Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book III: On Free Choice
Chapter 4: What liberty is necessary for free choice
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The first particle of the definition which seems to us to need sifting is “free.” It is asked, then, what liberty that is from which free choice is named, or, as we placed it in the definition, a free power. For a threefold liberty is distinguished by St. Bernard in the book On Grace and Free Choice, and by Peter Lombard, book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 25: one from necessity, another from sin, a third from misery. The first is called the liberty of nature, the second the liberty of grace, the third the liberty of glory. Of the first the Apostle writes in the first epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 7: having no necessity, but having power of his own will. Of the second in the epistle to the Romans, chapter 6: being then freed from sin, we have been made servants of justice. Of the third in the same epistle, chapter 8: the creature also itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption, into the liberty of the glory of the children of God. But it is sufficiently agreed among authors that the liberty from which free choice is named is none but the first; for impious men do not lack free choice, though they be servants of sin and corruption, and thereby lack the second and third liberty.
But again, the liberty of nature can be divided into two species. For there is a liberty which is opposed to simple coaction; and there is a liberty to which not coaction only, but necessity also, is repugnant. Which partition is taken from the doctrine of the Philosopher in book 3 of the Ethics, chapters 4 and 5. Now those things are said to be free from simple coaction which, though they be done necessarily, and cannot not be done, are yet done spontaneously, voluntarily, and gladly — as when we so will to be happy that we can in no way will to be unhappy. But those things are said to be free from necessity which at our pleasure we can will and refuse, or also will and not will — as when we walk and speak, when we could have sat and been silent.
It is asked, then, whether for constituting free choice there is required liberty from necessity, or whether that suffices which is from coaction. There are not wanting, among the heretics of this time, those who judge liberty from coaction to be enough. Martin Bucer, in the book on the concord of doctrine, writes that only coaction is repugnant to free choice; and since the Lutherans do not deny free choice, if only liberty from coaction be required, Bucer therefore judges that by this distinction he has found the way to concord. For what the Catholics say — that man is of free choice — he bids be understood of a choice free from coaction, not from necessity; and what the Lutherans say — that man is not of free choice — he teaches is to be taken of a choice free from necessity, not from coaction. John Calvin also, book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 2, §6 [al. 7], writes that man is free from coaction, not from necessity; and adds that this very thing was the mind of Peter Lombard, in book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 25: “Lombard at length pronounces,” says he, “that we are not of free choice for this reason, that we are equally strong toward evil and good, whether in doing or in thinking, but only in that we are loosed from coaction.” But Calvin, after his manner, not only wrongly expounds Lombard's judgment — which we shall demonstrate in the following chapter — but even fights with himself. For in the same book, chapter 2, §5 [al. 8], he speaks thus: “Lombard, since he knew not how to distinguish necessity from coaction, gave matter to a pernicious error.” But if Lombard knew not how to distinguish necessity from coaction, how did he a little before pronounce that we are not of free choice because we are equally strong toward evil and good, whether in doing or in thinking, but only because we are loosed from coaction? The same Calvin also, in the second book against Pighius, in express words pronounces that he will hold him for a heretic who denies a choice free from coaction, provided he assert not one free from necessity. To the same judgment Alphonsus de Castro seems to have come, book 9, under the word “liberty”; for treating of the liberty whence free choice is named: “It is,” says he, “the liberty which is opposed to necessity, or, to speak more truly, to coaction.” But Alphonsus in the same place indicates plainly enough that by coaction he understands any determination to one thing; for he says that man, through liberty from coaction, can do and not do, will and not will, etc. And so he seems to have departed from the common judgment only in his manner of speaking — which judgment is, that for constituting free choice there is altogether required liberty from necessity, and that liberty from coaction does not suffice.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT IV. Quxnam libertas sit necessaria ad liberum arbitrium. Prima definitionis particula, qua) execu- tienda nobis esse videtur, est, « libera. » Quaeritur igitur, qutenam libertas sit, a qua dicitur liberum arbitrium, sive, ut in defini¬ tione posuimus, potentia libera. Triplex enim libertas distinguitur a S. Bernardo in libro de gratia et libero arbitrio, et Petro Lom- bardo lib. ii. Sent. dist. 25 una a necessi¬ tate, altera a peccato, tertia a miseria. Prima dicitur libertas naturae, secunda libertas gra¬ tiae, tertia libertas gloria). De prima scribit Apostolus inpriorc epist. ad Corinth. cap. vn : i\on habens necessitatem , sed potestatem ha¬ bens suai voluntatis. De secunda in epist. ad liom, cap. vi : Liberati a peccato , servi facti estis justitix. De tertia in eadem epist. c. vm : Tunc et ipsa creatura liberabitur a servitute corruptionis , in libertatem (jlorix filiorum Dei (1). Cseterum satis constat inter aucto¬ res, libertatem, a qua dicitur liberum arbi¬ trium, non esse nisi primam. Neque enim carent libero arbitrio homines impii, quam¬ vis servi sint peccati ct corruptionis, ac per hoc careant secunda et tertia libertate. Sed rursus libertas natura) duas in species dividi potest. Est enim libertas, qua) oppo¬ nitur simplici coactioni, et est libertas, cui non sola coactio, sed etiam necessitas repug¬ nat. Qua) partitio desumpta est ex doctrina Philosophi in lib. m. Ethicor. cap. 4. et 5. Dicuntur autem illa esse libera a simplici coactione, quie, tametsi necessario fiant, nec possint non fieri, tamen sponte, voluntarie, et libenter fiunt, ut cum ita volumus esse felices et infelices, esse nullo modo velle possumus. Illa vero dicuntur esse libera a necessitate, qua) pro arbitrio possumus velle, et nolle, sive etiam velle et non velle, ut cum ambulamus et loquimur, quando sedere et tacere potuissemus. Queeritur igitur, an ad liberum arbitrium constituendum requiratur libertas a neces¬ sitate, an vero sufficiat ea, qua; est a coa¬ ctione. Non desunt ex heereticis hujus tem¬ poris, qui libertatem a coactione satis esse Judicent. Murtinus Bucerus in lib. de con¬ cordia doctrina) scribit, libero arbitrio solam coactionem repugnare. Et quoniam Luthcrani non negant liberum arbitrium, si sola requi¬ ratur libertas a coactione, ideo se viam ad concordiam reperisse per hanc distinctionem Bucerus existimat. Quod enim Catholici di¬ cunt, hominem esse liberi arbitrii, intelligi jubet de arbitrio libero a coactione, non a necessitate. Quod vero dicunt Lutherani, hominem non esse liberi arbitrii, accipien- (1) Corin. VII. 37; Rora. VI, 18; ibid. VIII, 21. CAPUT V. 585 dum esse docet de arbitrio libero a necessi¬ tate, non a coactione. Joannes etiam Calvinus lib. ii. Institut. cap. 2. § 6. scribit, hominem esse liberum a coactione, non a necessitate. Et addit, hanc ipsam fuisse mentem Petri Lombardi in 2. Sentent. dist. 25 : « Pronunciat, inquit, tan¬ dem Lombardus, non liberi arbitrii ideo nos esse, quod ad malum et bonum, vel agen¬ dum, vel cogitandum peraeque polleamus, sed dumtaxat, quod coactione soluti imus. » Caeterum Calvinus pro suo more non solum perperam exponitLombardi sententiam, quod in sequenti capite demonstrabimus, sed etiam secum ipse pugnat. Nam in eodem lib. cap. 3. § 5. sic ait : « Lombardus, cum necessi¬ tatem a coactione distinguere nesciret, per¬ nicioso errori materiam dedit. » At si Lom¬ bardus necessitatem a coactione distinguere nesciebat ; quomodo paulo ante pronuncia- vit, non ideo nos esse liberi arbitrii, quod ad malum et bonum vel agendum vel cogi¬ tandum peraeque polleamus, sed dumtaxat, quod coactione soluti simus? Idem quoque Calvinus in secundo libro adversus Pighium, disertis verbis pronunciat, se pro haeretico habitutum, si quis neget liberum arbitrium a coactione, modo non asserat liberum a necessitate. Ad eamdem sententiam accessisse videtur Alphonsus de Castro lib. ix. verbo libertas, tractans enim de libertate, unde dicitur li¬ berum arbitrium : « Est, inquit, libertas quae opponitur necessitati, vel, ut verius di¬ cam, coactioni. » Caeterum Alphonsus in eodem loco satis aperte indicat, se per coa¬ ctionem intclligere quamlibet determinatio¬ nem ad unum, dicit enim, hominem per libertatem a coactione posse facere et non facere, velle et non velle etc. Itaque solum in modo loquendi a communi sententia re- cessisse'videtur, quae est, ad liberum arbi¬ trium constituendum omnino requiri liber¬ tatem a necessitate, neque sufficere a coa¬ ctione.