undeservedly, since they contain nothing false, and differ from the common definition only in words, not in sense.
Sixth, he impugns all the definitions at once: “For if,” he says, “a Sacrament is a sign signifying a gratuitous effect of God efficaciously, how will they not be Sacraments — the blessing of Monks, blessed water, the blessed rose, the blessed sword, the Agnus Dei, the blessing of herbs, of bells, of images, the royal anointing, the consecration of a temple, of a cemetery, of an altar, etc.? For these are done by certain consecrations, and are feigned to have spiritual effects.” But all these are easily refuted on a twofold head. First, because neither the blessing of Monks, nor the others enumerated, signify or effect justifying grace, but certain other effects, such as the deletion of venial sins, and protection against the Demon — which effects blessed water chiefly has. Second, because they do not have these very effects infallibly; for they have their power not from divine institution, but from the prayers of the Church.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XIII. Solvuntur argumenta kemnitii. Ex his autem, qtiee diximus, facile res¬ ponderi potest ad calumnias Kemnitii. Is enim in 2. par. Examin. cap. denumero Sa¬ cramentorum , reprehendit omnes defini¬ tiones, quas attulimus, excepta illa Cate¬ chismi Tridentini , cujus nullam facit men¬ tionem; et praeterea addit definitiones duas, unam Scoti, alteram Gulielmi Okam, quas etiam reprehendit. Primum igitur , pag. 38. arguit definitio¬ nem Isidori : « Quomodo, inquit, juxta hanc definitionem Matrimonium erit Sacramen¬ tum? » Respondeo, aptissime convenire hanc definitionem Matrimonio : nam sub tegu¬ mento visibilium rerum, id est , conjunctio¬ nis sponsi , et sponsae significatur gratia in¬ visibilis , per quaril Deus cum anima jungi¬ tur; eamque justificat, sive justitiam infun¬ dat, sive infusam augeat. Neque his repug¬ nat, quod Apostolus dicit, Matrimonium si¬ gnum esse conjunctionis Christi cum Eccle¬ sia : siquidem idem Sacramentum plurium rerum signum esse potest. Secundo, arguit definitiones Hugonis, quod non recte Sacramentum dicatur, elementum corporale, quandoquidem Sacramentum Eu¬ charistiae secundum Catholicos non sit sub¬ 339 stantia aliqua, sed sola accidentia panis, et vini. Respondeo. Nec ipsa substantia pa¬ nis, et vini est elementum proprie dictum, id est, corpus simplex, sed mixtum. Sed, ut supra ostendimus, elementum Vocavit Hugo rem quamlibet sensibilem, quae adhibetur ad Sacramenta perficienda. Tertio, arguit definitionem Magistri Sen¬ tentiarum, quod non recte habeat , Sacra¬ mentum esse formam visibilem. Nam in Ma¬ trimonio Catholici volunt materiam esse verba exprimentia consensum : verba au* tem nec visibilia sunt , nec elementum dict possunt, juxta Hugonem ; si elementum dis¬ tinguitur contra verbum, juxta illud ; « Ac* cedit verbum ad elementum , et fit Sacra* mentum. » Respondeo. Non desunt Catholici multi, qui materiam in Sacramento Matrimonii esse volunt ipsas personas contrahentes, verba autem solum esse formam : proinde materiam visibilem, et quse elementum dici possit, assignant. Vide Petrum Paludanum in IV. dist. 1. quaest. 4. Quod si etiam sola verba essent in Sacramento Matrimonii, adhuc nihil efficeret Kemnitii argumentum. Nam verba quoque elementa dici possunt, quatenus materia locum habent i id enim elementum dicimus, cum de Sacramentis agimus, quod est ex se indeterminatum, et per certa verba, quasi per formam determi¬ natur. Nec minus asserimus verba, visibilia dici posse, cum visibile ad omnia sensibilia, et sensus ipse videndi usitate ad omnem sensum transferatur. Ut enim docet Augus¬ tinus lib. X. Confess. cap. 33. recte dici¬ mus : Vide quomodo luceat, quomodo oleat, quomodo sapiat, quam sit durum, quam bene sonet : non tamen contra dicimus : Audi quomodo luceat, gusta quomodo splen¬ deat, olfac quam niteat, palpa quam ful¬ geat. Quarto, arguit easdem duas definitiones, quod non recte habeant. Sacramentum esse signum invisibilis gratiae, si per gratiam in- telligatur gratia gratum faciens. Nam etiamsi Ricbardus disputet, in Matrimonio, et Ordi¬ natione, ut in aliis Sacramentis, dari ejus¬ modi gratiam : '(Reliqui tamen, inquit Kem- nitius, agnoscunt hoc subsistere non posse. » Sed hoc est impudens mendacium, ut supra diximus cap. 2. Quinto, arguit definitionem Scoti , et Okam : Sed immerito, cum nihil falsi illas contineant ; et solum verbis, non autep seu- 3G0 LIBER I. tentia discrepent a definitione communi. Sexto, oppugnat omnes definitiones si¬ mul : « Si enim, inquit, Sacramentum est signum significans effectum Dei gratuitum efficaciter; quomodo non erunt Sacramenta, benedictio Monachorum, aqua benedicta, rosa benedicta, ensis benedictus, Agnus Dei, benedictio herbarum, campanarum, imagi¬ num, inunctio regalis, consecratio templi, coemeterii, altaris etc. Illa enim fiunt certis consecrationibus, et finguntur habere spiri¬ tuales effectus. » Sed hfec omnia facile re¬ felluntur ex duplici capite. Primo, quia nec benedictio Monachorum, nec alia enumera¬ ta significant, aut efficiunt gratiam justifi¬ cantem, sed alios quosdam effectus, ut de¬ letionem venialium, et protectionem contra Daemonem, quos effectus praecipue l\abet aqua benedicta. Secundo, quia hos ipsos ef¬ fectus non habent infallibiliter ; non enim ex divina institutione, sed ex Ecclesiae precibus vim habent.