Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book III: On Free Choice
Chapter 3: On the definition of free choice
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Free choice is defined by Clement (if indeed he is the author of book 3 of the Recognitions) in these words: “Free choice is a sense of the mind, having a virtue by which it can be inclined to what acts it will.” In the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas (which is had among the works of St. Augustine), chapter 21, free choice is defined as “rational will.” Peter Lombard, book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 24, brings this definition: “Free choice is a faculty of reason and will, by which good is chosen with grace assisting, or evil with the same desisting” — which definition seems to have been taken from the Enchiridion of St. Augustine, chapter 106, where we read that free choice can of itself choose evil, but cannot choose good save with grace helping. Likewise Peter Lombard, in the same book 2, distinction 25, writes that free choice is defined by the philosophers as “a free judgment concerning the will.” St. Anselm, in the book On Free Choice, chapter 3, defines the same thing thus: “Free choice is the power of keeping rectitude of will for the sake of rectitude itself.” St. Bernard, in the book On Grace and Free Choice, says that free choice is “consent, by reason of the unlosable liberty of the will and the undeclinable judgment of reason”; or, more briefly, “a habit of the mind free of itself.”
But because it would be long, and by no means necessary, to defend or explain all these definitions, we shall propose another, in our judgment fuller, gathered from the doctrine of St. Thomas, in this manner: “Free choice is a free power of choosing, out of those things which conduce to some end, one before another, or of accepting one and the same thing, or at one's pleasure refusing it — bestowed on an intelligent nature unto the great glory of God.” In which definition those first two words, “free power,” explain the very form and notion of free choice. For free choice is a certain power, not a habit or an act; and a power not of any sort whatever, but indeterminate and free — such as we shall demonstrate in its place that the will alone is. And so that name “power” in the definition indicates the genus; that word “free,” the difference. But since every power is an accident, and every accident depends on the subject in which it is; and again every power has a bearing toward its act and its object: therefore in a full and perfect definition the subject, the act, and the object had to be explained. And the subject of free choice is signified in those words, “on an intelligent nature”: for all those natures, and those only, which are endowed with intelligence have a free choice of the will — namely God, the Angels, and men. The object of free choice is indicated in those words: “out of those things which conduce to some end.” For free choice is not engaged about the end, but about the means: for election, which, as we are presently to say, is the proper act of free choice, is as it were the conclusion of a deliberation; and all deliberation is about the means to the end, not about the end itself. And so this is the difference between the will and free choice: that the same rational power of desiring, as it regards the end, is called will; as it regards the means, is called free choice — just as also the same power of understanding, as it regards first principles, is called intellect; as it regards the conclusions which are gathered from the principles by discourse, is called reason. The act of free choice is contained in those words: “of choosing one before another, or of accepting one and the same thing, or even at one's pleasure refusing it.” For the proper act of free choice is election; but this can be done in two ways: either by selecting one out of two or more things proposed — which is wont to be called the liberty of contrariety, or of specification; or, one thing only being proposed, by accepting or rejecting it — which is called the liberty of contradiction, or of exercise. And so, to signify the act of free choice of the former kind, it was said in the definition, “of choosing one before another”; to signify the act of the latter kind, it was said, “or of accepting one and the same thing, or at one's pleasure refusing it.” We added last also the end for whose sake free choice was bestowed on an intelligent nature, when we say: “unto the great glory of God.” This, then, is the definition of free choice, which in the following chapters will be more commodiously declared and proved part by part.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT III. De liberi arbitrii definitione. Definitur liberum arbitrium a Clcmente (si tamen is est auctor in lib. m. recogni¬ tionum) his verbis: « Liberum arbitrium est sensus animi, habens virtutem, qua possit ad quos velit actus inclinari. » In libro de Ec¬ clesiasticis dogmatibus (qui inter opera S. Augustini habetur) cap. 21. liberum arbi¬ trium definitur « rationalis voluntas. » Pe¬ trus Lombardus lib. n. Sentent. dist. 24. hanc definitionem adfert : « Liberum arbi¬ trium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum eligitur gratia assistente, vel malum eadem desistente. » Quae definitio desumpta esse videtur ex Enchiridio sancti Augustini cap. 106. ubi legimus, liberum arbitrium per se posse malum eligere. Bonum autem non posse, nisi gratia adjuvante. Item Petrus Lombardus in eodem lib. m. dist. 25. scribit, a Philosophis liberum arbitrium definiri, li¬ berum de voluntate judicium. S. Anselmus in libro de libero arbitrio cap. 3. rem cam- dem ita definit : « Liberum arbitrium est potestas servandae rectitudinis voluntatis , propter ipsam rectitudinem. » S. Bernardus in lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio, liberum arbitrium esse dicit consensum ob voluntatis inamissibilem libertatem, et rationis indecli¬ nabile judicium. Yel brevius, habitum animi liberum sui. Sed quia longum esset, minimeque neces¬ sarium, has omnes definitiones defendere,1 vel explicare, proponemus aliam, nostro ju¬ dicio, pleniorem, ex doctrina S. Thomae col¬ lectam, hoc modo :■ « Liberum arbitrium est libera potestas ex his, quae ad finem aliquem conducunt, unum prae alio eligendi, aut unum et idem acceptandi, vel pro arbitrio respuendi, intelligenti naturae ad magnam Dei gloriam attributa. » In qua definitione duae illae voces primae, « libera potestas, » explicant formam ipsam, et rationem liberi arbitrii. Est enim liberum arbitrium potentia quaedam, non habitus vel actus : et potentia non qualiscumque, sed indeterminata et li¬ bera, qualem solam voluntatem esse suo loco demonstrabimus. Itaque nomen illud, « po¬ tentia, » seu, « potestas, » in definitione indicat genus ; illud, « libera, » differen¬ tiam. Quia vero potentia omnis est accidens, et omne accidens pendet a subjecto, in quo est ; et rursus omnis potentia habitudinem habet ad actum et objectum, ideo in defini¬ tione plena et perfecta explicandum fuit sub¬ jectum, actus et objectum. Et quidem sub¬ jectum liberi arbitrii significatum est in illis verbis, « Intelligenti natura}. » Omnes enim et solae naturae illae, quae intelligentia prae- 584 LIBER Iit. dita) sunt, 1 berum habent voluntatis arbi¬ trium, Deus videlicet, Angeli et homines. Objectum liberi arbitrii illis verbis indicatur : « Ex his, qua) ad finem .aliquem conducunt. » Siquidem liberum arbitrium non versatur circa finem, sed circa media. Electio, enim, qua), ut statim dicturi sumus, est proprius actus liberi arbitrii, est quasi conclusio con¬ sultationis : Consultatio autem omnis est de mediis ad finem, non de ipso fine, Itaque hoc interest inter voluntatem et li¬ berum arbitrium , quod eadem appetendi potentia rationalis, ut respicit finem, dicitur voluntas ; ut respicit media, dicitur liberum arbitrium. Quemadmodum etiam eadem po¬ tentia intelligendi, ut respicit prima princi¬ pia, dicitur intellectus ; ut respicit conclu¬ sionem, qua) per discursum ex principiis col¬ liguntur, dicitur ratio. Actus liberi arbitrii continetur in illis ver¬ bis : « Unum pra) alio eligendi, aut unum et idem acceptandi, vel etiam pro arbitrio re¬ spuendi. i) Actus enim liberi arbitrii proprius est electio. Sed ea duobus modis fieri potest, Vel seligendo unum ex duobus, aut pluribus propositis, qua) dici solet libertas contrarie- tatis, sive specificationis ; vel uno tantum proposito, illud acceptando, vel rejiciendo, qua) dicitur libertas contradictionis, sive exercitii. Itaque ad significandum actum li¬ beri arbitrii prioris generis, dictum est in definitione, « unum pra) alio eligendi, » ad significandum actum generis posterioris, dictum est, « aut unum et idem acceptandi, vel pro arbitrio respuendi. » Adjecimus ultimo etiam finem, cujus gra¬ tia liberum arbitrium natura) intelligenti at- • tributum est, cum dicimus : « Ad magnam Dei gloriam. » Ha)c igitur est definitio liberi arbitrii, qufe in sequentibus capitibus per partes commodius declarabitur, et probabi¬ tur.