Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Sacraments in General · Book I: On the Nature and Causes of the Sacrament
Chapter 28: The arguments are solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. III, De Sacramentis in Genere, Book I: On the Nature and Causes of the Sacrament. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
It remains to solve the arguments: first Luther's, second Calvin's, third Kemnitz's, fourth Catharinus's. The first argument of Luther, from the assertion of article 12: The word of God, with whatever intention it be said, excites faith in the hearer. But it is faith that justifies; therefore the sacramental word, with whatever intention it be uttered, is efficacious and confirms. Because Philippians 1 the Apostle rejoices that the word is preached with whatever intention, even though some preached to stir up envy against Paul, since, namely, even in that manner the word could be fruitful; therefore in the same manner the word in the Sacraments, though uttered in jest, will be useful. Second, the same Luther confirms it in the book On the private Mass, from this, that Alexander Bishop of Alexandria is read to have held valid the Baptism which Athanasius as a boy had conferred on other boys in jest. Likewise from this, that it is read in other histories of certain Gentile parasites who baptized one of their own to mock the Christians, and yet he was straightway converted when the water touched him, from which we understand that that was a true Baptism.
I answer that the first argument rightly proves among those who think with Luther that the Sacraments were instituted only to excite faith, and that faith alone justifies; but among us it concludes nothing. For although we grant that the word uttered with whatever intention can excite faith, yet we do not grant that the word uttered with whatever intention can have the sacramental effect. The reason of the difference is that to excite faith no efficiency is required, but signification suffices, as is well known. To the confirmation I say that it is one thing to intend not to preach, another to intend to preach, but for an evil end. Paul speaks of this latter; and in this manner we grant that Baptism is true and efficacious when the minister intends truly to baptize, though for an evil end. You will say also: he who intends not to preach seriously, if yet he utter the words of a sermon, will be able to make fruit; therefore, etc. I answer that the reason of the sermon-word and of the sacramental word is not the same. For the words of sermons are, so to speak, speculative words, which do not depend on intention; the sacramental words are practical, which, as we proved, depend on intention. But although these arguments conclude in Luther's way, yet that that way is not right is plain from these same arguments. For it is concluded that the words alone suffice without water or another element; likewise they conclude that the Sacraments can be conferred by a drunkard, nay even by a magpie.
To the second confirmation I answer that in two ways the Sacraments can be conferred in jest (as Hugh explains, book 2 On the Sacraments part 6 chapter 13). In one way, that those who play intend truly to confer the Sacraments, but for the end of recreating the mind in that manner; in which way others could truly intend to confer the Sacraments, but for the end of gaining money. And this play does not impede the truth of the Sacrament, because this jest is extrinsic to the sacramental action itself. In another way, that those who play intend not truly to confer the Sacraments, but to mock and deceive; in which way those who clothed Christ in purple, and said to him, Hail, King of the Jews, did not intend to make him a King, but to mock him. And this play impedes the truth of the Sacrament, because this jest is intrinsic to the action. I say, then, that the play of Athanasius was of the former kind; for he truly willed to baptize, but took that action as the matter of play and delight. That it is so is gathered both from the very history, which Rufinus writes book 10 of the history chapter 14, Sozomen book 2 chapter 16, and Nicephorus book 8 chapter 40. For these authors write that by Athanasius Catechumens alone were baptized, and that with all the ceremonies of the Church applied; and also from this, that boys are wont to do playful things seriously. For, for example, when they feign one to be a King, others servants, or feign the assaulting of some place, their King truly intends to command, and they intend to obey; and they seriously assault some place, and others seriously defend it; yet these are called playful, because they are childish, and because they are undertaken for the sake of delight. A like history to have happened in his own time the same Nicephorus writes, book 3 last chapter. To that of the mime I answer that there is nothing in that history against us. For the first who wrote the history was (so far as I know) Ado of Trier in the martyrology, 8 Kalends of September. From him the later writers took it: Vincent in the Historical Mirror book 12 chapter 102, and St. Antoninus part 1 title 8 chapter 1 section 9 of the Historical Summa. Now Ado writes that that mime, by name Genesius, before the Emperor Diocletian, for the sake of mocking the Christian mysteries, feigned himself sick and demanded Baptism; then by the Emperor's command a presbyter and an exorcist were sent for to baptize him. But when he was asked by the presbyter what he sought, he, suddenly converted, answered not feignedly but seriously that he sought the grace of Christ, and so was baptized truly and seriously, since both the presbyter intended to baptize and he intended to receive Baptism; although the Emperor still believed that he was feigning. See Surius, tome 4, in the life of St. Genesius.
The second argument is Calvin's in the Antidote, and Kemnitz's in the second part of the Examen in the place cited, who take an argument from this, that if the efficacy of the Sacrament depended on the intention of the minister, the certitude which a man ought to have of the effect of the Sacrament would perish, and the spiritual consolation, because no one can be certain of the intention of another. I answer that a man ought not in this world to seek an infallible certitude of his salvation or justification, such as is the certitude of divine faith. For this does not agree with this state, of which the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 10: He that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall. And Philippians 2: With fear and trembling work out your salvation. Of which matter see Augustine book 2 On the good of perseverance chapter 13, and On correction and grace chapter 13. But a human and moral certitude, which suffices that a man be at rest, we have from the Sacraments, even though they depend on the intention of another. For since to have the intention is most easy, there is no cause of doubting whether the minister had the intention, unless he betray it by some exterior sign; and this suffices that a man not seek to be baptized again, but rest in the Baptism received. And note that the Lutherans are compelled to confess this very thing, even though they be unwilling. For they still baptize infants after the manner of the Catholics; wherefore when they have grown up they cannot remember, nor know whether they had Baptism, unless they be willing to believe their parents. And so they believe their parents, who yet can deceive, and rest in that. How much more will he be able to rest in his Baptism who sees himself baptized, and understands the words, and has no conjecture of a contrary intention of the minister, if he rests who only believes his parents or friends saying that he is baptized?
The third argument is Kemnitz's, from the authority of St. Augustine book 7 On Baptism chapter 53, where he does not dare to define whether Baptism conferred in jest holds, but says that a revelation of God must be awaited. Certain others add another place of Augustine from tract 5 on John, where he seems to say that Baptism conferred by a drunkard is valid, when yet it is established that drunkards have no intention. Kemnitz also adds Pope Innocent IV, who, on the testimony of Angelus in his Summa, thought that for the truth of the Sacrament it is not required that the minister bear in mind to do what the Church does; nay, that if he bear the contrary in mind — that is, not to do what the Church does — if yet it appear that he wills to do it, it is enough. I answer that the place of Augustine is against the adversaries. For, in the first place, Augustine there says that he doubted of that matter because it had been defined in no Council: “But for us,” he says, “it is safe not to advance in it by any rashness of opinion, in things which were begun in no Catholic regional Council, and terminated in no plenary Council. But let it be with a secure voice to assert that which, in the governance of the Lord our God and Savior Jesus Christ, is strengthened by the consent of the universal Church.” But now the matter is defined in two general Councils, the Florentine and the Tridentine. Nor does it matter that they are not received by the Lutherans; for neither was the Nicene received by the Donatists in the cause of Anabaptism; and yet Augustine everywhere affirms that the matter is certain and defined on account of the authority of that Council. Then Augustine there, when he says that a revelation of God must be sought, whether Baptism given in jest, without a true intention of conferring, is valid, plainly testifies that it is not certain from the Scriptures, as the adversaries boast, that the Sacraments do not require the intention of the minister. Besides, without doubt we do far better, according to Augustine's opinion, in baptizing those who are baptized without intention, than the Lutherans in not baptizing. For in a doubtful matter it is better to repeat Baptism, at least under condition, than to expose oneself to the danger of losing Baptism. To the other place of Augustine the answer is easy; for he does not say that the Baptism of a drunkard (ebrii), but of a drunkard-by-habit (ebriosi), is valid.
To the authority of Innocent I answer that Kemnitz, after his manner, faithfully recited his opinion. For Innocent in the chapter Si quis puerum, On Baptism, etc., after he had said that the Sacrament is valid even though the minister bear in mind not to do what the Church does, added: “Provided he intend to baptize” — which words Kemnitz omitted. And not once, but thrice, Innocent repeats that Baptism is not valid if the minister intend not to baptize, but only to wash the body. Whence those words of Innocent, “Even though he bear in mind not to do what the Church does,” can be understood in two ways: in one way, of what the Church does as to the substance of the action; in the other way, as to the effect of that action. In the latter way Innocent understood it, and the sense is: Even though the minister bear not in mind to do what the Church does — that is, to justify a man from sins, because, namely, he thinks that ceremony has not such virtue — yet if he intend truly to do the ceremony which the Church does, it is enough. In the former way Kemnitz took it, but wrongly, because Innocent has the contradictory thrice in the same place. Wherefore Kemnitz also falsely imposes on Innocent that he said the Sacrament is valid if it only appear that the minister willed to baptize, even though in truth he did not intend it. For this Innocent does not say, though it can be gathered from the words.
The fourth argument is Catharinus's, from the authority of St. Thomas, Chrysostom, and Pope Nicholas. St. Thomas part 3 question 64 article 8 to the second says that for the perfection of the Sacrament the intention of the Church, which is expressed in the very form of words, suffices, and that nothing else is required on the part of the minister. Which he has more clearly in book 4 distinction 6 question 1 article 2, where he says that the mental intention of the minister is not required, but that the expression of the words, in which the intention of the Church is contained, suffices. Chrysostom homily 85 on John: “The priest,” he says, “lends his tongue and hands; for it is not just that those approaching for our salvation be harmed on account of another's malice.” Pope Nicholas, asked in the Responses to the Bulgarians whether those baptized by a Jew were to be rebaptized, answered that they were not, if they were baptized in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; where no mention is made of intention. Finally Catharinus adds a reason, because it seems too harsh that God should have placed the salvation of men in the will of an impious minister, and because our justification is rendered uncertain. Which argument, however, is already solved. But another can be added in its place: because among men, when a master contracts with another through a servant, or sends a gift to another, it is not required with what intention the servant do it.
I answer to St. Thomas that he teaches the internal intention of the minister to be required. For part 3 question 64 article 8 in the body of the article he says that the things which are done in the Sacraments must be determined, because they can be done for many uses, by the intention of the minister. Likewise in the answer to the first he says that the minister, because he is an animate instrument, must apply himself to the work by intention, by which he intend to do what Christ and the Church do. Likewise in the answer to the third he says that an actual intention is not necessary, but that a habitual one suffices; and he explains that it is then habitual, when at the beginning of the work he actually intended to do what the Church does. Likewise in article 9 to the first he says that it is a true Sacrament, even though the minister do not believe the Sacrament to avail anything, provided he intend to do what the Church does. Finally in article 10 he most clearly says that the intention of conferring the Sacrament is required in the minister, but not of playing or jesting, and that without that intention the Sacrament is not perfected. Nor does it stand in the way that St. Thomas adds: “Especially when he manifests his intention exteriorly.” For he means to say: When the minister has the intention not of conferring the Sacrament, but of jesting, but does not manifest it, then the Sacrament is null; but it is more null if he manifest the intention; because in the first way it is null before God, in the second way it is null before God and before men. To the place objected by Catharinus from the answer to the second of article 8, I answer with Cajetan and Soto that St. Thomas, when he says that a mental intention is not required for the perfection of the Sacrament, but that the exterior utterance of the words suffices, does not speak of the perfection of the Sacrament simply, but of its perfection before men, which suffices for human certitude and for pacifying the mind, so that it seek nothing else. Which is proved in two ways. First, because in the second argument St. Thomas had objected that, if a mental intention be required, no one can be certain that he has received the Sacrament. The answer, then, must be understood of the perfection of the Sacrament as to certitude, not absolutely. Second, because in this solution St. Thomas adds that the exterior utterance of the form suffices, unless a contrary intention of the minister or of the receiver be expressed; which addition is very well put if the matter be of certitude, as is plain; but is false if the matter be of the perfection of the Sacrament absolutely, as Catharinus will have it. For if the internal intention of the minister were not required, except of pronouncing those words, then certainly it would be a true Sacrament if the minister expressed a contrary intention, in this manner: I do not intend to baptize, but to mock the Sacrament, and therefore I will to say these words, “I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit”; nay, even if by an exterior gesture he expressed mockery, and said those words ironically, it would still be a Sacrament. But St. Thomas teaches the contrary, as has appeared.
To the place of Chrysostom I answer that Chrysostom speaks of the probity of the ministers, and means to say that the efficacy of the Sacraments depends not on the goodness of the ministers, but on the goodness of God alone. Whence, when he says, “The priest lends his hands and tongue,” he excludes the virtues, not the intention, of the minister. For he means to say: The minister is an instrument of God, not the principal agent; and from this, that the minister is an instrument, it follows that he does not act in his own power, and accordingly that faith, hope, charity, or any other of his virtues is not required; yet it does not follow that intention is not required; nay rather, on the contrary, it follows that it is required, since a man is an animate and rational instrument, and accordingly ought to be moved by God according to his nature — that is, by means of his own choice and intention. You will say: But the reason which Chrysostom brings — namely, Because it is not just that another's malice harm another — concludes also that the Sacraments ought not to depend on the intention of the minister; because then the malice of the minister could harm those receiving the Sacraments, if, namely, he secretly withdrew his intention. I answer that that reason concludes of probity, but not of intention, for two causes. First, because if the Sacraments depended on probity, very often the malice of one would harm another, because very many are evil; and the Sacraments could not be valid which are sometimes given by unbelievers, or heretics, or public sinners, when necessity urges. But if they depend on intention, most rarely will the malice of the minister harm the receivers; for all can have the intention, nor is there a reason why they should be unwilling. Second, because it is just that the Sacraments depend not on that quality of the minister which is not altogether necessary to the ministry itself, such as probity; but it was not equally just that they depend not on that quality without which the minister would not be a minister, such as intention. Add that, if this reason proved that the Sacraments do not depend on the intention of seriously giving the Sacraments, it would prove also that they do not depend on the intention of doing that external act, which alone Catharinus and the heretics admit. For even in this way it can happen that the malice of the minister harm the receiver, as if one be unwilling to say the words, or to pour the water, at the time when no other is found who can or will do this. And by this is solved also that reason of Catharinus, that it is too harsh that the salvation of men be in the will of an impious minister; for he too is compelled in some case to confess it. Nor ought it to seem harsh that God permits it, lest he destroy the nature of man; otherwise it would also seem harsh that God left in the will of a tyrant the lives of many innocents. To the authority of Pope Nicholas, I say that he was not anxious about the intention, both because it is ordinarily present, and because the Church does not judge of internal things. To the last argument from human custom, the solution is plain from our third reason.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXVIII.
. Solvuntur argumenta.
Superest argumenta solvere. Primo Lu-
theri. Secundo Calvini. Tertio Kemnitii.
Quarto Catharini.
Primum argumentum Lutheri ex asser¬
tione articuli 12. Verbum Dei, quacumque
intentione dicatur, excitat fidem in audiente.
Sed fides est qua) justificat; ergo verbum
Sacramentale, quacumque intentione profe¬
ratur, efficax est et confirmat. Quia Philip. I
Apostolus gaudet pra)dicari verbum qua¬
cumque intentione, etiamsi aliqui praxlica-
rent, ut invidiam Paulo conflarent, quia ni¬
mirum etiam eo modo poterat verbum esse
fructuosum : igitur eodem modo vei'bum in
Sacramentis, licet joco prolatum, utile erit.
Secundo confirmat idem Lutherus in lib.
de Missa privata, ex eo quod Alexander Epi¬
scopus Alexandrinus ratum habuisse legitur
Baptismum, quem Atlianasius puer aliis
pueris per jocum contulerat. Item ex eo,
quod legitur in aliis historiis de quibusdam
Gentilibus parasitis, qui unum ex suis bap-
tizarunt, ut riderent Christianos, et ille ta¬
men continuo conversus est, ubi aqua eum
CAPUT XXVIII.
417
tetigit, ex quo intelligimus fuisse illum ve¬
rum Baptismum.
Respondeo , Primum argumentum recte
probare apud eos qui sentiunt cum Luthero
Sacramenta tantum esse instituta ad exci¬
tandam lidem, et solam fidem justificare : at
apud nos nihil concludit. Nam etiamsi con¬
cedamus verbum quacumque intentione pro¬
latum, posse excitare fidem,’ non tamen con¬
cedimus verbum quacumque intentione pro¬
latum habere posse effectum Sacramenta-
lem. Ratio discriminis est, quia ad excitan¬
dam fidem non requiritur ulla efficientia, sed
sufficit significatio, ut notum est.
Ad confirmationem dico, aliud esse inten¬
dere non concionari, aliud intendere condo¬
nari, sed ob malum finem. Paulus de hoc
posteriore loquitur ; et hoc modo concedi¬
mus Baptismum esse verum et efficacem
cum minister intendit vere baptizare, licet
ob malum finem. Dices- etiam, qui intendit
non concionari serio, si tamen verba con¬
cionis proferat, fructum facere poterit: Ergo
etc. Respondeo, non esse eamdem rationem
verbi concionalis et Sacramcntalis. Nam
verba concionum sunt verba, ut sic dicam,
speculativa, qua; non pendent ab intentione;
verba Sacramentalia sunt practica, quse, ut
probavimus, pendent ab intentione.
Quamvis autem argumenta ha;c conclu¬
dant in via Lutheri, tamen non esse rectam
eam viam, patet ex istis iisdem argumentis.
Nam concluditur sola verba sufficere sine
aqua, vel alio elemento, item concludunt
Sacramenta posse conferri ab ebrio, imo
etiam a pica.
Ad Secundam confirmationem respondeo,
duobus modis posse pejr jocum Sacramenta
conferri (ut explicat Ilugo lib. II de Sacra¬
mentis par. 6. cap. 13.) Uno modo, ut qui
ludunt, intendant vere Sacramenta conferre,
sed ob finem recreandi animum eo modo :
quo modo possent alii vera intendere Sacra¬
menta conferre, sed ob finem lucrandae pe¬
cuniae. Et hic ludus non impedit veritatem
Sacramenti, quia hic jocus est extrinsecus
ipsi Sacramentali actioni. Alio modo, ut qui
ludunt, intendant non vere Sacramenta con¬
ferre, sed illudere et decipere, quo modo qui
Christum purpura induebant, eique dice¬
bant : Ave Ilex Judaeorum, non intendebant
eum Regem facere, sed ei illudere. Et hic
ludus impedit veritatem Sacramenti, quia
hic jocus est intrinsecus actioni.
Dico igitur ludum Athanasii fuisse prioris
Tom. III.
generis : nam vere voluit baptizare, sed ac¬
cepit eam actionem pro materia ludi, et
oblectationis. Id ita esse colligitur tum ex
ipsa historia, quam scribunt Ruffinus lib. X.
hist. cap. 14. Sozomenus lib. II. cap. 16.
et Nicephorus lib. VIII. cap. 40. Scribunt
enim hi auctores ab Athanasio solos Cate¬
chumenos baptizatos, idque omnibus Eccle¬
siae cteremoniis adhibitis : tum etiam ex eo,
quod solent pueri serio facere res ludicras.
Nam, verbi gratia, cum fingunt unum esse
Regem, alios famulos, vel fingunt oppugna¬
tionem alicujus loci, vere intendit Rex eo¬
rum jubere, et illi intendunt obedire; et
serio oppugnant locum aliquem, et alii serio
defendunt : dicuntur tamen haec ludicra,
quia sunt puerilia, et quia gratia oblectatio¬
nis suscipiuntur. Similem historiam suo
tempore accidisse scribit idem Nicephorus
lib. III. cap. ult.
Ad illud de mimo, Respondeo : nihil in
historia illa esse contra nos. Nam primus,
qui historiam scripsit, fuit (quod sciam) Ado
Trevirensis in martylogio 8 Kalend. Sep¬
tembris. Ab eo acceperunt posteriores Vin-
ccntius, speculo historiali lib. XII. cap. 102.
et S. Antoninus I. par. tit. 8. cap. 1. §. 9.
summa; historialis. Porro Ado scribit, mi¬
mum illum nomine Genesium, coram Impe¬
ratore Diocletiano gratia irridendi mysteria
Christiana, se segrotum finxisse, ac Baptis¬
mum postulasse; tum jussu Imperatoris ac-
cersitum presbyterum, et exorcistam, qui
eum baptizarent. Verum cum a presbytero
interrogaretur, quid peteret, illum i’epente
conversum, non ficte, sed serio respondisse,
gratiam Christi se petere, atque ita baptiza-
tum vere et serio, cum et presbyter bapti¬
zare intenderet, et ille intenderet suscipere
Baptismum; licet imperator adhuc crederet
eum fingere. Vide Surium, tom. IV. in vita
S. Genesii.
Secundum argumentum est Calvini in
Antidoto, et Kemnitii in 2. par. Examinis,
loco citato, qui inde argumentum sumunt,
quod si ab intentione ministri penderet effi¬
cacia Sacramenti, periret certitudo, quam
homo debet habere de effectu Sacramenti,
et consolatio spiritualis, quia nemo potest
certus esse de intentione alterius.
Respondeo, non debere hominem in hoc
mundo quaerere certitudinem de sua salute,
vel justificatione infallibilem, qualis est
certitudo fidei divina;. Hecc enim non con¬
venit huic statui, de quo dicit Apostolus,
27
418
LIBER 1.
I. Corinth. X : Qui stat, videat, ne cadat, Et
Philip. II : Cum timore, et tremore salutem
vestram operamini { 1). De qua re vide Au¬
gustinum lib. II.de bono persever. cap. 13.
et de corrept. et gratia cap. 13. Certitudi¬
nem autem humanam, et moralem, qum
sufficiat, ut homo quiescat, ex Sacramentis
habemus, etiamsi pendeant ab intentione
alterius. Nam cum habere intentionem sit
facillimum, nulla est causa dubitandi, an
minister habuerit intentionem, nisi aliquo
signo exteriori id prodat : et hoc sufficit, ut
homo non quoerat iterum baptizari, sed ac¬
quiescat in accepto Baptismo.
Et Nota, Lutheranos cogi idipsum confi¬
teri etiamsi nolint. Nam ipsi baptizantur
adhuc infantes more Catholicorum; quo¬
circa cum adoleverint non possunt recor¬
dari, nec scire an habuerint Baptismum,
nisi credere velint parentibus. Itaque pa¬
rentibus credunt, qui tamen decipere pos¬
sunt, et in eo acquiescunt. Quanto magis
poterit acquiescere in Baptismo is, qui vi¬
det se baptizari, et intelligit verba, nec ha¬
bet ullam conjecturam contrariae intentionis
ministri ; si is acquiescit, qui tantum credit
parentibus, vel amicis dicentibus, eum esse
baptizatum?
Tertium argumentum est Kemnitii ex
auctoritate S. Augustini lib. VII. de Bap¬
tismo cap. 53. ubi non audet definire, an
Baptismus collatus per jocum teneat, sed
dicit exspectandam Dei revelationem. Ad¬
dunt quidam alii alium locum Augustini ex
tract. 5. in Joannem, ubi videtur dicere,
Baptismum ab ebrio collatum, esse ratum;
cum tamen constet, ebrios non habere in¬
tentionem.
Addit etiam Kemnitius Innocentium Pa¬
pam IV. qui teste Angelo in sua summa,
sensit ad veritatem Sacramenti non requiri,
ut minister gerat in mente facere, quod fa¬
cit Ecclesia, imo, si contrarium gerat in
mente, id est, non facere, quod facit Eccle¬
sia, si tamen appareat, quod velit illud fa¬
cere, satis esse.
Respondeo, locum Augustini esse contra
adversarios. Nam in primis ibidem Augusti¬
nus dicit, se de ea re dubitasse, quia in nullo
Concilio res definita fuerat : « Sed nobis,
inquit, tutum est in ea non progredi aliqua
temeritate sententiae, quae nullo in Catho¬
lico regionali Concilio coepta, nullo plenario
Concilio terminata sunt. Id autem sit cura
securae vocis asserere, quod in gubernatione
Domini Dei nostri, et Salvatoris Jesu Christi
universalis Ecclesiae consensione roboratum
est. » Nunc autem res definita est in duobus
generalibus Conciliis, Florentino et Triden-
tino. Neque refert, quod non recipiuntur a
Lutheranis; nam neque Nicaenum recipieba¬
tur a Donatistis in causa Anabaptismi; et
tamen Augustinus ubique affirmat, rem
esse certam, et definitam ob illius Concilii
auctoritatem. Deinde ibidem Augustinus
cum dicit, petendam e§se Dei revelationem,
an Baptismus joco traditus, sine vera in¬
tentione conferendi sit ratus, aperte testa¬
tur non esse certum ex Scripturis, ut ad¬
versarii jactant, Sacramenta non requirere
intentionem ministri. Praeterea sine dubio
nos longe melius facimus secundum Augus¬
tini sententiam baptizando eos, qui sunt
baptizati sine intentione, quam Lutherani
non baptizando. Nam in re dubia praestat
repetere Baptismum, saltem sub conditione,
quam exponere se periculo amittendi Bap¬
tismum. Ad alium locum Augustini facilis
est responsio : nam non dicit ebrii, sed
ebriosi Baptismum esse ratum.
Ad auctoritatem Innocentii Respondeo,
Kemnilium more suo fideliter recitasse ejus
sententiam. Innocentius enim in cap. Si quis
puerum, extra de Baptismo etc. postquam
dixerat, Sacramentum esse ratum, etiamsi
minister gerat in mente non facere, quod
facit Ecclesia, addidit : « Dummodo inten¬
dat baptizare, » quae verba omisit Kemni¬
tius. Nec vero semel, sed ter repetit Inno¬
centius, Baptismum non esse ratum, si mi¬
nister intendat non baptizare, sed tantum
lavare corpus.
Unde illa verba Innocentii : « Etiamsi
gerat in mente non facere, quod facit Eccle¬
sia, » duobus modis possunt intelligi; uno
modo, de eo, quod facit Ecclesia, quantum
ad substantiam actionis; altero modo, quan¬
tum ad effectum illius actionis. Posteriori
modo intellexit Innocentius, et est sensus :
Etiamsi minister non gerat in mente facere,
quod facit Ecclesia, id est, justificare homi¬
nem a peccatis, quia nimirum putat non ha¬
bere talem virtutem illam caeremoniam; ta¬
men si intendit vere facere caeremoniam,
quam facit Ecclesia, satis est. Priori modo
accepit Kemnitius, sed perperam, quia con-
-(1) I. Cor. X, 12; Philipp. II, 12.
CAPUT XXVIII.
419
%
tradictorium ter ibidem habet Innocentius.
Quare illud etiam Kemnitius falso imponit
Innocentio, quod dixerit, Sacramentum esse
ratum, si tantum appareat ministrum vo¬
luisse baptizare, etiamsi revera id non in¬
tenderit. Id enim Innocentius non dicit, sed
ex verbis colligi potest.
Quartum argumentum est Catharini ex
auctoritate S. Thomae, Chrysostomi, et Ni¬
colai Papse. S. Thomas 3. par. qucest. LX1V.
nrt. 8. ad 2. dicit, ad perfectionem Sacra¬
menti satis esse intentionem Ecclesia?, qua?
exprimitur in ipsa forma verborum, nec
aliud requiri ex parte ministri. Quod clarius
habet in IV. dist. 6. qusest. I. art. 2. ubi di¬
cit, non requiri mentalem intentionem mi¬
nistri, sed sufficere expressionem verborum,
in qua continetur intentio Ecclesiae. Ghryso-
stomus homil.85. in Joan. : « Sacerdos, in¬
quit, linguam et manus pra?bet; neque enim
justum est propter alterius malitiam ad sa¬
lutem nostram accedentes offendi. ;> Nicolaus
Papa dd Consulta Bulgarorum interrogatus,
an baptizati a Judaeo, essent rebaptizandi ;
respondit, non esse, si in nomine Patris et
Filii et Spiritus sancti baptizati essent : ubi
nulla fit mentio intentionis.
Denique addit rationem Catharinus, quia
nimis durum videtur, ut Deus in arbitrio
impii ministri posuerit salutem hominum ;
et quia redditur incerta nostra justificatio.
Quod tamen argumentum jam est solutum.
Sed potest addi aliud ejus loco ; quia inter
homines, cum dominus per servum contra¬
hit cum alio, vel mittit munus alteri, non
requiritur, qua intentione servus id faciat.
Respondeo ad S. Thomam, eum docere,
requiri intentionem internam ministri. Nam
3. par. quaest. LXIV. art. 8. in corpore arti¬
culi, dicit, determinari debere ea, qme in
Sacramentis fiunt, quia ad multos usus fieri
possunt per intentionem ministri. Item in
respons. ad I. dicit, ministrum, quia est ins¬
trumentum animatum, debere seipsum ap¬
plicare ad opus per intentionem, qua inten¬
dat facere, quod facit Christus et Ecclesia.
Item in responsione ad tertium dicit, non
esse necessariam actualem intentionem, sed
sufficere habitualem ; et explicat, tunc esse
habitualem, quando initio operis, actu in¬
tendebat facere, quod facit Ecclesia. Item in
art. 9. adi. dicit, verum esse Sacramen¬
tum, etiamsi minister non credat Sacramen-
tuin aliquid valere, modo intendat facere,
quod facit Ecclesia. Denique in art» 10. cla¬
rissime dicit, requiri in ministro intentio¬
nem Sacramentum conferendi, non autem
ludendi, vel jocandi, et sine ea intentione
non perfici Sacramentum. Neque obstat,
quod addit S. Thomas : « Praecipue quando
suam intentionem exterius manifestat. »
Nam vult dicere : Quando minister habet in¬
tentionem non conferendi Sacramentum, sed
jocandi, sed eam non manifestat, tum Sacra¬
mentum esse nullum, sed magis esse nul¬
lum, si intentionem manifestet, quia primo
modo est nullum coram Deo, secundo modo
est nullum coram Deo et coram hominibus.
Ad locum objectum a Catharino ex resp.
ad 2. art. 8. Respondeo cum Cajetano et
Soto, S. Thomam, cum dicit, non requiri
mentalem intentionem ad perfectionem Sa¬
cramenti, sed sufficere exterriam prolatio-
nemverborum, non loqui de perfectione Sa¬
cramenti simpliciter, sed de perfectione co¬
ram hominibus, qua? sufficit ad humanam
certitudinem, et mentem pacandam, ut non
1’cquirat aliud. Id quod probatur dupliciter.
Primo, quia in argumento 2. S. Thomas hoc
objecerat, si requiratur intentio mentalis,
nullum posse esse certum se accepisse Sa¬
cramentum. Responsio igitur debet intelligi
de Sacramenti perfectione, quoad certitudi¬
nem, non absolute. Secundo, quia in hac so¬
lutione addit S. Thomas, sufficere externam
prolationem forma?, nisi exprimatur contra¬
ria intentio ministri, vel suscipientis, qua?
additio optime se habet, si agatur de certi¬
tudine, ut patet; falsa autem est, si agatur
de perfectione Sacramenti absolute, ut vult
Catharinus. Nam si non requireretur interna
ministri intentio, nisi pronuntiandi illa ver¬
ba, tum certe verum esset Sacramentum, si
minister exprimeret contrariam intentionem,
hoc modo : Ego non intendo baptizare, sed
irridere Sacramentum, et ideo volo dicere
haec verba : Ego te baptizo in nomine Pa¬
tris, et Filii, et Spiritus sancti : imo etiam
si externo gestu irrisionem exprimeret, et
ironice illa verba diceret, adhuc esset Sa¬
cramentum. At S. Thomas contrarium do¬
cet, ut patuit.
Ad locum Chrysostomi Respondeo, Chry-
sostomum loqui de probitate ministrorum,
ac velle dicere, non pendei’e efficaciam Sa¬
cramentorum a bonitate ministrorum, sed a
"Bonitate Dei solius. Unde cum ait : « Sacer¬
dos manus et linguam praebet, » excludit
virtutes, non intentionem ministri. Nam vult
dicere : Minister est instrumentum Dei, non
420
L1BE11 I.
principale agens; ex hoc autem, quod mi¬
nister est instrumentum, sequitur, ut non
agat in virtute propria; et proinde, ut non
requiratur fides, spes, charitas, aut alia ejus
virtus : tamen non sequitur, ut non requira¬
tur intentio, imo potius contra sequitur, ut
requiratur, cum homo sit instrumentum ani¬
matum et rationale ; et proinde debeat mo¬
veri a Deo secundum naturam suam, id est,
mediante propria electione ct intentione.
Dices : At ratio quam afTertChrysostomus
nimirum : Quia non est justum, ut alterius
malitia alteri noceat, concludit etiam non
debere pendere Sacramenta ab intentione
ministri; quia tunc nocere posset ministri
malitia suscipientibus Sacramenta, si nimi¬
rum ille occulte subtraheret intentionem.
llespondeo : Rationem illam concludere
de probitate, non autem de intentione, ob
duas causas. Primo, quia si Sacramenta pen¬
derent a probitate, sa>pissime noceret unius
malitia alteri, quia plurimi sunt mali, et non
possent Sacramenta esse rata, qua; ab infi¬
delibus, vel heereticis, vel publicis peccato¬
ribus aliquando urgente necessitate tradun¬
tur. At si pendeant ab intentione, rarissime
nocebit malitia ministri suscipientibus: nam
intentionem omnes habere possunt, nec est
ratio cur nolint. Secundo, quia justum est,
ut non pendeant Sacramenta ab ea qualitate
ministri, qua; non est omnino necessaria ipsi
ministerio, qualis est probitas ; at non erat
a*que justum, ut non pendeant ab ea quali¬
tate, sine qua minister non esset minister,
qualis est intentio. Adde, quod si haec ratio
probaret, Sacramenta non pendere ab in¬
tentione serio tradendi Sacramenta, proba¬
ret etiam ea non pendere ab intentione fa¬
ciendi actum illum externum, quam solam
admittuntCatharinus et haeretici. Nam etiam
hoc modo potest fieri, ut malitia ministri
noceat suscipienti, ut si quis nolit dicere
verba, aut infundere aquam eo tempore, quo
non inveniatur alius, qui possit aut velit hoc
facere.
Et per hoc solvitur etiam illa ratio Gatha-
ri ni, quod sit nimis durum, salutem homi¬
num esse in arbitrio impii ministri : nam
cogitur ipse quoque in aliquo casu id fateri.
Neque debet videri durum, quod Deus per¬
mittit, ne destruat naturam hominis, alioqui
etiam videretur durum, quod Deus relique¬
rit in arbitrio tyranni vitas multorurfi inno¬
centium.
Ad auctoritatem Nicolai Papa;, Dico, eum
non fuisse sollicitum de intentione, tum quia
ea ordinarie adest, tum quia Ecclesia non
judicat de internis.
Ad ultimum argumentum ex more huma¬
no, patet solutio ex nostra tertia ratione.
1
CONTROVERSIARUM
DE SACRAMENTIS IN GENERE
LIBER SECUNDUS