Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Sacraments in General · Book I: On the Nature and Causes of the Sacrament
Chapter 27: That the intention of doing what the Church does is required
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. III, De Sacramentis in Genere, Book I: On the Nature and Causes of the Sacrament. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
There remains the last question concerning the ministerial cause: whether the intention of the minister is necessary for the perfection of the Sacrament. There will be four parts of this question. First, the opinion of the heretics must be explained. Second, the opinion of the Catholics must be at once explained and vindicated from the falsehoods of the adversaries. Third, the truth must be confirmed. Fourth, the objections solved.
As to the first, a new heresy has arisen in our time, that intention is not required in the minister of a Sacrament, but that the Sacrament is entirely perfected if the thing and the words be present, even though the minister perform that action in jest, or mockingly, or feignedly and lyingly. The first author seems to have been Luther. For thus he writes in the book On the Babylonian captivity, chapter On Baptism: “I would not doubt,” he says, “that if anyone receive it in the name of the Lord, even though an impious minister give it not in the name of the Lord, he is truly baptized in the name of the Lord. For the virtue of Baptism is placed not so much in the faith or use of him who confers as of him who receives, as is read in the example of a certain mime baptized in jest.” And in article 12 of those which Pope Leo condemned: “If a priest,” he says, “should absolve not seriously but in jest, yet if he believe himself to be absolved, he is most truly absolved.” And in the assertion he confirms this same thing; and also in the book On the private Mass, published in the year '34, he proves the same by three arguments, which will afterward be solved. John Calvin, following Luther, in the Antidote to the Council of Trent session 7 canon 11: “What they prattle,” he says, “about the intention of consecrating was brought forth by the sophists on no probable ground.” And below: “But I so far defer to the most sacred institution of Christ that if some Epicurean, inwardly mocking the whole action, should administer to me the supper by the command of Christ and according to the rule given by him, and with the legitimate rite, I would not doubt that the bread and the chalice held out by his hand are to me true pledges of the body and blood of Christ.” The same Tileman Heshusius teaches in the book On six hundred errors of the Pontificians, place 45. The same too Martin Kemnitz in the second part of the Examen page 141 and following, where he treats at length of this matter. And although page 146 he teaches that the sacramental action ought not to be a mimic mockery or a ridiculous game, in which he seems to agree with us, yet he understands this of the exterior action only, not of the internal intention. For afterward page 154 he teaches that the Sacrament is true, though the minister administer the Sacrament with a mocking mind; and throughout the whole disputation he contends that the efficacy of the Sacrament does not depend in any way on the intention of the minister. And below page 145, where he treats of Absolution: “Nor,” he says, “ought the conscience to be anxious about the intention of the minister; but if the voice of the Gospel is announced, let it, apprehending it by faith, judge itself absolved before God, whatever be in the priest's mind.”
To this opinion of the heretics Ambrose Catharinus seems to have come nearest, who in a little work On the intention of the minister of the Sacraments distinguishes a twofold intention: one, of doing simply the external act which the Church does; the other, of doing the external act not simply, but as sacramental, or with the mind of celebrating the mystery which Christ instituted and the Church celebrates. And the former intention he says is required, the latter he denies. And so if anyone, while he baptizes a boy, intend to pour water on the boy and to say, “I baptize thee,” according to Catharinus it will be a true Sacrament, even though he intend to pour the water and say those words only to wash the boy's body from filth, or to play in that manner. Which opinion I do not see how it differs from the opinion of Kemnitz and the other heretics, except that Catharinus at the end of the little work submits himself to the Apostolic See and the Council, but they deride both.
As to the second, the opinion of the Catholics is that the intention of doing what the Church does is required. For so expressly hold the Council of Trent session 7 canon 11, and the Council of Florence in the instruction of the Armenians. But here certain things are to be noted. First, it is not so required that the minister have the general intention of doing what the Church does, that he may not have a particular one; nay, it is better to have a particular one — that is, of conferring the Sacrament of Baptism, of Absolution, of Confirmation, of consecrating the Eucharist, etc. But for one who did not know our mysteries, it would be enough if in general he intended to do what the Church does; and this the Councils teach. Second, it is not necessary to intend what the Roman Church does, but what the true Church does, whatever it be, or what Christ instituted, or what Christians do; for these come to the same. You will ask, what if anyone intend to do what some particular and false Church does, which he himself thinks true, as the Genevan, and intend not to do what the Roman Church does? I answer that this too suffices. For he who intends to do what the Genevan Church does, intends to do what the universal Church does. For he intends to do what such a Church does because he thinks it to be a member of the true universal Church, though he be deceived in the knowledge of the true Church. But the error of the minister concerning the Church does not take away the efficacy of the Sacrament, but a defect of intention does. And hence it is that in the Catholic Church those baptized by the Genevans are not rebaptized, who yet, while they baptize, intend to do what the Genevan Church does, and not what the Roman Church does. Add that, since the true Roman Church and the false Genevan Church do not dissent as to the substance of Baptism, but only as to accidental ceremonies, if anyone otherwise a Catholic should intend to baptize in the manner in which the Genevan ministers minister, and not in the manner of Catholic priests, he would intend a true Baptism as to substance, but without the accidental ceremonies; and accordingly he would confer a true Sacrament, although he would sin, and could be justly punished as suspect of heresy. Third, an actual intention is not necessarily required, nor does a habitual one suffice, but a virtual one is required and suffices; although care must be taken that an actual one be had. It is called actual when the minister actually has such an intention; which actual intention does not require, as certain scrupulous persons do, that we say with mouth or heart those formal words, “I intend to do this,” or “I will to do this,” but only requires that the man be present in mind and attentively do what he does. For this is called the intention in the exercised act, as Cajetan speaks; and, as we said, it is not necessarily exacted, because it is not in our power that our thought be not sometimes distracted, even while we do the most holy things. It is called habitual when there is a certain inclination or promptitude from an infused or acquired habit, such as can be even in a sleeping man; and this without doubt does not suffice. For the act proceeding thence is not human and deliberate; otherwise one would be said to be baptized if he were baptized by a sleeping or drunken man. It is called virtual when the actual intention is not present at the moment on account of some wandering of mind, yet a little before it was present, and by the virtue of it the operation is done; and this, by the consent of all, is required if the actual be not present, and suffices. Nor does St. Thomas repugn this doctrine, although part 3 question 64 article 8 he says that a habitual intention suffices. For (as he himself explains) by “habitual” he understands “virtual”; for he mentions only the actual and the habitual intention. But Scotus and Gabriel and other later writers, for the sake of greater clarity, made a threefold distinction, and called “virtual” what St. Thomas calls “habitual,” and added another “habitual” which St. Thomas omitted. Lastly it is to be noted that in this whole doctrine the Catholic doctors agree wonderfully, one Catharinus excepted; which will be plain from the refutation of the falsehoods of Tileman and Kemnitz.
First, each author in the places noted says that the Council of Trent defined that the Sacrament is not valid unless the minister intend not only the act, but also the end of the Sacrament — that is, intend that for which the Sacrament was instituted; which certainly differs much from our opinion. But this is a mere falsehood; for the Council in the whole of canon 11 does not name the end of the Sacrament, nor does the Council say, as they seem to have taken it, that the minister must intend to do what the Church intends, but what the Church does. Now “what the Church does” signifies not the end, but the action. Finally, it is established from practice. For neither did the old Church rebaptize little ones baptized by the Pelagians, nor do we rebaptize those baptized by the Zwinglians and Calvinists; and yet we all know that all these baptize without the intention of the true end, which is to take away original sin. Nor yet do we hold that the Council defined that which Catharinus holds, and which Kemnitz would hold — namely, that the minister only intend to do the external act which the Church does; for this there was no need to define, since it was never denied by anyone, nor could be denied. Then he who intends to do the external act, but not seriously, does not intend to do what the Church does, but intends to simulate what the Church does. In the way that those soldiers who, on bended knee, said to Christ, Hail, King of the Jews, truly intended to bend the knees and to say those words; yet because they did it not seriously but in jest, no one would say that they intended to do what those do who adore their kings, but that they intended to simulate adoration. Second, Kemnitz says that the Scholastics dissent among themselves, in that the Master of the Sentences and Pope Innocent IV will have it suffice to have the intention of doing what Christ instituted, but Alexander of Hales and Gabriel will have the intention of the end of the Sacrament also required. But the Scholastics do not truly dissent, if they be rightly understood; for all in book 4 of the Sentences distinction 6 teach the very thing which the Master teaches. Nor are Alexander and Gabriel to be excepted. For Alexander in part 4 of the Summa question 13 member 1 article 2 says indeed that the intention of the end of the Sacrament is required in the minister, but by the intention of the end he understands the intention of the entire and complete action, and so says the same which the others say, but in other words. That it is so is plain from the same place, where he distinguishes a twofold end: one intrinsic to the work, which is nothing but the term and complement of the action; the other extrinsic, which is the fruit and utility of the thing. For example, in a Sacrament the intrinsic end is the completed ceremony by the thing and words duly joined; the extrinsic end is the remission of sins. And Alexander affirms that the intention of the former end is necessarily required, but not of the latter. Now Gabriel in book 4 distinction 6 question 1 conclusion 3 says that the intention of the minister is required not only in respect of the act of baptizing, as an object, but also in respect of the effect, as an end. But Gabriel took all these from Scotus in book 4 distinction 6 question 5. But each, as they explain themselves, understand by “the act as object” the external act itself, such as even he could intend who wished to baptize in jest; which intention we too said does not suffice. And by “the effect as end” they understand a certain general and remote end, not a particular and proximate one. For they do not will it required that the minister intend the effect of grace or salvation, but only that he intend to do in the baptized that which Christians do in those whom they baptize; for so Scotus explains it. But this is nothing else than to say that the intention is required in respect of the work, not as it is a certain natural work, and which can be done in jest, but as it is a sacred work, or as it is a ceremony which Christ instituted, or which Christians use. And so this opinion falls back into that which all Catholics say.
As to the third, the opinion of the Church is to be proved. The first reason: As a certain form of words is necessarily required to determine the indifference of the matter, so something is required by which the indifference of the form may be determined. For those words, I baptize thee, and the like, can have various significations. For to baptize is to dip in water; but he dips in water who washes the filth of the body, who cools, who by washing heals, etc. But nothing can be imagined by which this indifference of the form may be determined, except the intention of the minister who utters those words, and whose is the whole action; therefore, etc. They will say perhaps that it is determined by the intention of the receiver; but this is false. For here we treat of the action of the minister, not of the action of the receiver; but the action of one cannot be determined by the intention of another. Besides, what would happen when those are baptized who can intend nothing, as infants? Will they say it is determined by the institution of Christ? But against this: for if the institution of Christ effected that those words should signify that, provided they be uttered exteriorly, without any order to the intention of the speaker, why would it not be a true Sacrament if those words were uttered by a parrot?
The second reason is taken from the kind of ministry. For the ministers of the Sacraments are instruments of God, but animate instruments, using reason. Where it is to be noted that in many ways one man can be an instrument of some agent. First, according to the bodily members alone, as if one use the hand of another to take something, or if he compel him to carry burdens, which can be done without any will of his. Second, through the bodily members and the sentient powers, as if one bid a servant read something, or signify something to someone, or watch and look at something and report what he sees; and for this the will of the servant is not required, except that by which he wills to do the exterior act. For even if he intend not to read significantly, yet if he will to utter those words, he satisfies his office; because the master uses for an instrument nothing but his tongue and eyes, etc. Third, through the bodily members, the sentient powers, and also the reason; as when a king appoints presidents and judges in the cities, who in his name pronounce law and govern the peoples; for in such not only the body and the senses, but also the prudence and the will, are instruments. For the king does not determine the particular actions, but leaves them to the judgment of the instrument. Wherefore in such cases there is necessarily required not only power, but also will, and accordingly the intention of exercising the actions. Nor is he truly absolved whom a judge absolves without intention, although exteriorly he seem absolved. And that the ministers of the Sacraments are of this third kind is plain from the Scriptures. For Matthew 24 it is said: Who, thinkest thou, is a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family? Where fidelity and prudence indicate that this servant is such that it is in his judgment to do and not to do; for this fidelity and prudence are required. Besides, therefore they are called prelates (praepositi), to the Romans 12: He that ruleth, with carefulness; and Hebrews 13: Obey your prelates. Finally Christ did not determine the particular actions, but said: Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them, John 20, where he plainly leaves it to their judgment to loose or to bind. And this reason plainly convinces. For since instruments of this kind are chiefly instruments through the will and intention, if this be taken away, they cease to be instruments.
The third reason is taken from the difference between speculative and practical words. For speculative words, because they have their whole efficacy in signifying, have the same force by whomsoever they be said; for words signify the same whether they be said by a sober man or by a drunkard, or even by a parrot, or by the ass of Balaam, provided the signification be not ambiguous, because then, as we said, it would have to be determined by the intention of the speaker. But practical words, which besides signification have efficiency, are not efficacious unless they be said by him who has the power and the will of doing what the words signify. This is plain by induction. For the commands of kings and judges are efficacious, not the commands of private persons. Likewise those who have the gift of miracles efficaciously command diseases and demons, but not others, even though they use the same words. And the reason is that, since words of themselves and naturally are not operative, it is necessary that they be efficacious only then, when they are said by him who has the power. The same can be proved of the will; for the power never passes into act unless he who has it wills. Wherefore of the power of prophesying the Apostle says 1 Corinthians 14: The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets. And the same is plain by experience; for if a king without intention, as in dreaming, bid someone be killed, the command is not wont to be carried into execution, because it is not established whether he wills it, although the king could command it. But it is established that the words of the Sacraments are practical words, since they are instruments of justification; therefore they require power and will, and accordingly intention.
If anyone object that the words of the Sacraments have in themselves an operative virtue from the institution of Christ, and accordingly that their efficacy does not depend on the intention or power of the minister: it must be answered that there are two opinions of the Theologians. For some, as Cajetan part 3 question 64 article 1, and Soto book 4 distinction 1 question 5 article 1, and Ledesma in the same place, will have there to be in the minister himself too an operative virtue, efficiently and instrumentally, as there is in the Sacrament; and according to this opinion the solution is easy. For in the sacramental words there is an operative virtue, but dependently on the minister. For those words have virtue only then, when they are joined with the virtue which is in the minister. Others, however, think that the minister has in himself no efficient force in respect of justification, but that it is only in the Sacrament; and that the minister only concurs by applying the Sacraments; in the way that he who plants and he who waters (to whom the Apostle compares the ministers of the Church, 1 Corinthians 3) do not efficiently and physically produce the fruits of the trees, but apply the agents. So St. Thomas seems to some to think, part 3 question 64 article 1 to the first. Nor ought it to be inferred: Therefore the ministers, according to this opinion, do not truly and properly consecrate, absolve, wash, reconcile, etc. For this is the difference between voluntary agents and other things, that other things are not properly said to act when they only apply the agents; for a cat is not properly said to have burned a house, if it applied the fire, but that house is said to have been burned by chance. But voluntary agents, when they purposely apply the agents, are said most properly to act. For a physician properly heals the sick man when he applies a salutary medicine; and properly kills him when he purposely offers poison for medicine. And according to this opinion the answer to the objection proposed is that the sacramental words have not virtue, and accordingly are not sacramental, except when they are moved by God as instruments; but they are not moved by God as instruments except when they are pronounced by him to whom he himself has committed it. Wherefore the sacramental words always in some way depend on the power and will of the minister. Although, then, the former opinion seem more probable, yet according to each the argument is rightly solved.
The fourth reason is from the absurdities which would otherwise follow, as Hugh of St. Victor well notes, book 2 On the Sacraments part 6 chapter 13. For, first, if some parent should lead his son to the baths, and while he immerses the boy should, after the Christian manner, sign him with the cross, and say, “I wash thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit” — namely invoking God that that washing may turn out well, and thinking nothing of Baptism — then that boy would have to be said to be baptized, if the intention of baptizing be not required, but the matter and form uttered in any way whatsoever suffice. This, however, is plainly ridiculous. Second, if a priest at table should read the Gospel, as is wont to be done at the table of Prelates and religious, and while reading should pronounce those words, This is my body, and, This is my blood, then all the bread and all the wine of that table would be consecrated, if intention be not required. Third, if, when someone hires a maidservant, he should say, “I take thee to be mine” (understanding, but not expressing, the maidservant), and she should say, “I take thee to be mine” (understanding the master, but not expressing him), then they would be married.
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CAPUT XXVII. % Requiri intentionem faciendi quod Ecclesia facit. Restat postrema quaistio de causa minis- teriali : Sitne intentio ministri necessaria ad Sacramenti perfectionem. Quatuor eruntpar- tes hujus quaestionis. Primo, explicanda erit sententia haereticorum. Secundo , sen¬ tentia Catholicorum simul explicanda , et vindicanda a mendaciis adversariorum. Ter¬ tio, confirmanda veritas. Quarto, solvendae objectiones. Quantum ad Primum , nova haeresis nos¬ tro tempore exorta est, non requiri intentio¬ nem in ministro Sacramenti ; sed Sacramen¬ tum omnino perfici , si res, et verba adsint, etiamsi minister joco, aut irrisorie, aut fic¬ te, et mendaciter actionem illam peragat. Primus auctor videtur fuisse Lutberus. Sic enim scribit in lib. de captivitate Babyloni¬ ca cap. de Baptismo : «Non dubitem, in¬ quit , si quis in nomine Domini suscipiat, etiamsi impius minister non det in nomine Domini, vere baptizatum esso in nomine Do¬ mini. Non enim in conferentis tantum, quan¬ tum in suscipientis fide, vel usu sita est vir¬ tus Baptismi , sicut legitur exemplum de quodam mimo per jocum baptizato. » Et in art. 12. eorum, quos Leo Papa damnavit : «Si sacerdos, inquit, non serio, sed joco ab¬ solveret : si tamen credat se esse absolutum verissime est absolutus. » Et in assertione idipsum confirmat; necnon in lib. de Missa privata, anno 34 edito , idem probat tribus argumentis, qua; postea solventur. Joannes Calvinus Luthcrum secutus in An¬ tidoto Concilii Tridentini sess. VII, can. 44: « Quod , inquit, de intentione consecrandi garriunt, a sophistis nulla probabili ratione fuit proditum.» Et infra : « Ergo vero sacro¬ sancta; Christi institutioni tantum defero, ut si Epicureus quispiam, intus totam actionem subsannans, mihi coenam ex Christi manda¬ to, et secundum regulam ab eo datam , ri¬ tuque legitimo administret , non dubitarem panem, et calicem illius manu porrecta ve¬ ra mihi esse corporis et sanguinis Christi pi¬ gnora. » Idem docet Tilmannus. Heshusius in lib. de sexcentis erroribus Pontificiorum, loco 45. Idem etiam Martinus Kemnitius in 2. par. Examinis pag. 441. et scq. ubi fuse de hac retractat. Et quamquam pag. 446. docet, actionem Sacramentalem non debere esse mimicam subsannationem, aut ridiculum lu¬ sum, in quo videtur nobiscum convenire : tamen intelligit hoc de exteriore actione „ tantum, non de intentione interna. Nam po¬ stea pag. 154. docet, Sacramentum esse ve¬ rum , licet minister animo irrisorio Sacra¬ mentum administret : et tota disputatione id contendit , non pendere Sacramenti effi¬ caciam ullo modo ab intentione ministri. Et infra pag. 4045. ubi agit de Absolutione : « Nec sollicita, inquit, esse debet conscien¬ tia de intentioni ministri, sed si vox Evan- gelii annuntiatur , fide eam apprehendens, statuat se coram Deo absolutum : quidquid sit de sacerdotis animo. » CAPUT XXVII. 413 Ad hanc haereticorum sententiam proxime accessisse videtur Ambrosius Calharinus, qui in opusculo de intentione ministri Sa¬ cramentorum distinguii duplicem intentio¬ nem : unam, faciendi simpliciter actum ex¬ ternum, quem facit Ecclesia : alteram , fa¬ ciendi actum externum non simpliciter, sed ut Sacramentalem , sive animo celebrandi mysterium , quod Christus instituit, et Ec¬ clesia celebrat. Et quidem priorem intentio¬ nem ait requiri, posteriorem negat. Itaque si quis dum puerum baptizat, intendat fun¬ dere aquam super puerum, et dicere : Ego te baptizo , secundum Catharinum erit ve¬ rum Sacramentum, etiamsi ille intendat aquam fundere , et illa verba dicere solum ad lavandum corpus pueri a sordibus , vel ad ludendum eo modo. Quaj opinio non vi¬ deo quid differat a sententia Kemnitii , et aliorum haereticorum, nisi quod Catharinus in fine opusculi subjicit se Apostolicac sedi, et Concilio ; illi autem rident utrumque. Quantum ad Secundum, sententia Catho¬ licorum est, requiri intentionem faciendi, quod facit Ecclesia. Ita enim expresse ha¬ bent Concilium Tridentinum sess. VII, can. 11. et Concilium Florentinum in instructio¬ ne Armenorum. Sunt autem hoc loco quaedam notanda. Primo, non ita requiri , ut minister habeat intentionem generalem faciendi, quod facit Ecclesia, ut non possit habere particularem: imo melius est habere particularem, id est, conferendi Sacramentum Baptismi, Absolu¬ tionis, Confirmationis , consecrandi Eucha¬ ristiam etc. Sed qui non nosset nostra mys¬ teria , satis esset , si in generali intenderet facere, quod facit Ecclesia : et hoc docent Concilia. Secundo, non est opus intendere, quod fa¬ cit Ecclesia Romana , sed quod facit vera Ecclesia, quacumque illa sit, vel quod Chri¬ stus instituit , vel quod faciunt Christiani : ista enim in idem recidunt. Petes, quid si quis intendat facere , quod facit Ecclesia aliqua particularis , et fal¬ sa, quam ipse putat veram, ut Geneven- sis, et intendat non facere, quod facit Eccle¬ sia Romana? Respondeo, etiam id sufficere. Nam qui intendit facere , quod facit Eccle¬ sia Genevensis, intendit facere , quod facit Ecclesia universalis. Ideo enim ille intendit facere, quod facit talis Ecclesia, quia putat illam esse membrum Ecclesiae vera) univer¬ salis : licet fallatur in cognitione verae Ec¬ clesia). Non autem tollit efficaciam Sacra¬ menti error ministri circa Ecclesiam , sed defectus intentionis. Atque hinc est quod in Ecclesia Catholica non rebaptizantur bapti- zati a Genevensibus , qui tamen dum bapti¬ zant, intendunt facere quod facit Ecclesia Genevensis, et non quod facit Ecclesia Ro¬ mana. Adde quod cum Ecclesia vera Roma¬ na, et Ecclesia falsa Genevensis non dissen¬ tiant, quoad substantiam Baptismi, sed so¬ lum quoad accidentarias cairemonias : si quis alioqui Catholicus intenderet baptizare, quo modo ministri Genevenses ministrant, et non quo modo Sacerdotes Catholici , is intenderet verum Baptismum quoad sub¬ stantiam , sed absque eseremoniis acciden- tariis. Proinde verum Sacramentum confer¬ ret, quamvis peccaret et tamquam de hsere- si suspectus, jure puniri posset. Tertio, non requiritur necessario actualis intentio, nec sufficit habitualis , sed victua¬ lis requiritur, et sufficit, quamvis danda sit opera , ut actualis habeatur. Actualis dici¬ tur, quando minister actu habet talem in¬ tentionem : quai quidem actualis intentio non requirit, ut quidam scrupulosi faciunt, ut dicamus ore aut corde illa formalia ver¬ ba, Intendo hoc facere, aut volo hoc facere, sed tantum requirit , ut homo sit praesens animo, et attente faciat, quod facit. Ista enim dicitur intentio in actu exercito, ut loquitur Cajetanus , et ut diximus , non necessario exigitur; quia non est in nostra potestate, quin distrahatur aliquando nostra cogitatio, etiam dum res sanctissimas agimus. Habi¬ tualis dicitur inclinatio quaedam, seu promp- titudo ex habitu infuso, vel acquisito, qua¬ lis etiam in dormiente inesse potest : et ha)c sine dubio non sufficit. Nam actus inde pro¬ cedens , non est humanus , et deliberatus ; alioqui baptizatus diceretur , si quis a dor¬ miente, vel ebrio baptizatus esset. Virtualis dicitur cum actualis intentio in praesenti non adest ob aliquam evagationem mentis , ta¬ men paulo ante adfuit, et in virtute illius fit operatio : et haec omnium consensu requiri¬ tur, si actualis non adsit, et sufficit. Neque repugnat huic doctrina) S. Thomas, licet 3. par. q. LXIV, art. 8. dicat, sufficere habitua¬ lem intentionem. Nam (ut ipse se explicat) per habitualem intelligitvirtualem,ipse enim solum meminit intentionis actualis, et habi¬ tualis. Scotus autem, et Gabriel et alii poste¬ riores, majoris claritatis gratia fecerunt tri¬ membrem distinctionem , et virtualem ap- 414 I.1HER I. pellarunt, quam S. Thomas vocat habitua¬ lem, et addiderunt aliam habitualem, quam S. Thomas omisit. Ultimo notandum est , in hac tota doctri¬ na mirifice convenire Catholicos doctores, uno Catharino excepto : Id quod patebit ex refutatione mendaciorum Tilmanni et Kcm- nitii. Primo; Uterque auctor locis notatis dicit, Concilium Tridentinum definivisse, non esse ratum Sacramentum, nisi minister intendat non solum actum , sed etiam finem Sacra¬ menti, id est., intendat illud , propter quod Sacramentum est institutum : quod certe multum distat a nostra sententia. Sed hoc merum mendacium est , Conci¬ lium enim in toto can. 11. non nominat fi¬ nem Sacramenti, neque dicit Concilium, ut illi videntur accepisse , oportere ministrum intendere id facere, quod Ecclesia intendit, sed quod Ecclesia facit. Porro, quod Eccle¬ sia facit, non finem, sed actionem significat. Denique ex praxi id constat. Nam neque ve¬ tus Ecclesia rebaptizabat baptizatos parvu¬ los a Pelagianis , neque nos rebaptizamus baptizatos a Zwinglianis et Calvinistis , et tamen scimus omnes istos baptizare sine in¬ tentione veri finis, qui est tollere peccatum originale. Neque tamen volumus a Concilio definitum id, quod vult Catharinus, et quod Kemnitius vellet, nimirum, ut solum inten¬ dat minister facere actum externum , quem Ecclesia facit : id enim non erat opus defi¬ nire , cum a nemine unquam negatum fuis¬ set, nec posset negari. Deinde qui intendit facere externum actum , sed non serio , is non intendit facere, quod facit Ecclesia, sed intendit simulare, quod facit Ecclesia. Quo¬ modo milites illi, qui genu flexo , dicebant Christo : Ave Rex Judaeorum , vere intende¬ bant flectere genua, et dicere illa verba ta¬ men quia non serio , sed joco id faciebant, nemo diceret eos intendisse facere, quod fa¬ ciunt qui adorant suos Reges, sed intendis¬ se simulare adorationem. Secundo Kemnitius dicit, Scolasticos inter se dissentire, quod Magister Sententiarum, et Innocentius Papa IY. velint sufficere inten¬ tionem faciendi, quod Christus instituit. Alexander autem Alensis, et Gabricl velint requiri etiam intentionem finis Sacramenti. Sed non vere dissentiunt Scholastici, si recte intelligantur : omnes enim in IY. sent. dist. 6. docent, id ipsum, qund Magister do¬ cet» Neque excipiendi sunt Alexander ct Gabriel. Nam Alexander in 4. par. summae quaest. 13. memb. 1. art. 2. dicit quidem requiri in ministro intentionem finis Sacra¬ menti, sed per intentionem finis intelligit intentionem actionis integrae, et completae, et sic idem dicit, quod alii dicunt, sed aliis verbis. Id ita esse, patet ex eodem loco, ubi duplicem finem distinguit ; unum intrinse¬ cum operi, qui nihil est aliud, nisi terminus et complementum actionis ; alterum extrin- secum, qui est fructus, ct utilitas rei. Verbi gratia, in Sacramento, finis intrinsecus est completa caeremonia per res, et verba rite conjuncta; finis extrinsecus est remissio pec¬ catorum. Affirmat autem Alexander inten¬ tionem prioris finis necessario requiri, non autem posterioris. Porro Gabriel in IY. dist. 6. quaest. 1. * conclus. 3. dicit, requiri intentionem minis¬ tri, non solum respectu actus baptizandi, ut objecti, sed etiam respectu effectus, ut finis. Accepit autem Gabriel haec omnia a Scoto in IY. dist. 6. quaest. 5. Uterque autem, ut ipsi se explicant, intelligunt per actum, ut objectum, ipsum actum externum, qualem etiam intendere posset, qui joco baptizare vellet : quam intentionem etiam nos diximus non sufficere. Per effectum autem, ut finem intelligunt finem quemdam generalem, et re¬ motum, non particularem , et proximum. Non enim volunt requiri, ut minister inten¬ dat effectum gratiae, vel salutis, sed solum ut intendat id facere in baptizato, quod fa¬ ciunt Christiani in iis, quos baptizant : sic enim Scotus explicat. IIoc autem nihil est aliud, quam dicere requiri intentionem res¬ pectu operis, non ut est opus quoddam na¬ turale, et quod joco fieri potest, sed ut est opus sacrum, seu ut est caeremonia, quam Christus instituit, sive qua Christiani utun¬ tur. Atque ita recidit haec sententia in id, quod omnes Catholici dicunt. Quantum ad Tertium, probanda est sen¬ tentia Ecclesiae. Prima ratio; Sicut certa forma verborum requiritur necessario, ut determinetur indifferentia materiae ; ita re¬ quiritur aliquid, quo determinetur indiffe¬ rentia formae. Nam illa verba : Ego te bap¬ tizo, et similia, possunt habere varias signi¬ ficationes. Nam baptizare est tingere aquis, tingit autem aquis, qui lavat sordes corpo¬ ris, qui refrigerat, qui lavando medetur ctc. At nihil fingi potest, quo determinetur haec indifferentia formae ; nisi intentio ministri, qui illa verba profert, el cujus est tota ac* CAPUT XXVII. 415 tio; ergo etc. Dicent fortasse determinari ab intentione suscipientis ; at falsum est. Nam hic agimus de actione ministri, non de ac¬ tione suscipientis; non potest autem actio unius determinari ab intentione alterius. Praeterea quid fieret, cum baptizantur, qui nihil intendere possunt, ut infantes? Num dicent determinari ab institutione Christi? Sed contra; nam si Christi institutio id fa¬ ceret, ut illa verba id significarent, modo proferantur exterius, sine ullo ordine ad in¬ tentionem dicentis, quare non esset verum Sacramentum, si ea verba a psittaco pro¬ ferrentur? Secunda ratio sumitur ex genere ministe¬ rii. Nam ministri Sacramentorum sunt ins¬ trumenta Dei, sed instrumenta animata, et ratione utentia. Ubi notandum est, multis modis posse unum hominem esse instrumen¬ tum alicujus agentis. Primo, secundum sola membra corpora¬ lia, ut si quis utatur manu alterius ad ali¬ quid capiendum, vel si cogat eum ferre onera, id quod potest fieri sine ulla ejus vo¬ luntate. Secundo, per membra corporalia, et po¬ tentias sentientes, ut si quis jubeat servum legere aliquid, aut alicui aliquid significare, aut excubare et respicere aliquid, etrenun- tiare quid videat : et ad hoc non requiritur voluntas servi, nisi qua velit actum exterio¬ rem facere. Nam etiamsi non intendat le¬ gere significanter, tamen si velit ea verba proferre, satisfacit muneri suo : quia non utitur Dominus pro instrumento, nisi ejus lingua, et oculis etc. Tertio, per membra corporalia, potentias sentientes, et etiam rationem ; ut cum Rex constituit praesides et judices in urbibus, qui nomine suo jus dicant, et gubernent popu¬ los : in hujusmodi enim non solum corpus et sensus, sed etiam prudentia, et voluntas sunt instrumenta. Non enim Rex determinat actiones particulares, sed relinquit in arbi¬ trio instrumenti. Quare in talibus requiritur necessario non solum potestas, sed etiam voluntas, et proinde intentio exercendi ac¬ tiones. Nec vere est absolutus, quem judex absolvit sine intentione, licet exterius videa¬ tur absolutus. Ministros autem Sacramento¬ rum esse hujus tertii generis, patet ex Scrip¬ turis. Nam Matth. XXIV dicitur : Quis est fidelis servus, et prudens, quem constituit Do¬ minus super familiam suam? ubi fidelitas et prudentia indicant talem esse hunc servum, ut in ejus arbitrio sit facere et non facere : ad hoc enim requiritur fidelitas et pruden¬ tia. Prajterea ideo vocantur prajpositi, ad Roman. XII : Qui preeest in sollicitudine ; et Ifebr. XIII : Obedite praepositis. Denique non determinavit Christus particulares actiones, sed ait : Quorum remiseritis peccata, remittun¬ tur eis( 1), Joan. XX, ubi manifeste relinquit in eorum arbitrio, ut solvant, vel ligent. Et bsec ratio plane convincit. Nam cum ejus¬ modi instrumenta potissimum sint instru¬ menta per voluntatem et intentionem; si liBec tollatur, desinunt esse instrumenta. Tertia ratio sumitur ex discrimine inter verba speculativa et practica. Nam verba speculativa, quia totam efficaciam suam ha¬ bent in significando, a quocumque dicantur, eamdem vim habent : idem enim significant verba, sive dicantur ab homine sobrio, sive ab ebrio, sive etiam a psittaco, vel ab asina Balaam, modo non sit ambigua significatio, quia tunc, ut diximus, deberet determinari ex intentione dicentis. At verba practica, quas praeter significationem habent efficien¬ tiam, non sunt efficacia, nisi dicantur ab eo, qui habet potestatem et voluntatem faciendi quod verba significant. Id patet inductione. Nam imperia Regum et Judicum sunt ef¬ ficacia, non imperia privatorum. Similiter qui habent donum miraculorum, efficaciter imperant morbis et daemonibus, non autem alii, etiamsi iisdem verbis utantur. Et ratio est, quia cum verba per se et naturaliter non sint operativa, necesse est ut tunc solum sint efficacia, cum ab eo dicuntur, qui habet potestatem. Idem de voluntate probari po¬ test, nam potestas numquam exit in actum, nisi velit, qui eam habet. Quare de potes¬ tate prophetandi dicit Apostolus I. Gorinth. XIV : Spiritus Prophetarum prophetis subjecti sunt (2). Et idem patet experientia; nam si Rex sine intentione, ut somniando, jubet aliquem occidi, imperium non solet mandari exeeutioni, quia non constat, an velit, licet possit Rex illud jubere. Sed constat verba Sacramentorum esse verba practica, cum sint instrumenta justificationis; ergo requi¬ runt potestatem et voluntatem, ac proinde intentionem. Si quis Objiciat, verba Sacramentorum habere in se virtutem operativam ex Christi (1) Matth. XXIV, 45; Rom. XII, 8; Hebr. XIII, 17; Joan. XX, 23. — (2) I. Cor. XIV, 32. -4 1 G LIBER I. institutione ; proinde non pendere eorum ef¬ ficaciam ab intentione vel potestate mi¬ nistri. Responderi debet, duas esse Theologorum sententias. Aliqui enim, ut Cajetanus 3. par. quaest. LXIV. art. 1. et Sotus IY. dist. I. q. o. art. 1. et Ledesmius ibidem, volunt in ipso etiam ministro esse virtutem operati vam efficienter et instrumentuliter, ut est in Sa¬ cramento, et secundum hanc sejitentiam fa¬ cilis est solutio. Nam in verbis Sacramenta- libus est virtus operativa, sed dependenter a ministro. Tunc enim solum illa verba ha¬ bent virtutem, dum conjunguntur cum vir¬ tute, quae est in ministro. Alii tamen sentiunt ministrum non habere in se vim ullam efficientem respectu justifi¬ cationis, sed eam solum esse in Sacramento: ministrum autem solum concurrere, appli¬ cando Sacramenta; quomodo qui plantat et qui rigat (quibus comparat Apostolus minis¬ tros Ecclesia), I. Cor. 111) non producunt ef¬ ficienter ct physice fructus arborum, sed applicant agentia. Ita videtur quibusdam sentire S. Thomas 3. par. qua)st. LXIV. art. I. ad primum. Neque inferri debet : Ergo ministri secundum hanc sententiam non vere et proprie consecrant, absolvunt, la¬ vant, reconciliant etc. Nam hoc interest in¬ ter agentia voluntaria, et res ca)teras, quod res ceetera) non dicuntur proprie agere, quando solum applicant agentia : non enim dicitur proprie felis incendisse domum, si ignem applicuit, sed dicitur domus illa casu combusta. At agentia voluntaria quando de industria applicant agentia, dicuntur pro¬ priissime agere. Nam et medicus proprie curat a?grotum, cum adhibet medicinam salutarem ; et proprie illum occidit, cum de industria pro medicina porrigit venenum. Et secundum hanc sententiam responden¬ dum est ad objectionem positam, verba Sa- cramentalia non haberevirtutem, ct proinde non esse Sacramentalia, nisi quando moven¬ tur a Deo ut instrumenta ; non autem mo¬ ventur a Deo ut instrumenta, nisi quando pronuntiantur ab eo, cui ipse commisit. Quare semper aliquo modo pendent verba Sacramentalia a ministri potestate et volun¬ tate. Quamvis igitur prior sententia proba¬ bilior videatur : tamen secundum utramque recte solvitur argumentum. Quarta ratio ex absurdis, quae alioqui se¬ querentur, ut bene notat Ilugo de S. Victore lib. II de Sacramentis par. 6. cap. 13. Nam primo, si parens aliquis duceret filium ad balnea, et dum puerum immergit , more Christiano signaret eum cruce, et diceret : Lavo te in nomine Patris, ct Filii, et Spiri¬ tus sancti, nimirum invocans Deum, ut bene cedat illa lotio, et nihil de Baptismo cogi¬ tans; tunc ille puer deberet dici baptizatus, si non requiritur intentio baptizandi, sed sufficiant materia ct forma quomodocumque prolata. JIoc tamen plane ridiculum est. Secundo , si Sacerdos in mensa legeret Evangelium, ut fieri solet in mensa Proela- torum et religiosorum; ct inter legendum pronuntiaret illa verba : Hoc est corpus meum. Et : Hic est sanguis 7neus : jam totus panis et totum vinum illius mensae esset consecratum, si non requiritur intentio. Tertio, si cum aliquis ancillam conducit, diceret : Accipio te in meam (intelligens, sed non exprimens ancillam) et illa diceret; Accipio te in meum (intelligens herum, sed non exprimens) jam illi essent conjugati.